Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War
- Thread starter Red_Galiray
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Many of those closest to him described him as almost implausibly good-hearted, magnanimous, kind, and empathetic. Frankly it was a recurring (if not major) political inconvenience. People who knew him a little less well couldn't wrap their heads around such a person ever making The Hard But Necessary Decisions, and so were surprised by him again and again.
Mary Todd Lincoln.... She was probably an asset for his prodigious ambitions, and he clearly loved and was loyal to her, but yikes.
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Bookmark1995
Banned
Hilariously, Cracked compared Abraham Lincoln to the President from Idiocracy in a really interesting article.
Yes, that President from Idiocracy.
But the comparison was done in a oddly plausible way. The article said something like this:
1. Both Lincoln and Camacho were magnanimous people by the standards of their era. Lincoln was described as a gentleman by 19th century standards, while Camacho, by the standards of his time, seems like a pretty fun guy to be around. By our standards, he's a lout, but he's merely a product of the era he is living in.
2. Both Lincoln and Camacho had a love for their nation that borders on religious, which give one strength and hope in a period of crisis.
3. Lincoln and Camacho were humble enough to welcome people who were smarter than them into their inner circle. Lincoln was willing to tolerate rivals as long as they gave him good counsel and ideas, and was able to lead his nation through a period of violence and division. When faced with a dustbowl, Camacho not only welcomed Joe into his cabinet and gave him the power to implement his ideas, but helped Joe become the next President.
Goddamn it, we need Lincoln back in the body of Camacho. For obvious reasons, no assassin would dear kill this man.
Or maybe it was “the South Shall Rise Again?”
Sounds like he was a decent man. Maybe not quite radical enough to be completely on board with making America’s black populace fully equal citizens, but a good man by the standards of the time.
Yeah, that's why it annoys me when people compare Camacho to a certain POTUS that shall not be named, when they really have nothing in common.
Bookmark1995
Banned
I was referencing the racist Afrikaners from "Guns of the South."
For what's its worth, while he didn't properly connect with blacks as people, he was at least empathetic about their plight, having seen their suffering as a riverboat captain.
The fact that he could look past the prejudices of his time and see the suffering as unjust speaks well of him.
In my experience, the Camachos were often better people than I was. Sure, they didn't know state capitals or the names of Presidents, but they were often chill dudes who had a surprising amount of emotional intelligence and who gave me good advice about enjoying life and not putting on airs.
You can say many things about Camacho, but he was certainly not a phony. He didn't wave a Bible around and hide behind a veneer of religion, he didn't spent his days appeassing corporate shills, and he didn't spread toxic lies and BS to cover for any insecurities.
He may not have been smart, but at least he acknowledged he wasn't smart and got a man who was smart on the job.
Is he somebody you should emulate? Probably not. But there are qualities within him that many of those in power lack.
Sad things is the general attitude at the time would have prevented him from moving to full equality even if he wanted to. But at least he was willing to make some steps wwich allowed the rights for some which could then be expanded.
Bookmark1995
Banned
Considering the Radical Republicans were able to accomplish a lot, even with a hardcore racist in the executive branch, it is certainly possible that even if Lincoln had lived in OTL, their accomplishments might have been more permanent.
Again, Lincoln was a man with prejudices, but he was not a man consumed by them, and I can imagine if he lived long enough, he could've embraced full racial equality.
When social change happens, even the people who opposed it can come to accept it once they see society doesn't full apart.
Since I started reading this timeline during the Turtledoves, it's led me to complete Davis' Battle at Bull Run, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as commander in chief, and as of last week also Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. Thanks again, @Red Galiray
Of course it's also caused me to expand my library by more than 20 related or tangential histories and biographies, so if anything I'm losing ground.
I'm on the lookout for detailed criticism of Lincoln at the moment to contextualize things; both McPherson and Goodwin think very highly of the man. With some reason, obviously, but nevertheless.
Of course it's also caused me to expand my library by more than 20 related or tangential histories and biographies, so if anything I'm losing ground.
I'm on the lookout for detailed criticism of Lincoln at the moment to contextualize things; both McPherson and Goodwin think very highly of the man. With some reason, obviously, but nevertheless.
Well, I could offer several criticisms of Lincoln as commander-in-chief from my readings of the American Civil War. From Donald Stoker's "The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War", Lincoln deserves credit for understanding that he was an amateur and was a quick learner in war. That said, he had several criticisms of Lincoln's ability as commander-in-chief.
One of Lincoln's biggest weaknesses was his meddling with the upper command of the Army of the Potomac. Intentionally or not, he taught the AotP officers that intriguing against superior officers paid dividends, particularly Joe Hooker against Burnside, and McClellan against Scott. This resulted in a poisonous and politicized command climate in the Eastern theatre that seriously handicapped his generals, encouraged intrigue and dissent, and made the AotP highly dysfunctional and causes high turnover. One of the smartest things Grant did upon taking over was to immediately ban officers from going to D.C. without specific authorization from HQ.
Now it should be said that some of the interventions Lincoln made was on real strategic insight often, and he was often right over some of his generals, but overall his actions created a major problem in the eastern theater. Stoker notes that none of Lincoln's interventions in military affairs, barring emancipation, had a significant beneficial impact on the U.S. army's conduct of the war.
Another weakness notes that Lincoln's strategic insight was never truly imposed on his generals. Although Lincoln recognized the nature of the war better than most of his generals and Lincoln understood and liked the idea of a simultaneous advance long before Grant employed it in 1864, Lincoln only gave suggestions but never imposed it on his generals, most likely because of his doubt in his own military ability.
Furthermore, one criticism that I have read (unfortunately I don't quite remember the source) is that Lincoln held on to political generals for so long. By 1864, the (political) benefit to maintaining them had surely been outweighed by the military burden of their ineptitude. Yet Banks was still leading a pointless campaign into Louisiana, stealing veteran troops for Sherman needed for a descent on Mobile. In Virginia, the secondary armies were led by Franz Sigel and Benjamin Butler.
Grant warned Lincoln of Banks' lack of talent, which was ignored. Butler's failings were well known and Sigel was held by Halleck with utter contempt, which was communicated to Grant. If Lincoln had been willing to fully commit to Grant's campaigns and let him place better men in command of these armies, I'm willing to bet that the 1864 election would have gone smoothly. Instead, these particular political generals were a major drag on military success in 1864, and in fact majorly contributed to the fact that Lincoln's reelection was in danger at all.
On another specific note, Lincoln almost torpedoed the Vicksburg Campaign by giving McClernand independent command in Grant's department because he was friends with McClernand. This was in direct contradiction of Grant's authority as department commander in that region; the presence of separate forces under rival commanders trying to compete for the glory of taking Vicksburg, rather than working together, could only spell disaster. Fortunately, Halleck, who hated McClernand more than Grant, promptly informed Grant that he had authority over all forces in his department, including McClernand's. Thanks to Sherman's suggestion to McClernand to besiege Arkansas Post, Grant was able to incorporate McClernand's command into his army before McClernand dragged his and Sherman's forces into Arkansas.
Bookmark1995
Banned
Hmm....
Could there be some kind of POD where Lincoln had been more competent in his choice of General to fight against the Army of Northern Virginia?
Could this army have routed Lee and possibly captured Richmond as early as 1862?
@Red_Galiray I don't know if you've read it, but I've heard good things about the graphic novel Battle Lines (https://arikelman.org/books/battle-lines/).
in his own time he said he was okay with white man marrying black woman [but only said so in private ] and voting rights for black veterans and the educated. which as an author pointed out [i think Michael Burlingame]would be an easy thing to translate to full voting rights and he probably knew that.
so I give it 5 years of reconstruction before he's around equal to a modern person.
on a side note burilagames muilt volume biography is the source for my claims and is found for free unedited and with authors approval here
[https://www.knox.edu/about-knox/lincoln-studies-center/burlingame-abraham-lincoln-a-life]
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Honestly speaking, given how unprepared the U.S. Army officers were for large war-time commands, the fact that there was, by 1863, a capable set of generals is a surprise. Lincoln's options for generals were often limited and seemed justified in context. For McClellan, it seemed like a no-brainer to bring over the only Union general to actually win a campaign over retaining McDowell, the loser of 1st Bull Run. For Burnside, Burnside was successful in the North Carolina expedition and was a genuinely likeable individual - hard working, intelligent and humble (very much unlike McClellan or Hooker). For Hooker, his combat record was quite stellar and he was closely aligned with the Republicans. For Meade, his solid combat record and the fact that all the senior generals respected made him a good pick if Reynolds declined.
An aspect of Lincoln I forgot to give praise for Lincoln is his willingness to replace generals - it took the better part of 2 years of failure for Jeff Davis to finally let Bragg go. For the Army of the Potomac to have a more solid commander to fight the Army of Northern Virginia, it might be best to start from the beginning. When it came to choosing the Army of the Potomac's commander (then named the Army of Northeastern Virginia vs the Confederate Army of the Potomac), it was really anyone's game.
Winfield Scott recommended Colonel Joseph K.F. Mansfield (the XII Corps commander killed at Antietam), but Lincoln supposedly regarded him as too old. Secretary of War Simon Cameron, Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase and Ohio governor William Dennison lobbied for Major Irwin McDowell, which was a very unhappy choice for the U.S. Army regular officers. An interesting choice might have been Bvt. Col. Charles F. Smith, Grant's mentor and an overall capable officer. C.F. Smith was briefly in command of Washington D.C.'s defenses after Fort Sumter was fired upon. Unfortunately, Smith was replaced and reassigned away from a combat post due to rumors of drunkenness from correspondents irritated by his unwillingness to divulge classified information and some questioned his connections with Southern officers.
As for the challenge of Virginia in 1862, it should be said that there was a window of opportunity to defeat the Confederate army in Virginia in detail. Although Confederate forces totalled to 73,000 men against the Army of the Potomac's 120,000 men, the Confederates were very dispersed.
- Joseph Johnston's main army of 37,000 men along the Rappahannock
- Benjmain Huger had 13,000 men at Norfolk
- John B. Magruder commanded 12,000 men at Yorktown
- Stonewall Jackson's 5,000 men opposed Banks at the Shenandoah Valley
- Three other detachments manning observation posts that totaled up to 6,000 men
Sidenote: another criticism I forgot to include is Lincoln's concern over Washington D.C.'s safety, which was supported by some military officers. General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the venerable military adviser to the War Department, warned that “possession by the enemy [even] for a short time would injure the cause of the country more than even the loss of many battles.” As such, the Army of the Potomac was sometimes constrained in their operations to shield Washington from Lee. The two best examples are the Peninsula and Gettysburg Campaigns.
In the former, during "Stonewall" Jackson's operations in the Valley, Lincoln and Stanton were concerned about Washington's safety to the point that McDowell's I Corps was diverted from the Peninsula to the Shenandoah Valley. It should be said that some blame falls on McClellan for failing to address Lincoln's concerns about the safety of the capital while the Peninsula Campaign was ongoing. There was no way for Jackson to attack Washington but because McClellan's counting of the forces actually defending Washington was rather liberal, Lincoln overreacted.
In the latter, Meade was constrained to carry out an indirect pursuit of Lee's forces, which involved an exhausting trek through the Catoctin Mountain and South Mountain ranges. This was because Washington D.C.'s garrison had been reduced below the limits of safety to reinforce the Army of the Potomac before the battle at Gettysburg. So even though Lee had no interest in attacking Washington, Lincoln and Halleck never gave permission for Meade to ignore the directive.
Bookmark1995
Banned
It really shocks me how precarious the Union's position really was, and how a few serious defeats could've weakened the Unionist effort to the point that many Americans might've given up on trying to keep the country together.
This gets even more ridiculous when you read about how weak the Confederacy was: it was laughably unindustrialized, technologically backward (aside from ironclad ships), had a lower population than the North, one-third of the population were slaves with no vested interest in the Confederacy's survival, an extremely weak sense of civic nationalism, an inept administrator in the executive branch, politicians too obsessed with states' rights to make the necessary sacrifices, and an unproductive legislature.
And yet, having a few competent generals nearly gave the Confederacy some chance of survival.
Now I will say that this statement does underestimate the Confederacy.
Yes, they were less industrialized than the north and indeed they lacked locally-sourced natural resources necessary to jump start an industrial economy. But what industry they had proved sufficient for a war-time industry, especially with the imported supplies of Europe and the leadership of Chief of Ordnance Josiah Gorgas. Tredegar Iron Works was transformed into a fountain of arms, cannon and other iron products and numerous arsenals and powder work popped up along the South with some aid from the rifle-making machinery stolen from the Harpers' Ferry Arsenal. The Confederacy never lost a battle due to a lack of arms or ammunition. That said, the weakness of Confederate industrialization was in its transportation and its agricultural produce, especially since the latter was close to the North-South border. It's often left out just how damaged Bragg's Army of Tennessee was due to logistic weakness and not the enemy's sword. Even if they could produce sufficient food, they couldn't bring it to the armies themselves as the war progressed.
As for technological backwardness, I never got the impression that the South was that technologically backwards. Their armies were armed with relatively modern rifle muskets. Their artillery was certainly inferior to that of the North, but I cannot think of a single battle the inferiority was significant that it decisively determined the outcome of the battle. The desperation of the Confederate situation also spurred the invention of torpedos (mines).
Something else to consider is the size of the Confederacy. IIRC its landmass is roughly equal to that of Western Europe and thus requires the dispersal of Northern manpower on garrison duty to protect lines of communication. If you look at the Vicksburg Campaign, despite the fact that Grant has a total strength of 150,000 in his department. The actual number of troops Grant used for the Vicksburg Campaign? 45,000. Incredibly, the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of McClernand's XIII, Sherman's XV, McPherson's XVII Corps, was equal to the XVI Corps garrisoning West Tennessee and Kentucky.
Ironically, the Confederate weakness in transportation was a massive disadvantage for the advancing Northern armies. The fact that there was usually one railroad to follow down South made it easier for Southern guerillas to harass Union lines of communication or for Southern armies to block their progress. In Northern Virginia, with the help of defensive terrain of wilderness, hills and rivers, Southern forces could always muster to block the Union advance. In the Western Theater, guerillas and cavalry raiders made the supply process for armies to be an immense challenge. It's easy to understand the frustration of the Northern population - not only is there a frightfully long list of casualties, but also the sense of futility in a war that's going nowhere. Sure they think the war is just, but what is the point of a just war if they're not winning it?
As for Jefferson Davis, it should be noted that the one thing he was arguably better at than Lincoln was mobilizing the Southern population and maintaining the strength of his armies. Davis' rather tyrannical decision to bind the Southern soldier to his post until the war was over was, for the armies at least, better than the 2-year, 3-year, 9-month and 100 days enlistment that the Lincoln administration used, especially in the Eastern Theater. After Chancellorsville, the Army of the Potomac's 2-year and 9-month enlistments expired and so 23,000 veterans went home just at the Gettysburg Campaign began. During the Overland Campaign, 1/3 of the Army of the Potomac's veterans refused to enlist again and were went home in the middle of the campaign, which led to some units attacking very weakly. That said, for the better performing Western armies, a good majority of them re-enlisted once more.
Bookmark1995
Banned
Man, this is a really good analysis.
You must've picked up dozens of books on the subject.
Being who I am, I've always found economics and production of war more interesting that actual battles sometimes.
In regards to transportation, I talked to someone once who maintained that if there was a single gauge railroad system connecting the state capitals of the 11 states of the confederacy that they would have "won" the war. While I'm not *certain* that would have been enough, I'm willing to at least consider it. (Having such a system exist, we agreed was probably ASB) ("won" in this case is pretty much any scenario that has an independent confederacy at the end).
Another thing to consider is the South's near-complete unwillingness to commit to any meaningful industrialization. The predominant Southern attitude of the time was that industry and manufacturing was a Yankee pasttime, and therefore inferior to the Southern Lifestyle and to be shunned. Many Southern businessmen, political leaders and (above all others) plantation owners and slave traders may have actively seen industrialization as a threat to slavery as an institution, and likely undermined attempts to introduce factories, mines, refineries and other industrial activity within the slave-holding states.
Bookmark1995
Banned
They say that racism is a self destructive ideology, but man oh man, the fact that Southern racism could be so self-destructive proves how much of aberration that flag ought to be.