Unsystematic Chaos

After consulting my notes, I realized to my dismay that the Balkan Crisis cannot really occur in 1949, but rather about 1945. I will be updating the Adriatic War map at some point when I decide on a specific year. The actual sequence of events remains unchanged. (The timeline isn't a week old yet, and I'm already retconning...)

Anyway, time for the last bit I have done so far, set at the timeline's end*. I don't really know much about what's going on in the rest of the world in the 1990s, so answering questions will be rather difficult. (In case anybody might be worried - no, this isn't the last update. The next ones will return to the earlier part of the timeline.)

*Once I flesh things out, I might be tempted to continue it farther into the 21st century. But if I ever do so, it won't be anytime soon.
 
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The late 1950s and early 1960s were Germany’s golden age. The new experiment with democracy had caught on (at least for now), and coincided with a time of unprecedented growth and prosperity. In the south and east a delicate balance was being maintained, allowing Germany to profit tremendously while keeping its clients more or less satisfied. And the cold war with the Soviets had abated, the new post-Stalinist leadership now looking inwards after its last remaining allies in europe drifted towards Germany. This detente was not unique to Europe: the entire planet was experiencing a particularly peaceful period as tensions eased and conflicts disappeared.

But no golden age lasts forever. Germany’s second democratic experiment (Thande’s expression sounded too good not to be stolen) was more fruitful then the first, but in the 1970s an authoritarian regime would again consolidate. This coincided with economic mismanagement. But worse was to come. In the 1960s several significant errors, most notably a shortsighted attempt to gain public support by increasing the pressure on the rest of Mitteleuropa, upset the delicate balance between Germany and its satellites. Without outside involvement these unfavorable changes might still have been reversed, but this was not to be. For the reformed and reinvigorated USSR, less and less deserving of the ‘Socialist’ part its name (although it would take another thirty years for the communist symbolism to be abandoned altogether), would reinitiate the Cold War. The 1970s also brought an intensive, multipolar space race, in which Germany had no intention of falling behind. The two decades of relative peace had come to an end.

Mitteleuropa was never a grouping of true equals (although some of the larger or more distant countries like Turkey and Poland were much less involved in it then the others) – such claims are (at best) merely proof of the power of German propaganda. But in its early years it probably brought greater benefits to all its members then anything else could have, even if one particular member profited disproportionately more then the others. Even after Germany’s hold on its ‘partners’ strengthened as Mitteleuropa was reorganized, the smaller states still gained much from it even as they became encased in the gilded cage. But no golden age lasts forever: presently the cage’s bars had to be sold to put more stuff in space then the Russians and Americans, and were replaced with rusted steel (the better steel having been sent to factories in Germany). At last the corroded structure became too weak to hold Mitteleuropa together. Turkey and Poland, less closely integrated then the other states, drew away from Germany, but the rest of Mitteleuropa would be kept intact (by increasingly forceful means) until the end. In the early 1990s economic hardship and widespread discontent throughout Mitteleuropa fueled by Soviet interference brought a crisis which could not be contained. A Yugoslav attempt to exploit a political earthquake in Berlin to distance itself from Germany (with covert Soviet support) escalated. Several other nations tried to imitate the Yugoslavs, mostly with success. (Some were too successful, and presently found themselves heavily influenced by Russia). The Serbs who started the whole mess succeeded in breaking free, at the cost of Yugoslav unity. (German meddling largely influenced Croatia’s decision to leave Yugoslavia. Slovenia didn’t have to be manipulated – Italy had still not forgotten Trieste). In 1994 Mitteleuropa was no more, and only a handful of small satellites remained arrayed around Germany, now on far wider and more unstable orbits.

Poland had one of the last states to associate itself with Mitteleuropa. The rapid growth of its diversified economy and access to distant markets allowed it to do well outside it, and as a result Poland never truly became well-integrated within its structure. This put Poland in a good position to distance itself from Germany when things began to deteriorate. While it would never quite escape Germany’s influence until 1993, in the 1980s its membership in Mitteleuropa became largely nominal. Instead Poland would pursue the French strategy of maintaining neutrality backed with a considerable arsenal of WMDs. The atomic bomb which made this possible would in time gain a unique place in Polish culture. Ties with France itself would increase, and although there would be significant co-operation (the joint space program being the most example), the old military alliance of the 1920s would not be renewed. Having finally achieved more or less what it had been trying to do for the last 60 years, it seemed that Poland could now subsist contentedly and learn to stop worrying (or at least worry about some things a little less then before). And it would indeed do so for a time…

Soon after the Great War it had attempted to create a confederation between Germany and Russia, capable of resisting pressure from both these powers. More recently it had tried – and failed – to organize a somewhat cohesive bloc among the Mitteleuropean states, thus hoping to limit German influence and amplify its own strength. After distancing itself from Mitteleuropa and adopting the French Doctrine, it seemed that even the more modest variant of this plan had been abandoned forever. But the Poles never quite forgot their old dream. And when the wind of change once again swept across central Europe, they were ready to act…

Of course, the best-laid plans have a tendency to fail in far more favorable circumstances. Unsurprisingly, the ‘new Intermarum’ was very different from what the utopian pre-1993 dreams envisioned. Only Hungary would actually join in the grand endeavour. While it would obviously be the weaker partner, its size and traditional close friendship with Poland would permanently prevent any attempts at vassalization on the latter’s part. Instead a close alliance, nicknamed the ‘Warsaw-Budapest Axis’, would emerge. And while its co-operation would be admirable, it would abandon the ideals which were originally supposed to drive the Cracow Group. Slovakia and Czechia, the only other states which entered any sort of association, would be kept at arm’s length. Unlike Hungary, they remained in Germany’s orbit for some time past 1993, and subsequently experienced crises and instability. The Czechs’ traditional pro-Russian attitude and important pro-German factions in Slovakia farther complicated matters. At various times during the 1990s they would alternately drift towards and away from the CG, but even though they would profit from this partnership those links would remain uncertain and tenuous.

Thus at the turn of the century a strong Polish-Hungarian alliance had emerged. While the duo would continue to attempt to influence Czechia and Slovakia, by 2000 any plans to draw others into the group had become finally abandoned. The old ‘Intermarum dream’ of a great confederation working towards the common good of them all had died once again.
 
Zaius, this is really becoming a great timeline. I'm ashamed that I could only skim through the walls of text, due to a lack of time, but I think you've connected the maps in an excellent way, creating a very interesting and promising timeline... :cool:
 
So the German Imperium, I mean Mitteleuropa has imploded, that... sucks. Still very good work on the TL, hows society doing by 2000 ITTL?
 
Zaius, this is really becoming a great timeline. I'm ashamed that I could only skim through the walls of text, due to a lack of time, but I think you've connected the maps in an excellent way, creating a very interesting and promising timeline... :cool:

I did no clever connecting whatsoever – the maps were designed as part of a greater whole from the start. Each time I entered the MoTF, I wondered what part of the timeline might best suit the challenge at hand, and made a map.

So the German Imperium, I mean Mitteleuropa has imploded, that... sucks.

Lithuanians, Greeks, Slovenes, Croats, Hungarians, Czechs, Latvians and others disagree, and would like a word with you. Life wasn’t as bad as in OTL’s Warsaw Pact, but things had become pretty nasty towards the end.

Still very good work on the TL, hows society doing by 2000 ITTL?

That’s a pretty broad question. One obvious difference from OTL is that Eastern Europe did not suffer from WWII and 50 years of communism, so societies there are much healthier and more cohesive. I’d like to know more myself, actually. If anybody has any thoughts I’d be pleased to hear them.

I’m glad to hear the two of you like it.
 
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I did no clever connecting whatsoever – the maps were designed as part of a greater whole from the start. Each time I entered the MoTF, I wondered what part of the timeline might best suit the challenge at hand, and made a map.



Lithuanians, Greeks, Slovenes, Croats, Hungarians, Czechs, Latvians and others disagree, and would like a word with you. Life wasn’t as bad as in OTL’s Warsaw Pact, but things had become pretty nasty towards the end.



That’s a pretty broad question. One obvious difference from OTL is that Eastern Europe did not suffer from WWII and 50 years of communism, so societies there are much healthier and more cohesive. I’d like to know more myself, actually. If anybody has any thoughts I’d be pleased to hear them.

I’m glad to hear the two of you like it.

Well if their economies are more robust then the lost of cohesion might be less damaging than the OTL revolution 89. The big one to watch will of course be the Balkans and how unstable Serbia becomes or doesn't, we shall see.

The lack of a second world war could set a lot of things back, women s rights for one, technology could be at a somewhat lower level, unless external conflict affected the rate of development.
 
The atomic bomb which made this possible would in time gain a unique place in Polish culture.
Indeed. It would be something that IIRC never occured in OTL. Especially since the army itself had much respect in pre-war Poland.
Ties with France itself would increase, and although there would be significant co-operation (the joint space program being the most example)
Wait, there is a Franco-Polish space programme? I don't think there are enough resources for that.
 

ccdsah

Donor
What about Us? Or BRitish Empire? Or Japan. Good timeline, great maps, but would love to see what happened to the rest of the world
 
What about Us?

One of the world’s superpowers, together with Russia and China.

Or BRitish Empire

It wound down roughly as it did IOTL, probably a bit more slowly without the disturbance of WWII.

Or Japan.

As of 2001 it’s one of the many second-rate powers, with nukes and a space program of its own trailing in the Big Three’s wake. I know nothing about interwar Japan, so I have absolutely no idea what happened in the meantime.

the rest of the world

It’s multipolar. So-called „polarizations” are looked upon with a certain dread, since the last big one led to the Great War. The dominant powers are the „Big Three” (USA, Russia, China), and there’s a large gap between them and everyone else. India might eventually ascend to the same weight class if its development accelerates, but this isn’t happening anytime soon. Europe could also compete if it pools its resources, but it doesn’t really want to at the present time. Economic co-operation is a rather popular idea (this is what the current talks of a „European Confederacy” mostly boil down to), but political integration less so.

Wait, there is a Franco-Polish space programme? I don't think there are enough resources for that.

It’s not a big one, Poland and France certainly lack the kind of resources the USA, China and Russia can amass. Italy may also be tagging along. Such initiatives are more common then IOTL: TTL’s multipolar world meant an equally multipolar space race. And one that didn’t die end when one party backed down, since there were always quite a few others. And with the strongest world powers all messing around in space to some degree, the second-tier ones also joined in the fun so as not to be left too far behind. So expansion into space was more widespread and sustained then IOTL. It’s definitely a topic I plan to expand on in the future.
 
Well if their economies are more robust then the lost of cohesion might be less damaging than the OTL revolution 89.

More robust economies, and no attempts at turning society upside down as the communists tried to do. That corner of the world will be radically different from OTL. In relative terms the difference won't be quite as large as Germany and the USSR were also spared WWII, but in absolute terms the gains will be huge.

The lack of a second world war could set a lot of things back, women s rights for one, technology could be at a somewhat lower level, unless external conflict affected the rate of development.

I don't think technology in general will be at a lower level. Some fields will be more advanced and others may be retarded, but I wouldn't expect a significant difference. The resources and lives poured into WWII which will be mostly available ITTL for more peaceful purposes. And there will also be quite a few technology and arms races in the meantime to keep things from stagnating.
 
Taken from The End of an Era: the decolonization of the British, French, German and Italian empires, 1945-1995

"...The earliest plans to divide Libya into an Arab state and Italian territories date back to the Libyan Spring of the 1960s, when the realization began to dawn that Libya could only be completely Italianized by the use of totaliterian means Italy was no longer willing to employ. A significant faction within the Italian government supported it in 1967, and had Italy's withdrawal from its other colonies not allowed it to concentrate solely on Libya, it might already have been implemented then. But while many Italians still opposed this at the time, the terrorism and renewed violence of the 1970s brought a profound change in public opinion. By 1980 Italian morale had eroded to the point where it would not have taken much to tip the balance and cause widespread acceptance of concessions. As a result, the uprising of 1983 led the Italian government to begin negotiations with the rebels..."

A tentative map of Libya in 1985 following the Treaty of Benghazi. A decade after its signing it would be clear that the treaty had caused nearly as many problems as it solved. The rebels' weakerer position during the negotiations allowed Italy to retain most of Libya's oilfields, hindering the new state's development. Italy on the other hand would continue to face unrest among its remaining Arab populations.

libya.png
 
I've decided that continuing the timeline in this present form will be a bit inconvenient. Instead I'll let this thread die and will do a reboot later on, starting the traditional way with the PoD and moving forwards in a more orderly way. The updates associated with my past and future MoTF entries will only be appearing when the time is right. Hopefully it will be tidier and less confusing.
 
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