US Commission during Crimean War

takerma

Banned
In 1856 United states sent a commission of 3 officers to study the war. They managed to obtain letters of introduction from British but not from French. After a long detour in Russia(to inspect Krondstadt defences and get permission to enter Russian camp in Crimea) they finally managed to reach Sebastopol. However by that time city has fallen and they could only inspect fortifications, positions and such. They did not get chance to see any of the fighting in the actual war.

In general I found information about this to be hard to come by. There is and old thesis that has a summary of what happened http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133315.pdf . The three men were quite interesting. Mordecai retired to avoid serving on either side of the war, Delafiel published a book on European Art of war in 1854, 55, 56 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133315.pdf (I am planning to read it), third was General McClellan(captain at the time), the one and only.

Often people call ACW as the first "modern" war and yet in Crimea almost everything that we see in ACW happened already, at least on tactical level. In the period in between seems like a lot of could be done to reform training and organization of the army. What we see even at Gettysburg seems like it was already obsolete in Crimea, range at which rifle fire is effective. Advancing in closed order, field fortifications etc

I am curious if anyone written or explored a TL where commission is sent earlier. Perfect time would be 1854 to be with the Allied landing in Crimea and see full extent of war and siege of Sebastopol. Be present at Alma and after? Seem like it could have massive impact on US and beginning stages of ACW.

Other possibility is one of the generals who joined the Confederates being present on the commission. Delafiel book was apparently suppressed because it was feared that it would be used by Confederates. What if someone who later joined Confederacy was sent in his place?

If someone knows about good things to read not the topic please feel free to share as well.
 
In 1856 United states sent a commission of 3 officers to study the war. They managed to obtain letters of introduction from British but not from French. After a long detour in Russia(to inspect Krondstadt defences and get permission to enter Russian camp in Crimea) they finally managed to reach Sebastopol. However by that time city has fallen and they could only inspect fortifications, positions and such. They did not get chance to see any of the fighting in the actual war.

In general I found information about this to be hard to come by. There is and old thesis that has a summary of what happened http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133315.pdf . The three men were quite interesting. Mordecai retired to avoid serving on either side of the war, Delafiel published a book on European Art of war in 1854, 55, 56 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133315.pdf (I am planning to read it), third was General McClellan(captain at the time), the one and only.

Often people call ACW as the first "modern" war and yet in Crimea almost everything that we see in ACW happened already, at least on tactical level. In the period in between seems like a lot of could be done to reform training and organization of the army. What we see even at Gettysburg seems like it was already obsolete in Crimea, range at which rifle fire is effective. Advancing in closed order, field fortifications etc

I am curious if anyone written or explored a TL where commission is sent earlier. Perfect time would be 1854 to be with the Allied landing in Crimea and see full extent of war and siege of Sebastopol. Be present at Alma and after? Seem like it could have massive impact on US and beginning stages of ACW.

Other possibility is one of the generals who joined the Confederates being present on the commission. Delafiel book was apparently suppressed because it was feared that it would be used by Confederates. What if someone who later joined Confederacy was sent in his place?

If someone knows about good things to read not the topic please feel free to share as well.


I doubt it would have made any difference. Generals- heck, maybe humans in general- don't see what
they don't want to see. In this case, Civil War generals were so entranced by the vision of re-living
Waterloo & winning the war in one big smashing battle that they ignored ANY & ALL evidence showing
that the fire of guns, of the defense in war, now made this impossible. So IOTL during the Civil War
generals of both the North & South kept ordering grand assaults against entrenched positions which
were always bloodily repulsed(for example, Burnside @ Fredericksburg, 1862, Lee @ Gettysburg, 1863, & Grant @ Cold Harbor, 1864). Fifty years later European generals did the same ghastly thing, on an
even larger scale. They had the example of TACW before them, not to mention reports on that con-
flirt filed by observers sent by the various European powers. But all this evidence was ignored(is this
why Clemenceau snapped that war was too important to be left to the generals?)
 

takerma

Banned
I doubt it would have made any difference. Generals- heck, maybe humans in general- don't see what
they don't want to see. In this case, Civil War generals were so entranced by the vision of re-living
Waterloo & winning the war in one big smashing battle that they ignored ANY & ALL evidence showing
that the fire of guns, of the defense in war, now made this impossible. So IOTL during the Civil War
generals of both the North & South kept ordering grand assaults against entrenched positions which
were always bloodily repulsed(for example, Burnside @ Fredericksburg, 1862, Lee @ Gettysburg, 1863, & Grant @ Cold Harbor, 1864). Fifty years later European generals did the same ghastly thing, on an
even larger scale. They had the example of TACW before them, not to mention reports on that con-
flirt filed by observers sent by the various European powers. But all this evidence was ignored(is this
why Clemenceau snapped that war was too important to be left to the generals?)

Perhaps. Thing is to win you have to attack, question is how? Take example of Burnside at Fredericksburg. On the Left Union could have achieved a breakthrough. But opportunity was wasted. Even the crazy frontal assault after, imagine those troops were ordered to attack in loose order and had necessary training to fire from distances that actually used the precision of the minie ball. Lots is written how rifled muskets changed everything but in reality most of these battles were fought at ranges where smooth bore is just as good, probably because most of the troops really were not capable of hitting anything beyond that range.

In their report one of the things they mention is that most troops were using smooth bores in Crimean war. This is true for Russian army, however most British if not all were equipped with minie ball rifles. This seems like a bit oversight perhaps based on who they met after the city has failed already, hard to say.

I think Alma in particular could have had effect on McClellan, here was example of attacking entrenched enemy, being able to route him. Yet failing to pursue. He was the one responsible for building Army of the Potomac. He had full power to institute training that focused on precision shooting and change tactical doctrine for attacking in open order for example. It could have also have pushed him to be more aggressive?

Also I think WW1 is a bit of a different beast. Western Front was not the only front after all. In the east things played out quite differently. ACW did not have machine-guns and machine-gun is really what changed the firepower equation I think. That could have been learned perhaps from the Russo-Japanese war, but to be honest I don't know enough to say.
 
I doubt it would have made any difference. Generals- heck, maybe humans in general- don't see what
they don't want to see. In this case, Civil War generals were so entranced by the vision of re-living
Waterloo & winning the war in one big smashing battle that they ignored ANY & ALL evidence showing
that the fire of guns, of the defense in war, now made this impossible. So IOTL during the Civil War
generals of both the North & South kept ordering grand assaults against entrenched positions which
were always bloodily repulsed(for example, Burnside @ Fredericksburg, 1862, Lee @ Gettysburg, 1863, & Grant @ Cold Harbor, 1864). Fifty years later European generals did the same ghastly thing, on an
even larger scale. They had the example of TACW before them, not to mention reports on that con-
flirt filed by observers sent by the various European powers. But all this evidence was ignored(is this
why Clemenceau snapped that war was too important to be left to the generals?)

Later European Generals were working off the evidence of the German Wars of Unification (1864, 1866 & 1870), the Russo Japanese War and the 20th Century Balkan Conflicts. All of which said that war worked as an instrument of national policy, and could be won with a sufficient application of the correct factors.
The ACW was largely considered outdated and irrelevant, and it almost certainly was. Although the trappings of modern war could be seen in the conflict they were no less present in later conflicts and as the civil war lacked many of the elements to be found in WW1 using it as any sort of guide would be extremely naïve and dangerous.
The wars fought by Prussia in pursuit of a United German Empire are contemporary with the ACW and far more important in terms of tactics and strategy. They contained all that could be found in the ACW and more!

If war is a far too serious business to be left to soldiers, then politicians are the last people who should be allowed anywhere near it.
 
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