Under what circumstances could a strategic position holder in the RAF submit advice to the civil authorities to bombard with gas (momentary / persistent / nerve) OPFOR civilians without the officer being required to resign.
1) British politics often obscures the decisive moment. This involves soft requirements, such as "voluntary" resignation; or post-fact limitation of awards that would otherwise be expected.
2) It is less interesting to suggest that the UK uses horrific weapons, than the policy suggestion that they use such. Real live bastards are more interesting. And while we might imagine a UK capable of the policy decision of civil gassing [failed Sealion], it is more interesting to consider who, why and how civil gassing would flow through UK policy systems without an unexpected and unusual prod.
3) This differs from the common pro-Soviet or communist proletarian expectation that NATO would use a variety of "abhorrent" weapons to stop conventional advances. In part, NATO forces in the US command structure viewed the Soviet Union as historically abhorrent and was willing to tolerate human extinction as a prophylactic. In part the anticipated potential WWII scale within the UK of "excess civil deaths" was smaller than the fantasy amongst (at least) western policy makers of the potential human extinction. Chiefly: we will not all go together when we go.
4) The soft discipline of a monstrous policy would receive human evaluation in the British system of power. A PM, the cabinet, a ministerial, or a public servant would be forced to consider, "Why don't we just mustard the hun?" In contrast to other states' systems, the UK case would have resulted in a documentary record: a historical record.
As I think I have indicated, I am less interested in Mustard Dresden, than in how the British state would have stomached consistent advice to reduce civil populations by gas; much as they received a constant bombardment regarding Harris' historical desires.
Yours,
without advocacy,
Sam R.
1) British politics often obscures the decisive moment. This involves soft requirements, such as "voluntary" resignation; or post-fact limitation of awards that would otherwise be expected.
2) It is less interesting to suggest that the UK uses horrific weapons, than the policy suggestion that they use such. Real live bastards are more interesting. And while we might imagine a UK capable of the policy decision of civil gassing [failed Sealion], it is more interesting to consider who, why and how civil gassing would flow through UK policy systems without an unexpected and unusual prod.
3) This differs from the common pro-Soviet or communist proletarian expectation that NATO would use a variety of "abhorrent" weapons to stop conventional advances. In part, NATO forces in the US command structure viewed the Soviet Union as historically abhorrent and was willing to tolerate human extinction as a prophylactic. In part the anticipated potential WWII scale within the UK of "excess civil deaths" was smaller than the fantasy amongst (at least) western policy makers of the potential human extinction. Chiefly: we will not all go together when we go.
4) The soft discipline of a monstrous policy would receive human evaluation in the British system of power. A PM, the cabinet, a ministerial, or a public servant would be forced to consider, "Why don't we just mustard the hun?" In contrast to other states' systems, the UK case would have resulted in a documentary record: a historical record.
As I think I have indicated, I am less interested in Mustard Dresden, than in how the British state would have stomached consistent advice to reduce civil populations by gas; much as they received a constant bombardment regarding Harris' historical desires.
Yours,
without advocacy,
Sam R.