Uniate Serbia?

[simplification] Uniates are Orthodox Christians who accept the authority of the Pope. [/simplification]

There are clusters of them all over Eastern Europe and the Middle East: see http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniate_Church, which lists 22 distinct Uniate churches, though some of them are quite small.

However, there are no Uniate Serbs. What if there were?

Well... probably the best way is to have Austria-Hungary not lose that border war with the Ottomans in the 1730s. Austria had picked up some nice frontier territory in the 17-teens under Prince Eugene, including Belgrade and its immediate surroundings. OTL they foolishly frittered it away a generation later. That had a number of unfortunate results, the main one being that they didn't manage any more territorial expansion in the Balkans until they picked up Bosnia 140 years (!) later.

Say that in this TL, though, the Austrians manage to hang on to Belgrade. Now they have all the best bits of what's going to be Serbia, including the Metropolitan seat of the Church. Serb nationalism in the Ottoman territories is going to be hamstrung, since an independent Serbia without the pashalik of Belgrade doesn't make much sense.

Now, just to make things more interesting, have the Austrians force the Serbs of Belgrade and Vojvodina to become Uniates. There's precedent, in Transylvania, Ruthenia and the western Ukraine. OTL, Austria forced Uniate status upon Orthodox churches there. It met with resistance at first, but eventually came to be accepted as the normal order of things. Today there are hundreds of thousands of Uniates in Ukraine and Romania, and they vigorously resent and resist the idea of being pulled /away/ from Rome. (And -- in Romania, at least -- get beaten up by nationalists accordingly; Ceausescu hated the Uniates, and the contemporary Romanian Orthodox Church has picked up where he left off.)

Anyway. This adds a fourth group to the Serbo-Croat religious mix -- there will still be plenty of Orthodox Serbs in the Turkish lands. Paradoxiclaly, I think this will make it easier for ethnic/linguistic nationalism to take root. Uniate Serbs could serve as a bridge, after all; they'd be just as "Austrian" (and so "civilized") as the Croats, but Orthodox rather than Catholic. If Serb nationalism is definied as "all Christian South Slavs" instead of "all Orthodox South Slavs", then the Balkans are going to look very different.

Of course, Austria keeping Belgrade would yank Balkan history out of its track pretty quickly anyway. There's probably no Serb Revolt and so no Kingdom of Serbia. I think it's plausible that Bosnia and much of the rest of Serbia could come under Austrian domination before the French Revolution. In that case, the *Yugoslavs would be in roughly the position of the OTL Czechs and Slovaks: most of them live under Austrian rule, and nationalism can coalesce along one pole (cultural expression -> autonomy -> independence) instead of two.

As an interesting side effect, you've also got a richer and (probably) stabler Austria.

Thoughts?


Doug M.
 
If the Austrians win in 1739, that means that the Russians almost certainly win as well. That means, at the least, that you have Russian Crimea and Moldovia thirty years earlier, with the attendant Russian fleet on the Black Sea.

Without Austro-Russian defeat two years earlier will the war of Austrian succession play out the same way? It's certainly going to happen, but I doubt that Sweden will enter the war, as they won't be sure that they'll be able to engineer an anti-Austrian coup in the imediate aftermath of a victorious war in league with them. This will completely change the direction of Russian politics in the 18th century. Without Sweden to act as a spoiler, the Russians will march on Prussia in 1740. This probably means that the war ends much sooner, and very unfavourably for Prussia.

The post war settlement probably includes no Austrian losses, and the Prussian loss of East Prussia to Russia.
 
You're very probably right, but I'd like to focus on the Balkans for the nonce. "Austria and Russia beat Turkey hard" is a related but separate POD.

cheers,


Doug M.
 
You're very probably right, but I'd like to focus on the Balkans for the nonce. "Austria and Russia beat Turkey hard" is a related but separate POD.

I disagree here, I don't think you can have an Austrian victory without a Russian one or vice versa, as one being defeated means that the Ottomans can concentrate their forces (as they did against Russia IOTL) and win.

That dosen't mean one can't concentrate on the direct effects in the Balkans, but the strong coupling to the War of Austrian succession almost immeditately after your PoD make it hard.

The first question is how much territory the Austrians acquire if they win. According to this review of a book on the subject, Austria had quite limited war aims, and may be content with quite minor concessions from the Ottomans that make Belgrade more secure. I will assume this for the rest of the post. If the Austrians do take the opportunity to take southern Serbia, a lot more changes, particualrly if the Austrians can comple the submission of the Serbian Patriarch to the Pope. This will leave Oltenia as a Habsburg possession, and lead to interesting times as the Russian possession of Moravia and the Crimea leads to greater influence in the Eastern Balkans.

Looking at the Serbs in particular, some thoughts:

  • With greater Austrian success, I would assume that the Second Serbian Migration does not occur to the same extent, or at least, dosen't go as far north.
  • The Patriarchy of the Serbian Orthodox church remains, I assume in Ottoman territory in Pec, although I can see the Austrians wanting to come back for a rematch 20 years later. If the forced Unitate conversion dosen't start immeditaly, I'd imagine that it could migrate to Belgrade and then get stuck there.
  • the rate of conversion of Serbs to Islam for economic reasons may be slowed, as migration to northern Serbia is more attractive/accessible than OTL. If the Austrians come back for more 20 years later and take southern Serbia, then conversion will halt, leading to a larger self identified "Serbo-Croat" population.
  • what happens to Montenegro? As a Russian ally they may become de jure autonomous as well as de facto.
This is where the War of Austrian succession really matters. If the war ends relatively quickly with an Austrian victory, then a stronger Austria better placed in the Balkans is very likely to team up with the Russians for the next round of wars in the Balkans. Even with the OTL result, I think it quite possible that the Austrians may choose to get involved. Essentially, the question is about when/whether Bosnia and southern Serbia falls to Austrian expansion. If the Russians are confident that the Austrians are on board, then this could occur in the early 1760s. This also matters for the GDiplomatic Revolution, which will not occur with a quick War of Succession.

I'd best stop here, but this is quite a fun PoD, as it totally changes the 18th century, probably averts/slows the rise of Prussia, and maintains the British-Austro-Russian alliance. It would be interesting to see a 18th century dominated by tensions between them and a Franco-Swedish-North German-Ottoman allaince.
 

Vitruvius

Donor
I'm not sure about Russia but just speaking to the main point, Uniate Serbs, I think the easiest way might involve the least change. Just have Emperor Leopold put some clause into the Great Privilege that requires them to convert. Maybe after Passorowitz when its clear that the Serbs who fled into the Banat can't go back the Emperor renegotiates the terms. Or perhaps this occurs later. The Serbs petitioned several times for an autonomous Voivodeship but never got it. Maybe when Francis Rakoczi rises up against the Austrians the Emperor buys some Serbian help by granting them their voivodeship. Or maybe it happens in between. Point being they get an autonomous region (politicaly) maybe even a crown land in the Austrian hereditary domains no longer subject to the Hungarian crown but they have to submit (ecclesiasticaly) to Rome.

Of course this doesn't do anything for the rest of the Serbs in Serbia who remain orthodox. (though it might affect orthodox Romanians who were at that time under the Serbian Patriarchs jurisdiction at least as far as Austria was concerned) So I could either see this leading to the pan slavic nationalism described above or see it breaking the back of Serbian nationalism in the 19th century, depending very much on how things play out in the wider scene. Anyways its just a thought.
 
I don't think you'll see much difference in Serbian nationalism because there was no such thing as Serbian nationalism. That's a little of an anachronism. "Identity" was almost entirely religious, so you're not creating an alternative to this and thus ethnic nationalism, you're creating yet another Serbo-Croatian group that will hate the others, especially if they are preferentially treated. You're also probably overloading the empire with South Slavs which will have a pretty large effect on the development of the Hapsburg monarchy, and probably a large negative effect at that.

Trying to force them to become uniate at such a late date could be problemmatic and might cause many to flee South, which would be a strange irony.

But what you're proposing doesn't sound impossible - while the situations are a lot different, the Maronites became "more uniate" in the same time frame, but that was French agency, and France wasn't adjacent to Lebanon...
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
I don't think you'll see much difference in Serbian nationalism because there was no such thing as Serbian nationalism. That's a little of an anachronism. "Identity" was almost entirely religious, so you're not creating an alternative to this and thus ethnic nationalism, you're creating yet another Serbo-Croatian group that will hate the others, especially if they are preferentially treated.
I agree with most of this. The only exception is if southern Serbia+Bosnia falls to the Austrians within the next few decades, then the great majority of Orthodox "Serbs" may convert. This Uniate group may latterly be less antagonistic with the Catholics.

You're also probably overloading the empire with South Slavs which will have a pretty large effect on the development of the Hapsburg monarchy, and probably a large negative effect at that.
It is this increased number of southern Slavs that I think has the greatest likelihood of encouraging the formation of a united Serbo-Croat identity, particularly if come the Hungarian rebellion they are set up as some form of third leg of the Hapsburg Empire alongside the Kingdom of Hungary. Having a couple of hundred years of common institutions and the construction of an identity in opposition to Magyar and German Others might be sufficient to create what Doug M. is looking for.
 
I agree with most of this. The only exception is if southern Serbia+Bosnia falls to the Austrians within the next few decades, then the great majority of Orthodox "Serbs" may convert. This Uniate group may latterly be less antagonistic with the Catholics.

It is this increased number of southern Slavs that I think has the greatest likelihood of encouraging the formation of a united Serbo-Croat identity, particularly if come the Hungarian rebellion they are set up as some form of third leg of the Hapsburg Empire alongside the Kingdom of Hungary. Having a couple of hundred years of common institutions and the construction of an identity in opposition to Magyar and German Others might be sufficient to create what Doug M. is looking for.

500 years of common history didn't suffice in Bosnia... nor did all of the "Serbs" convert. In the later era, conversion was much rarer pretty much everywhere.
 
500 years of common history didn't suffice in Bosnia... nor did all of the "Serbs" convert. In the later era, conversion was much rarer pretty much everywhere.

If the Austrians can compel both the Metropolitan of Belgrade and and the Patriarch in Pec to convert, then it could be moderatly successful if they stick at it for 50 years. On the common history, the important thing is to have the Catholic, Uniate, and Orthodox working together in support of the same institutions that they both have a stake in against someone they feel more threatened by, for a long time, rather than having them separated for another 200 years.
 
If the Austrians can compel both the Metropolitan of Belgrade and and the Patriarch in Pec to convert, then it could be moderatly successful if they stick at it for 50 years. On the common history, the important thing is to have the Catholic, Uniate, and Orthodox working together in support of the same institutions that they both have a stake in against someone they feel more threatened by, for a long time, rather than having them separated for another 200 years.

Trying to compel them is the best way of getting them to work together against someone they feel threatened by, it seems to me. When a foreign state forces a religious leader to convert, it rarely works as intended.
 
500 years of common history didn't suffice in Bosnia...

On the other hand, Albanians managed to develop an intense national identity despite being divided religiously in much the same way as the South Slavs. (And with the Gheg/Tosk split thrown in on top of that.)


Doug M.
 
When a foreign state forces a religious leader to convert, it rarely works as intended.

In the Balkans, the track record seems to be about 50-50. The Austrians pulled exactly this trick in Transylvania, and managed to "convert" about half of that province's Romanians in fairly short order.

Interestingly, this ended up having little effect on Romanian nationalism. But that's something else again.


Doug M.
 
On the other hand, Albanians managed to develop an intense national identity despite being divided religiously in much the same way as the South Slavs. (And with the Gheg/Tosk split thrown in on top of that.)


Doug M.

I don't think that's true, though. They certainly had tribal and regional identities, but it wasn't really until the Balkan Wars and their physical separation from the Ottoman Empire that they were forced to adopt a national indentity, and even then it wasn't achieved uniformly. A lot of Albanians ended up in other countries where they were forcibly assimilated (many Orthodox Christian Albanians became Greeks, for example). Also, note that nobody is in a hurry to unite Kosova with Albania - neither party wants this.
 
In the Balkans, the track record seems to be about 50-50. The Austrians pulled exactly this trick in Transylvania, and managed to "convert" about half of that province's Romanians in fairly short order.

Interestingly, this ended up having little effect on Romanian nationalism. But that's something else again.


Doug M.

But Romania developed without Transylvania - by the time it was incorporated, Romania was already an ethnic national state. Anyway, I suppose it's possible - but it strikes me that Romania had a more problemmatic relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate than did the Serbs, who didn't have the same impetus to resist the Greeks than did the Bulgarians - when the Bulgarian Exarchate was created there was no equivalent push for a Serbian church...
 
I don't think that's true, though. They certainly had tribal and regional identities, but it wasn't really until the Balkan Wars and their physical separation from the Ottoman Empire that they were forced to adopt a national indentity,

I said they managed to develop an intense national identity regardless of religion. The fact that they did it later than their neighbors is not really relevant.

That said, I note that Albanian nationalism appeared in strength long before their separation from the Ottomans.


Also, note that nobody is in a hurry to unite Kosova with Albania - neither party wants this.

But that's not because of religious differences. (1) And I'm not sure what your point is here. Is the existence of Cyprus evidence that Greek nationalist feeling is weak?


Doug M.

(1) It's because they don't want to share Eurovision entries.
 
Last edited:
That had a number of unfortunate results, the main one being that they didn't manage any more territorial expansion in the Balkans until they picked up Bosnia 140 years (!) later.

Orsova in 1791, Dalmatia in 1797, Ragusa in 1815.

Serb nationalism in the Ottoman territories is going to be hamstrung, since an independent Serbia without the pashalik of Belgrade doesn't make much sense.
Not if you consider that Old Serbia didn't even reach the Danube. And what would you call Montenegro?

Now, just to make things more interesting, have the Austrians force the Serbs of Belgrade and Vojvodina to become Uniates. There's precedent, in Transylvania, Ruthenia and the western Ukraine. OTL, Austria forced Uniate status upon Orthodox churches there.
I don't know about the Ukrainians but it wasn't forced in Transylvania. The Austrians simply offered the Eastern Orthodox clergy a choice between second-class citizenship and theological compromise... and later ignored its promises, at least according to Romanian historiography. I highly doubt Austria has the ability to impose religion on its Serb subjects.

If the Austrians win in 1739, that means that the Russians almost certainly win as well. That means, at the least, that you have Russian Crimea and Moldovia thirty years earlier, with the attendant Russian fleet on the Black Sea.

Errr, no. The POD was limited to Austria not losing any territory in 1739. Russia's gains will accordingly be limited. In OTL it took them until 1783 to secure the Crimea and they were never able to keep all of Moldavia. It's way too early for a Russo-wank.

I disagree here, I don't think you can have an Austrian victory without a Russian one or vice versa, as one being defeated means that the Ottomans can concentrate their forces (as they did against Russia IOTL) and win.

That only proves that you can't have an Austrian defeat without a Russian one and vice versa, or at least it would if the argument didn't ignore the unbalanced outcome of the war for Austria and Russia.

This will leave Oltenia as a Habsburg possession, and lead to interesting times as the Russian possession of Moravia and the Crimea leads to greater influence in the Eastern Balkans.
"Moldovia" I can let pass but this is where I draw the line.
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OrşovaErrr, no. The POD was limited to Austria not losing any territory in 1739. Russia's gains will accordingly be limited. In OTL it took them until 1783 to secure the Crimea and they were never able to keep all of Moldavia. It's way too early for a Russo-wank.

Earlier in the war we are discussing the Russians had taken the territory I mention, most of it by the time of Austrian entry.

That only proves that you can't have an Austrian defeat without a Russian one and vice versa, or at least it would if the argument didn't ignore the unbalanced outcome of the war for Austria and Russia.

From my (limited) reading the Russians were only forced to seek terms with the Ottomans after Austrian defeat left them isolated in Europe with Sweden appearing more threatening. That means you can have Austrian defeat without a Russian one, with a PoD between Austrian surrender and Russian defeat. The reason the results of the war were apparently unbalanced is that the Russians had territory to give back that they had conquered earlier in the war , the Austrians didn't. The Russians aeguably surrendered more than the Austrians at the peace treaty, but they had held it for a much shorter period.
 
Orsova in 1791, Dalmatia in 1797, Ragusa in 1815..

While true, I'd say this verges on quibbling. Orsova and Ragusa were city states, and Dalmatia was a vary narrow strip of coastline.

But okay, "very little" territorial expansion. Compared to what the Russians or British gained at Ottoman expense over that same period? It's pretty pathetic.



Not if you consider that Old Serbia didn't even reach the Danube.

Wait, what? Belgrade isn't on the Danube?


And what would you call Montenegro?

"Very, very small."

(Recall that historical M'gro was less than half the size of the modern state. It was independent, but it wasn't exactly a major regional player.)



Doug M.
 
Top