~ El Gran Turco Golpeado: 1520-1535 ~
La batalla de Chaldiran, c. 1514
- Yakın ölüm deneyimi -
Selim I - known primarily to posterity as “the Grim,” but also as “the Sectarian” or “the Factious” (“Mezhepçi”) due to his wars against other Muslims - had made the mistake of having his eldest son, the Şehzade Suleiman, accompany him in his campaign against the Persians in 1514, which quickly turned to disaster as Suleiman and thousands of crack Ottoman troops lost their lives in what would be an utterly useless battle at Chaldiran. While technically an Ottoman victory, the Persians had lost fewer troops, most of whom were Qizilbash irregulars and not even in direct Persian employ. While Ismail I, the Persian Shah, was forced to withdraw, his return to Anatolia was almost inevitable: Persia’s secondary threat, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, had united, and were achieving landmark victories across central Asia under Muhammad Shaybani. But Shaybani had died in 1510, and squabbles over his inheritance had ensued predictably. Limping back to Sivas and harassed by the Qizilbash, Selim I’s army barely made it back into relatively friendly territory in one piece. Selim I was extremely frustrated: he had plans to overrun the decaying Mamluks, to capture Belgrade and take the Hungarian plain, to expand into Mesopotamia and the steppes north of Crimea - this was a major reversal. What made matters worse was the fact that Şehzade Murad - the son of Ahmet, the legal heir to the throne who was usurped by Selim I - had fled to the court of none other than Ismail I in 1513, and now possessed the window he needed to possibly form an opposition against Selim I. The situation looked dire, and any large-scale expansion had to be postponed for the time being.
El imperio Otomano, c. 1516
The Şehzade Murad had already attempted to enter Anatolia in force, accompanying the Persian general Nur-Ali Khalifa in 1512 and possibly even “girding the Qizilbash crown.” While this campaign failed to accomplish anything of note, another such incursion had become possible after Chaldiran. Ingratiating himself with the Qizilbash once again and lobbying Ismail I more aggressively for Persian assistance, Murad promised his supporters that he would pursue a policy of religious toleration, allowing for Shi’ite madrasas and imams to continue in their observance - while, significantly, not providing similar terms for the Armenians, due to Ismail I’s policy of suppression towards them. After several months of effective hit-and-run tactics, Murad led an army of 30,000 (mostly Qizilbash with some Persian cavalry and artillery) onto the Anatolian plateau in early 1516, and was soon joined by 10,000 to 15,000 Turkish supporters. It was not until early 1517, however, that Selim I could settle matters in Konstantiniyye (his court was concerned for the now nebulous succession) and amass another army to confront his nephew Murad. Assembling near Konya with nearly 60,000 troops, Selim I decided not to break his army again by going through the harsh terrain of Eastern Anatolia, and rather waited near the opening of the Ihlara valley at the town of Aksaray. Hiding his full strength, Selim I drew Murad out of the rugged hills surrounding his encampment at Nevşehir. Murad - outnumbered, taken by surprise, and leading a force better suited to asymmetric warfare - was defeated handily and fled north to Kirşehir.
El imperio Otomano, c. 1517
(Pink: Murad)
Selim was prepared to pursue his foe, but word quickly reached him of two very pressing issues to the west. Firstly, Charles von Hapsburg, king of Hungary and Bohemia, had defeated the opposition to his accession to the throne and was now eyeing the Ottoman frontier - especially the city of Belgrade - and secondly, Yunus Pasha, Selim I’s recently appointed Grand Vizier of Balkan descent, had led a coalition of leading courtiers, advisors, and military officials to seize control of the Sublime Porte and declare full support for Murad - attempting also to seize Selim I’s three sons, Orhan, Musa, and Korkut, but only succeeding in capturing Korkut, whom they executed. Herzekadze Ahmed Pasha, Yunus’ predecessor, had served as Grand Vizier on and off since 1503, and spent 1516 and 1517 as an important loyalist counterweight to the Murad sympathizers, but now his position fell to Yunus, who was more concerned with Balkan affairs given his heritage, was resentful (like many others) of Selim I’s campaigns against fellow Muslims, and had an increasingly contentious personal relationship with his Sultan (Selim I had actually intended to remove Yunus from office in late 1516). Selim I could not afford to let his enemies and detractors know just how tangled up he was in the east, and began moving west for a show of soft power in the Balkans and hard power in Konstantiniyye (Selim I likewise knew that Murad lacked the clout to make an advance in the near future).
The old residence of the Ottoman Sultans
(Modern Topkapı [Topkapŭ] Palace, Historic Quarter of Tsarigrad-Konstantinoúpoli)
Yunus Pasha and his cohorts failed to take control of the city before Selim I could arrive (possibly given Selim I’s reputation for excessive acts of retribution), and were all beheaded in late 1517. The suspicion of a Hapsburg invasion also turned out to be a red herring, and, after a few light skirmishes on the border, Selim I again turned east to confront his nephew - and hopefully bring back his head on a pike. However, the eastern half of the Ottoman possessions in Asia were now under the sway of Murad, who had spent the months since Aksaray drumming up support. Ferried around by lithe companies of Qizilbash, Murad was able to remain out of Selim I’s grasp for months, and, just as Selim I was beginning to feel a little more certain of imminent domestic stability, he began to succumb to a skin infection on his leg - accumulated from riding on horseback ceaselessly for the better part of 4 years - finally dying in September of 1518 in Sivas.
El imperio Otomano, c. 1519
(Red: Musa, Dark Red: Orhan)
Selim I’s constant campaigning had prevented him from attending to the more mundane matters at his court, and, consequently, as to whether Orhan or Musa would take the throne was of yet undecided. Orhan was the elder brother, but also had a Pontic Greek mother, while Musa’s mother was Turkish and he had been shown preference by his father. Albeit somewhat short in stature, the black-haired Musa displayed a tenacity and self-reliance that was not found in the lankier, paler Orhan. Also of significance was Musa’s strict anti-Persian position, which alleviated the fears of the Sublime Porte becoming a Persian satellite under the figurehead Murad or the ineffectual Orhan. The more independent sanjaks and beys of the empire - primarily in Greece, the Balkans, and the former Jandarid Beylik - mostly sided with Orhan, while those more conscious of a Sunni Turkish identity - primarily in Rumelia and the rest of Anatolia - sided with Musa. This succession war would be relatively short, with the superior manpower reserves of Musa’s supporters and the symbolic and administrative weight of their collective possessions (especially Konstantiniyye) outdoing Orhan’s, ultimately ending in mid 1520 with the battle of Resen - in the aftermath of which Orhan was cornered on the banks of Lake Prespa and killed. Meanwhile, support for Murad was beginning to wane, due to the religious differences of his supporters, suspicions over him being a Persian puppet, and the gradual decline of Persian support. The Persians had been unable to follow up the battle of Chaldiran and provision Murad’s forces due to a number of difficulties: the Uzbeks and Turkmenis had begun an invasion of Khorasan, the Sunni populace of Baghdad and its environs had risen up in revolt, Armenians and Georgians were engaging in guerrilla warfare against Persian garrisons, and the Persian presence in the Indian Ocean had been virtually eradicated due to the actions of the Portuguese (who seized the isle of Ormus in 1507, further strangulating Persian trade). Musa eventually met Murad on the field at Tunceli in February of 1521, and shattered his army - following which Murad’s cause persisted only in the highlands beyond Ottoman control.
- La Primera Gran Guerra Turca -
The Ottoman Civil War of 1516-1521 caused a great deal of strife and desolation in the empire, and put a major halt on the heretofore highly ambitious expansion of the Turks. What most suffered during this period was the Ottoman navy (or lack thereof). Luckily for the Ottomans, in the absence of a comprehensive naval program, the matter of projecting Ottoman power seawards fell to a number of resourceful Turkish privateers, who provided their own fleets and filled them with enslaved Christian oarsmen. While Kemal Reis, the Turkish admiral who first made the push into the Western Mediterranean (and possibly had designs on the Atlantic), had died in 1511, he was followed by a spate of others - many of whom were much more aggressive and capable. Aydın Reis, one of Kemal’s subordinates and tellingly known to the Spanish as “Cachidiablo,” and Dragut, regarded later on in his career as the “Drawn Sword of Islam,” were two examples, both operating in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. However, it would be the two Turkish “Barbarossa” brothers, Oruç (known to the Spanish as Arrudye) and Hayreddin (born Hızır), who would represent the Ottoman thrust into the Western Mediterranean - especially in terms of succoring the Maghreb. Oruç, the older of the two, had made a name for himself as a corsair - red-bearded, festooned in gold jewelry, and prone to enormous outbursts of rage, Oruç was a figure greatly feared, having spent the years 1510-1525 harassing, plundering, and enslaving along the coasts of Spain, Italy, and the Maghreb, abetted by an astonishingly accurate map of the Mediterranean drawn up by the Turkish cartographer Piri Reis. This map detailed all of the many inlets and ports of the pockmarked Maghrebi coast, as well as all of its complicated winds - which had often sent entire Spanish expeditions to the bottom of the sea.
Arrudye, el corsario pavoroso
Oruç and Hayreddin had been based on the isle of Djerba until they were driven out by Fernando of Aragon’s navy in 1503, following which they set up shop in Tunis and Tripoli. When both ports were recaptured by the Órdenes Militantes in 1517 and 1518, respectively, the Barbarossas were forced to flee once again, this time to a miniscule fishing village named Cherchel, roughly 50 kilometers from Algiers. This location proved fortuitous, especially as a launch pad into Algiers itself. Taking advantage of the small size of the garrison and chronic lack of supplies at the Spanish fort on the Peñón, Oruç wiped out the Spaniards and established himself in the city proper in late 1520, personally murdering the Tlemceni sultan (who had taken up residence in Algiers following the fall of Tlemcen) with his bare hands and arranging for the execution of a dozen members of the sultan’s family. Declaring himself Bey of Algiers, Oruç rapidly established his authority over vast swathes of the surrounding villages and towns and turned Algiers into an entrepot for piracy the likes of which the Mediterranean easily had not seen in a millennium. From just 1520 to 1522, Oruç’s corsairs seized as many as 8,000 captives from the Spanish coast from Barcelona to Valencia - a stretch of hardly 200 miles. Meanwhile, from 1520 to 1525, Hayreddin succeeded in enslaving 35,000 Christians from Sicily, Sardinia, Southern Italy, and the Baleares.
The huge military investment that Miguel had made (and was making) into the conquest of Tlemcen and Fes left his hands tied on how much could be done about this highly destructive corsair-king, but there remained a few options open to him. Firstly were the Genoans. Miguel had been steadily improving relation with the Republic of Genoa since his coronation in 1515 (seeing this as a means of combatting the Mohammedan) - especially important considering no Christian power could do much of anything in the Western Mediterranean without the consent or assistance of the Genoese and their immense galley fleet - and had given them a colossal amount of concessions in both trade and land grants in the Spanish possessions east of Orán. Miguel’s crusade had made Spain far and away the largest investment for the Genoans (especially regarding their new monopoly on North Africa) and consequently the Genoans and their republic were now intimately linked to the Spanish Empire and dependent upon its continued success in the Mediterranean - to such such an extent that it caused Gaston de Foix, the Marshal of France, to remark in 1521 that Genoa had practically become a “military colony of the Spaniards.”
Secondly were the Knights of St. John and the Republic of Venice. Another issue for the Turks was the island of Rhodes, occupied by the Knights of St. John since 1291 and used as a base for piracy against the Ottomans and the Mamluks. Dragut and his corsairs attempted to seize the island (or at least exact tribute) in 1518, but ended up abandoning his blockade due to stiff resistance from the Knights. Dragut had, however, succeeded in burning the Knights’ fleet, which was used almost exclusively for piracy and rescue of Christians and was therefore their primary source of both revenue and manpower. Yet Spain would come to their aid when, in 1520, Miguel’s ambassador reached an agreement with the Venetians (both as part of his militant orders initiative and as an attempt to push the naval frontier further east by allying with the Venetians): Spain would provide military assistance against the Ottomans in securing the island of Rhodes for the Republic, in exchange for Venetian assistance in ferrying the Knights of St. John to Malta, Tunis, and Djerba. The Venetians took ownership of the island, and 1,200 Knights (along with 2,000 Greek Catholics) were installed in the Central Mediterranean, with their headquarters on Malta. The Knights and their new fleet and resources effectively corked up the Strait of Sicily and consequently cut off the Maghreb from the Turks.
Una iglesia de los Caballeros de San Juan en la isla de Llerva
The Barbarossas were still very capable, and had the support of the populace that they now governed - taking Bugia and Mazalquivir in 1522, and retaking Tunis in 1525. Nonetheless, Miguel, now supplied with Genoese galleys and Knight commanders, began to draw on Southern Italy’s available soldiery to form a more comprehensive strategy against the Barbarossas. Luckily for him, the opinion of Oruç’s subjects was beginning to shift. Whatever divinely-ordained mission the Barbarossas claimed, at the end of the day they were still pirates, not liberators or even administrators. Their foreign imposition and their capricious violence continuously alienated Arab and Berber alike under their rule, many of whom began to consider the Spanish administration as much more benign. The Barbarossas failed entirely to earn the cooperation of the local Berber tribes, even entering into open warfare with the Kabyle Berbers, and they now faced the inevitability of a Spanish invasion. What had been stalemate for nearly 10 years was about to shift at a stroke, with a 35,000 man Spanish army headed directly for Algiers in the Spring of 1529. What the corsairs had failed to recognize was that Piri Reis’ map - which provided extremely helpful information regarding all the pitfalls and fickle weather that had frustrated so many Spanish expeditions to the Maghreb - had made it into Spanish hands, and now ensured that the vast majority of Spain’s shipments to the North African coast would arrive unscathed, whether they be of supplies or soldiers. Simultaneously, the Barbarossa brothers had urgently requested aid from their homeland, even swearing their fealty and declaring their Beylik in Algiers an Ottoman satrapy, but neither Selim I nor Musa had the resources to invest in such a far-off project. The arrival of the Spanish army convinced Oruç that a change of scenery was necessary, and he left with his guard and much of the city’s riches. While the primary goal of the Spaniards had been to capture Oruç (for an elaborate and gruesome public execution), his departure racked the city’s morale, and, despite fielding as many as 70,000, fell to the Spaniards on March 31st of 1529 - resulting in thousands of its inhabitants being put to the sword and nearly 30,000 Christian slaves being freed. Oruç would eventually be caught at Cherchel, where he was making plans to depart for Tunis, and would be garrotted on the deck of a Spanish flagship in the town’s harbor on May 7th.
Unable to directly engage to Venetians, Dragut and another Turkish corsair known to the West as Curtogoli began making plans for an invasion of Southern Italy - which was depleted of manpower following the expeditions against the Barbarossas. Beginning in late 1529, Dragut and Curtogoli assaulted the city of Otranto, seizing it in the span of 2 days, after which some 8,500 Turks, North Africans, Muslim Greeks and Albanians, and assorted renegades were unloaded in Apulia and ready to range the countryside. Miguel’s brother Fernando scrambled to organize a defense despite the lack of resources at his disposal, but little could be done to prevent the corsairs from taking the ports of Bari, Barletta, Brindisi, and Manfredonia. Nearly all of Apulia and Basilicata was in Turkish hands by early 1531, with the exception of two cities under siege: Taranto and Montescaglioso. These sieges worked in Spain’s favor, wrapping up the Turks while a relief army of 5,800 arrived from North Africa. The Turks hit another snag when they attempted to take Pescara in July, where they were repulsed - opening up the Adriatic enough to allow a combined Veneto-Spanish fleet to capture Durazzo on the Albanian coast. Cut off from their closest route of access to the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish campaign - while at this point it had swelled to 12,500 volunteers - was fighting against the clock. What initiated its collapse was the arrival of none other than Charles von Hapsburg and an army of 11,000 - intent on avenging Otranto on behalf of his Hungarian subjects, on honoring his marital alliance with Spain, and also on intimidating the Pope into speeding up the convocation of a Church council to address Protestantism. Montescaglioso was relieved by the Spanish in a battle at the nearby town of Pisticci in late July, and Taranto was relieved in turn after the exhausted Turks were routed near Matera. While many would escape over the sea, most of the Turkish army lacked an open escape route, and were either taken prisoner or massacred. While the Turks were completely driven out of Italy by 1534, it was not until January of 1535 that Musa formally assured the cessation of hostilities between his empire and Spain.
La Primera Gran Guerra Turca, c. 1530-1532
One of the major factors in the quick death of this corsair campaign was the disinterest of the Sublime Porte. Both Selim I and Musa believed that the sea was alien and barren, and that real glory - riches, titles, and slaves - lie on land. Despite this, the Ottomans were not even prepared yet to fight on land: for instance, when the Mamluks attempted to take advantage of the Ottomans’ weakened state in 1520, they were only beaten back by a private naval campaign - Dragut’s sack of Dumyat and his occupation of the Mamluks’ Syrian ports. Deep in debt, having lost thousands of its best and brightest, and under assault from all sides, the Ottomans were in no shape to bother the Spanish again for a long time - and vice versa. But this would not be their end - indeed, the Great Turk would continue to be a threat to the West for many years.