I think to get a better US LMG in that interwar period, you need to get US Army doctrine move off the idea that the individual US infantryman is an innate marksman and bayonet expert, overpowering all in their path. The uber Sgt York, if you will. (Ok, that's hyperbole, but that underlying concept played a role in having the M1 Garand as the squad weapon of preference). The US experience as late arrivals on the WW1 battlefield and Pershing (and his disciples) believed in that model of soldier. They were largely using 1914 tactics into late 1917 and early 1918. Pershing's Army and Corps level commanders succeeded him at the top command levels after the war and again, largely held to that mind set. The often maligned Big Mac (for all of his flaws) was NOT a Pershing guy, but he had to work within that chain of thought to some extent.
Have the US Army leadership learn different lessons from WW1 - take your pick on whether its following British, French (who did most of the US Infantry's training), or the Germans small unit tactics. Maybe the biggest battlefield opportunity missed was having US troops work under the Australian Gen Monash for much longer.
All of that is preamble to getting the US brain trust working on a different path for how Army and Marine small unit tactics are shaped in the interwar years. That would give you a reason to change the equipment selected.