United States of the Americas and Oceania Version 2.0
- Thread starter Eurofed
- Start date
- Status
Why dont you just give Alaska all of Klondike?Ok, the Seward Peninsula has a guarantee to be included in Alyaska.
Eurofed
Banned
It might eventually happen, but I prefer not to be bound by promises that go against the general rule of keeping largely uninhabited areas as territories.
The general rule dont apply to Klondike and Alaska. There is no way to govern Klondike as a seperate territory. Alaska should have it.
Eurofed
Banned
Perhaps. We shall see.
I have concocted a draft of the missing part of the last update, the build-up to the Second Great War. If it feels good enough to you folks, I may officially add it to last update.
Last edited:
Eurofed
Banned
The ultimate roots of the Second Great War lie in the outcome of the First one. That conflict, the first world war of the Industrial Age, made the political unity of the USA irreversible and entrenched the ascension of the new superpowers of America, Russia, and the Central Powers bloc. It also gave ultimately irresistible momentum to the drive towards unification of the Americas and of continental Europe under the US and CP hegemonies respectively, a process started by the American Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Nonetheless, the outcome of the FGW had left that process critically unfinished. The great powers of Western Europe, the British Empire and the “Gallic” Franco-Iberian bloc, had been humbled and somewhat diminished, but not any crippled or destroyed yet, by that conflict. They would not concede their final and lasting submission to the aborning new world order without a further serious fight. In retrospective, looking at how much the strength of America and the Central Powers had grown during the 19th century, one might conclude that such stubborn resistance by the Western European powers was foolish and ultimately doomed to failure.
There was certainly a critical element of miscalculation and denial in the decision of London and Paris to gamble everything on the battlefield again: the advent of the Bourbon regime in France-Iberia could be credited as much as to the shock of defeat in the FGW and subsequent political turmoil as to revanchist denial of the changes in the international pecking order, a kind of collective “raging against decline” if you wish. It seemed that the Western European peoples reacted to the reality of their defeat by embracing the “stab in the back” legend. For the French it was the assumption that their country had been defeated by the disloyalty of “anti-national” domestic elements, and the weakening and demoralizing influence of liberalism, instead of the superior strength of the enemy. For the British, the blame was cast on the Great Rebellion, and they assumed that if India had remained quiet and loyal during the FGW, the British Empire would have triumphed. Regardless of the serious misjudgment of the revanchist powers’ public opinions about their previous military performance, it is probable that their ruling elites would have kept enough common sense not to chance a rematch so easily if the victor powers’ front had remained united. The split between Russia and the American-Central European front substantially changed the global balance of power, giving the League powers the reasonable expectation that if they played their diplomatic cards right, they could face their American and CP enemies with a neutral and benevolent Russia, or even joined to their side. This made the perspective of a general war look not such an uphill fight in London and Paris, even if they still underestimated the power of their adversaries.
Besides the lingering animosities that hailed from the FGW, and the long-standing rivalry between the USA and the British Empire on one side, France and the Central Powers on the other side, that went back to the Revolutionary Era, the Second Great War was the ultimate expression of the imperialistic competition for economic and political dominance of the world, that gripped all the great powers during the 19th century as an effect of global industrialization. Political factors just aligned this free-for-all rivalry into a structured clash between the blocs of Western Europe and America-Central Europe, with Russia playing a wild card. As a matter of fact, if one takes all the various factors that were driving the rival alliance blocs to a fight, they may wonder why the interwar period lasted so long, 36 years. There are various reasons that may account for it. First of all, the social shock of the FGW, the first total war of the Industrial Age, induced a lingering war weariness in European and American society that took a generation to dwindle completely and influenced the great powers to steer away from ultimate escalation to a general war while it lasted. Second, and no less important, colonial expansion of the European powers, and American focus on settlement of the Western Hemisphere, acted as a powerful “safety valve” for imperial competition: as long as the great powers could grab new markets and resources, and satisfy their ambitions for glory, in a much safer and easier way by conquering the pre-colonial states and colonizing the undeveloped areas of Asia and Africa, the impulse to fall on each other and rob their rival was substantially diminished and kept in check for decades.
The colonial outlet however could not work to defuse imperialistic hostility forever. By the end of the 19th century, the world, with the exception of China proper, had been partitioned into the empires of the great powers. The pressure to expand their own power and influence remained as high as ever, due to the socio-economic effect of industrialization and an international order that had carved the world into a few protectionist big blocs. American annexation of Brazil, the Scramble for Africa, Russian expansion in the Middle East and Central Asia, European colonization of South Asia and Southeast Asia, Japan’s and Egypt’s modernization, regional expansion, and integration in the alliance blocs, had all been important stages of this process that had left the great power wanting of further room to expand, short of falling on each other, or the complete colonial partition or joint colonization of China (an impressive task that at the very least required more long-term cooperation than the great powers were able to muster reliably).
A significant hallmark of the growing imperialistic rivalry between the great powers were the recurring international crises that intermittently marked the last quarter of the 19th century. Variously involving flashpoints in the typical areas where the spheres of influence of the great powers met and clashed, such as South America, Africa, the Pacific, Western Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, they were too many, and their apparent causes often apparently too trivial, to be chronicled in a global history context. But their recurrence, increasing frequency, and ever more difficult peaceful solution, that often just froze them into unsatisfactory or instable compromises, were a manifestation of the underlying international tensions that gradually heightened during the 1880s and the 1890s. The arms race in the naval and land fields between the great powers, that spanned and steadily intensified during the last third of the 19th century, was another major manifestation of their imperialistic rivalry.
One event that in the opinion of many historians was a critical step in the path to the second world war was the so-called “Triple Entente” pact between Britain, France-Iberia, and Russia. Its genesis lies in the aftermath of the Eight-Nation War: Russia had been left unsatisfied and alienated by the other great powers’ veto to its sole protectorate over Manchuria, and the alliance of Japan with America and the CP, and turned to the Western European powers seeking an understanding that might guarantee its desired sphere of influence. On their part, London and Paris were eager, as long as Russian demands were reasonable, to bind the wild-card diplomacy of the Russian Empire to a stance that would guarantee its benevolent neutrality, or optimally its active support, in a clash with their American and Central European enemies. Contrasting Russian and British interests in the Middle East and China were a significant, but not insurmountable, obstacle, and in 1894, diplomatic talks ensued in the so-called “Entente Cordiale” between Russia and the League powers of Britain and France-Iberia. It involved a public non-aggression pact between the three powers, that bound them to neutrality in the case that Russia or the Anglo-French-Iberian alliance found themselves at war with one or more third powers; there also was a secret agreement that recognized Turkey and Manchuria within the Russian sphere of influence as far as Britain and F-I were concerned. The talks failed to establish a full-fledged military alliance between Russia and the Western European powers because of lingering Russian reluctance to bind itself so thoroughly and owing to the onerous demands of St. Petersburg for such an alliance (recognition of a Russian sphere of influence over Egypt and North China), which Britain balked to for the moment. Nonetheless, the three powers expressed their mutual willingness to re-consider further definition and recognition of a Russian sphere of interest in the Middle East and China, in the case of a general conflict.
Although it officially amounted to nothing more than a non-aggression pact, the Triple Entente was widely interpreted by the Western public opinion as a substantial change in the great powers’ alliance game, which bound wild-card Russia to benevolent neutrality towards, and -it was often suspected- an occult quasi-alliance with, Britain and France-Iberia. As a result, the Western European powers felt emboldened and took a more confrontational diplomatic and strategic stance towards America and the Central Powers. Conversely, the USA and the CP were driven to strengthen their own alliance ties and to assume an openly anti-Russian stance; international tensions and the arms race intensified in the following three years, till in early 1898, a “perfect storm” of various simultaneous minor international crises between the Anglo-French-Iberians and the USA or the CP occurred.
It was the combination of several minor flashpoints coming in rapid succession. The final straw were street incidents between French irredentist groups and German and Italian authorities in Lorraine and Savoy and clashes between UK colonial police and US settlers in the border areas of Patagonia. However, as much as popular imagination may like to single out the "Patagonia incidents" and/or the "Lorraine-Savoy troubles" as the main cause of the war, the international atmosphere had already been made tense in the previous months by the reopening of frozen border conflicts over some contested areas in Cameroon and Tanganyika, as well as disputes over the ownership of some islands placed between US Philippines and UK Indonesia. Taken individually, each of those flashpoints might have been far too trivial to justify a world war, especially in a different international atmosphere. But in the tense conditions of the late 1890s, their sum proved to be beyond the will or ability of the great powers to solve or contain by peaceful means yet again, and the heating antagonisms of the last thirty years finally reached the boiling point. The combined crisis worsened to a war fever and diplomatic escalation, then to mobilization of the great powers, and eventually in mid-1898 to a quick volley of declarations of war that squared the Alliance of the USA, Germany, Italy, H-C-S, Greece, Egypt, and Japan against the League of Britain, France-Iberia, and Turkey. Greece and Egypt joined the conflict out of their long-standing alliance commitments to the CP. Turkey did so out of its previous ties to the League powers and because of its irredentist ambitions on Greece. After the signature of the Entente pact, Russia had cranked up its pressure on Turkey to expand its own influence in the country and make it a client, with London and Paris making their unwillingness to intervene in the matter known to the hapless Turks. The Turkish government had reluctantly given in to Russian pressure, but given the strong popular hostility in Turkey to close ties with Russia, they had tried to compensate by stepping up their irredentist stance against equally unpopular Greece. Japan too joined the Alliance to honor its alliance treaties with the USA and the CP. Russia and Scandinavia instead declared their own neutrality for the moment, although they took a pro-League and pro-Alliance diplomatic stance, respectively. China was far too embroiled in its own domestic problems to play an active role in the conflict, although many Chinese hoped it might be a good opportunity to throw off colonial encroachment in their own land. The Second Great War had begun, and it would change the world.
There was certainly a critical element of miscalculation and denial in the decision of London and Paris to gamble everything on the battlefield again: the advent of the Bourbon regime in France-Iberia could be credited as much as to the shock of defeat in the FGW and subsequent political turmoil as to revanchist denial of the changes in the international pecking order, a kind of collective “raging against decline” if you wish. It seemed that the Western European peoples reacted to the reality of their defeat by embracing the “stab in the back” legend. For the French it was the assumption that their country had been defeated by the disloyalty of “anti-national” domestic elements, and the weakening and demoralizing influence of liberalism, instead of the superior strength of the enemy. For the British, the blame was cast on the Great Rebellion, and they assumed that if India had remained quiet and loyal during the FGW, the British Empire would have triumphed. Regardless of the serious misjudgment of the revanchist powers’ public opinions about their previous military performance, it is probable that their ruling elites would have kept enough common sense not to chance a rematch so easily if the victor powers’ front had remained united. The split between Russia and the American-Central European front substantially changed the global balance of power, giving the League powers the reasonable expectation that if they played their diplomatic cards right, they could face their American and CP enemies with a neutral and benevolent Russia, or even joined to their side. This made the perspective of a general war look not such an uphill fight in London and Paris, even if they still underestimated the power of their adversaries.
Besides the lingering animosities that hailed from the FGW, and the long-standing rivalry between the USA and the British Empire on one side, France and the Central Powers on the other side, that went back to the Revolutionary Era, the Second Great War was the ultimate expression of the imperialistic competition for economic and political dominance of the world, that gripped all the great powers during the 19th century as an effect of global industrialization. Political factors just aligned this free-for-all rivalry into a structured clash between the blocs of Western Europe and America-Central Europe, with Russia playing a wild card. As a matter of fact, if one takes all the various factors that were driving the rival alliance blocs to a fight, they may wonder why the interwar period lasted so long, 36 years. There are various reasons that may account for it. First of all, the social shock of the FGW, the first total war of the Industrial Age, induced a lingering war weariness in European and American society that took a generation to dwindle completely and influenced the great powers to steer away from ultimate escalation to a general war while it lasted. Second, and no less important, colonial expansion of the European powers, and American focus on settlement of the Western Hemisphere, acted as a powerful “safety valve” for imperial competition: as long as the great powers could grab new markets and resources, and satisfy their ambitions for glory, in a much safer and easier way by conquering the pre-colonial states and colonizing the undeveloped areas of Asia and Africa, the impulse to fall on each other and rob their rival was substantially diminished and kept in check for decades.
The colonial outlet however could not work to defuse imperialistic hostility forever. By the end of the 19th century, the world, with the exception of China proper, had been partitioned into the empires of the great powers. The pressure to expand their own power and influence remained as high as ever, due to the socio-economic effect of industrialization and an international order that had carved the world into a few protectionist big blocs. American annexation of Brazil, the Scramble for Africa, Russian expansion in the Middle East and Central Asia, European colonization of South Asia and Southeast Asia, Japan’s and Egypt’s modernization, regional expansion, and integration in the alliance blocs, had all been important stages of this process that had left the great power wanting of further room to expand, short of falling on each other, or the complete colonial partition or joint colonization of China (an impressive task that at the very least required more long-term cooperation than the great powers were able to muster reliably).
A significant hallmark of the growing imperialistic rivalry between the great powers were the recurring international crises that intermittently marked the last quarter of the 19th century. Variously involving flashpoints in the typical areas where the spheres of influence of the great powers met and clashed, such as South America, Africa, the Pacific, Western Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, they were too many, and their apparent causes often apparently too trivial, to be chronicled in a global history context. But their recurrence, increasing frequency, and ever more difficult peaceful solution, that often just froze them into unsatisfactory or instable compromises, were a manifestation of the underlying international tensions that gradually heightened during the 1880s and the 1890s. The arms race in the naval and land fields between the great powers, that spanned and steadily intensified during the last third of the 19th century, was another major manifestation of their imperialistic rivalry.
One event that in the opinion of many historians was a critical step in the path to the second world war was the so-called “Triple Entente” pact between Britain, France-Iberia, and Russia. Its genesis lies in the aftermath of the Eight-Nation War: Russia had been left unsatisfied and alienated by the other great powers’ veto to its sole protectorate over Manchuria, and the alliance of Japan with America and the CP, and turned to the Western European powers seeking an understanding that might guarantee its desired sphere of influence. On their part, London and Paris were eager, as long as Russian demands were reasonable, to bind the wild-card diplomacy of the Russian Empire to a stance that would guarantee its benevolent neutrality, or optimally its active support, in a clash with their American and Central European enemies. Contrasting Russian and British interests in the Middle East and China were a significant, but not insurmountable, obstacle, and in 1894, diplomatic talks ensued in the so-called “Entente Cordiale” between Russia and the League powers of Britain and France-Iberia. It involved a public non-aggression pact between the three powers, that bound them to neutrality in the case that Russia or the Anglo-French-Iberian alliance found themselves at war with one or more third powers; there also was a secret agreement that recognized Turkey and Manchuria within the Russian sphere of influence as far as Britain and F-I were concerned. The talks failed to establish a full-fledged military alliance between Russia and the Western European powers because of lingering Russian reluctance to bind itself so thoroughly and owing to the onerous demands of St. Petersburg for such an alliance (recognition of a Russian sphere of influence over Egypt and North China), which Britain balked to for the moment. Nonetheless, the three powers expressed their mutual willingness to re-consider further definition and recognition of a Russian sphere of interest in the Middle East and China, in the case of a general conflict.
Although it officially amounted to nothing more than a non-aggression pact, the Triple Entente was widely interpreted by the Western public opinion as a substantial change in the great powers’ alliance game, which bound wild-card Russia to benevolent neutrality towards, and -it was often suspected- an occult quasi-alliance with, Britain and France-Iberia. As a result, the Western European powers felt emboldened and took a more confrontational diplomatic and strategic stance towards America and the Central Powers. Conversely, the USA and the CP were driven to strengthen their own alliance ties and to assume an openly anti-Russian stance; international tensions and the arms race intensified in the following three years, till in early 1898, a “perfect storm” of various simultaneous minor international crises between the Anglo-French-Iberians and the USA or the CP occurred.
It was the combination of several minor flashpoints coming in rapid succession. The final straw were street incidents between French irredentist groups and German and Italian authorities in Lorraine and Savoy and clashes between UK colonial police and US settlers in the border areas of Patagonia. However, as much as popular imagination may like to single out the "Patagonia incidents" and/or the "Lorraine-Savoy troubles" as the main cause of the war, the international atmosphere had already been made tense in the previous months by the reopening of frozen border conflicts over some contested areas in Cameroon and Tanganyika, as well as disputes over the ownership of some islands placed between US Philippines and UK Indonesia. Taken individually, each of those flashpoints might have been far too trivial to justify a world war, especially in a different international atmosphere. But in the tense conditions of the late 1890s, their sum proved to be beyond the will or ability of the great powers to solve or contain by peaceful means yet again, and the heating antagonisms of the last thirty years finally reached the boiling point. The combined crisis worsened to a war fever and diplomatic escalation, then to mobilization of the great powers, and eventually in mid-1898 to a quick volley of declarations of war that squared the Alliance of the USA, Germany, Italy, H-C-S, Greece, Egypt, and Japan against the League of Britain, France-Iberia, and Turkey. Greece and Egypt joined the conflict out of their long-standing alliance commitments to the CP. Turkey did so out of its previous ties to the League powers and because of its irredentist ambitions on Greece. After the signature of the Entente pact, Russia had cranked up its pressure on Turkey to expand its own influence in the country and make it a client, with London and Paris making their unwillingness to intervene in the matter known to the hapless Turks. The Turkish government had reluctantly given in to Russian pressure, but given the strong popular hostility in Turkey to close ties with Russia, they had tried to compensate by stepping up their irredentist stance against equally unpopular Greece. Japan too joined the Alliance to honor its alliance treaties with the USA and the CP. Russia and Scandinavia instead declared their own neutrality for the moment, although they took a pro-League and pro-Alliance diplomatic stance, respectively. China was far too embroiled in its own domestic problems to play an active role in the conflict, although many Chinese hoped it might be a good opportunity to throw off colonial encroachment in their own land. The Second Great War had begun, and it would change the world.
Last edited:
Sorry for not responding earlier. It sounds good to me, but I will leave that decision up to Eurofed as he is still the official mapmaker, and I am merely assisting.
These are perfectly viable reasons for why a World War might start, but I think that there should be a specific event that gets focused on as a 'straw that broke the camel's back'. WWI happened because Europe was a clusterfuck of secret treaties and alliances and it would have erupted into a world conflict eventually, but most people agree that the spark which started the flames of war was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.
There's a coolness factor to this, too. It's cooler to think 'The tensions exploded into war because X politician was assassinated or fascist country Y invaded country Z in a fit of expansionism' as opposed to 'various minor international incidents'. The public should focus on one event in particular and mark it as the instigator of the world conflict, even though it may not necessarily be the sole cause.
Eurofed
Banned
Sorry for not responding earlier. It sounds good to me, but I will leave that decision up to Eurofed as he is still the official mapmaker, and I am merely assisting.
I've uploaded revised 1862 and 1875 maps with the Philippines divided into the three territories in posts #673-674.
Last edited:
Eurofed
Banned
In all honesty, I felt unsatisfied with picking any single viable casus belli and making it the official cause of the war, b/c they felt too petty for a world war of such epic scope. Morever, I was fond of giving at least each major pair of "hereditary enemies" in the lineup (US/UK, CP/France) their own casus belli instead of being dragged in by their allies.
Here, I've slightly modifed the wording. Does it feel better ?
"It was the combination of several minor flashpoints coming in rapid succession. The final straw were street incidents between French irredentist groups and German and Italian authorities in Lorraine and Savoy and clashes between UK colonial police and US settlers in the border areas of Patagonia. However, as much as popular imagination may like to single out the "Patagonia incident" and/or the "Lorraine-Savoy trouble" as the main cause of the war, the international atmosphere had already been made tense in the previous months by the reopening of frozen border conflicts over some contested areas in Cameroon and Tanganyika, as well as disputes over the ownership of some islands placed between US Philippines and UK Indonesia."
Last edited:
Eurofed
Banned
Not always. There are times when history graciously provides a suitably impressive "spark" event (e.g. Pearl Harbor, 9-11) and times when it doesn't really exist or it is an ultimately trivial red herring.
I regard OTL WWI as belonging in the latter category: the great powers were headed to a clash, it would have quite easily happened a few years before (there had been a number of near misses) or later, on a wide variety of pretexts. The situation for TTL equivalent is the same, only more so, since the Alliance and the League have been spoiling for a fight for years and years.
So I've purposefully de-emphasized the final casus belli. If you really wish to identiy some, think of the "Patagonia incident" for the USA and the UK, and the "Lorraine-Savoy trouble" for the CP and F-I. But just like Princip and Franz Ferdinand, they are ultimately trivial red herrings. The real causes, course, and outcome of the war are everything that matters.
Moreover, I'm fond of the symmetry implied in the fact that both America and Europe can look to their own "final straws", for the little that they can matter.
Last edited:
The causes belli:
In Europe: In Strassbourg, an ethnically German organized crime organization kills the first ethnically French mayor of the city since the FWW. A general uprising against the Germans in Lorraine then follows, which sort of inspires the Savoyards, so a similar uprising breaks out in Savoy. The uprisings succeed in basically recapturing Lorraine and Savoy, and the Franco-Iberians are welcomed with open arms. The Germans and Italians react with a declaration of war.
In America: General Reston Otter is appointed the Colonial Governor of Patagonia. Otter, a native of British Rio de la Plata and a general during the FWW, was appointed military governor of the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and reacted to an uprising in January of 1858 with mass murder and rape. The appointment of Otter is followed by mass protests throughout Bolivia and South Peru, which quickly spread to the whole country.
Now we have two wars: America vs. Britain, and Franco-Iberia vs. Germany, Italy. Now to tie them together
On the Lorraine Front: A contingent of the British Red Cross (or whatever the equivalent is), helping wounded French soldiers on the Lorraine front, was shot at and massacred by the Germans. Later evidence would show that the whole thing was fabricated by the French, who were startled to have Britain not immediately, enthusiastically fight for them. The heavily-publicized incident caused a scandal in Britain, leading them to declare war on Germany and Italy. America had already (meaninglessly) declared war on Franco-Iberia.
In the Eastern Mediterranean: The signing of a formal Greco-Egyptian alliance, and joint military exercises off the coast of Syria, coupled with the distraction of the Great Powers, and Brother Leader's success in modernizing the Turkish army, led to a sudden Turkish declaration of war on Greece and Egypt. Massacres of Pontic Greeks led the Central Powers to intervene on the Greco-Egyptian side, and the whole thing just kinda merged into the general war. Russia provided great aid to Turkey, but fell short of declaring war on its former allies, due largely to the protests of influential FWW veterans' groups who had fought side-by-side with the Germans and Italians.
And Japan was just opportunistic.
Eurofed...is all this good?
In Europe: In Strassbourg, an ethnically German organized crime organization kills the first ethnically French mayor of the city since the FWW. A general uprising against the Germans in Lorraine then follows, which sort of inspires the Savoyards, so a similar uprising breaks out in Savoy. The uprisings succeed in basically recapturing Lorraine and Savoy, and the Franco-Iberians are welcomed with open arms. The Germans and Italians react with a declaration of war.
In America: General Reston Otter is appointed the Colonial Governor of Patagonia. Otter, a native of British Rio de la Plata and a general during the FWW, was appointed military governor of the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and reacted to an uprising in January of 1858 with mass murder and rape. The appointment of Otter is followed by mass protests throughout Bolivia and South Peru, which quickly spread to the whole country.
Now we have two wars: America vs. Britain, and Franco-Iberia vs. Germany, Italy. Now to tie them together
On the Lorraine Front: A contingent of the British Red Cross (or whatever the equivalent is), helping wounded French soldiers on the Lorraine front, was shot at and massacred by the Germans. Later evidence would show that the whole thing was fabricated by the French, who were startled to have Britain not immediately, enthusiastically fight for them. The heavily-publicized incident caused a scandal in Britain, leading them to declare war on Germany and Italy. America had already (meaninglessly) declared war on Franco-Iberia.
In the Eastern Mediterranean: The signing of a formal Greco-Egyptian alliance, and joint military exercises off the coast of Syria, coupled with the distraction of the Great Powers, and Brother Leader's success in modernizing the Turkish army, led to a sudden Turkish declaration of war on Greece and Egypt. Massacres of Pontic Greeks led the Central Powers to intervene on the Greco-Egyptian side, and the whole thing just kinda merged into the general war. Russia provided great aid to Turkey, but fell short of declaring war on its former allies, due largely to the protests of influential FWW veterans' groups who had fought side-by-side with the Germans and Italians.
And Japan was just opportunistic.
Eurofed...is all this good?
Agreed. But what of the Falklands? Does US take it as a prize as well or does it remain in British hands? I vote for the former.
Also, did France retain any of its Pacific posessions? I understand the endgoal is for US controlled Oceania, so it would make sense for them to EVENTUALLY be transferred over, but did I miss it already happening? Particularly Wallis and Fortuna, and New Caledonia?
Eurofed
Banned
BSA is just the beginning. This is the endgame of the British Empire. At least, this TL grants it a glorious death on the battlefield. Brant's Prophecy shall eventually find its penultimate meaning.
Last edited:
Eurofed
Banned
The USA shall take the Falklands, and much, much more.
One way or another, this war shall result in the USA controlling all of Oceania. I really could not force myself to bother covering the colonial settlement of all the fricking Pacific island groups in the TL.
I have to comment on what will happen to Indonesia and Yakutia for this war..., Are they going to be annexed by the United States later on... even not after this SGW... as this scenario is plausible as understood?
- Status