Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War
- Thread starter Red_Galiray
- Start date
Ah, thank you for explaining it to me! I've never heard that expression before, so your meaning escaped me. But now that I understand it, I have to say it's pretty apt.
I'll watch those videos later, thank you! Perhaps I could find some obscure but capable general there.
Chapter 30: We're marching on to Richmond!
Ulysses S. Grant always felt more comfortable as a commander than as a politician. Consequently, he did not know how to defend himself against the virulent and unfair attacks the press unleashed after his failure to take Corinth. An army of “correspondents who wrote for partisan papers and weren’t overly scrupulous in their methods” invaded his headquarters, and subjected him to painful scrutiny at the national level, thus complicating the task of organizing a new campaign against Corinth. It seemed like the hero of Dover was to be replaced with the disgraced soldier of 1854.
The main reason behind these attacks is the appalling casualties the Union suffered at the battle of Corinth, and the persistent rumors that Grant had not been prepared to withstand the Confederate counterattack after the first day. Johnston had been greatly aided by just how defensive Corinth was, but it was true to a certain point that Grant’s overconfidence and his characteristic focus only on what he was going to do almost brought disaster. Certainly, Grant and his lieutenants bravely rallied back the men, trapping Johnston once again in Corinth. But the press little cared about this, preferring to tell sensational stories about Union soldiers bayoneted in their tents and maliciously printing rumors about Grant being drunk during the battle.
Ohio and Iowa politicians were specially outraged because many of their regiments had been in the middle of the fiercest fighting at Corinth, and thus those two states suffered high casualties. Grant and his staff claimed that soldier who had skedaddled and not even seen battle were the main culprits of these rumors. But Lieutenant Governor of Ohio Benjamin Stanton, after personally interviewing several soldiers, reported to the press that there was “a general feeling among the most intelligent men that Grant and Prentiss ought to be court-martialed or shot.” The young Whitelaw Reid, more interested in a good story than a factual reportage, printed a widely circulated account that engraved many of the Corinth mythos in the popular imagination, including images of Grant as a careless man who was sleeping at luxury headquarters during the battle and a suggestion that had Buell been there, the rebels would have been crushed.
Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, many also claimed that Grant had been drunk. Fortunately, his friends rallied to his defense, including the tireless Rawlins, and William Rowley, who told Washburne that “the man who fabricated the story is an infamous liar.” One of Grant’s old friends from Ohio said that Grant himself “spoke bitterly of being charged with drunkenness and denied that he had been drinking, said he had not drunk any for several years.” Overall, press coverage of the aftermath of Corinth was unfair and painful to Grant, who, to his credit, refused to censure the press. He limited himself to closing down treasonous papers and preventing the loyal press from reporting about future military movements, such as his new plans to take Corinth.
John A. Rawlins
A direct assault having failed, Grant laid siege on April 4th. Johnston’s last victory had done much to restore some of his reputation, which had been in tatters after Dover. With Washington back on Union hands, holding Corinth seemed more vital than ever, but once again circumstances were against the rebels, especially during a siege that promised to eventually force the rebels out due to fetid waters and the dangerous spread of diseases. Indeed, the supply of water was inadequate, and diseases such as typhoid or dysentery took out many soldiers and resulted in Corinth “becoming an ecological trap.” 40,000 dispirited and hungry rebels, who the harsh disciplinarian and heartily disliked Braxton Bragg referred to as "this mob we have, miscalled soldiers", were trapped within the pestilential town, and it seemed like soon more men would fall to disease than to Yankee bullets.
Grant’s soldiers were not having a pleasant time either. For one, their leader had wanted to renew the attack sometime in the future, stating that he could not see "how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed.” But Halleck ordered him to wait for more reinforcements from Buell, and to continue the siege. Such a strategy was perfectly sound according to the books of military theory that guided Halleck’s behavior, but it was not adequate for a harsh war. Also, the bluecoats found problems gathering water or defending themselves against the ruthless raiders commanded by Forrest and Morgan, who did everything they could to stop Union logistics and harass them. The siege developed in the hot days just before summer started in earnest, increasing the misery of those Yankee farm boys unused to a tropical climate or high temperatures.
Disease was the greatest killer of the war, accounting for around 2/3rds of fatalities. Though such a high rate has led some to proclaim the medical services of the Civil War an utter failure, as James McPherson points out, mortality due to disease during the Civil War was smaller when compared to the Mexican War and the Crimean War. In general, disease was so deadly because many of the men were farm boys who had never had contact with some viruses and who were now crowded with thousands of other soldiers, whose hygiene was often poor. The conditions of northern Mississippi during the spring and summer of 1862 made it especially fertile ground for disease, which had a major effect on the campaign.
Among the several diseases that affected both Billy Yank and Johnny Reb, measles and tonsillitis usually only forced the soldiers to lay down for a while, though sometimes they interrupted important military campaigns. On the other hand, smallpox, dysentery, typhoid and pneumonia “went through some regiments like a scythe.” Grant’s soldiers were especially affected by malaria – Sherman contracted it, for example. And while trapped in Corinth, almost a third of Johnston’s army came down with what was called the “evacuation of Corinth”, that is, diarrhea. Consequently, even if Halleck was right that a siege would be enough to force Johnston out through the deadly effect of disease, by the same token the siege also weakened Grant’s own force.
Halleck’s insistence on a siege has been interpreted as an expression of his fear that Grant was upstaging him. After all, previous to Corinth Grant had been one of the few Union generals to achieve clear-cut victories. With Lincoln’s trust in professional military men such as Halleck and McClellan shaken, Grant becoming the most celebrated hero of the Union seemed possible. Because of this, “Halleck pretended to be Grant’s champion while subtly stabbing him in the back”, often showing him no respect or consideration. Great controversy surrounds the debate of whether the siege of Corinth was actually an attempt by Halleck to finally end Grant’s military career, or if it was simply a reflection of Halleck’s meticulous and cautious generalship. In any case, it cannot be denied that Halleck used his influence as General in-chief to keep Grant from launching another attack on Corinth as he wanted.
Braxton Bragg
But even if direct action against Corinth was not undertaken at the moment, Union operations on the Mississippi continued. John Pope captured Island No. 10, but its small garrison had managed to scape to Fort Pillow, just fifty miles above Memphis. To defend this important stronghold, the rebels had around 40 guns and a “fleet of eight steamboats converted into armed rams.” The rebel navy managed to defeat its Union counterpart at Plum Run Bend, damaging two ironclads and causing the Southern captain to proclaim that the Yankees would “never penetrate farther down the Mississippi.”
Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Union river float soon obtained some rams as well. Partly inspired by the success of the CSS Virginia, Charles Ellet created a fleet of rams that could use steam power to pierce their enemies with reinforced prows which “could be far more lethal than any shot or shell then in existence”. After the Navy Department showed its lack of interest, Ellet went to Stanton, who approved his designs and send him to the Mississippi as a colonel. The Union river flotilla faced the Confederates at Fort Pillow on June 6th, 1862. The Union ships had the advantage of going downriver, which greatly increased their speed, but the soldiers at Fort Pillow supported their comrades with their 40 guns. The end result could be considered a draw, since Fort Pillow was still standing – but 4 out of 8 Confederate gunboats had been sunk, and 2 were badly damaged. It was clear that Fort Pillow would be unable to resist any other assault.
Meanwhile, the situation in Corinth was growing desperate. After nearly two months of siege and ravaged by disease and hunger, Johnston’s army had been weakened, and it was clear that trying to hold onto Corinth any longer would just be a senseless sacrifice. Grant, sensing the weakness of the rebels, wanted to go forward and attack again. However, Halleck against impeded this, and the delay that ensued as Halleck, Grant, Lyon, Stanton and Lincoln all contemplated the best course of action proved fatal. On June 5th, a courier arrived bringing news that a sullen Breckenridge had finally approved a withdrawal. At first, he had wanted to move to Memphis, but news of the battle of Fort Pillow arrived and changed his mind. Now judging Memphis another similar death trap, Johnston decided to leave for Tupelo, to the south of Corinth. The decision greatly displeased him, but, ultimately, he knew it was necessary for otherwise his army would have been overcome by disease.
On June 9th, Johnston pulled out of Corinth with admirably skill. Covered by the night, he managed to make preparations for his 35,000 surviving rebels to flee. Unfortunately, early the next day Grant caught columns of smoke that rose high to the sky, showing that the Confederates were destroying anything of military value and were going to retreat. Deciding to ignore the political squabbles that had held him back, Grant prepared his army to pursue Johnston and, hopefully, defeat him decisively this time. The action was, of course, a great political risk, especially because the pressure on Lincoln to remove Grant from command was increasing – during the debates over the best strategy to take Corinth, Lincoln had told Washburne that he was “annoyed to death by demands for his removal.” But Grant cared little about his ego or reputation. As soon as he could, he went forward to a battle other Union generals would not have dared to initiate.
On June 11th, Grant and his men caught Johnston at Kings Creek, near the small Booneville, roughly halfway between Tupelo and Corinth. A hilly area of dense forests, defensible terrain similar to that of Corinth, Kings Creek would have been a good place for making a stand had Johnston’s men been able to rest and fortify. But that was not the case. At least, they were not completely outnumbered, since Grant had not been able to bring to bear his full force, having needed to keep some 20,000 to guard his supply lines and patrol his rear. He still had numerical superiority, having 55,000 men to Johnston’s 35,000, but the rebels, even if tired and sick, had the defensive advantages of fighting on good terrain they knew well. Still, Grant attacked fiercely, something that the equally fierce Johnston welcomed.
The Battle of Kings Creek
The Blue and the Gray slugged it out in a battle that, in the words of one Dixie officer, “had nothing of glory or honor, but just ugly suffering.” Already cured of war thanks to the Battle of Corinth, soldiers of both sides went forward without any real enthusiasm, but still determined to win whatever the cost. The same kind of fighting madness that would possess Eastern soldiers at Anacostia just a few weeks after Kings Creek took hold of Grant’s and Johnston’s men, and soon enough the battle degenerated into a desperate and bloody struggle. At the end of the day, Johnston had to further wound his pride by retreating, this time successfully, to Tupelo. Grant’s troopers tried to pursue, but the superior rebel cavalry, including Forrest’s raiders, managed to hold him back. His tired troops were not capable of any more fighting anyway, and the Battle of Kings Creek, with around 3,000 casualties on each side, came to an end.
Kings Creek was not a real strategic success, since Johnston was retreating to Tupelo anyway, and Grant’s intervention did not destroy his army. But timing and optics both were key. Just one day after Kings Creek, Fort Pillow and Memphis were evacuated, their position now indefensible without Johnston at Corinth and with the Union flotilla still active. Again, they would have retreated anyway, since the real catalyst was Johnston leaving Corinth. But because this retreat came so soon after the battle, it seemed like Grant had forced them to. In less than two weeks, Union forces occupied Corinth, the critical rail junction, and Memphis, the Confederacy’s fifth largest city. Though usually overshadowed by Anacostia, a bigger battle on the more visible Eastern Front, there is proof that the victory at Kings Creek also influenced Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.
Historians critical of Grant, some as unfair as the reporters that attacked him following Corinth, have often argued that Kings Creek was no victory at all, but rather unnecessary butchery since Johnston was retreating anyway, and the Confederates soon managed to gather some 60,000 men in Tupelo and Vicksburg. Even if one could argue that it was no strategic victory, Kings Creek was definitely a personal victory for Grant, who once again became the darling of the press. “We have no better man”, one proclaimed, “than U.S. Grant, whose very name invokes warm patriotism on the people and chilling fear on the rebels.” Another added that “the whole nation will happily place their sincere trust on General Grant”.
At the same time that Kings Creek restored Lincoln’s confidence on Grant, it also eroded his opinion of Halleck, who, the President said, “broke down—nerve and pluck all gone—and has ever since evaded all possible responsibility.” On the Confederate side, Breckenridge is said to have reached his lowest point. Just a few weeks after, news came of the Emancipation Proclamation. “I fear our destruction will be assured if we don’t win any battles,” Breckinridge wrote, and he would also grimly comment that perhaps the Confederate experiment was about to end. Altogether, the President’s sagging morale was a faithful representation of the gloom that overtook the Southern people on the summer of 1862, when it seemed like Union victory was imminent.
Another Union success increased the despair of the Southerners. Towards the end of July, 1862, after recovering from his earlier failure to take New Orleans, Farragut came back. This time, he had the support of two fast Union ironclads, made after the design of the Monitor. The USS New York and USS Massachusetts supported his fleet and Burnside’s bluejackets as they descended once again on the important port, the biggest city of the Confederacy. The defenses of New Orleans had been greatly weakened by the need to hold Corinth – Bragg and his troops had been sent North to join Johnston, and the flotilla defeated by the Union at Fort Pillow was supposed to protect New Orleans. The rebels stacked their hopes on the ironclad CSS Louisiana, but like her sister the Virginia, the Louisiana was hard to maneuver and very slow.
Memphis during the Civil War
In July 29rd, after pounding the Confederate defenses for six entire days, Farragut sent two small gunboats that managed to cut the chain that held the port close. The Louisiana came to the rescue, as in last time, but before being sunk both gunboats had managed to create an opening. Farragut’s fleet steamed upriver and his two ironclads attacked the Confederate behemoth in what has been termed “the greatest fireworks display in American history”. The Louisiana finally ran aground and was blown up by her crew after many hours of battle. Their trump card defeated, the rebels scattered, clearing the way for Farragut’s ships to take the Crescent City. They had lost around 53 men, and almost 200 were wounded, but the Confederate mosquito fleet had been destroyed and the forts that were meant to protect the city were captured.
In August 1st, Farragut and his crew entered New Orleans. They found “a city filled with burning cotton and cursing mobs brandishing pistols against the eleven-inch guns trained on their streets.” According to the young George Washington Cable, the people “howled and screamed with rage” while a Yankee sailor “standing with lanyard in hand beside a great pivot-gun, so plain to view that you could see him smile, silently patted its big black breach and blandly grinned.” A rather petty series of negotiations followed as the Confederate authorities refused to officially surrender the city, and Farragut finally decided to send in the marines, who raised Old Glory over the public buildings. Military command of New Orleans was given over to Burnside, who, among other tasks, would have to enforce the Emancipation Proclamation – after all, New Orleans was still in rebel hands when it was issued.
By middle October, Farragut and his fleet had forced the surrender of Baton Rouge and Natchez, thus setting the stage for Grant to start a campaign against Vicksburg, now the last Confederate stronghold on the West. Protected by Johnston’s nearby army at Tupelo, Vicksburg defiantly refused to surrender when Farragut called on them to do so. "Mississippians don't know, and refuse to learn, how to surrender”, said the military governor of the city, “If Commodore Farragut . . . can teach them, let him come and try.” With more than two hundred guns and twenty-three mortars, and placed on a high buff that protected it from both land and naval forces, Vicksburg could not be conquered by Farragut’s ships alone. Since an “infantry assault up the bluffs from the river would be suicidal”, Grant and the Union forces would have to find a way to attack Vicksburg from its rear, “a knotty problem in strategy that the Union army would not solve for nearly a year.”
Nonetheless, few doubted that Grant would be able to easily and quickly subdue this “Gibraltar of the West”, and Union morale, late so low, started to climb, which made its later fall all the more painful. Still, victories at New Orleans and Kings Creek did much to reinvigorate the Union war effort and imbue the people with trust in the Lincoln Administration, which had been badly shaken by the strong conservative reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation. But if Grant and Farragut were accumulating victories in the West, the same could not be said of Buell and McClellan east of them.
Buell, at least, had several justifications for his delay. His troops were as ravaged by illness as Grant’s and Johnston’s were, and the “disastrously dry” summer of 1862 had dried up rivers that the Union desperately needed. In fact, one of the factors that kept Grant from continuing to pursue Johnston after Kings Creek was that he did not have enough water for his entire force. Continuous attacks by Confederate partisans represented a continuous threat to the rear of the Union armies, which had to detach large sections in order to hold them at bay. This was especially necessary because the dry summer made logistics almost completely dependent on rail transport. At the same time as Halleck obstructed Grant’s aggressive plans, he directed Buell and his 40,000 soldiers to move towards Chattanooga, in order to finally liberate East Tennessee.
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Battle of New Orleans
It quickly became clear that Buell was not the man for the job. In a McClellan-esque statement, he said that the true objective of the war was “not to fight great battles, and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces." Hesitant to march his army through the mountains of East Tennessee, Buell dithered until after Grant took Corinth. When he started his campaign against Chattanooga, advancing along the railway that connected it with Corinth, he moved at a snail’s pace. The ruthless rebel Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry kept harassing him, cutting off the railway that supplied him. But despite these attacks, Buell persevered on his belief that a soft war was the best way to earn the trust of civilians and stop attacks by partisans.
In September 5th, Halleck told Buell that "The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory and that you should move more rapidly.” But Buell was still mercilessly harassed by Confederates lead by Forrest and the able Kentuckian John Hunt Morgan, who “combined elements of Stuart's dash and Forrest's ferocity”. Time and time again, they attacked Buell’s supply lines, forcing him to divert divisions to futilely try and protect them, and slowing him down enormously. They could do this because they knew the territory well, and the people celebrated them as heroes, readily giving them supplies and refuge. This effectively meant that “rebel horsemen could strike at times and places of their own choosing”. Union posts proved very ineffective in the face of this style of warfare. Consequently, Buell’s campaign continued to advance slowly, while at Philadelphia Lincoln was losing his patience.
Breckinridge’s faith on Johnston was also evaporating. The fierce Johnston, aggressive as ever, proposed to leave around 30,000 men in Tupelo, where they could watch Grant, and take the other half of his force to Kentucky. The rebel commander and his main lieutenant, Braxton Bragg, had convinced themselves that another offensive-defensive stroke would be able to send the Union troops fleeing to the Ohio and earn the loyalty of the Kentuckians. An offensive into Kentucky, Bragg told Johnston, would allow them to liberate “our brothers and sisters of Tennessee and Kentucky” who had been rendered “bondmen and bondwomen of the abolition tyrant.” After restoring them “to the freedom inherited from their fathers”, they would presumably become fierce Confederates, adding their resources and manpower to the Southern cause.
However, Breckenridge had had enough of this aggressive behavior, which most of the time failed to gather any results except “making more orphans and widows.” Davis, too, believed that it was better to remain in the defensive for the moment, at least until the new Confederate draft could get in place and refill their ranks. Lee, brought in as Breckenridge’s new military advisor, placed little trust in a western offensive as well, though he already apparently was dreaming of a Napoleonic stroke in the East that could win the war. Either way, Breckinridge firmly refused to give Johnston the go ahead for his offensive against Kentucky, instead ordering him to hold Vicksburg with all his troops. When Johnston insisted, Breckinridge relented and allowed him to send Bragg with reinforcements to defend East Tennessee against Buell, but nothing more.
Nathan Bedford Forrest
Events also developed slowly in the East, where General McClellan was preparing for his invasion of Virginia. His strained relation with the administration and with elements within the Army of the Susquehanna did much to slow him down in the aftermath of Anacostia. Lincoln had managed to chastise McClellan slightly after he cashiered Major Key, but conflict still raged within the pro- and anti-McClellan factions of the Army. Porter, Franklin and Smith, all friends of McClellan who shared his vision, formed one faction, while Sumner, Hooker and Heintzelman formed the other. Even though the country, and McClellan and his supporters, celebrated the supposedly great victory at Anacostia, soon enough the anti-McClellan faction and their Radical Republicans allies raised bitter accusations of lost opportunities, obstruction, and even deliberate sabotage and disloyalty. The most vocal was Hooker, who believed that had McClellan and Porter supported his last assault, then the rebels could have been completely broken.
An incident punctuated the Administration’s lack of trust on McClellan. After retaking Harpers Ferry, McClellan organized an operation to supply the garrison there, under former Speaker of the House Nathaniel Banks, with provisions brough through the Ohio Canal. In a tragi-comic episode, the boats McClellan brought were too big to pass through. After Stanton informed an incredulous Lincoln, the president summoned McClellan himself to Philadelphia to irately question him. “Why in [tar]nation,” the President demanded, “couldn’t you have known whether a boat would go through that lock, before spending a million of dollars getting them there? I am no engineer; but it seems to me that if I wished to know whether a boat would go through a hole, or a lock, common sense would teach me to go and measure it.”
He then pointed out that “The general impression is daily growing that the Army does not intend to do anything. By a failure like this we lose all the prestige we gained by the liberation of Washington. I am grievously disappointed.” Despite this, Lincoln still allowed McClellan to go ahead with the Peninsula operation. A vote among the corps commanders of the Army of the Susquehanna produced an even four in favor four against, but Lincoln finally decided that he could not go back on his promise to allow McClellan to put his plan on operation without sparking a mutiny. The political situation was delicate, after all he had just issued the controversial Emancipation Proclamation, and, as he told Stanton, “We can’t reject it and adopt another without assuming all the responsibility in the case of the one we adopt.” The plan went ahead.
Lincoln did, nonetheless, impose some conditions before McClellan could leave for the peninsula. Though the capital would remain at Philadelphia, it was still necessary to defend Washington. After all, for it to again fall in rebel hands would be a great humiliation. Consequently, Lincoln ordered a force to remain at Washington. This McClellan took as a personal insult, and a military unsound disposition. McClellan believed that a skeleton force would be enough for protecting Washington, and that his Peninsula movement would force the entire Confederate command to confront him in order to protect Richmond. Still under the delusion that his was a campaign to capture Richmond and not one to defeat the rebel army, McClellan insisted that he needed all the men he could get.
The Peninsula Campaign begins
After preparing through July and August, McClellan and his Army boarded their ships at Annapolis, destined for Fort Monroe. If everything went according to plan, they would raise the Union flag over Richmond before Christmas. The General carried a letter from Lincoln saying that “it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow . . . You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty—that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place.” Lincoln was expressing his doubts of whether McClellan could succeed, but he finished the letter with a rather paternal note: “I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you…. But you must act.” But when McClellan and the Army of the Susquehanna arrived at Fort Monroe in September 15th, whether he would truly act remained to be seen.
The main reason behind these attacks is the appalling casualties the Union suffered at the battle of Corinth, and the persistent rumors that Grant had not been prepared to withstand the Confederate counterattack after the first day. Johnston had been greatly aided by just how defensive Corinth was, but it was true to a certain point that Grant’s overconfidence and his characteristic focus only on what he was going to do almost brought disaster. Certainly, Grant and his lieutenants bravely rallied back the men, trapping Johnston once again in Corinth. But the press little cared about this, preferring to tell sensational stories about Union soldiers bayoneted in their tents and maliciously printing rumors about Grant being drunk during the battle.
Ohio and Iowa politicians were specially outraged because many of their regiments had been in the middle of the fiercest fighting at Corinth, and thus those two states suffered high casualties. Grant and his staff claimed that soldier who had skedaddled and not even seen battle were the main culprits of these rumors. But Lieutenant Governor of Ohio Benjamin Stanton, after personally interviewing several soldiers, reported to the press that there was “a general feeling among the most intelligent men that Grant and Prentiss ought to be court-martialed or shot.” The young Whitelaw Reid, more interested in a good story than a factual reportage, printed a widely circulated account that engraved many of the Corinth mythos in the popular imagination, including images of Grant as a careless man who was sleeping at luxury headquarters during the battle and a suggestion that had Buell been there, the rebels would have been crushed.
Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, many also claimed that Grant had been drunk. Fortunately, his friends rallied to his defense, including the tireless Rawlins, and William Rowley, who told Washburne that “the man who fabricated the story is an infamous liar.” One of Grant’s old friends from Ohio said that Grant himself “spoke bitterly of being charged with drunkenness and denied that he had been drinking, said he had not drunk any for several years.” Overall, press coverage of the aftermath of Corinth was unfair and painful to Grant, who, to his credit, refused to censure the press. He limited himself to closing down treasonous papers and preventing the loyal press from reporting about future military movements, such as his new plans to take Corinth.
John A. Rawlins
A direct assault having failed, Grant laid siege on April 4th. Johnston’s last victory had done much to restore some of his reputation, which had been in tatters after Dover. With Washington back on Union hands, holding Corinth seemed more vital than ever, but once again circumstances were against the rebels, especially during a siege that promised to eventually force the rebels out due to fetid waters and the dangerous spread of diseases. Indeed, the supply of water was inadequate, and diseases such as typhoid or dysentery took out many soldiers and resulted in Corinth “becoming an ecological trap.” 40,000 dispirited and hungry rebels, who the harsh disciplinarian and heartily disliked Braxton Bragg referred to as "this mob we have, miscalled soldiers", were trapped within the pestilential town, and it seemed like soon more men would fall to disease than to Yankee bullets.
Grant’s soldiers were not having a pleasant time either. For one, their leader had wanted to renew the attack sometime in the future, stating that he could not see "how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed.” But Halleck ordered him to wait for more reinforcements from Buell, and to continue the siege. Such a strategy was perfectly sound according to the books of military theory that guided Halleck’s behavior, but it was not adequate for a harsh war. Also, the bluecoats found problems gathering water or defending themselves against the ruthless raiders commanded by Forrest and Morgan, who did everything they could to stop Union logistics and harass them. The siege developed in the hot days just before summer started in earnest, increasing the misery of those Yankee farm boys unused to a tropical climate or high temperatures.
Disease was the greatest killer of the war, accounting for around 2/3rds of fatalities. Though such a high rate has led some to proclaim the medical services of the Civil War an utter failure, as James McPherson points out, mortality due to disease during the Civil War was smaller when compared to the Mexican War and the Crimean War. In general, disease was so deadly because many of the men were farm boys who had never had contact with some viruses and who were now crowded with thousands of other soldiers, whose hygiene was often poor. The conditions of northern Mississippi during the spring and summer of 1862 made it especially fertile ground for disease, which had a major effect on the campaign.
Among the several diseases that affected both Billy Yank and Johnny Reb, measles and tonsillitis usually only forced the soldiers to lay down for a while, though sometimes they interrupted important military campaigns. On the other hand, smallpox, dysentery, typhoid and pneumonia “went through some regiments like a scythe.” Grant’s soldiers were especially affected by malaria – Sherman contracted it, for example. And while trapped in Corinth, almost a third of Johnston’s army came down with what was called the “evacuation of Corinth”, that is, diarrhea. Consequently, even if Halleck was right that a siege would be enough to force Johnston out through the deadly effect of disease, by the same token the siege also weakened Grant’s own force.
Halleck’s insistence on a siege has been interpreted as an expression of his fear that Grant was upstaging him. After all, previous to Corinth Grant had been one of the few Union generals to achieve clear-cut victories. With Lincoln’s trust in professional military men such as Halleck and McClellan shaken, Grant becoming the most celebrated hero of the Union seemed possible. Because of this, “Halleck pretended to be Grant’s champion while subtly stabbing him in the back”, often showing him no respect or consideration. Great controversy surrounds the debate of whether the siege of Corinth was actually an attempt by Halleck to finally end Grant’s military career, or if it was simply a reflection of Halleck’s meticulous and cautious generalship. In any case, it cannot be denied that Halleck used his influence as General in-chief to keep Grant from launching another attack on Corinth as he wanted.
Braxton Bragg
But even if direct action against Corinth was not undertaken at the moment, Union operations on the Mississippi continued. John Pope captured Island No. 10, but its small garrison had managed to scape to Fort Pillow, just fifty miles above Memphis. To defend this important stronghold, the rebels had around 40 guns and a “fleet of eight steamboats converted into armed rams.” The rebel navy managed to defeat its Union counterpart at Plum Run Bend, damaging two ironclads and causing the Southern captain to proclaim that the Yankees would “never penetrate farther down the Mississippi.”
Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Union river float soon obtained some rams as well. Partly inspired by the success of the CSS Virginia, Charles Ellet created a fleet of rams that could use steam power to pierce their enemies with reinforced prows which “could be far more lethal than any shot or shell then in existence”. After the Navy Department showed its lack of interest, Ellet went to Stanton, who approved his designs and send him to the Mississippi as a colonel. The Union river flotilla faced the Confederates at Fort Pillow on June 6th, 1862. The Union ships had the advantage of going downriver, which greatly increased their speed, but the soldiers at Fort Pillow supported their comrades with their 40 guns. The end result could be considered a draw, since Fort Pillow was still standing – but 4 out of 8 Confederate gunboats had been sunk, and 2 were badly damaged. It was clear that Fort Pillow would be unable to resist any other assault.
Meanwhile, the situation in Corinth was growing desperate. After nearly two months of siege and ravaged by disease and hunger, Johnston’s army had been weakened, and it was clear that trying to hold onto Corinth any longer would just be a senseless sacrifice. Grant, sensing the weakness of the rebels, wanted to go forward and attack again. However, Halleck against impeded this, and the delay that ensued as Halleck, Grant, Lyon, Stanton and Lincoln all contemplated the best course of action proved fatal. On June 5th, a courier arrived bringing news that a sullen Breckenridge had finally approved a withdrawal. At first, he had wanted to move to Memphis, but news of the battle of Fort Pillow arrived and changed his mind. Now judging Memphis another similar death trap, Johnston decided to leave for Tupelo, to the south of Corinth. The decision greatly displeased him, but, ultimately, he knew it was necessary for otherwise his army would have been overcome by disease.
On June 9th, Johnston pulled out of Corinth with admirably skill. Covered by the night, he managed to make preparations for his 35,000 surviving rebels to flee. Unfortunately, early the next day Grant caught columns of smoke that rose high to the sky, showing that the Confederates were destroying anything of military value and were going to retreat. Deciding to ignore the political squabbles that had held him back, Grant prepared his army to pursue Johnston and, hopefully, defeat him decisively this time. The action was, of course, a great political risk, especially because the pressure on Lincoln to remove Grant from command was increasing – during the debates over the best strategy to take Corinth, Lincoln had told Washburne that he was “annoyed to death by demands for his removal.” But Grant cared little about his ego or reputation. As soon as he could, he went forward to a battle other Union generals would not have dared to initiate.
On June 11th, Grant and his men caught Johnston at Kings Creek, near the small Booneville, roughly halfway between Tupelo and Corinth. A hilly area of dense forests, defensible terrain similar to that of Corinth, Kings Creek would have been a good place for making a stand had Johnston’s men been able to rest and fortify. But that was not the case. At least, they were not completely outnumbered, since Grant had not been able to bring to bear his full force, having needed to keep some 20,000 to guard his supply lines and patrol his rear. He still had numerical superiority, having 55,000 men to Johnston’s 35,000, but the rebels, even if tired and sick, had the defensive advantages of fighting on good terrain they knew well. Still, Grant attacked fiercely, something that the equally fierce Johnston welcomed.
The Battle of Kings Creek
The Blue and the Gray slugged it out in a battle that, in the words of one Dixie officer, “had nothing of glory or honor, but just ugly suffering.” Already cured of war thanks to the Battle of Corinth, soldiers of both sides went forward without any real enthusiasm, but still determined to win whatever the cost. The same kind of fighting madness that would possess Eastern soldiers at Anacostia just a few weeks after Kings Creek took hold of Grant’s and Johnston’s men, and soon enough the battle degenerated into a desperate and bloody struggle. At the end of the day, Johnston had to further wound his pride by retreating, this time successfully, to Tupelo. Grant’s troopers tried to pursue, but the superior rebel cavalry, including Forrest’s raiders, managed to hold him back. His tired troops were not capable of any more fighting anyway, and the Battle of Kings Creek, with around 3,000 casualties on each side, came to an end.
Kings Creek was not a real strategic success, since Johnston was retreating to Tupelo anyway, and Grant’s intervention did not destroy his army. But timing and optics both were key. Just one day after Kings Creek, Fort Pillow and Memphis were evacuated, their position now indefensible without Johnston at Corinth and with the Union flotilla still active. Again, they would have retreated anyway, since the real catalyst was Johnston leaving Corinth. But because this retreat came so soon after the battle, it seemed like Grant had forced them to. In less than two weeks, Union forces occupied Corinth, the critical rail junction, and Memphis, the Confederacy’s fifth largest city. Though usually overshadowed by Anacostia, a bigger battle on the more visible Eastern Front, there is proof that the victory at Kings Creek also influenced Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.
Historians critical of Grant, some as unfair as the reporters that attacked him following Corinth, have often argued that Kings Creek was no victory at all, but rather unnecessary butchery since Johnston was retreating anyway, and the Confederates soon managed to gather some 60,000 men in Tupelo and Vicksburg. Even if one could argue that it was no strategic victory, Kings Creek was definitely a personal victory for Grant, who once again became the darling of the press. “We have no better man”, one proclaimed, “than U.S. Grant, whose very name invokes warm patriotism on the people and chilling fear on the rebels.” Another added that “the whole nation will happily place their sincere trust on General Grant”.
At the same time that Kings Creek restored Lincoln’s confidence on Grant, it also eroded his opinion of Halleck, who, the President said, “broke down—nerve and pluck all gone—and has ever since evaded all possible responsibility.” On the Confederate side, Breckenridge is said to have reached his lowest point. Just a few weeks after, news came of the Emancipation Proclamation. “I fear our destruction will be assured if we don’t win any battles,” Breckinridge wrote, and he would also grimly comment that perhaps the Confederate experiment was about to end. Altogether, the President’s sagging morale was a faithful representation of the gloom that overtook the Southern people on the summer of 1862, when it seemed like Union victory was imminent.
Another Union success increased the despair of the Southerners. Towards the end of July, 1862, after recovering from his earlier failure to take New Orleans, Farragut came back. This time, he had the support of two fast Union ironclads, made after the design of the Monitor. The USS New York and USS Massachusetts supported his fleet and Burnside’s bluejackets as they descended once again on the important port, the biggest city of the Confederacy. The defenses of New Orleans had been greatly weakened by the need to hold Corinth – Bragg and his troops had been sent North to join Johnston, and the flotilla defeated by the Union at Fort Pillow was supposed to protect New Orleans. The rebels stacked their hopes on the ironclad CSS Louisiana, but like her sister the Virginia, the Louisiana was hard to maneuver and very slow.
Memphis during the Civil War
In July 29rd, after pounding the Confederate defenses for six entire days, Farragut sent two small gunboats that managed to cut the chain that held the port close. The Louisiana came to the rescue, as in last time, but before being sunk both gunboats had managed to create an opening. Farragut’s fleet steamed upriver and his two ironclads attacked the Confederate behemoth in what has been termed “the greatest fireworks display in American history”. The Louisiana finally ran aground and was blown up by her crew after many hours of battle. Their trump card defeated, the rebels scattered, clearing the way for Farragut’s ships to take the Crescent City. They had lost around 53 men, and almost 200 were wounded, but the Confederate mosquito fleet had been destroyed and the forts that were meant to protect the city were captured.
In August 1st, Farragut and his crew entered New Orleans. They found “a city filled with burning cotton and cursing mobs brandishing pistols against the eleven-inch guns trained on their streets.” According to the young George Washington Cable, the people “howled and screamed with rage” while a Yankee sailor “standing with lanyard in hand beside a great pivot-gun, so plain to view that you could see him smile, silently patted its big black breach and blandly grinned.” A rather petty series of negotiations followed as the Confederate authorities refused to officially surrender the city, and Farragut finally decided to send in the marines, who raised Old Glory over the public buildings. Military command of New Orleans was given over to Burnside, who, among other tasks, would have to enforce the Emancipation Proclamation – after all, New Orleans was still in rebel hands when it was issued.
By middle October, Farragut and his fleet had forced the surrender of Baton Rouge and Natchez, thus setting the stage for Grant to start a campaign against Vicksburg, now the last Confederate stronghold on the West. Protected by Johnston’s nearby army at Tupelo, Vicksburg defiantly refused to surrender when Farragut called on them to do so. "Mississippians don't know, and refuse to learn, how to surrender”, said the military governor of the city, “If Commodore Farragut . . . can teach them, let him come and try.” With more than two hundred guns and twenty-three mortars, and placed on a high buff that protected it from both land and naval forces, Vicksburg could not be conquered by Farragut’s ships alone. Since an “infantry assault up the bluffs from the river would be suicidal”, Grant and the Union forces would have to find a way to attack Vicksburg from its rear, “a knotty problem in strategy that the Union army would not solve for nearly a year.”
Nonetheless, few doubted that Grant would be able to easily and quickly subdue this “Gibraltar of the West”, and Union morale, late so low, started to climb, which made its later fall all the more painful. Still, victories at New Orleans and Kings Creek did much to reinvigorate the Union war effort and imbue the people with trust in the Lincoln Administration, which had been badly shaken by the strong conservative reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation. But if Grant and Farragut were accumulating victories in the West, the same could not be said of Buell and McClellan east of them.
Buell, at least, had several justifications for his delay. His troops were as ravaged by illness as Grant’s and Johnston’s were, and the “disastrously dry” summer of 1862 had dried up rivers that the Union desperately needed. In fact, one of the factors that kept Grant from continuing to pursue Johnston after Kings Creek was that he did not have enough water for his entire force. Continuous attacks by Confederate partisans represented a continuous threat to the rear of the Union armies, which had to detach large sections in order to hold them at bay. This was especially necessary because the dry summer made logistics almost completely dependent on rail transport. At the same time as Halleck obstructed Grant’s aggressive plans, he directed Buell and his 40,000 soldiers to move towards Chattanooga, in order to finally liberate East Tennessee.
Battle of New Orleans
It quickly became clear that Buell was not the man for the job. In a McClellan-esque statement, he said that the true objective of the war was “not to fight great battles, and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces." Hesitant to march his army through the mountains of East Tennessee, Buell dithered until after Grant took Corinth. When he started his campaign against Chattanooga, advancing along the railway that connected it with Corinth, he moved at a snail’s pace. The ruthless rebel Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry kept harassing him, cutting off the railway that supplied him. But despite these attacks, Buell persevered on his belief that a soft war was the best way to earn the trust of civilians and stop attacks by partisans.
In September 5th, Halleck told Buell that "The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory and that you should move more rapidly.” But Buell was still mercilessly harassed by Confederates lead by Forrest and the able Kentuckian John Hunt Morgan, who “combined elements of Stuart's dash and Forrest's ferocity”. Time and time again, they attacked Buell’s supply lines, forcing him to divert divisions to futilely try and protect them, and slowing him down enormously. They could do this because they knew the territory well, and the people celebrated them as heroes, readily giving them supplies and refuge. This effectively meant that “rebel horsemen could strike at times and places of their own choosing”. Union posts proved very ineffective in the face of this style of warfare. Consequently, Buell’s campaign continued to advance slowly, while at Philadelphia Lincoln was losing his patience.
Breckinridge’s faith on Johnston was also evaporating. The fierce Johnston, aggressive as ever, proposed to leave around 30,000 men in Tupelo, where they could watch Grant, and take the other half of his force to Kentucky. The rebel commander and his main lieutenant, Braxton Bragg, had convinced themselves that another offensive-defensive stroke would be able to send the Union troops fleeing to the Ohio and earn the loyalty of the Kentuckians. An offensive into Kentucky, Bragg told Johnston, would allow them to liberate “our brothers and sisters of Tennessee and Kentucky” who had been rendered “bondmen and bondwomen of the abolition tyrant.” After restoring them “to the freedom inherited from their fathers”, they would presumably become fierce Confederates, adding their resources and manpower to the Southern cause.
However, Breckenridge had had enough of this aggressive behavior, which most of the time failed to gather any results except “making more orphans and widows.” Davis, too, believed that it was better to remain in the defensive for the moment, at least until the new Confederate draft could get in place and refill their ranks. Lee, brought in as Breckenridge’s new military advisor, placed little trust in a western offensive as well, though he already apparently was dreaming of a Napoleonic stroke in the East that could win the war. Either way, Breckinridge firmly refused to give Johnston the go ahead for his offensive against Kentucky, instead ordering him to hold Vicksburg with all his troops. When Johnston insisted, Breckinridge relented and allowed him to send Bragg with reinforcements to defend East Tennessee against Buell, but nothing more.
Nathan Bedford Forrest
Events also developed slowly in the East, where General McClellan was preparing for his invasion of Virginia. His strained relation with the administration and with elements within the Army of the Susquehanna did much to slow him down in the aftermath of Anacostia. Lincoln had managed to chastise McClellan slightly after he cashiered Major Key, but conflict still raged within the pro- and anti-McClellan factions of the Army. Porter, Franklin and Smith, all friends of McClellan who shared his vision, formed one faction, while Sumner, Hooker and Heintzelman formed the other. Even though the country, and McClellan and his supporters, celebrated the supposedly great victory at Anacostia, soon enough the anti-McClellan faction and their Radical Republicans allies raised bitter accusations of lost opportunities, obstruction, and even deliberate sabotage and disloyalty. The most vocal was Hooker, who believed that had McClellan and Porter supported his last assault, then the rebels could have been completely broken.
An incident punctuated the Administration’s lack of trust on McClellan. After retaking Harpers Ferry, McClellan organized an operation to supply the garrison there, under former Speaker of the House Nathaniel Banks, with provisions brough through the Ohio Canal. In a tragi-comic episode, the boats McClellan brought were too big to pass through. After Stanton informed an incredulous Lincoln, the president summoned McClellan himself to Philadelphia to irately question him. “Why in [tar]nation,” the President demanded, “couldn’t you have known whether a boat would go through that lock, before spending a million of dollars getting them there? I am no engineer; but it seems to me that if I wished to know whether a boat would go through a hole, or a lock, common sense would teach me to go and measure it.”
He then pointed out that “The general impression is daily growing that the Army does not intend to do anything. By a failure like this we lose all the prestige we gained by the liberation of Washington. I am grievously disappointed.” Despite this, Lincoln still allowed McClellan to go ahead with the Peninsula operation. A vote among the corps commanders of the Army of the Susquehanna produced an even four in favor four against, but Lincoln finally decided that he could not go back on his promise to allow McClellan to put his plan on operation without sparking a mutiny. The political situation was delicate, after all he had just issued the controversial Emancipation Proclamation, and, as he told Stanton, “We can’t reject it and adopt another without assuming all the responsibility in the case of the one we adopt.” The plan went ahead.
Lincoln did, nonetheless, impose some conditions before McClellan could leave for the peninsula. Though the capital would remain at Philadelphia, it was still necessary to defend Washington. After all, for it to again fall in rebel hands would be a great humiliation. Consequently, Lincoln ordered a force to remain at Washington. This McClellan took as a personal insult, and a military unsound disposition. McClellan believed that a skeleton force would be enough for protecting Washington, and that his Peninsula movement would force the entire Confederate command to confront him in order to protect Richmond. Still under the delusion that his was a campaign to capture Richmond and not one to defeat the rebel army, McClellan insisted that he needed all the men he could get.
The Peninsula Campaign begins
After preparing through July and August, McClellan and his Army boarded their ships at Annapolis, destined for Fort Monroe. If everything went according to plan, they would raise the Union flag over Richmond before Christmas. The General carried a letter from Lincoln saying that “it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow . . . You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty—that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place.” Lincoln was expressing his doubts of whether McClellan could succeed, but he finished the letter with a rather paternal note: “I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you…. But you must act.” But when McClellan and the Army of the Susquehanna arrived at Fort Monroe in September 15th, whether he would truly act remained to be seen.
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Absolutely brilliant work, and I hope that our Ulysses reclaims his rightful place as the hero of the American way!
Now that I've gotten that out of my system, this is another excellent update (as I mentioned in my last post), and I'm impressed with how you keep a balanced view of each battle and campaign while still taking into account the sheer weight of advantage held by America. I have zero confidence in that dipshit McClellan, but I eagerly await your next update!
Deep_Whiskers
Banned
Reads the situation in the West: "Hey it looks like the war might actually be over before the election!"
Reads the situation in the East: "But maybe not"
Intersesting fact I ran across, the gov of Louisiana opposed an effort to make New Orleans a "free city" after LA secceded from the Union
Reads the situation in the East: "But maybe not"
Intersesting fact I ran across, the gov of Louisiana opposed an effort to make New Orleans a "free city" after LA secceded from the Union
Hopefully unlike OTL this upcoming disaster will end McClellan's military career for good.
Nearly a year for Vicksburg to fall. So does that mean Falls later than July in 1863?
Apparently no Butler in Louisiana, I wonder how far it gets rule is different.
I don't know how many generals were killed or wounded in the first couple of years of the war versus the last couple, it feels like less in this timeline as of now, but McDowell's death early makes up for that.
Instead of Dugout Doug, this timeline has Mighty Mouth Mac. Or depending on the definition in the 1860s, maybe even Gorgeous George, telling himself how valuable he is to the union when he isn't.
With discussion of Chamberlain being president after Lincoln, I wonder if he will have some more heroics then our timeline and not be injured.
Speaking of injuries, I just checked and it was not Gettysburg where he was injured but a battle a year later.
Apparently no Butler in Louisiana, I wonder how far it gets rule is different.
I don't know how many generals were killed or wounded in the first couple of years of the war versus the last couple, it feels like less in this timeline as of now, but McDowell's death early makes up for that.
Instead of Dugout Doug, this timeline has Mighty Mouth Mac. Or depending on the definition in the 1860s, maybe even Gorgeous George, telling himself how valuable he is to the union when he isn't.
With discussion of Chamberlain being president after Lincoln, I wonder if he will have some more heroics then our timeline and not be injured.
Speaking of injuries, I just checked and it was not Gettysburg where he was injured but a battle a year later.
Indeed! I'm excited because here comes Lee and the somersaults of doom.
We're coming Father Abraham! He's going to need those 300,000 more...
Thank you for your support! I really appreciate it, and I'm glad I'm doing a good job maintaining balance.
According to McPherson, Sherman needed to leave almost half of his army behind to guard his supply lines during the Atlanta Campaign. That partly influenced his decision to cut loose and start his march to the sea. So, I think that having to leave 20,000 behind is realistic. Some of them were, no doubt, struck by the illnesses I mentioned.
A free city? Does that mean that New Orleans would have all the powers and autonomy of a state?
And his political one as well.
No comment on Vicksburg.
Butler is still in Maryland, establishing military rule over the recently liberated areas. As for how Burnside might fare, well, see how he did enforcing the draft and limits on free speech in the OTL midwest.
Chamberlain will have his moment to shine, but latter. Btw, that's interesting. I always thought that he was injured at Gettysburg.
I agree. But take into account some things: first, the Confederacy started with higher morale because they captured Washington. Second, a lot more Border States men joined them this time out of fear of radicalism. Third, vital areas of the Confederacy, mainly Virginia, haven't been ravaged by war yet, so the Confederate situation isn't as hopeless when it comes to logistics, production and economy. Fourth, Breckenridge is a more capable administrator than Davis, especially when it comes to the economy, because while Davis is almost completely devoted to the war, Breckenridge oversees all aspects, similarly to Lincoln. Fifth, the Emancipation Proclamation means that McClellan army has to free all the slaves in its path, and that impels the Confederates to fight with more fierty. This is more a morale crisis than a material one, so if someone, let's say a Virginian, scored a victory they would be able to take the Southerners from gloom to elation fairly easily.
Yeah, it was Second Petersburg. Pretty much everyone thought he was going to die.
Joke's on them, because he powered through for nearly fifty years.
Perceptions matter though. So said Virginian would be under a lot of pressure to not only defeat McClellan but to inflict something akin to Waterloo upon him. Virginia's industry is largely intact and the Army of Northern Virginia probably got a lot out of Baltimore's factories before it fell, so their supply situation is better. I think this Virginian would have the ability to defeat McClellan in detail. We shall see
I think Lee is going to encircle and destroy McClellan at, say, Yorktown? That could be a big propaganda win for the Confederates.
Look as much as we hate McClellan if there's one thing that'll never happen to an army he's in charge of is it getting trapped. Any of the other Pre-Meade generals however...
McClellan would be very, very cautious. This could Lee to outmaneuver him , or to pick off the other generals piecemeal cause I bet they'd be chomping at the bit for glory and to take the initiative
The issue in that regards is McClellan's cautiousness makes it nearly impossible to outmaneuver him. The moment he thinks the army is in any danger he's going to pull out. Plus McClellan always had multiple routes for retreats if needed so even if they block one or two escape paths odds are he's got another three somewhere.
IOTL Lincoln took direct command of the army during the Peninsula campaign. I could foresee him ordering an attack on what looks like an easy front, and McClellan becoming angry at this and over-committing to it, which would lead to an encirclement.
He could also be pinned against the rivers or have Lee catch him flat-footed as they are crossing, which would put the army in a very bad position if attacked with a fair number of troops in the water.Not quite "destroy the arm" bad but enough he has to skeedaddle really fast with the troops still on the other side.