And preferably displace the Democrats in the North. There is a reason I like Seward, he was popular among immigrants due to his pro-migrant position as Governor of NY. He would have kept the GOP competitive in immigrant vote.Maybe said alt-Liberal Republicans could be longer-lasting with the post-civil war political divide being between moderate and radical wings of the Republicans?
I'm not sure I can agree with this. As his track record goes, his time as a corps commander was mixed. He is quite aggressive, but I think he has a tendency to micromanage, which is noted in Charles Wainwright's diary. At Fredericksburg, Meade's messenger, who was asking for reinforcements to support Meade's breakthrough, couldn't find Reynolds because Reynolds was helping artillerymen fire on the enemy. At Chancellorsville, he was not really engaged. At Gettysburg, he showed great attention to detail, but his riding with the Iron Brigade into action was beneath his responsibility. As a wing commander, he shouldn't have been charging with the boys when he could have been calling for reinforcements and selecting new positions as new units arrived. Had he survived, he could have used his authority to order Sickles and Slocum to move to Gettysburg early. In fact, he did order Sickles to go to Gettysburg, but the latter hesitated when he heard no further instructions.
Reynolds was apparently offered the command of the Army of the Potomac after the Battle of Chancellorsville but declined when Lincoln wouldn't guarantee him freedom from politics.
Wha- What about Horatio G. Wright? The guy who led Sheridan's infantry, the commander who broke Lee's line at Petersburg with a complex column formation?I'm open to debate on the claim, because I know the limits of my familiarity with all of the AotP generals in question. In broad strokes - as I think most of us know well enough - it's a field of mediocrity or worse, so it's a relatively short list for "the best." I'm certainly open to arguments for Hancock...and perhaps even Humphreys.
I will gladly admit that Reynold understood that the volunteers were not regulars and needed personal leadership to really get them to work. That served him very well as a brigade/division commander. However, I still do find his record as corps commander to be mixed.actually don't disagree that he seems to have had a non-delegation streak, though I think it's more understandable, and even at times a virtue, in the context of a hastily assembled citizen, non-professional army. There are things you can take for granted with a professional army that you cannot with the Union Army as it mostly existed in 1861-65, even in its late stages, given the paucity of trained NCO's and junior officers.
I will heartily admit that Franklin was largely at fault for the failed assault, but that doesn't excuse Reynolds for neglecting Meade's progress. When Meade and John Gibbon broke the Southern lines at Fredericksburg, Reynolds was "worrying the artillery about ephemeral details" as Fredericksburg historian Francis A. O’Reilly says. In a letter to his wife, Meade censured Reynolds for failing to support him, which allowed the Rebels to counterattack and close the breach.To take up the specific points: At Fredericksburg I'm inclined to the majority view that the failure was Franklin's, not Reynolds - it was really Franklin's responsibility at the end of the day, regardless of where Reynolds should have been at that moment.
Fair enough.At Chancellorsville Reynolds can hardly be blamed for Hooker's erratic management of his corps - first sent to cross the Rapahannock at Fredericksburg, then suddenly rushed all the way back to join Hooker's main force (but too late to accomplish much of anything in it).
Ok, I'll defend Meade from this jab. As a commander of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division, Meade fought aggressively and displayed valor. As the commander of the V Corps, he saw the folly of Hooker's actions and took the initiative to protect the Army of the Potomac's supply route after the collapse of XI Corps. Meade was the one who proposed counterattacking with I and V Corps, which was rejected by Hooker.I am not prepared to say that Reynolds was quite, say, Lee's equal; but I think he was what the Army of the Potomac needed. The urgent need for aggressiveness was one he could supply, with a balance of other necessary virtues often absent from his colleagues (like, uh, Meade). As Morris Schaff observed, "Its early commanders had dissipated war's best elixir by training it into a life caution, and the evil of that schooling it had shown on more than one occasion." It would not be until the Appomattox Campaign that that life of caution was really beaten out of it, though that was as much by attrition as it was Grant's and Sheridan's driving leash.
While I will acknowledge that Meade should have replaced Pleasanton for Cavalry Corps commander, I would like to point out that because of Lincoln's orders, Meade had to move east of South Mountain. Such a route is not only longer, but more exhausting. That's 7 infantry corps, 1 cavalry corps, all its artillery and all of its wagon trains moving over a limited road network. Moreover, Lee was retreating to his supply base while Meade was moving was away from his. Meade had ordered the rear areas of his army cleared of obstruction during the battle; this facilitated the rapid movement of troops on interior lines, but didn't aid the pursuit. There's a myriad of logistical factors that hampered Meade, some covered in Kent Masterson Brown's work on the retreat from Gettysburg. If you think Meade could have defeated Lee at Williamsport, see the after action reports of both sides. Just about everyone on the field admitted that Meade made the right call of not attacking Lee's fortified position.Still, I don't think he can avoid some criticism for his slowness in following Lee hard to Falling Waters in the retreat from Gettysburg: Yes, many of his units were horribly mangled; but four of his corps (including the largest, VI Corps) and his cavalry corps had barely been scratched - that's 40,000-45,000 troops right there. And given how much worse shape Lee was in, that would have been enough to inflict serious harm on the rear elements of the ANV, if pushed aggressively.
Meade's mistake of putting French in the lead is indefensible. However, I think we should instead praise Meade for having the moral courage to call off an attack on Lee's fortified line rather than re-enact Fredericksburg. While you say that Lee has been weakened, I ask that you don't forgot that Meade has lost XI and XII Corps to Chattanooga and had just 69,000 troops for the Mine Run campaign. Pitting 69,000 troops against 48,000 in fortified positions is nothing to scoff at. If anything, Meade successfully escaped Lee's trap for him and left Lee disappointed.Similarly, Mine Run remains a rather underwhelming display of the one time Meade actually initiated an offensive of his own. It was a decent plan in conception, but poor in execution. Some of that's on French, who Meade was ready (with justice) to flay alive; but then, we're left to wonder why he put French rather than Sedgwick in the lead on the right flank in the first place. In any event, Meade seems to have had no Plan B agaunst Lee, who was down to only 48,000 men of all arms at that point; nor does he seem to have factored the weather (or his shortage of bridging equipment) into his plan, either. With Longstreet's corps out of the picture, it was a missed opportunity.
The main thing I know about Reynolds' politics is that he was offered command of the Army of the Potomac after Chancellorsville, but refused to accept it unless he was given a free hand and allowed to ignore political influences from Washington. Lincoln was unwilling to countenance what amounted to a suspension of the military's subordination to civilian authority, so he gave the job to Meade, who had no such quibbles. In my opinion, the main sticking point was that Reynolds had seen the Army of the Potomac relegated to political generals (McClellan and Burnside primarily, and Hooker to an extent) with such disastrous results that he just wanted the politicians to butt out and let the soldiers get on with the war. Which simply wasn't feasible, because the Army of the Potomac was unavoidably a political army, if only by virtue of it's proximity to Washington. In addition to which, I wouldn't be surprised if Reynolds had a consummate professional's impatience with amateurs, which would doubtless inform his request to be cut loose of any armchair strategists in Washington.
Since you wanna avoid Hancock becoming a political figure post war why not have him take command but die during what I hope is the armys pursuit of a defeated Lee?
1. Your assessmentthat Reynolds was a basically apolitical Democrat lines up with everything I have read about him.
2. I do think your concern is well founded, and I have the suspicion he would turn down the job if those requirements were imposed.
As his track record goes, his time as a corps commander was mixed. He is quite aggressive, but I think he has a tendency to micromanage, which is noted in Charles Wainwright's diary.
Maybe said alt-Liberal Republicans could be longer-lasting with the post-civil war political divide being between moderate and radical wings of the Republicans?
Well, I'm not as concerned about Reynolds position on abolitionists. In this timeline the south is clearly the aggressor and despite his closeness to the Buchanan Administration Reynolds would probably see Buchanan as the poor cousin who never seems to get his act together. even if Reynolds is more neutral, a pox on both their houses kind of thing, he would definitely not see abolitionists as the main problem.
Would he be radicalized enough to do the things needed? That depends on what he has seen in the course of the war. He will have seen successful black units and realize that they are quite capable soldiers and will have seen some of the horrible suffering. Any atrocities committed during Lee's attack will enhance this.
The issue is whether Reynolds is more like Grant (started considering abolitionists as agitators and grew to become a strong defender of Black rights) or Sherman (who, from what I know, maintained his racism to the end and beyond yet was willing to engage in a hard war). I'd be okay with him being something of an Eastern Sherman, although it seems that he was never as contemptuous of Blacks as Sherman was. My question is, then, would it be realistic for Reynolds to see all these events and decide to engage in hard war even if he never becames an egalitarian?
Hopefully a better remembrance in history then OTL given how willing he was to work with the Republicans post-warAlso what will happen to Longstreet?
This blog I found raises some concerns regarding Reynold's performance. What do think of this?
But to get back to Red's timeline: I still doubt that Reynolds is then man you want for a really hard war. I think there are some bright lines he would not have crossed.
Where would the Democratic machines (like Tammany Hall) go? Republicans or Liberals?I like that. I would like to see a North with Liberals and Republicans and a South with redeemers, new departure (roughly Liberal) and Republicans. This would isolate those who want a return to full on White Supremacy and take the edge off the political assault against Reconstruction. Basically, make Northerners accept Reconstruction as a fait accompli and any Southern attempt to overturn it as a criminal measure they cannot accept.
Just wanting to point this potential option out again since it seems to have been overlooked.Hey wait a second what about Sheridan? If you find a way for him to become the hero of the war you get a capable general who would be willing to go through with Reconstruction!
Actually it was that blog that caused me to question Reynolds' overall performance. That said, I do still think well of Reynolds. Like Meade, he was eager to fight the enemy. When Reynolds agreed with Buford to fight at Gettysburg, he still took the bigger picture into account. He contacted Meade about his decision at Gettysburg, ordered Howard's XI Corps to come up and support him as well as Sickles' III Corps (unfortunately Sickles vacillated for 3 hours after receiving Reynolds' orders). His attention to detail was pretty key in determining the early fight. It is, however, plausible that Reynolds may make mistakes by choosing to focus on a certain situation when a distant part of the line is under threat.This blog I found raises some concerns regarding Reynold's performance. What do think of this?
Sheridan is pretty junior at this point of the war. He's commanding a division commander in the Army of the Cumberland. To jump a junior division commander to an army commander would have officers spitting flames.Hey wait a second what about Sheridan? If you find a way for him to become the hero of the war you get a capable general who would be willing to go through with Reconstruction!