Guys, this has been an interesting read so far.
I do feel there has been too much emphasis on the superior Prussian organisation and doctrine. The French were indeed quite disorganised compared to the Prussians, albeit not significantly more than most first rate armies, I’d say. But where they truly failed was tactically.
Yes, the French expected the Prussians would be fielding raw militia where instead the Prussian conscripts were rather well trained. But that did not make the Prussians win.
What made the Prussians win was French doctrinal confusion.
Up to 1868, the French had been staunch adherents of shock power over fire power. Well timed assaults, ideally with supporting artillery, had trumped a succession of enemies. Even Austria, which had a doctrine based on fire power, adopted the French doctrine after 1859. What nobody realised was that the Austrians couldn’t shoot properly (overshot the French assault columns) and thus the French survived to maul the Austrians.
The Austro-Prussian war saw Austrian assault columns face Prussian troops who had learnt to shoot properly and the results weren’t pleasant.
The French noticed this and promptly changed their doctrine to firepower instead of shock power. But the change was too rapid and incoherent. The result was that in 1870, French troops would pick a defensible piece of real estate and stay put at all costs, relying on firepower to win the battle.
Thus the tactical story of the Franco-Prussian war is one of sedentary French corps repulsing frontal attacking Prussian forces until outflanked and overwhelmed as more and more Prussian troops ‘march to the sound of the guns’. Meanwhile, other French troops in supporting distance refuse to budge and give up their own defensible positions. If additional French corps had arrived in support or if the French had counterattacked the wavering Prussians, they could have won each and every battle before additional Prussian corps arrived to extend the line.
The French themselves were well aware of this and rightly blamed their own generals for their timidity. Hence the (early) obsession with attack at all costs in the subsequent Franco-Prussian war a.k.a. World War One.
A properly led French army of 1870 vintage would have done better. Unfortunately, it was badly served by timid generals lacking initiative and drive.
So let’s not assume the Prussian victory was somehow pre-ordained because of a huge qualitative gap between the two armies. As usual, it was human errors that caused the lopsided victory.
I do feel there has been too much emphasis on the superior Prussian organisation and doctrine. The French were indeed quite disorganised compared to the Prussians, albeit not significantly more than most first rate armies, I’d say. But where they truly failed was tactically.
Yes, the French expected the Prussians would be fielding raw militia where instead the Prussian conscripts were rather well trained. But that did not make the Prussians win.
What made the Prussians win was French doctrinal confusion.
Up to 1868, the French had been staunch adherents of shock power over fire power. Well timed assaults, ideally with supporting artillery, had trumped a succession of enemies. Even Austria, which had a doctrine based on fire power, adopted the French doctrine after 1859. What nobody realised was that the Austrians couldn’t shoot properly (overshot the French assault columns) and thus the French survived to maul the Austrians.
The Austro-Prussian war saw Austrian assault columns face Prussian troops who had learnt to shoot properly and the results weren’t pleasant.
The French noticed this and promptly changed their doctrine to firepower instead of shock power. But the change was too rapid and incoherent. The result was that in 1870, French troops would pick a defensible piece of real estate and stay put at all costs, relying on firepower to win the battle.
Thus the tactical story of the Franco-Prussian war is one of sedentary French corps repulsing frontal attacking Prussian forces until outflanked and overwhelmed as more and more Prussian troops ‘march to the sound of the guns’. Meanwhile, other French troops in supporting distance refuse to budge and give up their own defensible positions. If additional French corps had arrived in support or if the French had counterattacked the wavering Prussians, they could have won each and every battle before additional Prussian corps arrived to extend the line.
The French themselves were well aware of this and rightly blamed their own generals for their timidity. Hence the (early) obsession with attack at all costs in the subsequent Franco-Prussian war a.k.a. World War One.
A properly led French army of 1870 vintage would have done better. Unfortunately, it was badly served by timid generals lacking initiative and drive.
So let’s not assume the Prussian victory was somehow pre-ordained because of a huge qualitative gap between the two armies. As usual, it was human errors that caused the lopsided victory.