UK intervention in Franco-Prussian war of 1870

Guys, this has been an interesting read so far.

I do feel there has been too much emphasis on the superior Prussian organisation and doctrine. The French were indeed quite disorganised compared to the Prussians, albeit not significantly more than most first rate armies, I’d say. But where they truly failed was tactically.

Yes, the French expected the Prussians would be fielding raw militia where instead the Prussian conscripts were rather well trained. But that did not make the Prussians win.

What made the Prussians win was French doctrinal confusion.

Up to 1868, the French had been staunch adherents of shock power over fire power. Well timed assaults, ideally with supporting artillery, had trumped a succession of enemies. Even Austria, which had a doctrine based on fire power, adopted the French doctrine after 1859. What nobody realised was that the Austrians couldn’t shoot properly (overshot the French assault columns) and thus the French survived to maul the Austrians.

The Austro-Prussian war saw Austrian assault columns face Prussian troops who had learnt to shoot properly and the results weren’t pleasant.

The French noticed this and promptly changed their doctrine to firepower instead of shock power. But the change was too rapid and incoherent. The result was that in 1870, French troops would pick a defensible piece of real estate and stay put at all costs, relying on firepower to win the battle.

Thus the tactical story of the Franco-Prussian war is one of sedentary French corps repulsing frontal attacking Prussian forces until outflanked and overwhelmed as more and more Prussian troops ‘march to the sound of the guns’. Meanwhile, other French troops in supporting distance refuse to budge and give up their own defensible positions. If additional French corps had arrived in support or if the French had counterattacked the wavering Prussians, they could have won each and every battle before additional Prussian corps arrived to extend the line.

The French themselves were well aware of this and rightly blamed their own generals for their timidity. Hence the (early) obsession with attack at all costs in the subsequent Franco-Prussian war a.k.a. World War One.

A properly led French army of 1870 vintage would have done better. Unfortunately, it was badly served by timid generals lacking initiative and drive.

So let’s not assume the Prussian victory was somehow pre-ordained because of a huge qualitative gap between the two armies. As usual, it was human errors that caused the lopsided victory.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'm by no means suggesting you should have noticed that this is a recurring theme: if you don't frequently participate in these conversations on the British side you have no opportunity to have done so. But hopefully, if in future you spot someone getting a little short while trying to argue in favour of the competence of the Victorian British army, you'll know it's just frustration and nothing personal.

I'm afraid that I'd like to bring this up again because I just found perhaps the most outrageous example of the lot.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=9305388#post9305388
and associated discussion. In which a certain poster claims that it would take 12.5 million troops to defend Canada in the 1860s.
This is, frankly, something close to insane, 12.5 million troops being roughly the entire male population of the Union - whether of age or not.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
What made the Prussians win was French doctrinal confusion.

Up to 1868, the French had been staunch adherents of shock power over fire power. Well timed assaults, ideally with supporting artillery, had trumped a succession of enemies. Even Austria, which had a doctrine based on fire power, adopted the French doctrine after 1859. What nobody realised was that the Austrians couldn’t shoot properly (overshot the French assault columns) and thus the French survived to maul the Austrians.

The Austro-Prussian war saw Austrian assault columns face Prussian troops who had learnt to shoot properly and the results weren’t pleasant.

The French noticed this and promptly changed their doctrine to firepower instead of shock power. But the change was too rapid and incoherent. The result was that in 1870, French troops would pick a defensible piece of real estate and stay put at all costs, relying on firepower to win the battle.

Thus the tactical story of the Franco-Prussian war is one of sedentary French corps repulsing frontal attacking Prussian forces until outflanked and overwhelmed as more and more Prussian troops ‘march to the sound of the guns’. Meanwhile, other French troops in supporting distance refuse to budge and give up their own defensible positions. If additional French corps had arrived in support or if the French had counterattacked the wavering Prussians, they could have won each and every battle before additional Prussian corps arrived to extend the line.

That is fascinating - thank you!
It explains why the Prussians took so many heavy casualties and yet won anyway, and how armies so close together as the French were in the border zones (not more than a couple of hundred miles wide in toto) could be defeated in detail.

I've also heard that the French had ammunition issues in their engaged units - is that the case? (Clearly if a French unit had been able to retreat when called for it could have resupplied and repeated the process, if so).
 
That is fascinating - thank you!
I've also heard that the French had ammunition issues in their engaged units - is that the case? (Clearly if a French unit had been able to retreat when called for it could have resupplied and repeated the process, if so).


Yes, but mostly in a tactical sense.

The French were not prepared for war and had no sound logistical plans, leading to much chaos. Which meant that they indeed lacked supplies although French troops usually carried enough with them (the famed French systeme D or the ability to scrounge up supplies somehow) to fight the initial battles although lack of supplies certainly preyed on Bazaine’s mind.

What usually happened was that a Prussian corps would encounter an entrenched French corps. The Prussians would immediately attack to fix the French while neighbouring corps were called in. The French would basically slaughter the attacking Prussian infantry who would go to ground. That was the moment to launch a counter-attack. But before it could be organised and/or launched, the next set of Prussians would appear and immediately attack. This sequence of repeated attacks usually prevented French troops from resupplying or being replaced in the line. And because of the repeated attacks (and breech loading rifles can shoot off a lot of ammo), the troops would eventually start running out of ammo.

Then, after hours of repulsing frontal attacks and slowly running out of ammo, the fatigued French troops would realise that the Prussians were outflanking them. Quickly followed by a rapid retreat.
 
And because of the repeated attacks (and breech loading rifles can shoot off a lot of ammo), the troops would eventually start running out of ammo.
Now that is very interesting. I've always interpreted the Prussian complaints about the Bavarians shooting off all their ammunition in the context of fire discipline, but actually it seems there may be more to it than that. It's also a case of battlefield mobility, of the Prussians being able to funnel and rotate units through the front line in a way the French can't (and, historically, the Roman legions could). There's actually quite a bit in the 1870 British FE&E about the relief of skirmishers (they run behind their supports and form up, while the supports disperse and advance) but these things never work as well in real life as they do on paper.
 
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