AMBOMB wrote:
While a lot of that tonnage was tactical the largest part was strategic dropped by bombers on railways, roads, bridges and the like. And while it initially destroyed North Korea's infrastructure, (what was left of it) after the Chinese intervention by which time most industry and supply was coming from inside China which the UN could NOT hit even if they wanted to the effect dropped significantly.
As for the statement "If we had been more aggressive in the Korean War, launching large scale operations after mid-1951 instead of essentially sitting on the 38th parallel and bombing and shelling for 2 years, we would've won" followed by numerous statements of "allied air superiority" and the ability to bomb the enemy at will with impunity.
I'd suggest reviewing the history. By mid-1951 UN forces had edged back to near the 38th parallel at which point the enemy counter attacked with sufficient forces to push the UN back towards Seoul. In response once we'd prepared we pushed THEM back to the 38th and so on and so forth until late 1951 at which point the North and South Koreans asked the Chinese and UN to begin negotiations towards an armistice agreement.
Why would "we" consider this when we had been pushing the enemy back and had "air superiority"? Because the enemy was pushing the UN back just about as often as the UN pushed them back at this point and we did NOT have 'air superiority' except over our own lines. "Mig Alley" was a thing and we were no longer capable of pushing effective mass bombing raids into North Korea by late 1951 and our ground forces were now engaged with a foe of equal determination and ability. Further that foe was obviously being supplied with first line Soviet equipment both on the ground and in the air which indicated a significant interest, and support by that nation.
(And at the time YES it was considered quite possible that the USSR would go to Atomic war with America over Korea, let alone China. They had included China in their "atomic umbrella" much as they later did Cuba and they had indicated such to us through diplomatic channels)
In part there was a general agreement by all sides that there would be no major operations during the talks, but when those talks broke down in August 1952 the UN went on the offensive and pushed the enemy back in several key locations then went on the defensive and weathered several heavy counter-attacks.
From this direct experience the commanding General, (Ridgeway) with full UN support directed a halt on major offensive operations along the front BECAUSE the cost of any major assault would be far higher than the territory gained would be worth. To make such an effort "worthwhile", (aka push NKA/CCA forces further back in any significant measure) would require a massive commitment of troops, equipment and supplies that would have to come from other, (read Europe) theaters which was unacceptable either politically or militarily.
When Chinese and North Korean units began to engage in bolder probing attacks, artillery duels, and aggressive patrolling during the summer/fall of 1952 the UN aggressively responded by pushing forward a line of fortified observation and strong points which then withstood several determined counter attacks. It was not until the summer of 1952 that UN air power managed to reach parity with the enemy and strategic bombing of targets in North Korea ramped up again. (The problem was if it was important enough by this point the Chinese had it ringed with AAA emplacements and covered by interceptor units so actual damage didn't increase significantly despite more bombs being dropped)
In October 1952 the Enemy launched a series of heavy attacks meant to push the UN back along the front, (specifically to take two critical hills that overlooked the UN positions) but at the end of the two day battle the UN line held and decisively held the critical hills.
Spring and early summer saw a renewed offensive by the enemy aimed at several of the UN outpost/strong points and managed to occupy three of them and pushed back a ROK corps about two miles before they could reestablish a defensive line.
In fact right up to the day the armistice was signed fighting continued. Political policy, (armistice negotiations and diplomacy) were the major factor that kept the UN forces along the 38th parallel but so too did the military reality of a peer level enemy with questionable "air superiority" behind their lines.
https://history.army.mil/html/reference/army_flag/kw.html
AMBOMB wrote:
And yet that is where the majority of the tonnage of bombs was used. Further bridges, railways and roads are strategic not tactical targets even if you use tactical airpower, (the Navy mostly) to hit them.
They were and they did but overall they were NOT going to be ordered to push the Chinese and North Koreans back to the Yalu because there weren't enough forces or power to do so against determined opposition. Negotiations were in progress to end the war and as the UN mandate was to 'restore South Korea' the majority were not willing to commit much more assets than were already in theater to any offensive action.
Hammurabi wrote:
Which has been directly responsible for perpetuation the "overrating" of Air Power as a decisive factor in war. (I was there) The Coalition pretty much destroyed Saddam's Air Force on day one, and effectively degraded his Air Defenses to nil by day three so that Allied fighters and bombers could roam from one end of Iraq to the other without significant threat, let alone any credible opposition.
This compared to late WWII in both Europe and Japan but is very different from such AO's as Korea and Vietnam where enemy air power is a credible and real danger. Air Power, even with total air superiority over Iraq, failed to stop carefully planned movement of forces, (The Highway of Death was NOT an example of this) the firing of SCUDS, or other military operations which required direct application of ground forces in the area, (supported by Air Power) to engage and destroy.
ObssesedNuker wrote:
And the fact that we couldn't hit the broad-side-of-a-bridge to save our lives was another. It took several hits with high power bombs to DAMAGE most of the bridges that moved supplies from China to Korea and that damage could rapidly be repaired. To DROP the bridge required several DIRECT hits with high powered bombs which even with the deployment of the then 'cutting edge' guidance technology we still couldn't achieve on a regular basis. That failure was what lead to the ability to put a 2000lb bomb through a moving truck window at range.
Similarly the in-ability to keep the enemy movements under observation started development at that point. Butterfly away Korea and the initial basis for a lot of US technological warfare gets significantly delayed. (Along a similar path look how far behind US ECM/ECCM and anti-air counter measures would be without Vietnam)
Cryhavoc101 wrote:
Bush didn't get 'cold feet' the Coalition leadership did and told Bush, (not General Schwarzkopf whom they blindsided, on purpose) they would not support or engage in a direct attack on Baghdad. (Despite the fact the US had troops inside the city at this point) Nor would they support the removal of Saddam from power. He 'pulled-the-plug' because if he had not the Coalition troops were going to turn around and go home the next day no matter what the US did and we were too far in with too exposed supply lines to continue on our own.
Schwarzkopf was very verbal about WHO was at fault while he was throwing a trash can around HQ and having people retrieve it so he could throw it again a couple more times and Bush was not the subject of abuse
(And yes I know he said he didn't but even a General needs to blow off some steam on occasion, and there were NOT may places in HQ that his voice did not reach
)
Hammurabi wrote:
::::sigh::: The "revisionism" is simply the Air Force trying to tone down the rhetoric because we literally CAN NOT do such a thing against any near-peer military and the idea that "Air Power" can solve everything is getting to be considered a 'truism' rather than the special case it was. We've been through this before with the false idea that "Air Power" can be some unstoppable force of nature that eliminates any previous military strategy. While the military tends to "learn" from history, political, media, and the public only remember the highlights.
Saddam's army WAS battle hardened... Against other 'peer' armies with little or no coordinated air support. As such they had limited and very inadequate air defense systems and almost no mobile systems beyond man-pack missiles which are useless against most fighter-bomber aircraft.
The Coalitions biggest fear was never Saddam's Army because we knew he didn't have any defenses that could stop or even greatly hinder out air attacks. It was that he had more air defenses than he'd previously shown and maybe enough trained troops to use them effectively. Of secondary concern was his Air Force which could at least blunt or disrupt some of the initial attacks but we knew he didn't have the capability to use what he did have effectively.
And once the Russian's handed over his ID and transponder codes so we could activate his aircrafts on-board radar beacons and transponders remotely we knew where every plane he had was from the first day.
Now back on subject NONE of this applies to Korea because we never had anything similar to that level of air superiority once the Chinese intervened. The North Koreans had last generation Soviet WWII surplus which over matched what the US had given the South Koreans but the US Air Force had wiped the North Korean Air Force away within a couple of weeks of the start of the war. The Chinese Air Force and Air Defenses (and general military which Mac significantly never believed) however were on-par with the UN forces right down the line and occasionally better as the Mig and T-34 showed.
It's not even a close 'comparison' as there was only a short time when the US/UN had "air superiority" over the Korean theater.
Something to keep in mind about both Mao and Stalin; Neither of them really had WANTED a war in Korea at that time as they weren't really 'ready' for it. Neither did the US. The faction IN Korea however saw things differently.
On the one hand Syngman Rhee was determined to see Korea united even if it was by force, while Kim II-sung was determined to see Korea united by force from the start. While Rhee lobbied MacArthur and Truman for supplies, weapons and training they dragged their feet about it. Meanwhile as Kim lobbied Stalin and Mao about supplies, weapons and training and they dragged their feet about it, Kim had a 'one-up' on Rhee. A volunteer Korean division had fought in the Chinese Civil war for Mao and he 'owed' Kim for that help. Further while most of Rhee's communications went through MacArthur to Truman Kim was in contact with both Stalin and Mao through different channels.
So when he was 'ready' (and thought the US would not interfere) he simply used those channels to tell Stalin that Mao had agreed to the attack and Mao that Stalin had given it the green light...
And the rest is history as they say.
BlondieBC wrote:
We tried the former all during the war and failed to put a dent in traffic flow. The latter wasn't an option as we didn't HAVE nerve agent in the field at the time nor could we locate those 'paths' as for the most part they didn't use them. They simply went over the hills and around the crests out of sight of UN forces in small groups that were difficult at best to spot from the air. They would gather at a rally point and then attack. Further the supply depots were in China.
Lastly, and most critically, US and UN policy considered the use of gas on the same level, (and required the same authorization as) nuclear weapons. There was a strict no-first-use policy and the only stores in the Pacific were on, (IIRC) Wake, Johnston, and maybe Kwajalein island at that time with no plans or support to ship it forward. Use would also invite retaliatory use which we were aware both the USSR and China had supplies MUCH closer and estimated larger quantities than available to the UN forces. (Much more so in China since we'd apparently given the Nationalist some just before the fall) And our 'gear' was out of date if it was even available.
More specifically that was MacArthur's "plans" for using nukes against China. He was going to target the Yalu bridges with a couple nukes each followed by fords or any possible crossing point or beach-heads on the Korea side and then proceed to nuke "strategic" targets inside China. His "backup-plan" was to uses conventional weapons but the main point is he was NOT shy about telling everyone and anyone that he fully intended to "pursue" NK forces into and destroy supply dumps and organizational areas that could succor those forces...
And he pretty much 'dared' the Chinese to try and stop him...
Randy
The United States dropped 635,000 tons of bombs during the Korean War, almost as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. If we had been more aggressive in the Korean War, launching large scale operations after mid-1951 instead of essentially sitting on the 38th parallel and bombing and shelling for 2 years, we would've won.
While a lot of that tonnage was tactical the largest part was strategic dropped by bombers on railways, roads, bridges and the like. And while it initially destroyed North Korea's infrastructure, (what was left of it) after the Chinese intervention by which time most industry and supply was coming from inside China which the UN could NOT hit even if they wanted to the effect dropped significantly.
As for the statement "If we had been more aggressive in the Korean War, launching large scale operations after mid-1951 instead of essentially sitting on the 38th parallel and bombing and shelling for 2 years, we would've won" followed by numerous statements of "allied air superiority" and the ability to bomb the enemy at will with impunity.
I'd suggest reviewing the history. By mid-1951 UN forces had edged back to near the 38th parallel at which point the enemy counter attacked with sufficient forces to push the UN back towards Seoul. In response once we'd prepared we pushed THEM back to the 38th and so on and so forth until late 1951 at which point the North and South Koreans asked the Chinese and UN to begin negotiations towards an armistice agreement.
Why would "we" consider this when we had been pushing the enemy back and had "air superiority"? Because the enemy was pushing the UN back just about as often as the UN pushed them back at this point and we did NOT have 'air superiority' except over our own lines. "Mig Alley" was a thing and we were no longer capable of pushing effective mass bombing raids into North Korea by late 1951 and our ground forces were now engaged with a foe of equal determination and ability. Further that foe was obviously being supplied with first line Soviet equipment both on the ground and in the air which indicated a significant interest, and support by that nation.
(And at the time YES it was considered quite possible that the USSR would go to Atomic war with America over Korea, let alone China. They had included China in their "atomic umbrella" much as they later did Cuba and they had indicated such to us through diplomatic channels)
In part there was a general agreement by all sides that there would be no major operations during the talks, but when those talks broke down in August 1952 the UN went on the offensive and pushed the enemy back in several key locations then went on the defensive and weathered several heavy counter-attacks.
From this direct experience the commanding General, (Ridgeway) with full UN support directed a halt on major offensive operations along the front BECAUSE the cost of any major assault would be far higher than the territory gained would be worth. To make such an effort "worthwhile", (aka push NKA/CCA forces further back in any significant measure) would require a massive commitment of troops, equipment and supplies that would have to come from other, (read Europe) theaters which was unacceptable either politically or militarily.
When Chinese and North Korean units began to engage in bolder probing attacks, artillery duels, and aggressive patrolling during the summer/fall of 1952 the UN aggressively responded by pushing forward a line of fortified observation and strong points which then withstood several determined counter attacks. It was not until the summer of 1952 that UN air power managed to reach parity with the enemy and strategic bombing of targets in North Korea ramped up again. (The problem was if it was important enough by this point the Chinese had it ringed with AAA emplacements and covered by interceptor units so actual damage didn't increase significantly despite more bombs being dropped)
In October 1952 the Enemy launched a series of heavy attacks meant to push the UN back along the front, (specifically to take two critical hills that overlooked the UN positions) but at the end of the two day battle the UN line held and decisively held the critical hills.
Spring and early summer saw a renewed offensive by the enemy aimed at several of the UN outpost/strong points and managed to occupy three of them and pushed back a ROK corps about two miles before they could reestablish a defensive line.
In fact right up to the day the armistice was signed fighting continued. Political policy, (armistice negotiations and diplomacy) were the major factor that kept the UN forces along the 38th parallel but so too did the military reality of a peer level enemy with questionable "air superiority" behind their lines.
https://history.army.mil/html/reference/army_flag/kw.html
AMBOMB wrote:
I'm not talking about strategic bombing (which did greatly reduce German production of oil, aviation fuel and synthetic nitrogen and hold down German arms production by the way). Strategic bombing was a wasted effort in the Korean War because North Korea wasn't industrialized
And yet that is where the majority of the tonnage of bombs was used. Further bridges, railways and roads are strategic not tactical targets even if you use tactical airpower, (the Navy mostly) to hit them.
They weren't ordered to take ground. They should've been.
They were and they did but overall they were NOT going to be ordered to push the Chinese and North Koreans back to the Yalu because there weren't enough forces or power to do so against determined opposition. Negotiations were in progress to end the war and as the UN mandate was to 'restore South Korea' the majority were not willing to commit much more assets than were already in theater to any offensive action.
Hammurabi wrote:
Air power is most definitely not overrated. The United States completely destroyed Saddams army in the Gulf War, an army which was the fourth largest in the world at the time, in a matter of weeks with airpower.
The Highway of Death wasn't called such for nothing.
EDIT: I have friends and family that served in the Iraqi army during the war. All of their fantastical war stories end with "and then we got bombed".
Which has been directly responsible for perpetuation the "overrating" of Air Power as a decisive factor in war. (I was there) The Coalition pretty much destroyed Saddam's Air Force on day one, and effectively degraded his Air Defenses to nil by day three so that Allied fighters and bombers could roam from one end of Iraq to the other without significant threat, let alone any credible opposition.
This compared to late WWII in both Europe and Japan but is very different from such AO's as Korea and Vietnam where enemy air power is a credible and real danger. Air Power, even with total air superiority over Iraq, failed to stop carefully planned movement of forces, (The Highway of Death was NOT an example of this) the firing of SCUDS, or other military operations which required direct application of ground forces in the area, (supported by Air Power) to engage and destroy.
ObssesedNuker wrote:
Yeah, the Chinese managed to exploit some pretty big sensor gaps that existed at the time to mitigate the effects of US air supremacy. The lack of good night fighting equipment is the most glaring.
And the fact that we couldn't hit the broad-side-of-a-bridge to save our lives was another. It took several hits with high power bombs to DAMAGE most of the bridges that moved supplies from China to Korea and that damage could rapidly be repaired. To DROP the bridge required several DIRECT hits with high powered bombs which even with the deployment of the then 'cutting edge' guidance technology we still couldn't achieve on a regular basis. That failure was what lead to the ability to put a 2000lb bomb through a moving truck window at range.
Similarly the in-ability to keep the enemy movements under observation started development at that point. Butterfly away Korea and the initial basis for a lot of US technological warfare gets significantly delayed. (Along a similar path look how far behind US ECM/ECCM and anti-air counter measures would be without Vietnam)
Cryhavoc101 wrote:
Saddam's Republican Guard survived because of one reason - basically it had moved north out of the 'kill area' leaving many of the 'non republican guard' units to get massacred but the coalition forces were preparing for another major thrust as their logistics caught up which would have seen many of the Rep guard units engaged - when the only force on earth capable of stopping the coalition Army from destroying the Republican Guard was POTUS George Bush Snr
Basically he got cold feet and told Gen. Schwarzkopf that he was pulling the plug the next day (because the curb stomp was playing badly on TV) - the General quite rightly did not wait for the deadline but instead halted everything right away.
The General was damned if he would waste a single additional coalition life on a campaign where the leadership had obviously bottled it.
For that he has my respect even if it did allow the Rep Guard to escape and as we know go on to commit mass murder vs Iraqi civilians
Bush Snr?..not so much
Bush didn't get 'cold feet' the Coalition leadership did and told Bush, (not General Schwarzkopf whom they blindsided, on purpose) they would not support or engage in a direct attack on Baghdad. (Despite the fact the US had troops inside the city at this point) Nor would they support the removal of Saddam from power. He 'pulled-the-plug' because if he had not the Coalition troops were going to turn around and go home the next day no matter what the US did and we were too far in with too exposed supply lines to continue on our own.
Schwarzkopf was very verbal about WHO was at fault while he was throwing a trash can around HQ and having people retrieve it so he could throw it again a couple more times and Bush was not the subject of abuse
Hammurabi wrote:
I really don't understand why this revisionism exists regarding the Gulf War, and the importance of air power in it. Of course any military conduct requires a ground campaign, but the USAF took the fourth largest army in the world, an army which had just been hardened with eight years of war, and dismembered and routed it in a matter of weeks. The Battle of al-Khafji is a testament to the raw power of air. Iraqi forces had been made destitute in the two week air campaign preceding the offensive, and all of its offensive potential was destroyed before it even saw ground combat against coalition forces outside of a few engagements with recon platoons.
::::sigh::: The "revisionism" is simply the Air Force trying to tone down the rhetoric because we literally CAN NOT do such a thing against any near-peer military and the idea that "Air Power" can solve everything is getting to be considered a 'truism' rather than the special case it was. We've been through this before with the false idea that "Air Power" can be some unstoppable force of nature that eliminates any previous military strategy. While the military tends to "learn" from history, political, media, and the public only remember the highlights.
Saddam's army WAS battle hardened... Against other 'peer' armies with little or no coordinated air support. As such they had limited and very inadequate air defense systems and almost no mobile systems beyond man-pack missiles which are useless against most fighter-bomber aircraft.
The Coalitions biggest fear was never Saddam's Army because we knew he didn't have any defenses that could stop or even greatly hinder out air attacks. It was that he had more air defenses than he'd previously shown and maybe enough trained troops to use them effectively. Of secondary concern was his Air Force which could at least blunt or disrupt some of the initial attacks but we knew he didn't have the capability to use what he did have effectively.
And once the Russian's handed over his ID and transponder codes so we could activate his aircrafts on-board radar beacons and transponders remotely we knew where every plane he had was from the first day.
Now back on subject NONE of this applies to Korea because we never had anything similar to that level of air superiority once the Chinese intervened. The North Koreans had last generation Soviet WWII surplus which over matched what the US had given the South Koreans but the US Air Force had wiped the North Korean Air Force away within a couple of weeks of the start of the war. The Chinese Air Force and Air Defenses (and general military which Mac significantly never believed) however were on-par with the UN forces right down the line and occasionally better as the Mig and T-34 showed.
It's not even a close 'comparison' as there was only a short time when the US/UN had "air superiority" over the Korean theater.
Something to keep in mind about both Mao and Stalin; Neither of them really had WANTED a war in Korea at that time as they weren't really 'ready' for it. Neither did the US. The faction IN Korea however saw things differently.
On the one hand Syngman Rhee was determined to see Korea united even if it was by force, while Kim II-sung was determined to see Korea united by force from the start. While Rhee lobbied MacArthur and Truman for supplies, weapons and training they dragged their feet about it. Meanwhile as Kim lobbied Stalin and Mao about supplies, weapons and training and they dragged their feet about it, Kim had a 'one-up' on Rhee. A volunteer Korean division had fought in the Chinese Civil war for Mao and he 'owed' Kim for that help. Further while most of Rhee's communications went through MacArthur to Truman Kim was in contact with both Stalin and Mao through different channels.
So when he was 'ready' (and thought the US would not interfere) he simply used those channels to tell Stalin that Mao had agreed to the attack and Mao that Stalin had given it the green light...
And the rest is history as they say.
BlondieBC wrote:
Blow up the Yalu river bridges, then do persistent nerve agent on the paths the Chinese troops were traveling. And use nerve agents on any supply depots we could find. They had to get their food from somewhere.
We tried the former all during the war and failed to put a dent in traffic flow. The latter wasn't an option as we didn't HAVE nerve agent in the field at the time nor could we locate those 'paths' as for the most part they didn't use them. They simply went over the hills and around the crests out of sight of UN forces in small groups that were difficult at best to spot from the air. They would gather at a rally point and then attack. Further the supply depots were in China.
Lastly, and most critically, US and UN policy considered the use of gas on the same level, (and required the same authorization as) nuclear weapons. There was a strict no-first-use policy and the only stores in the Pacific were on, (IIRC) Wake, Johnston, and maybe Kwajalein island at that time with no plans or support to ship it forward. Use would also invite retaliatory use which we were aware both the USSR and China had supplies MUCH closer and estimated larger quantities than available to the UN forces. (Much more so in China since we'd apparently given the Nationalist some just before the fall) And our 'gear' was out of date if it was even available.
More specifically that was MacArthur's "plans" for using nukes against China. He was going to target the Yalu bridges with a couple nukes each followed by fords or any possible crossing point or beach-heads on the Korea side and then proceed to nuke "strategic" targets inside China. His "backup-plan" was to uses conventional weapons but the main point is he was NOT shy about telling everyone and anyone that he fully intended to "pursue" NK forces into and destroy supply dumps and organizational areas that could succor those forces...
And he pretty much 'dared' the Chinese to try and stop him...
Randy