I'd have thought it was obvious that Britain versus Prussia is different to Britain and France versus Prussia.
Versus Prussia, Austria (pre-1866 defeat) and potentially the rest of the German Confederation, to be more accurate.
Germany still had troops in reserve throughout their Homeland - in fear of an Austrian entry in the war
VI Corps was initially held in Silesia but released in August 1870. The remaining reserve troops were Landwehr, and there hasn't been time since 1866 to build up a proper cadre of troops outside the Prussian heartlands.
Also the troops besieging Paris can be used for other Tasks
Besieging an army of 400,000 with an army of 240,000 is a risky proposition as things stand: in fact, one of the main purposes of the provincial armies is to draw off troops from the siege, such as when Molkte has to detach Ludwig von der Tann to defeat the French troops at Orleans, to facilitate an attempt to break out.
"Stiffened by regular (Brit) troops" - I am not shure howw well that will work - difficulties in communication, national pride (on side 9of the French).
The British do have a certain amount of experience with these problems though, both historically (Peninsular war with the Spanish, Hundred Days with the Dutch-Belgians) and more recently (Crimea with the French, Second China War with the French) The general who led the latter war, Sir James Hope Grant, was appointed to command the Aldershot division which would form the nucleus of any expeditionary force in 1870; his French counterpart, Charles Cousin-Montauban, Comte de Palikao, was appointed minister of war in August.
troops drawn to bolster the French armies will not be able to bolster the relieve effort of Metz.
Unless they're sent to bolster the Army of the North, which is about 150 miles as the crow flies from Metz; this army could also try to lift the siege of Paris, which is about 100 miles away.
I don't think the Snider Enfield is an improvement over the Chassepot (and France could produce 50.000 per month at the end of the war). Even if there is a shortage in weapons on the French side the Snider Enfield is also a relative new weapon, how many had the Brits to spare? - you Need ammo too...
The AotL's performance was abysmal too,
I think part of the problem here may be people struggling to differentiate between the early war military situation and the late war military situation for France. In the early war, France has regular troops armed with breech-loading rifles: nobody's arguing that Britain would make a significant contribution at that stage. In the late war, France has scratch troops armed with muzzle-loading rifles and elderly artillery and is struggling to buy guns on the world market because almost all the Chassepots have been captured. That's when I and others are arguing that the British contribution would have made the difference- I explained how many weapons they had to spare earlier:
the British have in store in August 1870 231,250 Sniders
One things the Germans had an Advantage was in Artillery (being able to shoot at double distance is no small means) - I don't know how much can be done by the Brits in this regard.
The French have a bronze rifled muzzle-loading gun with a timed fuze; the Prussians have a rifled breech-loading gun with percussion fuses, allowing the shells to burst on impact with the ground; the British are equipped with a rifled breech-loading gun with percussion fuses, of which they have 30 batteries (180 guns) for field service and 312 guns in storage which could be provided to the French.
The oppinions of British officers don't count? Have you read some of the letters from the Crimean War on French soldiers?
I'm not sure it's safe to draw conclusions from one campaign, particularly one fifteen years ago- after all, if you'd picked one campaign ten years ago, you would have had a completely different view:
About the middle of May the French troops began to arrive at Shanghai; but they had not yet made any arrangements to procure horses for their guns, and had organised little or no commissariat. Upon hearing this, I offered General de Montauban to let him have 170 ponies, which we had collected... his officers stated that they did not expect to be able to get to work this year... It was in a great measure owing to the scarcity of draught animals experienced by the French that the armies were unable to take the field until so late a date that, as will be subsequently seen, Pekin was captured but just before the severe winter set in.
The French general walked down the line with me, and frequently expressed his admiration of our troops. Such a sight, he said, would not have been extraordinary in Hyde Park or in the Tuileries, but he could never have expected to witness it in China.
The French general... moved forward with his columns massed on the highroad, and when within 1700 or 1800 yards of the forts managed to bring a few guns to the front, with which he opened fire. The enemy responded with vigour; but, fortunately for the French, the range was too great to be effective; otherwise their loss would have been heavy indeed. General de Montauban at last recognised the futility of the attempt, and withdrew his force.
They [Chinese] therefore attacked him with their cavalry, and for a short time the French guns were in jeopardy. Colonel de Bentzman commanding the French artillery afterwards told me that he drew his revolver as a last resource to aid in endeavouring to save them. Our gallant little force of cavalry with about half-a-dozen troopers which General de Montauban had with him (The French expedition was unprovided with cavalry, with the exception of a few mounted orderlies), the whole led by- Colonel Foley, the Commissioner with the French, now charged the Tartars...
I myself went in search of the French General, whom we supposed to be on our left, for the purpose of holding a conference with him. But he was nowhere to be found, and the cavalry which I had sent out as flankers had also disappeared. He and his force must have lost us in the enclosed country.
The French established their batteries a little higher up, and within 60 yards of the wall. They had only field artillery, brass rifled guns, throwing a 24-pounder shot ; and their commanding officer of artillery, Colonel de Bentzman, told me he much doubted their power to effect a breach, but that they would serve to distract the attention of the enemy.
Bearing in mind that you asked earlier what reforms there had been after the Crimea and I told you, I'm not sure why you'd expect the situations to be comparable in the first place.
They're complete. The post-Crimean reforms are intended to maximise the efficiency of the long-service army (10 years, with optional re-enlistment to 21 years which most soldiers choose to take), by amending tactical doctrine, implementing extensive
marksmanship training, providing breech-loading weapons, creating a staff college, and restricting flogging.
Like blitzkrieg that German military term is badly understood
But not by me, because I used the term correctly in describing Prussian infantry tactics. You assumed I meant a human wave tactic, but I'm not responsible for your assumptions.
What difference does it make when France's industrial capacity was bigger than Prussia's
Actually, Germany produced 1,240,000 tons of pig iron in 1870 compared to 1,178,000 tons in France and 5,964,000 tons in the UK: in steel, both France and Prussia prduce about 300,000 tons and Britain produces 700,000 tons. In 1869, Prussia alone produced 350,230,000 tons of coal compared to 198,000,000 in France and 1,632,000,000 in the UK. So the answer is: France's industrial capacity wasn't bigger, and it would have made quite a lot of difference.
The reason I pointed out Khartoum and the Zulus is it proved how bad British general staff decision making was.
So two battles (not wars, just battles, neither fought by somebody who was in high command in 1870) prove that British general staff decision making is terrible. However, similar instances of incompetence among Prussian generals don't prove the same thing. More importantly: when are you going to guess my general?
Seventy-four years old when granted a key field command, considered senile by some of his fellows, obsessed with the lessons of the previous war, fails to follow the strategic plan for the conflict, launches repeated artless and suicidal attacks on the enemy; relieved from command due to incompetence but, because of his friendship with the monarch, appointed to a prestigious post, promoted, given a peerage and a pension.
You could have brute-forced it through Wikipedia by now, which means there can be only one conclusion: you know, but refuse to admit that you know in the knowledge that it demolishes your argument about the respective quality of generals on each side.
as proven by the "superior" French tactic system in 1871 weren't the main factor in wins and losses.
But the French didn't have a superior tactical system: they didn't even have a tactical system that made the best use of their weapons. They should have used skirmishers to conceal their lines, spreading their main infantry line out, and allowing independent aimed fire by their long-service soldiers. Instead, they keep the skirmishers close, insist on a tight and narrowly-focused formation, and ban soldiers from firing more than five shots at a time. This plays right into Prussian hands, because they can use the swarm formations to try and feel out the French flanks and turn their position, or blow the tightly-packed French troops out of their trenches with artillery. What I've done, by going back to the original manuals, is shown how the British might have avoided that (I did a lot of other stuff as well, but it doesn't seem like you can contest any of that in anything other than the vaguest generalities).
The main reason Russia would attack Turkey 7 years early is opportunism, as I've said. If Britain is fighting on the other side, Austria is in hermit mode, and France defeated, who's going to stop them?
Given that historically Austria was in hermit mode, France was defeated and Britain had a tiny, puny, incompetent army, why did they wait seven years?
Alternatively that was their doctrine and their orders of battle show they did leave reserves
I've looked extensively at the orders of battle, and I don't believe you: . There are troops holding captured fortresses and troops holding the line of communications, but those aren't strategic reserves. If Moltke had troops spare, why did he strip the siege of Paris of troops to fight at Orleans (I Bavarian corps and 22nd Prussian Division) rather than bringing up these supposedly ample reserves? Why did Prince Leopold of Bavaria find himself "horribly expsed, surrounded by far more numerous troops" campaigning on the Loire? Why would Moltke let Tann get defeated at Coulmiers and only then reinforce him with troops taken from the siege of Metz if he has a massive strategic reserve sat round doing nothing?
You mean the people rebelling against the government?
You mean the Commune, which takes place
after the armistice that ends the war?
If Austria entered the war they would lose, and I don't think you're fooling anyone.
Who said anything about Austria? You know that Wissembourg is the first battle in the war of 1870, surely?