UK intervention in Franco-Prussian war of 1870

1) I don't think Britain is ready for this war (or any other power for that matter), but sending an expeditionary force would certainly help things for France. However, Britain was not the equal of France here. Let alone Prussia.

2) Lord Palmerstone threatened Prussia with intervention in their war with Denmark, but Bismarck called his bluff and he admitted they couldn't really stop them.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
1) I don't think Britain is ready for this war (or any other power for that matter), but sending an expeditionary force would certainly help things for France. Britain wa not the equal of France here, let alone Prussia.

2) Lord Palmerstone threatened Prussia with intervention in their war with Denmark, but Bismarck called his bluff and he admitted they couldn't really stop them.
Britain wasn't the equal of France or Prussia, no, but that's not required.
It just has to be equal to (or close to) the difference between France and Prussia.
 
Britain wasn't the equal of France or Prussia, no, but that's not required.
It just has to be equal to (or close to) the difference between France and Prussia.
It's not. At least I've never seen any evidence of it. France and Prussia were well ahead of the rest of Europe. Even the British considered the French system superior. The Crimean War brought about military reforms since almost every participant in that war performed poorly overall (France came out of that war looking great and Sardinia-Piedmont who based their armies organization and tactics on the French model), but I still don't think it's enough for them to keep up. Most importantly, the war only lasted about a year. I don't think Britain would be able to train and send hundreds of thousands of men fast enough to stop France from surrendering.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
It's not. At least I've never seen any evidence of it. France and Prussia were well ahead of the rest of Europe.l Even the British considered the French system superior. The Crimean War brought about military reforms since almost every participant in that war performed poorly overall, but I still don't think it's enough for them to keep up.
The British tended to have a small but very potent army - it's not as if the OTL BEF suddenly emerged from the head of Kitchener in 1912. Only one army's worth - a few corps - but quite enough to participate.
More to the point, though, they allow France to better use their manpower. Sniders for everyone!
 
Prussia was France wasn't after like the 1830s but for a long time they looked power when in reality they were weak.
No. They were both ahead. The fact that Prussia was a step above France just goes to show where the rest of Europe stood in the grand scheme of things. The French had beaten Russia and Austria in the field and had outperformed their British allies in the Crimean war.
 
The British tended to have a small but very potent army - it's not as if the OTL BEF suddenly emerged from the head of Kitchener in 1912. Only one army's worth - a few corps - but quite enough to participate.
More to the point, though, they allow France to better use their manpower. Sniders for everyone!
All European countries had professional soldiers. The British weren't different in that regard. Prussia and France just had more by virtue of being colonial powers with recent experience fighting other Europeans (and fighting well). That's not to say that their soldiers weren't brave. They just weren't up to the standards of the French or the Prussians. You didn't respond to my commeny about Lord Palmerston, Saphroneth. What do you think?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
All European countries had professional soldiers. The British weren't different in that regard. Prussia and France just had more by virtue of being colonial powers with recent experience fighting other Europeans (and fighting well). That's not to say that their soldiers weren't brave. They just weren't up to the standards of the French or the Prussians. You didn't respond to my commeny about Lord Palmerston, Saphroneth. What do you think?
I'd have thought it was obvious that Britain versus Prussia is different to Britain and France versus Prussia.

Anyway.

You say the British soldiers weren't up to the standards of the French or Prussians. I hope you have evidence for that one...
You also say that Prussia and France had more professional soldiers. Again, it's not the case that Britain needs to beat Prussia alone.
 
I'd have thought it was obvious that Britain versus Prussia is different to Britain and France versus Prussia.

Anyway.

You say the British soldiers weren't up to the standards of the French or Prussians. I hope you have evidence for that one...
You also say that Prussia and France had more professional soldiers. Again, it's not the case that Britain needs to beat Prussia alone.
The oppinions of British officers don't count? Have you read some of the letters from the Crimean War on French soldiers?

"The French, indeed, have been generous enough to say that our troops acted with great bravery, and that they wondered how we kept the Redan so long under tremendous fire; but British soldiers are rather acustomed to the nil admirari under such circumstances and praise like that gives pain as well as pleasure."

"The fact is the French understand this sort of work far better than we do and no how to keep both themselves and their animals in first rate conditions, whilst our men and horses are dying of cold and hunger... the French are doing everything for us. They carry our sick, they carry our sick, they furnish horses to drag the guns up from Balaclava, for our horses are all dead or dying, they carry our shot and shell up to our siege-train depot for us. In fact, without them we should be quite at a standstill."

"Altogether, I don't think we manage these things with much dignity. The French manage these things, as they do with everything connected to military matters, much better. They are getting, I should say, rather sick of us. They must be tired of carrying away our sick, guarding our batteries, carrying up our shot and shell, and in addition to all, having to fight three small battles with he Russians, waiting for our batteries to be put up."
 
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Even if one submits that the French performed better during the Crimean War it wasn't by a terribly great margin and France didn't exactly cover itself in glory. The French lost significantly more casualties to disease than the British, even proportionately so.

There's also a period of 14 years or so between the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War.
 
Even if one submits that the French performed better during the Crimean War it wasn't by a terribly great margin and France didn't exactly cover itself in glory. The French lost significantly more casualties to disease than the British, even proportionately so.

There's also a period of 14 years or so between the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War.
1) It's just a fact. It's true that the French lost more men. They also had more men there in the first place and took the lead in the fighting.

2) That's true. A good deal of time had passed between the Crimean war and the Franco-Prussian war, but as far as I know the British went untested against a European opponent in that period. All we know is that France was much better in the Crimean War and that until the Franco-Prussian war they were recognized as the worlds greatest military power. Britain could have had an army as strong ad France at the time, or it could have sharply declined in quality like Sardinias. We just don't know. I don't think we can just give them the benefit of the doubt, throw them into a conflict between Germany and France and expect them to keep up.

Also, I'm not knocking the common soldiers. As usual, they were very brave.
 
Britain wasn't the equal of France or Prussia, no, but that's not required.
It just has to be equal to (or close to) the difference between France and Prussia.

Tha'ts a big underestimation of hte gap: this war was stuied ofr forty years because of how imalanced and ecisive it was, tFrance lasted only short time and was abbsolutely stomped. By the time the British would even make it there, it would be too late. France had no hope after Sedan.

The British tended to have a small but very potent army - it's not as if the OTL BEF suddenly emerged from the head of Kitchener in 1912. Only one army's worth - a few corps - but quite enough to participate.
More to the point, though, they allow France to better use their manpower. Sniders for everyone!

The French were actually the epitome of the "small professional corps" idea, if people call 300,000 troops "small". They loved the spirit of the offensive and love d the idea of having elite veterans in their army. However, it was outdated, and when up against Prussian draftees, French professioanlism helped, but not by that much. Prussian organization and logistics still won the day, and French failure to raise a big conscript army and focus on their logistics is still to this day recognized as the #1 reason for their defeat - like the British at the time, they deluded themselves into thinking their small professional core would win out.

Swarm (schwarm in German) is the technical term for the Prussian policy of waves of supporting skirmish lines. As ordered at Wissembourg: "Regiment! Form attack columns! First and light platoons in the skirmish line! Swarms to left and right!"[/quote

Like blitzkrieg that German military term is badly understood because what it really means is hitting at a lot of points, not necessarily a human wave attack. Swarms left and right are to disrupt enemy communications and their decision cycle with rapid "pulsing" attacks. These tactics were also used by the Zulus and Boers, quite successfully might I add.

Firstly, this isn't an either-or situation: we're talking about adding the British (and their industrial capacity) to the French. Secondly, we're comparing the performance of British regular forces to the scratch French forces assembled after the defeat of the main French field forces. Thirdly, the French have substantial deficiencies which the British don't. These include both munitions - it's interesting that you say breech-loaders, because though the French have a breechloading rifle they don't have breechloading artillery with percussion fuses like the British and Prussians - and manpower.

For instance, officers: the average age of a French lieutenant is 37, a captain 45, a major 47 (though the Prussians capture French junior officers in their fifties and sixties). They show little interest in their men, resulting in widespread disobedience. The 1869 inspection of the 99th Infantry Regiment, for instance, notes "dirty rifles and kits, troops lolling unsupervised in the shade of their gymnastics equipment, choristers who could not sing, a fencing instructor who could not fence, and a disturbing number of NCOs either in jail or... busted down to private for various crimes" (Wawro, Franco-Prussian War p. 44). These circumstances did not change dramatically until the First World War, and the fact that in 1917 the French army mutinies and the British army doesn't has been ascribed to superior man-management techniques at the junior officer level.

Like the British, the French have long service: however, because Neil stopped paying bounties to encourage re-enlistment, thousands of veterans chose to leave the army in the years immediately before the war. The burden of administration is far lower in a British army of fewer than a hundred thousand than a French army of 400,000, meaning the administrative chaos would be commensurately lower. The French have a policy of requiring all reservists to report to their regimental depot for equipment before proceeding to their regiments, which leads to circumstances like Zouave reservists trekking from metropolitan France to Oran and Algiers before making their way back to northern France to join the fight. On the other hand, the 26,542 men of the British militia reserve can be ordered to join any regiment and receive their arms, clothing and kit from the regimental stores of the regiments they join, as can volunteers from other infantry regiments in the UK (the traditional method of bringing regiments for foreign service up to strength).

There are even more technical reasons I suspect the British would peform better against the Prussians. French tactics are to keep skirmishers very close to the main line to maximise defensive fire, leaving the already very narrow French formations blind to flanking attacks. This is unfortunate, because in 1868 the Prussians noticed French narrowness in defence and amended their swarm tactics to thin the centre and strengthen the flanks. On the other hand, the British drill manual which I previously linked you to stipulates that "skirmishers protect and overlap the flanks of the main body they are intended to cover... the distance of supports from the skirmishers, and reserves from the main body, must depend on circumstances and the nature of the ground". I appreciate it's not as simple as "Zulus beat British, Prussians beat Zulus, Prussians beat British" but I find this more nuanced approach quite interesting.

Industrial capacity isn't a reason people win wars until much later when war becomes less susceptible to twists of fate like the miraculous death of the French army. What difference does it make when France's industrial capacity was bigger than Prussia's, and small or big industrial capacity, britain only sends 100,000 men?

And oh my god don't twist words. I never said that last thing. The reason I pointed out Khartoum and the Zulus is it proved how bad British general staff decision making was. Let me repeat what I've said at least ten times by now. The British troops are fine. Their leadership was a clutter of incompetence.

And yes of course 100,000 men take less to maintain, the Exchequer smiles a thousand bright smiles. The recurring point is, what difference do 100,000 British men make when the Prussians have routed the French army, surrounded the starving Metz units, and when France is in civil chaos? Prussia will have to fight hard and recover from the setback for weeks, but in the process will ravage France and demand even harsher terms, which Britain has no way of reversing.

So when you were talking about "Crimea war era doctrine" that resulted in "a string of military defeats", you weren't actually talking about the systems with which the British fought on the battlefield on which those defeats took place? You, in fact, wanted us to conclude that the British lost those battles not because they were poorly led or because they were bad soldiers, but because they had insufficient supplies? And when you said:

Like I've said eight times (counted), British logistics and high command were bad. Their soldiers were fine. Battlefield systems, as proven by the "superior" French tactic system in 1871 weren't the main factor in wins and losses.

You said that lack of food would be the key factor in both uniting the German nation and bringing them closer to the Russians. You were then informed that there wouldn't be a lack of food, and then decided it didn't matter anyway. Like I said, I don't mind people being wrong: I have a professional interest in the law of blockade which others don't. What I mind is the way in which they react to being wrong.

Not at all haha, please read before you start accusing. The main reason Russia would attack Turkey 7 years early is opportunism, as I've said. If Britain is fighting on the other side, Austria is in hermit mode, and France defeated, who's going to stop them? I said food would be a factor in German long term hate for Britain, but if they don't blockade food it has nothing to do with the overall course of war except that Germany isn't hungry, which is good for them.

Clearly you've decided the Prussians are psychic supermen who have to handicap themselves by leaving hundreds of thousands of troops in "strategic reserve" (rather than besieging French fortifications in area like Strasbourg, or guarding their long supply lines against francs-tireurs. At the very least, though, you could try and get to grips with the point of breaking a siege: it's to create a gap to let the force inside escape, not to have the relieving force blunder in and get itself trapped.

Alternatively that was their doctrine and their orders of battle show they did leave reserves

It doesn't matter: what matters is what was accomplished by the existing forces, and what could be accomplished under these circumstances. Historically, the Army of the North was c.40,000 and the Army of the Loire c.60,000. Adding 60,000 British troops to that will have a massive effect; providing those two armies with proper weapons will have an even greater effect; freeing 180,000 French regular troops from Metz could be a game-changer.

Against a couple hundred thousand Prussians? No. The AotL's performance was abysmal too, and the Metz regiment was starving by then.

Firstly, that isn't a quote-unquote win: recovering from a defeat like that and kicking the Prussians out of France would have been an actual win on a par with some of the greatest victories in history. Secondly, that isn't the "win" condition I suggested was achievable: what I suggested was that with British aid the French could have secured a more creditable result than historically. Thirdly, my argument was not solely "superior arms and infantry tactics": my point was that Britain was peculiarly placed to help resolve many of the problems France encountered.

The rate at which things got worse for France politically and militarily by the later parts of the war was way faster than for the Prussians, so they wouldn't get a "better" result. More likely Prussia gets injured, loses thousands to British intervention, and revenges itself on an imploding France. Imagine if Germany after Versailles went back to war, but magically received support from some foreign power. Better or worse result when the new coalition loses?

And what I'm suggesting is a means of breaking the siege, or at the least giving hope to both Parisians and the wider French population that it could be broken.

You mean the people rebelling against the government?

Both after the point of departure here, the Commune actually coming after the end of the war. Though the emperor might have been deposed, on 3 November 1870 the Government of National Defence got a 90% majority of Paris voters to vote in favour of its strategy. Clearly there was a substantial honeymoon period in which the country had not lost confidence in eking out a reasonable result, a period which would have lasted longer in the event the government appeared to be doing better.

If you're just mention ways the British could intervene with less than 100,000 troops in NorthEast France, there's no way that would stop the spearhead charge to paris and the shelling of the city

I've laboriously walked you through them already. The problem is that if nothing but God himself can beat the Prussians, if the British can't get more than fifty starving troops across the Channel without the ship sinking, and if the French were begging for peace the moment the moment the first needle-rifle fired at Wissembourg, then obviously even the most moderate proposals are going to seem unreasonable.

If Austria entered the war they would lose, and I don't think you're fooling anyone. They know that nobody in this thread said any of that or that British intervention is useless. Just that its difference is small and the result of a "reasonable peace" is the kind of fantastic dream that sleepwalked Napoleon III into attacking in the first place. If your strategy is send 60,000 people to Free Metz, that's essentially the Prussian back yard by the point in the war they'd get there.
 
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The point I was making was that no country knows with 100% certainty what it's going to get out of a war when it joins it. France went into the war expecting to shore up domestic unity and check the ambitions of an upstart rival and wound up with a humiliating defeat, a massive indemnity and territorial sequestration. As such, the question "why should Britain bother" is irrelevant when framed only in terms of the actual benefits available part-way through the war, which is what you were asking. What matters is the potential benefits available at the start of the war.


Which were about zero.

In theory, I suppose, we could capture some place in the East Frisian Islands or the Gulf of Danzig, and build a naval station there, but I don't recall any evidence that we needed or wanted one. And Prussia, of course, has no colonies for us to capture.

It's remotely possible that France might offer us a free hand in Egypt in return for our intervention, but as events a decade later would show, we didn't really need French consent for that.
 
They'd see it as making sure that, say, Germany didn't replace France entirely as European hegemon. They'd consider that the case without intervention would be worse than, in fact, it was OTL.


But that wouldn't become a concern until after Sedan - by which point intervention would be obviously futile.

In any case, why would anyone expect Germany to become an "hegemon"? In 1870 it's population and industrial power were only about the same as France's. It would be another generation before the disparity got really big.

FTM, if there had to be an hegemon, wouldn't Germany have appeared the lesser evil? She had no colonies or navy, and at this point wasn't even much of a commercial rival to Britain. To all appearances she would make far less trouble than France, and until well into the 1890s such was indeed the case.
 
No, they can't. But they would have fought dramatically better with a stiffening of regular troops, both newly-arrived British troops and French troops liberated from Metz, and a supply of modern weapons and artillery. And I think it's a fairly short logical step to the proposition that much more efficient provincial armies might have brought Bismarck to acceptable terms well before Paris falls. Remember that the French position is "not one inch of our territory, nor one stone of our fortresses": they might well have accepted reparations, as the Austrians did in 1866.

I am actually NOT that far from your Position, but...

"French troops liberated from Metz"... - that has to be achieved first - not an easy Task. Germany still had troops in reserve throughout their Homeland - in fear of an Austrian entry in the war - they could have been used to bolster the effort in France. Also the troops besieging Paris can be used for other Tasks (The Germans were well aware that they could not simultaneously attack and garrisomn vast territiory in France, they could BEAT the French in the field though...

"Stiffened by regular (Brit) troops" - I am not shure howw well that will work - difficulties in communication, national pride (on side 9of the French). Discussions who "IS IN CHARGE" - also troops drawn to bolster the French armies will not be able to bolster the relieve effort of Metz. If the Brits send troops I think they are best used as a separate force and not split up between various French armies.

British Equipment used by France - I don't think the Snider Enfield is an improvement over the Chassepot (and France could produce 50.000 per month at the end of the war). Even if there is a shortage in weapons on the French side the Snider Enfield is also a relative new weapon, how many had the Brits to spare? - you Need ammo too...

Overall the French army was well equipped, One things the Germans had an Advantage was in Artillery (being able to shoot at double distance is no small means) - I don't know how much can be done by the Brits in this regard.

One Thing that COULD be disastrous to the German war effort is a joint british-Danish attack in Germany to open a second front ...
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The oppinions of British officers don't count? Have you read some of the letters from the Crimean War on French soldiers?
From fifteen years ago and before at least two major programs of reforms? Yes, they don't count, any more than one could criticize the British Army of 1910 for lacking tanks...

Anyway, the Crimea's also the place that produced the Thin Red Line.
 
From fifteen years ago and before at least two major programs of reforms? Yes, they don't count, any more than one could criticize the British Army of 1910 for lacking tanks...

Anyway, the Crimea's also the place that produced the Thin Red Line.
You haven't provided evidence that suggests it improved to the point that it could keep up with the French, let alone the Prussians in terms of quality. 15 years is enough time to improve the quality of their armed forces. Did they? Sardinia's went to crap. IIRC, the next major war against Europeans for the British was the Boer War. Although I might give them a pass there, because guerilla warfare is hard to fight.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
You haven't provided evidence that suggests it improved to the point that it could keep up with the French, let alone the Prussians in terms of quality. 15 years is enough time to improve the quality of their armed forces. Did they? Sardinia's went to crap. IIRC, the next major war against Europeans for the British was the Boer War. Although I might give them a pass there, because guerilla warfare is hard to fight.
What about the Indian Mutiny? I mean, by definition the mutiny had a hard core of experienced troops with modern tactics.


And to make it clear, your argument here is that:


1) The French were terrible compared to the Prussians.
2) The British were terrible compared to the French.

And you're essentially, I presume, demanding that I show you an actual historical battle to prove otherwise - but rejecting any that don't involve fighting Europeans.
That's silly.

If one looks at their handbooks and manuals one can see a fairly modern outlook. If one looks at the tactics and weapons deployed against non-European forces one sees a massive over-application of force including artillery and rapid-firing weapons deployed in the appropriate manners. (rapid firing weapons well forward.)
If one looks at their exercises then one sees a quite modern force.
And if one looks at what they were armed with one sees a continuous updating of the main artillery pieces and small arms to keep them competitive with continental armies.


We of course cannot know how well they would actually do. But when one looks at each of the components of fighting a modern war considered in isolation then they all seem to be there.
Weapons - Sniders and rifled breech loading artillery, along with a tendency (shown later) to use rapid fire weapons in the front lines instead of with the artillery.
Courage - certainly present and well tested in the field.
Accuracy - Crimea demonstrates this one, and uniquely the British trained against man-shaped targets. This would improve their ability to actually shoot real people.
Numbers - the number of British regulars present at home was enough for at least one large field army.
Tactical sophistication - the quick adaptation to various different combat environments, as well as their handbooks from the time.
Ability to learn - the Crimea demonstrates this.
Logistics - the British handled much of the Crimea logistics effort, and proved capable to deploy a force pretty much anywhere in the world.
 
I'd have thought it was obvious that Britain versus Prussia is different to Britain and France versus Prussia.
Versus Prussia, Austria (pre-1866 defeat) and potentially the rest of the German Confederation, to be more accurate.
Germany still had troops in reserve throughout their Homeland - in fear of an Austrian entry in the war
VI Corps was initially held in Silesia but released in August 1870. The remaining reserve troops were Landwehr, and there hasn't been time since 1866 to build up a proper cadre of troops outside the Prussian heartlands.
Also the troops besieging Paris can be used for other Tasks
Besieging an army of 400,000 with an army of 240,000 is a risky proposition as things stand: in fact, one of the main purposes of the provincial armies is to draw off troops from the siege, such as when Molkte has to detach Ludwig von der Tann to defeat the French troops at Orleans, to facilitate an attempt to break out.
"Stiffened by regular (Brit) troops" - I am not shure howw well that will work - difficulties in communication, national pride (on side 9of the French).
The British do have a certain amount of experience with these problems though, both historically (Peninsular war with the Spanish, Hundred Days with the Dutch-Belgians) and more recently (Crimea with the French, Second China War with the French) The general who led the latter war, Sir James Hope Grant, was appointed to command the Aldershot division which would form the nucleus of any expeditionary force in 1870; his French counterpart, Charles Cousin-Montauban, Comte de Palikao, was appointed minister of war in August.
troops drawn to bolster the French armies will not be able to bolster the relieve effort of Metz.
Unless they're sent to bolster the Army of the North, which is about 150 miles as the crow flies from Metz; this army could also try to lift the siege of Paris, which is about 100 miles away.
I don't think the Snider Enfield is an improvement over the Chassepot (and France could produce 50.000 per month at the end of the war). Even if there is a shortage in weapons on the French side the Snider Enfield is also a relative new weapon, how many had the Brits to spare? - you Need ammo too...
The AotL's performance was abysmal too,
I think part of the problem here may be people struggling to differentiate between the early war military situation and the late war military situation for France. In the early war, France has regular troops armed with breech-loading rifles: nobody's arguing that Britain would make a significant contribution at that stage. In the late war, France has scratch troops armed with muzzle-loading rifles and elderly artillery and is struggling to buy guns on the world market because almost all the Chassepots have been captured. That's when I and others are arguing that the British contribution would have made the difference- I explained how many weapons they had to spare earlier:
the British have in store in August 1870 231,250 Sniders

One things the Germans had an Advantage was in Artillery (being able to shoot at double distance is no small means) - I don't know how much can be done by the Brits in this regard.
The French have a bronze rifled muzzle-loading gun with a timed fuze; the Prussians have a rifled breech-loading gun with percussion fuses, allowing the shells to burst on impact with the ground; the British are equipped with a rifled breech-loading gun with percussion fuses, of which they have 30 batteries (180 guns) for field service and 312 guns in storage which could be provided to the French.

The oppinions of British officers don't count? Have you read some of the letters from the Crimean War on French soldiers?
I'm not sure it's safe to draw conclusions from one campaign, particularly one fifteen years ago- after all, if you'd picked one campaign ten years ago, you would have had a completely different view:

About the middle of May the French troops began to arrive at Shanghai; but they had not yet made any arrangements to procure horses for their guns, and had organised little or no commissariat. Upon hearing this, I offered General de Montauban to let him have 170 ponies, which we had collected... his officers stated that they did not expect to be able to get to work this year... It was in a great measure owing to the scarcity of draught animals experienced by the French that the armies were unable to take the field until so late a date that, as will be subsequently seen, Pekin was captured but just before the severe winter set in.

The French general walked down the line with me, and frequently expressed his admiration of our troops. Such a sight, he said, would not have been extraordinary in Hyde Park or in the Tuileries, but he could never have expected to witness it in China.

The French general... moved forward with his columns massed on the highroad, and when within 1700 or 1800 yards of the forts managed to bring a few guns to the front, with which he opened fire. The enemy responded with vigour; but, fortunately for the French, the range was too great to be effective; otherwise their loss would have been heavy indeed. General de Montauban at last recognised the futility of the attempt, and withdrew his force.

They [Chinese] therefore attacked him with their cavalry, and for a short time the French guns were in jeopardy. Colonel de Bentzman commanding the French artillery afterwards told me that he drew his revolver as a last resource to aid in endeavouring to save them. Our gallant little force of cavalry with about half-a-dozen troopers which General de Montauban had with him (The French expedition was unprovided with cavalry, with the exception of a few mounted orderlies), the whole led by- Colonel Foley, the Commissioner with the French, now charged the Tartars...

I myself went in search of the French General, whom we supposed to be on our left, for the purpose of holding a conference with him. But he was nowhere to be found, and the cavalry which I had sent out as flankers had also disappeared. He and his force must have lost us in the enclosed country.

The French established their batteries a little higher up, and within 60 yards of the wall. They had only field artillery, brass rifled guns, throwing a 24-pounder shot ; and their commanding officer of artillery, Colonel de Bentzman, told me he much doubted their power to effect a breach, but that they would serve to distract the attention of the enemy.

Bearing in mind that you asked earlier what reforms there had been after the Crimea and I told you, I'm not sure why you'd expect the situations to be comparable in the first place.

They're complete. The post-Crimean reforms are intended to maximise the efficiency of the long-service army (10 years, with optional re-enlistment to 21 years which most soldiers choose to take), by amending tactical doctrine, implementing extensive marksmanship training, providing breech-loading weapons, creating a staff college, and restricting flogging.

Like blitzkrieg that German military term is badly understood
But not by me, because I used the term correctly in describing Prussian infantry tactics. You assumed I meant a human wave tactic, but I'm not responsible for your assumptions.
What difference does it make when France's industrial capacity was bigger than Prussia's
Actually, Germany produced 1,240,000 tons of pig iron in 1870 compared to 1,178,000 tons in France and 5,964,000 tons in the UK: in steel, both France and Prussia prduce about 300,000 tons and Britain produces 700,000 tons. In 1869, Prussia alone produced 350,230,000 tons of coal compared to 198,000,000 in France and 1,632,000,000 in the UK. So the answer is: France's industrial capacity wasn't bigger, and it would have made quite a lot of difference.
The reason I pointed out Khartoum and the Zulus is it proved how bad British general staff decision making was.
So two battles (not wars, just battles, neither fought by somebody who was in high command in 1870) prove that British general staff decision making is terrible. However, similar instances of incompetence among Prussian generals don't prove the same thing. More importantly: when are you going to guess my general?

Seventy-four years old when granted a key field command, considered senile by some of his fellows, obsessed with the lessons of the previous war, fails to follow the strategic plan for the conflict, launches repeated artless and suicidal attacks on the enemy; relieved from command due to incompetence but, because of his friendship with the monarch, appointed to a prestigious post, promoted, given a peerage and a pension.
You could have brute-forced it through Wikipedia by now, which means there can be only one conclusion: you know, but refuse to admit that you know in the knowledge that it demolishes your argument about the respective quality of generals on each side.

as proven by the "superior" French tactic system in 1871 weren't the main factor in wins and losses.
But the French didn't have a superior tactical system: they didn't even have a tactical system that made the best use of their weapons. They should have used skirmishers to conceal their lines, spreading their main infantry line out, and allowing independent aimed fire by their long-service soldiers. Instead, they keep the skirmishers close, insist on a tight and narrowly-focused formation, and ban soldiers from firing more than five shots at a time. This plays right into Prussian hands, because they can use the swarm formations to try and feel out the French flanks and turn their position, or blow the tightly-packed French troops out of their trenches with artillery. What I've done, by going back to the original manuals, is shown how the British might have avoided that (I did a lot of other stuff as well, but it doesn't seem like you can contest any of that in anything other than the vaguest generalities).

The main reason Russia would attack Turkey 7 years early is opportunism, as I've said. If Britain is fighting on the other side, Austria is in hermit mode, and France defeated, who's going to stop them?
Given that historically Austria was in hermit mode, France was defeated and Britain had a tiny, puny, incompetent army, why did they wait seven years?
Alternatively that was their doctrine and their orders of battle show they did leave reserves
I've looked extensively at the orders of battle, and I don't believe you: . There are troops holding captured fortresses and troops holding the line of communications, but those aren't strategic reserves. If Moltke had troops spare, why did he strip the siege of Paris of troops to fight at Orleans (I Bavarian corps and 22nd Prussian Division) rather than bringing up these supposedly ample reserves? Why did Prince Leopold of Bavaria find himself "horribly expsed, surrounded by far more numerous troops" campaigning on the Loire? Why would Moltke let Tann get defeated at Coulmiers and only then reinforce him with troops taken from the siege of Metz if he has a massive strategic reserve sat round doing nothing?
You mean the people rebelling against the government?
You mean the Commune, which takes place after the armistice that ends the war?
If Austria entered the war they would lose, and I don't think you're fooling anyone.
Who said anything about Austria? You know that Wissembourg is the first battle in the war of 1870, surely?
 
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What about the Indian Mutiny? I mean, by definition the mutiny had a hard core of experienced troops with modern tactics.

And to make it clear, your argument here is that:

1) The French were terrible compared to the Prussians.
2) The British were terrible compared to the French.

And you're essentially, I presume, demanding that I show you an actual historical battle to prove otherwise - but rejecting any that don't involve fighting Europeans.
That's silly.

If one looks at their handbooks and manuals one can see a fairly modern outlook. If one looks at the tactics and weapons deployed against non-European forces one sees a massive over-application of force including artillery and rapid-firing weapons deployed in the appropriate manners. (rapid firing weapons well forward.)
If one looks at their exercises then one sees a quite modern force.
And if one looks at what they were armed with one sees a continuous updating of the main artillery pieces and small arms to keep them competitive with continental armies.

We of course cannot know how well they would actually do. But when one looks at each of the components of fighting a modern war considered in isolation then they all seem to be there.
Weapons - Sniders and rifled breech loading artillery, along with a tendency (shown later) to use rapid fire weapons in the front lines instead of with the artillery.
Courage - certainly present and well tested in the field.
Accuracy - Crimea demonstrates this one, and uniquely the British trained against man-shaped targets. This would improve their ability to actually shoot real people.
Numbers - the number of British regulars present at home was enough for at least one large field army.
Tactical sophistication - the quick adaptation to various different combat environments, as well as their handbooks from the time.
Ability to learn - the Crimea demonstrates this.
Logistics - the British handled much of the Crimea logistics effort, and proved capable to deploy a force pretty much anywhere in the world.
1) I'd like you to elaborate on your point on accuracy, tactical sophistication and adaptability. I already said that they were brave, although one quote from a French Zouave said otherwise. I didn't post it, because I have to type it all out and it's fairly long.

2) Being able to deploy a force anywgere in the world isnlt much of a bonus. It's happening right next door.

3) Can you expand on the Indian mutiny? I don't know much about it besides that it happened. Now, Indians weren't able to become officers in the British Army until the 20th Century IIRC. Did they have military advisors? Asking for their performance against Europeans isn't wrong BTW. Europe was ahead of the rest of the world in this area.
 
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