There are a lot of historians who believe that the embargo was virtually a declaration of war. Japan was hugely dependent on the United States for economic support, including significant amounts of critical materials such as zinc, iron, over 90% of its copper, and of course, oil. The Japanese Navy was burning hundreds (thousands?) of tons of oil a day and if Japan could not gain access to those raw materials again, their entire war effort, really their entire national economy, would come to a shuddering halt. Don't believe the conspiracy theorists who say Roosevelt declared the embargo to force the Japanese into attacking, but in Japan, the embargo was definitely seen as the next-best-thing to a declaration of war.
United States taking the initiative in the Pacific War
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Again, the US was not wanting to go to war right then. China lobby wanted Japan out of China and they had the support for the Embargoes. They also managed to come up with the supplies sent to ROC to help them against Japan instead of direct intervention by the US Military. You need to look at the Islolationists in the US as being in separate groups. The first group did not want to intervene at all except to support US interests, this groups supported thing like troops in Central America and the Caribbean. The second group. The second groups went along with the first group but did not necessarily want to send troops but did want to send material aid and embargoes, this group included the China lobby to help the Chinese to defend themselves against the aggression of the Japanese against "Our friend the Chinese" who we are helping. The third major group did not want to intervene in Europe but did work with the two preceding groups with there ideas.
Garrison
Donor
Alternatively Japan could have taken the hint, reined in the military and not started a war they couldn't win. Just because the embargo provided the militarists with an excuse for war does not mean that the embargo was anything close to a declaration of war.
Is there a potential hawkish presidential candidate who might be much more aggressive? There's a fair few discussions on neutral and isolationist candidates but I'm not aware of any on the alternates. They'd ideally need to be in their second term to have had a chance to build up the land forces (marines or army or both) required to displace Japanese ground forces and hold key posts against Japanese counterattacks.
I'm not back up to full health, but I'll try to follow this thread and offer comments.
So, Operation Barbarossa, kicks off on the summer solstice, June 22nd, 1941, so shortly after that means late June/early July?
So this offensive launches on or around Sep 7th, 1941. This gives us just about two months to prepare the US forces, so we cannot see any new CV/BB being built, nor anything larger than a DD really, so for naval forces we will have to deal with the historically existing forces. Airforces too will not see much increases, as it takes time to build more than what was alreading in the works. For Ground forces, two months would allow for conscripts taken in on day one to just about finnish their basic training, but if we then need to give them time to receive advanced training, and then ship them to forward bases, no new ground forces can be used for this threads operations in the initial days of the conflict.
On the Carriers, USS Hornet was not ready in June, 1942 historically, (I'm talking about the crew, not the ship), so we need not think about her participation in this, and if we are smart, USS Ranger and USS Wasp will not be in frontline areas either, as those two carriers were of known compromised designs. That leave the USN with the two Lexington class & the two (original) Yorktown class carriers for frontline service, and Ranger/Wasp to supply replacement aircraft for them, from a good distance.
On the BB, the USN could amass ALL the BB, but if they do this and let the Japanese know this, they likely will not try a direct headon fight, if, OTOH, the Atlantic fleet BB don't use the Panama Canal when they transition into the Pacific, then perhaps the Japanese can be made to think that they are still getting ready to join the Pacific fleet at a later time, and so perhaps the Japanese might believe that they can fight their battle/war, but only if they respond at once with an immediate counterattack, with everything they have, before the USN has fully formed up.
For ground and airforces, if we cannot built/train any in time for new forces to make it to the frontlines, then all we can do is draw from existing forces, and throw them forward, with the replacements filling in their old positions as they become available. The US had forces in the Panama Canal zone, Oahu, and the Philippine islands. The PI islands need the forces they have there, but perhaps the Oahu and PCZ forces could be used for some limited, and immediate attacks, followed up by fortifying and going over onto the defensive while awaiting the counter attacks by the IJN?
This post took a long time, and wore me out.
Here is what the Empire of the Rising sun did historically, so let us see what the USA/allies could do to mess this up for Japan.
Is it allowable that before attacking, the USA reinforces US and Allied positions? Midway and Wake could do with some reinforcements that are bigger and better (and sooner) than what they got historically, but what about sparing some forces for the Gilbert Islands, but with the bulk of US forces being sent to the New Britain/New Guinea theater?
A large part of the Japanese expansion in the early days was attacks against unready and weak forces, like at Wake. Reinforcements sent in July, and dug in and fully emplaced during August, should see the Japanese getting a good thrashing, and if the US/Allies can make it seem that there is going to be a concerted campaign aimed at the Caroline and Pelau islands, and thus potentially giving the US/Allies a way to reinforce the PH and Guam? Is there any chance that the US can send in enough engineers to make a home for all the airforces and ground forces from the PCZ and Oahu, so that once the Japanese do head in, this airpower can augment the OTL USN forces and the allied forces in the new combat theater.
Raids on Japanese territory, and a strong build up of Naval and Airforces in this theater, could that give the potential for the IJN to be sucked in and fighting against superior forces, while thinking they were only fighting a part of the USN, and before the airforces could be brought in and based there?
Is it allowable that before attacking, the USA reinforces US and Allied positions? Midway and Wake could do with some reinforcements that are bigger and better (and sooner) than what they got historically, but what about sparing some forces for the Gilbert Islands, but with the bulk of US forces being sent to the New Britain/New Guinea theater?
A large part of the Japanese expansion in the early days was attacks against unready and weak forces, like at Wake. Reinforcements sent in July, and dug in and fully emplaced during August, should see the Japanese getting a good thrashing, and if the US/Allies can make it seem that there is going to be a concerted campaign aimed at the Caroline and Pelau islands, and thus potentially giving the US/Allies a way to reinforce the PH and Guam? Is there any chance that the US can send in enough engineers to make a home for all the airforces and ground forces from the PCZ and Oahu, so that once the Japanese do head in, this airpower can augment the OTL USN forces and the allied forces in the new combat theater.
Raids on Japanese territory, and a strong build up of Naval and Airforces in this theater, could that give the potential for the IJN to be sucked in and fighting against superior forces, while thinking they were only fighting a part of the USN, and before the airforces could be brought in and based there?
I'm not convinced the USA would risk weakening the Canal Zone - at least not until they had had some success elsewhere. It's far too useful and OTL was one of the best defended military zones. However, once they'd either badly damaged or taken Truk (for example), then I could see experienced troops being moved out.
Why? What is the reason to go to war with japan that they tried diplomatic to leave china? The main intrest is Germany.
And if the US send it slow battleships across the pacific they are not sunk in shallow friendly territory
That's actually the plan that makes sense. Don't go to war with Japan, but establish the communications to Australia by securing the supply lines (Fiji, New Caledonia, etc). Move significant forces to Darwin in anticipation of a campaign for the supply lines to Luzon.
That's an interesting question. Assuming that battleships and cruisers get one full tank of oil a year for training, that destroyers get two, and carriers three, it might be somewhere around 350,000 tons of oil a year for the IJN to keep up proficiency.
Its 5.7m barrels PA for the army, 17.6mb for the navy. 12.6mb for the civilian economy. Production is 1.6mb home crude, 1.2mb synthetic with stocks for about 2 years peacetime use or 1 year wartime and that's mainly naval use upping the consumption.
As long as the British and DEI join the embargo Japan is on a clock from July 41. The other part of that is from the beginning of 41 the British and US had picked up on Japanese measures preparatory for war, retraining aircrews for anti shipping, reserve ships and officers being recalled.
If the Japanese do not attack around December 41 they are faced with the US and Britain continuing to reinforce the Pacific and CBI theatres.
Yes. The Canal Zone had tons of Coastal Artillery, but not a lot that could be moved to other theatres. The Panama Mobile Force was essentially a mountain division. I suppose that could be useful fighting in the Philippines, if the US could keep it in supply, which they couldn't.
One of the issues is a fundamental misunderstanding of how bad the US army was in the early part of WW2. A few months will not change this. McNair reports that there are 14 ID 2 Amd available for service in December 41, with a total of 27 Divisions by about March ( unless you expand the army or change organistion which happened.) Going from 27 to a 100 division target means stripping out a lot of trained personnel to train the next lot.
Anyone that says Louisiana Maneuvers should remember the old quote - From an exercise point of view it was fantastic, they totally screwed it up.
And you can't lift 27 Divisions. 3 is hard. And most of those will be badly trained and too many badly led. Defensively maybe ok. but for any sort of offensive action the US army is really not very capable, the forces in North Africa basically get sent to battle school by Alexander to learn modern combat realities. Which does not take that long but it shows the deficiencies in the US based training system in the early war and pre war.
Could they fix it yes but its more like a 12 - 18 month process than a few.
What 'a few months' does is reinforce the PI ( which means those forces are probably lost) Wake which might hold. and maybe advances deployment of some USAAC elements slightly. But in terms of offensive capability not a lot.
Delaying the war by say 3 months makes a bigger difference but that's because the Australian troops are better trained, more Indian troops are better trained and equipped, there maybe better aircraft available. Just a note 2/3 of the Ground forces fighting the Japanese in the Pacific are Commonwealth in 1942 and for most of43 and that excludes CBI.
Anyone that says Louisiana Maneuvers should remember the old quote - From an exercise point of view it was fantastic, they totally screwed it up.
And you can't lift 27 Divisions. 3 is hard. And most of those will be badly trained and too many badly led. Defensively maybe ok. but for any sort of offensive action the US army is really not very capable, the forces in North Africa basically get sent to battle school by Alexander to learn modern combat realities. Which does not take that long but it shows the deficiencies in the US based training system in the early war and pre war.
Could they fix it yes but its more like a 12 - 18 month process than a few.
What 'a few months' does is reinforce the PI ( which means those forces are probably lost) Wake which might hold. and maybe advances deployment of some USAAC elements slightly. But in terms of offensive capability not a lot.
Delaying the war by say 3 months makes a bigger difference but that's because the Australian troops are better trained, more Indian troops are better trained and equipped, there maybe better aircraft available. Just a note 2/3 of the Ground forces fighting the Japanese in the Pacific are Commonwealth in 1942 and for most of43 and that excludes CBI.
Honestly, the war would have probably played out exactly like it did IOTL. I think after the war Nimitz said something along the lines of "I had spent twenty years fighting this war" in reference to his time studying War Plan Orange. While the technologies and tactics were somewhat different, the Pacific War generally followed the outline of War Plan Orange that had been developed and practiced for twenty years prior to WW2. The worst case outcome for the US would be if the US Pacific Fleet got itself walloped in a Kessen Kantai with the Japanese Navy. All the losses of Pearl Harbor except none of the ships and men would be recoverable. But in the end it wouldn't have made a difference. The fatal flaw in the Japanese war strategy was that they never answered the question of "what if the United States doesn't give up?" The entire Japanese high command, even Yamamoto who is always praised for his "reluctance" to fight the United States, completely underestimated the resolve of the United States.
Without a monumental strategic, economic, and cultural overhaul, there is no way the Japanese Empire defeats the United States.
Without a monumental strategic, economic, and cultural overhaul, there is no way the Japanese Empire defeats the United States.
This is one of the few War Plans that was used totally in WW2 without hardly any changes. War Plan Orange was done over about every couple of years adding and subtracting new and old units and doctrine changes as needed. Much of all the design of ships and train was, not because of going to war in Europe, but going to war in the Pacific and needing to deal with the distance involved and the fact you had to take just about everything with you from island to island. Even in the early 1900's they realized you would need an advanced level fleet train to get there. Some of the Earlier Collier examples were designed with this and incorperated things used in the battle fleet. Some of the Colliers even had things like Turbo Electric drive in them from the get go. The USS Jupiter, later the CV 1 Langley, was one of these.
Beyond the political impossibility the US armed forces wasn't in anyway in anything like a state to fight a defensive war against Japan in summer of 1941 let a lone a defensive one. US forces (and Phillipino forces besides the PH Scouts) were in pretty much every way not prepared for or capable of fighting a offensive war.
Beyond that this is the US. The press, a democratic (ish) government and the lack of a national intel service mean that theres no chance of any sort of large scale secret attack. The Japanese would know well before any attack.
Basically without at least half a dozen year prior POD it's just not viable.
Beyond that this is the US. The press, a democratic (ish) government and the lack of a national intel service mean that theres no chance of any sort of large scale secret attack. The Japanese would know well before any attack.
Basically without at least half a dozen year prior POD it's just not viable.
Yes there are people that equate the so call ultimatum with a DOW. But those folks are simply WRONG. They are wrong from an international law/tradition/historical precedent point of view and they are wrong from a moral point of view and they are wrong from a USA law point of view.
Historically and legally in the US the president has the right to handle foreign relations including such things as embargoes and such, but that is a completely different thing than going to war. The last 75 Yeager’s where the US President sends in troops or bombs places without asking Congress has more than blurred that line but in 1941 and against a peer was a whole different world.
If FDR tried this he would be out on his ear for usurping the Congresses power yo declare war. Even on Dec 8 FDR didn’t try this and with the US fleet sitting at the bottom of a harbor in Hawaii and thousands dead FDR didn’t get a DOW on Germany. So in Sept 1941 he is not getting one.
But the big issue (and yet. ANOTHER example of why we cant just skip over the POD) is that without an act of aggression by Japan the people of the US are NOT going yo be behind this war in any way shape or means. So in 1942 anyone that supported the DOW is going to be voted out of affine and a new congress will be in and they will A) go after FDR if he started the war without asking them or B) they will be pressing hard to force FDR to end the war if congress did give him an DOW without Japan having done anything outside China.
This discussion however has a HUGE issue in that everyone is talking about a different alternative history that just happens to have a war staring in sept. We are all talking about different histories because we don’t have a common POD to start from because once again we have a topic that is close to ASB and thus the OP wanting to get to the discussion without the work of creating a POD (which in this case would be very hard to create) has left the door WIDE open. So I have one idea of how this goes you have another and so on and so forth and thus we can’t really have a discussion all we can do is toss off random idea but we can’t discuss the likelihood of any of them in less we first all publish out own POD that we are using as the starting point for our own conclusions.
On top if this the OP is specifying that basically the US goes aggressor without anything at all they can point to and say “we had to because…X”. At a time when most folks in the US wanted to stay out of foreign wars in part because WW1 was sold to them as a one and Donne to end the repeated wars in Europe and it obviously did no such thing so many folks viewed WW1 as a waste of US money and US lives and thus didn’t want to get into a war that the US had no reason to be involved with.
And the OP wants the US to go aggressive without a reason to sell the average American on? Sorry it is not going to happen. Congress may have been insane but they were nbit criminally stupid nor suicidal.
And if they were this is the ONE way that Japn may have actually achieved it real world goal of getting the US to give up the fight and sit down at the peace talks. As the US citizens are going yo go nuts when the casualties start rolling in. In Real Time the US was willing to take the casualties and pay the costs because the viewed themselves as the injured. Parting having Been attacked by surprise on a Sunday near Christmas so the US citizens were on a holy crusade to teach them damn ”bad guys“ (they would have used a word that would get me banned if I typed it here) a lesson. But if the US just wakes up one day and starts attacking the war is going yo be less popular the Vietnam.
So the POD DOES matter. A lot
Historically and legally in the US the president has the right to handle foreign relations including such things as embargoes and such, but that is a completely different thing than going to war. The last 75 Yeager’s where the US President sends in troops or bombs places without asking Congress has more than blurred that line but in 1941 and against a peer was a whole different world.
If FDR tried this he would be out on his ear for usurping the Congresses power yo declare war. Even on Dec 8 FDR didn’t try this and with the US fleet sitting at the bottom of a harbor in Hawaii and thousands dead FDR didn’t get a DOW on Germany. So in Sept 1941 he is not getting one.
But the big issue (and yet. ANOTHER example of why we cant just skip over the POD) is that without an act of aggression by Japan the people of the US are NOT going yo be behind this war in any way shape or means. So in 1942 anyone that supported the DOW is going to be voted out of affine and a new congress will be in and they will A) go after FDR if he started the war without asking them or B) they will be pressing hard to force FDR to end the war if congress did give him an DOW without Japan having done anything outside China.
This discussion however has a HUGE issue in that everyone is talking about a different alternative history that just happens to have a war staring in sept. We are all talking about different histories because we don’t have a common POD to start from because once again we have a topic that is close to ASB and thus the OP wanting to get to the discussion without the work of creating a POD (which in this case would be very hard to create) has left the door WIDE open. So I have one idea of how this goes you have another and so on and so forth and thus we can’t really have a discussion all we can do is toss off random idea but we can’t discuss the likelihood of any of them in less we first all publish out own POD that we are using as the starting point for our own conclusions.
On top if this the OP is specifying that basically the US goes aggressor without anything at all they can point to and say “we had to because…X”. At a time when most folks in the US wanted to stay out of foreign wars in part because WW1 was sold to them as a one and Donne to end the repeated wars in Europe and it obviously did no such thing so many folks viewed WW1 as a waste of US money and US lives and thus didn’t want to get into a war that the US had no reason to be involved with.
And the OP wants the US to go aggressive without a reason to sell the average American on? Sorry it is not going to happen. Congress may have been insane but they were nbit criminally stupid nor suicidal.
And if they were this is the ONE way that Japn may have actually achieved it real world goal of getting the US to give up the fight and sit down at the peace talks. As the US citizens are going yo go nuts when the casualties start rolling in. In Real Time the US was willing to take the casualties and pay the costs because the viewed themselves as the injured. Parting having Been attacked by surprise on a Sunday near Christmas so the US citizens were on a holy crusade to teach them damn ”bad guys“ (they would have used a word that would get me banned if I typed it here) a lesson. But if the US just wakes up one day and starts attacking the war is going yo be less popular the Vietnam.
So the POD DOES matter. A lot
Grey Wolf
Donor
It's basically how Japan read it. They went through the motions the next few months but going to war was the only outcome they could see which would not be a disaster for them
Well if the US strikes first, at least in this timeline Japan has the possibility of getting a conditional peace.
In such a scenario, I see the US probably going for a first strike against Saipan for the purpose of:
A) Protecting Guam
B) Keeping the Japanese as far away from Midway, Wake, and the Hawaiian Islands.
C) Drive out the Japanese fleet in a area that has limited ground air support.
In such a scenario, I see the US probably going for a first strike against Saipan for the purpose of:
A) Protecting Guam
B) Keeping the Japanese as far away from Midway, Wake, and the Hawaiian Islands.
C) Drive out the Japanese fleet in a area that has limited ground air support.
Well, I have some ideas.
Firstly, discount any and all thoughts of an early ground campaign, so no US led invasions of defended Japanese held islands before mid 1942.
Secondly, move the few existing ground forces from rear areas and vital strategic strongholds (I'm looking at you, Oahu and at you, PCZ) to hastily established forward bases.
Thirdly, while digging in on new islands, build airbases and relocate the airforces as well.
Midway and Wake would each get some love, and that is easy, as these historically were garrisoned by the USA.
Guadalcanal. Send in the US ground forces in July, 1941 and build an airstrip there,
Do the same for the best island in the Gilberts, no free expansion for the Japanese!
Take all the rest of these relocated forces and establish them in New Britain and New Guinea, along with the bulk of the airforces.
This is a fair attempt at showing what this part might look like...
So, the USA risks everything, on meeting the Japanese before they can expand to the SE, securing Australia and NZ, and forcing the Japanese to fight for these islands that historically they got a toe hold on with little trouble in OTL.
So, say on June 25th, 1941, something like the above is decided upon, and the US forces are busy implementing this by Sep 7th, 1941.
In addition to the US redeployments of ground and airforces...
Send all US pacific and atlantic fleet submarines to the Philippine islands, and invite the British and Dutch (And any Aussie/Kiwi, as well) to also redeploy all their submarines to the PI, as well. Confine the offensive to the naval forces combined submarine offensive, and airforces in the PI are also given an unlimited hunting license for attacks on any Japanese forces/shipping they come across.
I'm too tired to dig up British and Dutch markers, but look at the PI's as a combined allied sub and airforce base.
Getting tired, but here is an attempt to show allied bases to prevent Japanese easy flanking attacks.