Yeah. Mind you, that's likely South Carolina be the rest of the US, so it should be short and definitive.
Edit: or SC be vs the North with much of the South standing on the sidelines. Still be short.
One caution on this "South Carolina would be isolated" business:
As long as the issue was nullification due to the tariff, SC
was pretty isolated. The theory of nullification --that a state had the right to nullify a US law
and stay in the Union was overwhelmingly rejected outside SC. And while most of the South was anti-tariff, there were exceptions--LA was strongly protectionist (sugar)--and even the pro-free-trade South generally was not as obsessed with tariffs as SC was. And of course in 1833 the President was a Southerner and a slaveholder.
However, once SC seceded--especially if it seemed that the North was showing an unwillingness to compromise on the tariff--it might be considerably less isolated in the South. As William Freehling noted in
The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854: Volume 1, many southerners who did not believe in the right of nullification did believe in the right of secession (and thought that it might someday be necessary if the abolitionists got too powerful): "Many states' righters beyond Carolina, while repudiating Nullifiers' notion of living under a government and vetoing its laws, affirmed each state's right to secede and form another government. Southern states' righters especially believed erring slaveholding brothers must be allowed peacefully to leave the Union."
https://books.google.com/books?id=iqdoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA281 Even Marin Van Buren warned Jackson against including a denunciation of the right of secession in the Proclamation on Nullification, lest it cost Jackson support in VA and elsewhere. And indeed, "The Virginia legislature, even while sending Leigh to stop South Carolina from nullifying, affirmed that any state could legally secede." Ibid. Freehling also notes:
"Southern restiveness with a not-enough-states’-rights Jackson was illustrated in an early senatorial confrontation on Jackson’s so-called Force Bill. That bill, reflecting Jackson’s strategy, authorized new ways to enforce the tariff, without force if possible and with more federal troops if necessary. Fifteen of the 24 senators from slaveholding states voted unsuccessfully to table discussion of possible military coercion. The roll call revealed a South split in its usual way. Thirteen of 16 Deep and Middle South senators voted to table the Force Bill. Only two of eight Border South senators concurred.
27
"The vote signaled that in the more southern South, support for Jackson was none too hard. While Southrons applauded Jackson’s insistence that states’ rights did not justify nullification, they squirmed at Jackson’s notion that states’ rights did not justify secession. Their selective cheering could land them in Calhoun’s camp, if war broke out over secession rather than nullification. Wishing to avoid that debacle, they sought to lower the tariff before state veto led to disunion..."
https://webcache.googleusercontent....ion-volume-i/16.php+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
In spite of this, there would be far more southern support for the Union in case of war than there was in 1861--in particular, the loyalty of Tennessee would not even be in question. But SC might not be as isolated as is sometimes thought, which is one reason there was so much pressure to make some concessions to her on the tariff to give her a graceful way to avoid confrontation.