UK intervention in Franco-Prussian war of 1870

That's the thing - you say he's too smart for that, but then why did he doctor the telegram?
If there's no gain then it's a massive risk for nothing!

Great move, made it look like France was the senseless aggressor

As for this thread, nothing would happen. The British land forces in 1871 were pitiful, with terrible coordination, Crimea war era doctrine, and a string of military defeats up until the Boer wars. Even in those wars, there was a massive horse shortage, men were treated awfully, and coordination was terrible. The British military history until everyone adopted von Moltke and Prussian doctrine after the Franco-Prussian war, and were able to fully implement it by 1910, was terrible and a string of blunders and idiocy. Mahdi revolt, Anglo-Zulu War, Crimean War

Most likely the rapid Prussian victory happens before Britain can make a difference but Prussia is more bogged down by having to harshly treat France. Britain intervenes and gets destroyed by superior enemy coordination, morale, and logistics (why would Brits even want to go to war)?

Russia opportunistically takes out Turkey i the 1878 war 7 years early and drifts to the Prussian sphere. Austria is too aware of its own weakness and France's lack of help in 1866 to do anything.

Result: British government falls from power, France in chaos, Turkey collapses, Germany united and hates England, German-Russian alliance.
 
1864...;)

But yes, your point is quite clear; given the difficulties the British had in organzing expeditionary forces of any size in the 1870s and 1880s, the fact that 1870-71 finds them smack in the middle of the Cardwell reforms, and the reality that in a conflict the scale of the Franco-Prussian war, 10,000 or even 20,000 troops in Belgium are going to amount to a enclave guard at best (as witness the experience of the Royal Navy Division in 1914), and the point is that in a continental war, the strength of the RN notwithstanding, the British Army is not really in a position to do much.

Best,

For once I agree with TFSmitty

Given the Speed the French armies are defeated OTL a British DOW that is not immediately followed by a sizeable troop commitment is not going to change anything. Austria-Hungary is also NOT jumping on the wagon - if France is not winning - they did not before the war why should they when "germn" armies are approaching Paris. This keeps Russia out. - Well this Russia is also not the russia as we know it in 1914 - large, sure, but the Dschagganth many feared later on - hardly (especially NOT ofter the Crimean war). Hungary might likely have a flirt with Independence, but If russia jumps it will again join the herd (given OTLs Ausgleich giving them a good position)

But back to the start - France must do better to have other Nations have an impact on the war.

Lets assume Britain DOW on Germany sometime between mid July (start of Mobilisation) and the battle of Sedan (1-2 September) that gives a tme window of around 7 weeks - not much the Brits can do in this time (Occupy Antwerp? and violate the treaty of London ;)? :D)

The war will probably go as OTL - Germany will win...

What could be the demands in case Britain joined France?

(I assume the Germans might be more eager to make peace - the longer the war goes the more ist likely the brits send a sizeable army which could undo some german sucesses.)
 
For once I agree with TFSmitty

Given the Speed the French armies are defeated OTL a British DOW that is not immediately followed by a sizeable troop commitment is not going to change anything. Austria-Hungary is also NOT jumping on the wagon - if France is not winning - they did not before the war why should they when "germn" armies are approaching Paris. This keeps Russia out. - Well this Russia is also not the russia as we know it in 1914 - large, sure, but the Dschagganth many feared later on - hardly (especially NOT ofter the Crimean war). Hungary might likely have a flirt with Independence, but If russia jumps it will again join the herd (given OTLs Ausgleich giving them a good position)

But back to the start - France must do better to have other Nations have an impact on the war.

Lets assume Britain DOW on Germany sometime between mid July (start of Mobilisation) and the battle of Sedan (1-2 September) that gives a tme window of around 7 weeks - not much the Brits can do in this time (Occupy Antwerp? and violate the treaty of London ;)? :D)

The war will probably go as OTL - Germany will win...

What could be the demands in case Britain joined France?

(I assume the Germans might be more eager to make peace - the longer the war goes the more ist likely the brits send a sizeable army which could undo some german sucesses.)

Probably the opposite - when they besiege and bombard Paris and see France collapsing, Britain will pridefully refuse to acknowledge their conquests so they would goad Russia into invading Turkey and treat France harshly, suffering in the process and proclaiming a German empire united by a national myth that Britain is causing suffering from blockade. Resources would be an immediate problem so they and Russia would drift close. The "war" would go on until Turkey collapsed, in quotes because the only front is the southern front. I don't think the British (whose traditional tactic was to goad continentals into attacking) could convince either French or Austrians to step it up. Austria would be surrounded by 2 stronger countries and cower. France would be busy with a bigger commune and radical revolt than historical, mired by infighting, and militarily shattered and in rout. I wouldn't be surprised if they agree to a Draconian peace just to get out of the situation.

Think about it if you were German. Some brits who showed a terrible performance in Crimea try to intervene with their backwards and badly organized military on the continent while you've already blown the real enemy out of the water. Then, to save face, and in standard British way just like in Napoleon's time or world war 2, they refuse to acknowledge your conquests. They don't land in the main French theatre and France collapses anyway. Russia is itching for a fight with Turkey that starts in 7 years OTL. Why would you ever give more concessions to Britain and France instead of compensating yourself from British-imposed starvation and plague by trading with Russia and taking from France?
 
Britain went through some military reforms. Does anyone know how far along they were?
They're complete. The post-Crimean reforms are intended to maximise the efficiency of the long-service army (10 years, with optional re-enlistment to 21 years which most soldiers choose to take), by amending tactical doctrine, implementing extensive marksmanship training, providing breech-loading weapons, creating a staff college, and restricting flogging. The Cardwell reforms are driven by the desire to territorialise the forces and create a reserve that can be called up in the event of war: the problem is that, while this mimics some aspects of the Prussian system, the Prussian system isn't designed to provide troops to garrison a world-wide empire. You can read a critique of the Cardwell system by a 20th century secretary of war here- it mirrors many of the criticisms the Duke of Cambridge made at the time and which everybody calls him a hidebound traditionalist idiot for bringing up.

Lets assume Britain DOW on Germany sometime between mid July (start of Mobilisation) and the battle of Sedan (1-2 September) that gives a tme window of around 7 weeks - not much the Brits can do in this time
Sedan didn't end the war, though: even if we pretend the British spend two months loading the expeditionary force's tea supplies onto ships, I can still see three main strategies for the British after Sedan.

1) Contribute to attempts to lift the siege of Metz (which only falls on 27 October 1870), liberating c.180,000 French troops to continue the fight.
2) Support the French Army of the North after the fall of Metz (defeated in the battle of Bapaume on 3 January 1871) in their attempts to relieve the siege of Paris
3) Support the French Army of the Loire, again trying to draw off forces from the siege of Paris.

It could also support the French war effort by supplying their provincial armies with modern rifles, artillery, and drill instructors, all of which they lacked and all of which would have had a significant effect on their fighting capacity. Finally, a declaration of war would have lifted the restriction on volunteering for the French army by British citizens, encouraging Volunteers (who, despite all their flaws, do have the basics of military training) to serve in French formations as well as British.

While none of these moves would win the war for the French, they would undoubtedly increase the probability that Prussia satisfies itself with having smashed the myth of French military prowess and either signs a white peace or abandons claims on Alsace-Lorraine in favour of a simple indemnity.

As for this thread, nothing would happen. The British land forces in 1871 were pitiful, with terrible coordination, Crimea war era doctrine
You know that the 1870 Field Exercise and Evolutions is online, right? You can even compare it to the 1859 version, which itself had been updated to take into account the lessons of the Crimea and the Indian Rebellion, to see what changes were made even after the point at which you assume they're frozen in time.

a string of military defeats up until the Boer wars.
Which ones? In reality, the period between 1854 and 1881 is a long string of British victories- the Persian War, the Indian rebellion, the Second China War, the Ambela Campaign, the Bhutan war, the Abyssinian War, the Red River Rebellion, the Ashanti War, the Zulu War, the Second Afghan War- bookmarked by a victory in the Crimea marred by poor initial performance and a defeat in the Boer War. If we stretch the period a year, in 1882 the British fight a larger Egyptian force armed with 60 pieces of Krupp artillery and breech-loading rifles, entrenched at Tel el-Kebir: they lose 57 killed and inflict 1,396. And I find your treatment of the Mahdist wars completely confusing, because there seems to me to be a very clear division between battles fought by British troops (Second El Teb, Tofrek, Tamai, Abu Klea, Kirbekan, Ginnis, Suakin, Ferkeh, Atbara, Omdurman, Umm Diwaykarat) which are all victories, and battles fought without British troops (El Obeid, First El Teb, Siege of Khartoum) which are all defeats. I'm not claiming these are top-ranked opponents, but it was you who brought them up.

The bottom line is that by no conceivable stretch of the imagination is this "a string of military defeats", and I don't get why you'd argue-

Britain will pridefully refuse to acknowledge their conquests

the British (whose traditional tactic was to goad continentals into attacking)

Some brits who showed a terrible performance in Crimea

their backwards and badly organized military

to save face, and in standard British way just like in Napoleon's time or world war 2, they refuse to acknowledge your conquests.

British-imposed starvation and plague
Oh, right. It's not worth my explaining that food isn't a contraband item for the purposes of blockade in 1870, is it?
 
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It's worth mentioning that the British reaction to the Crimea and Mutiny was to analyze what worked, and completely do away with any distinction between light and heavy infantry.
The germ of the idea is older, though. From the 1833 Field Exercise and Evolutions:

"When battalions of the line are in perfect order in all the detail of line movements, it is essential that they should be practised in certain extended formations. It is always desirable that a battalion of the line, in the absence of any force of light infantry beyond the light companies of regiments, should be competent to assist in protecting the front and flanks of a column of march..."
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The germ of the idea is older, though. From the 1833 Field Exercise and Evolutions:

"no latitude can be permitted in the mode of executing the drill and manoeuvres laid down in the first, second and third parts of this book, upon the plea that they are performed by light infantry battalions... When battalions of the line are in perfect order in all the detail of line movements, it is essential that they should be practised in certain extended formations. It is always desirable that a battalion of the line, in the absence of any force of light infantry beyond the light companies of regiments, should be competent to assist in protecting the front and flanks of a column of march..."

Yep - just that here it was official. No such thing as non-light infantry battalions, the names are just names.
And their tactical evolutions... the Canadian Militia in the 1861 crisis was seen as poor quality by the Regulars because they couldn't do that kind of thing and were limited to the US standard of mostly standing in line and blasting away.
 
You know that the 1870 Field Exercise and Evolutions is online, right? You can even compare it to the 1859 version, which itself had been updated to take into account the lessons of the Crimea and the Indian Rebellion, to see what

That's great, and it takes more than a year to totally implement changes to military doctrine. British performance in the Mahdi revolt and Boer wars afterwards was equally abysmal, and their army even after reading that manual, anyone can conclude is inept for the continent and not ready for that kind of war. This "updated" manual also says nothing about logistics, which was the main reason that the Prussians won and French lost historically. The Prussian mobilization structure was fast and their logistics to the tee. Their doctrine was mission command and orders planned out, predicting uncertainties.

Britain's logistical structure as the boer wars proved was cluttered and terrible, worse than France's.


Which ones? In reality, the period between 1854 and 1881 is a long string of British victories- the Persian War, the Indian rebellion, the Second China War, the Ambela Campaign, the Bhutan war, the Abyssinian War, the Red River Rebellion, the Ashanti War, the Zulu War, the Second Afghan War- bookmarked by a victory in the Crimea marred by poor initial performance and a defeat in the Boer War. If we stretch the period a year, in 1882 the British fight a larger Egyptian force armed with 60 pieces of Krupp artillery and breech-loading rifles, entrenched at Tel el-Kebir: they lose 57 killed and inflict 1,396. And I find your treatment of the Mahdist wars completely confusing, because there seems to me to be a very clear division between battles fought by British troops (Second El Teb, Tofrek, Tamai, Abu Klea, Kirbekan, Ginnis, Suakin, Ferkeh, Atbara, Omdurman, Umm Diwaykarat) which are all victories, and battles fought without British troops (El Obeid, First El Teb, Siege of Khartoum) which are all defeats. I'm not claiming these are top-ranked opponents, but it was you who brought them up.

The bottom line is that by no conceivable stretch of the imagination is this "a string of military defeats", and I don't get why you'd argue-

I brought these opponents up because they're not top ranked. Of course the British won the wars, giants never lose wars to pygmies. But the amount of times the colonial countries got to stab them in the gut is just sad. Egyptians don't stack up to Germans just because they had "Krupp cannons" and "breech-loading rifles" - the Chinese in the boxer rebellion did too, but just like the Qing, Egyptians were behind in doctrine and organization. As Prussia proved using the needle rifle, inferior tech to the French breech-loader and mitrailleuse, their doctrine was the deciding point in winning.

And whats the "string of defeats"? Battles which were mainly lost because of incompetence. The Anglo-Zulu War, Mahdi Revolt, and Boer wars all saw these. It's no surprise British troops gun down backwards Sudanese rebels, but Khartoum was a disaster of planning. The Boer Wars were the textbook case of decent warfighting hitting up against a blundering and incapable force. The Anglo-Zulu war brought the greatest embarrassment Europeans would suffer in their colonial wars until Adwa.

If you're comparing the model military machine of the day that would be copied in its mobilization structure and logistics by friends and enemies alike with Britain, a country that suffered tons of non-combat losses and a handful of setbacks against midget powers, which had no experience besides an incompetent war in Crimea after Napoleon's day in fighting other Europeans, it's no contest.

Oh, right. It's not worth my explaining that food isn't a contraband item for the purposes of blockade in 1870, is it?

Why wouldn't the British block food?

Honestly what do you expect the British to do? If we took all your arguments on face we'd be going "oh they beat the Egyptians with Krupp cannons so they'll march right into France and kick out the Germans". It's not just the documents and their... "interesting" performance in Africa that says they'd likely be beaten. Think about doctrines. Name one Brit PM who tried to press for an intervention against Prussia. They didn't want to deal with it. Meanwhile, France and Prussia (Prussia more competently) prepped up for years. Do you really think the British would have done better in this war that proved preparation and mobilization in the railroad age were everything?

Find any documents on British mobilization plans in 1870? They exist, but are outdated and small. While the Germans mobilize hundreds of thousands quickly, the British probably wouldn't have a big force see action until the gates of Paris, and even then, they have a history of (smartly) maneuvering around the fringes instead of chopping at the center. They'd fight the Russians in Turkey, an inevitable war if they declared war on Germany. They might do okay there. They wouldn't reverse German gains, however, and the war would drag on for some months before they called it quits, maybe with another face saving deal where they get Cyprus from the turks, or something else circular.

France is the biggest loser here since there would be a much bigger "fight to the bitter end" faction.
 
Of course the British won the wars, giants never lose wars to pygmies. But the amount of times the colonial countries got to stab them in the gut is just sad.
And whats the "string of defeats"? Battles which were mainly lost because of incompetence.
What you need to understand is that this isn't Imperialism: Total War: you don't move your troops, hit the auto-resolve button and win every single battle as long as you've bought the breech-loading rifle upgrade for your infantry. Sometimes, no matter how well you prepare, how well you plan, how superior your military is, things go wrong. The key is whether you can overcome those setbacks and move on: it's what the Prussians do, and it's exactly what the British do.

Between the Crimean war and the First Boer War, Prussia fought three wars, in Europe, close to home, against other European powers fighting in a consistent and predictable way. In the same space of time Britain had to fight dozens of wars- all across the globe, in terrain ranging from desert to rainforest, against a range of opponents with vastly differing capabilities. It's completely understandable that things went wrong: it's commendable, given how many variables the British face, that they don't go wrong more often than they did. An open-order firing line designed for use against European opponents, is overwhelmed by a vastly superior force armed with melee weapons. An Indian regiment breaks under modern artillery fire, and the rest of the line is swamped under odds of ten to one. A force sent to support its allies in the field is hastily redirected to besiege one of the world's strongest fortresses and, though ultimately victorious, suffers from disease and cold.

Here's a fun little game: I'll describe a general, and you tell me who I'm thinking of. Seventy-four years old when granted a key field command, considered senile by some of his fellows, obsessed with the lessons of the previous war, fails to follow the strategic plan for the conflict, launches repeated artless and suicidal attacks on the enemy; relieved from command due to incompetence but, because of his friendship with the monarch, appointed to a prestigious post, promoted, given a peerage and a pension.
their army even after reading that manual, anyone can conclude is inept for the continent and not ready for that kind of war.
Maybe you could run us through the logic by which you conclude this, then- assuming you've actually read the manual, and haven't just concluded it's inept based on your existing prejudices. I'm particularly keen to learn why you think it's so far inferior to Prussian infantry tactics, given that in 1870 the rashness of said tactics lead to vast numbers of Prussian troops being thrown away in futile assaults against prepared French defensive positions, with battles being largely won thanks to superior Prussian artillery blowing the French out of their trenches.

This "updated" manual also says nothing about logistics
The clue is sort of in the title - Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry. It doesn't say anything about cavalry or digging latrines either, but- as I'm sure you remember- what you said was
Crimea war era doctrine
and not
an inadequate logistical support system
Khartoum was a disaster of planning
Can you explain exactly what you think one British officer serving as an official in the Egyptian government leading an army of seven thousand Egyptian soldiers in a ten-month siege against fifty thousand Mahdists proves? Because I don't see its relevance to this particular set of circumstances other than a rather ineffective bludgeon.
Britain's logistical structure as the boer wars proved was cluttered and terrible, worse than France's.
During the Boer War, all the supplies for the British army have to be shipped seven thousand miles to South Africa, and then carried by rudimentary rail systems and ox-cart four hundred into the continent. During the Franco-Prussian war, the supplies from the British army will have to be sent twenty seven miles to northern France and then carried by an extensive road and rail network to wherever the British army happens to be. That's ignoring the fact, of course, that there's a lot more stuff for sale in northern France than the South African veldt.
Why wouldn't the British block food?
Why wouldn't the British introduce conscription? The answer is the same: because war changes betwen 1870, which is the date we're supposed to be talking about, and 1914, which is the date you're talking about. The first time that food had been included on that blockade was by the Union during the American Civil War, and only then as conditional contraband (i.e., only food destined directly for the Confederate military was subject to seizure). In 1904, the Russians declared food as an absolute contraband and the British condemned the move.
Honestly what do you expect the British to do? If we took all your arguments on face we'd be going "oh they beat the Egyptians with Krupp cannons so they'll march right into France and kick out the Germans".
Any time you want to engage with my actual argument than a straw-man, I'm right here:
While none of these moves would win the war for the French, they would undoubtedly increase the probability that Prussia satisfies itself with having smashed the myth of French military prowess and either signs a white peace or abandons claims on Alsace-Lorraine in favour of a simple indemnity.
What I was pointing out is that the British faced a variety of opponents in its colonial wars: from the Krupp- and Remington-armed Egyptians through the European-drilled, musket-armed Sikhs to the spear-armed Zulu. The real irony is that you're accusing me of only focusing on one while ignoring the fact that you yourself are focusing myopically on the latter.
Name one Brit PM who tried to press for an intervention against Prussia. They didn't want to deal with it.
It was more the fact that they didn't have to deal with it, as we've established already:
In 1870 the future ruler of Germany is the liberal Anglophile Frederick III rather than the authoritarian Anglophile Wilhelm II... The UK didn't see Germany as a threat until, well, the Germans started threatening them.
But even after the Franco-Prussian War, there wasn't a massive shift in London where everyone was like, "OMG, we've gotta stop the Prussians now! Go, go go!" If anything, their eyes were still on Russia for the next thirty years or so, and Germany was seen as a potential ally in that endeavor.
Find any documents on British mobilization plans in 1870? They exist, but are outdated and small.
You're missing the obvious here: for Germany, mobilisation is something they do on a massive scale every so often. For the British, mobilisation- equipping troops for foreign service, moving them to ports, sending them overseas- is something they do all the time, either on a small scale to relieve troops or on a large scale in response to a crisis (see also: Trent Affair, Crimean War, Ashanti War). What we're proposing here is that the British send a small supporting field force and logistical support to a continental ally, which - and I don't know if you've noticed this yet - is pretty much what you've conceded has been their way of war for centuries.
 
What you need to understand is that this isn't Imperialism: Total War: you don't move your troops, hit the auto-resolve button and win every single battle as long as you've bought the breech-loading rifle upgrade for your infantry. Sometimes, no matter how well you prepare, how well you plan, how superior your military is, things go wrong. The key is whether you can overcome those setbacks and move on: it's what the Prussians do, and it's exactly what the British do.

Between the Crimean war and the First Boer War, Prussia fought three wars, in Europe, close to home, against other European powers fighting in a consistent and predictable way. In the same space of time Britain had to fight dozens of wars- all across the globe, in terrain ranging from desert to rainforest, against a range of opponents with vastly differing capabilities. It's completely understandable that things went wrong: it's commendable, given how many variables the British face, that they don't go wrong more often than they did. An open-order firing line designed for use against European opponents, is overwhelmed by a vastly superior force armed with melee weapons. An Indian regiment breaks under modern artillery fire, and the rest of the line is swamped under odds of ten to one. A force sent to support its allies in the field is hastily redirected to besiege one of the world's strongest fortresses and, though ultimately victorious, suffers from disease and cold.

The war in Europe would be consistent and predictable between Prussia and England so that doesn't count against the Germans. Why? The English would either not be fighting Prussia directly in some side-theater like Turkey against Russians, more likely, or, if theyre in France will need to coordinate with the French, who did fight in this predictable way. Conventional military doctrine is conventional for a reason. Doctrine from a colonial war does not revolutionize how you fight war in the heartland.

You're saying a lot of principles none of which apply. Sure Britain fought "a range of opponents with vastly differing capabilities", but these ranged from spears to poorly used second hand European equipment with little to no focus on modern doctrine. This kind of claim is like what a propagandist would do to convince his people his country will win in 2 weeks. Look at how we beat these tribesmen, and these tribesmen! The Prussians only fight one way!

That's because it's the best way or the time. Against Denmark, nobody was surprised they won, but they were surprised by how quick. Against Austria, the enemy used shock tactics and was considered a massive threat. Prussia won. Against France, a country that spoke one language, unlike Austria, with the best military tech in the time and a totally different army than Austria depending on "professionalism" and an elite core force. Prussia won. The combination was big emphasis on artillery, modern, calculated, rapid mobilization, calculated moves scrutinizing every possibility and pre-planning, sticking to general command's plan, and using mission command to avoid messups.

Prussian and British enemies are both varied, just the variety Britain was fighting nobody expected Britain to lose to. Everyone expected Prussia to lose to Austria and France, Britain fought a variety of mice and Prussia fought a variety of goliaths.

Maybe you could run us through the logic by which you conclude this, then- assuming you've actually read the manual, and haven't just concluded it's inept based on your existing prejudices. I'm particularly keen to learn why you think it's so far inferior to Prussian infantry tactics, given that in 1870 the rashness of said tactics lead to vast numbers of Prussian troops being thrown away in futile assaults against prepared French defensive positions, with battles being largely won thanks to superior Prussian artillery blowing the French out of their trenches.

I don't know if you read but I didn't say the British infantry tactics were bad. I said not a single thing mentions logistics. I agree - Prussian infantry tactics were awful. They were much worse than French infantry tactics. Man to man the Prussians often lost more than the French. The French infantry had the best rifle in the world. And the French lost. Why? Prussian artillery, mobilization structure and logistics.

The clue is sort of in the title - Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry. It doesn't say anything about cavalry or digging latrines either, but- as I'm sure you remember- what you said was
Crimea war era doctrine
not
an inadequate logistical support system

Actually I did.

The Prussian mobilization structure was fast and their logistics to the tee. Their doctrine was mission command and orders planned out, predicting uncertainties.

Britain's logistical structure as the boer wars proved was cluttered and terrible, worse than France's.

^

There ya go, please read the post not just one line. This is a recurring theme in your replies.

Can you explain exactly what you think one British officer serving as an official in the Egyptian government leading an army of seven thousand Egyptian soldiers in a ten-month siege against fifty thousand Mahdists proves? Because I don't see its relevance to this particular set of circumstances other than a rather ineffective bludgeon.

Imperialists won in better odds before. The reason they lost so fast is they were incompetent leading the defense and didn't even fortify until six months into knowing the city would be attacked. Their communications were cut and they only had food for a couple months. Logistics. I've got nothing against British soldiers, but while the strength of Britain or France might be in individual troops, German strength is in their high command, where both their enemies were terrible at the time.

Why wouldn't the British introduce conscription? The answer is the same: because war changes betwen 1870, which is the date we're supposed to be talking about, and 1914, which is the date you're talking about. The first time that food had been included on that blockade was by the Union during the American Civil War, and only then as conditional contraband (i.e., only food destined directly for the Confederate military was subject to seizure). In 1904, the Russians declared food as an absolute contraband and the British condemned the move.

Makes things better for the Germans if anything. They then just have an annoying fly swatting around on the fringes who doesn't recognize their conquests. They won't even need to deal with rationing.

During the Boer War, all the supplies for the British army have to be shipped seven thousand miles to South Africa, and then carried by rudimentary rail systems and ox-cart four hundred into the continent. During the Franco-Prussian war, the supplies from the British army will have to be sent twenty seven miles to northern France and then carried by an extensive road and rail network to wherever the British army happens to be. That's ignoring the fact, of course, that there's a lot more stuff for sale in northern France than the South African veldt.

The war really was over in a matter of weeks. Northeast France was almost totally occupied. Brits had their own people and regulations in SA. In France, they'd use someone else's railroad gauge and stress the French logistical system even more, which by the way was terrible. They had these beautiful Napoleonic grand victory plans, but their carriages ended up cluttering roads that were too narrow and stores were packed into railways that didn't have enough rolling stock. What are the British going to do? Ship over some French-gauge boxcars which they have no reason to have?

While none of these moves would win the war for the French, they would undoubtedly increase the probability that Prussia satisfies itself with having smashed the myth of French military prowess and either signs a white peace or abandons claims on Alsace-Lorraine in favour of a simple indemnity.

Why would they do that when Britain can't win on the continent? France was also on the verge of total collapse in the historical armistice. It's not like the Communards, opportunists, Republican remnants, and Monarchists suddenly get together after the British intervene, sing songs, and save themselves from infighting and defeat. As a lot pointed out, the gap in mobilization structure is so big that Sedan and Paris would have already happened by the time Britain gets a sizable force to France.

No doubt it would be good for Prussia if they didn't take Alsace Lorraine, Bismarck didn't even want to. But they wouldn't because of law one of politics: don't back down and seem spineless or your government won't last for long. In the war ferver after Sedan, let's say Britain declares war. Do you think Bismarck would really be able to say "okay guys let's call it quits, we'll just leave cause ya know we defended ourselves and now these big nasty British re coming for us". Of course not, the generals will scream that the British are historically terrible at fighting modern wars against Europeans, even the incompetent Russian army, have no mobilization structure, and quickly be proven right.

You're missing the obvious here: for Germany, mobilization is something they do on a massive scale every so often. For the British, mobilisation- equipping troops for foreign service, moving them to ports, sending them overseas- is something they do all the time, either on a small scale to relieve troops or on a large scale in response to a crisis (see also: Trent Affair, Crimean War, Ashanti War). What we're proposing here is that the British send a small supporting field force and logistical support to a continental ally, which - and I don't know if you've noticed this yet - is pretty much what you've conceded has been their way of war for centuries.
Oh absolutely that's my point exactly. They'd send a puny, irrelevant force to some fringe area while their ally collapses, Communards take the capital, the government is ejected from their last holding near Paris in Versailles, and the Prussians already threw the French into a rout, while 800,000 Germans run around in North France. They won't make a big difference, then use their traditional tactic of sitting and pouting behind the English channel, saying mean things while the Germans beat what's left of the French government until it gives up. Then the English will sit for a bit more and find a face saving way to call it a day.

I mean so far:

Britain:
- Sends a small force to help
- No mobilization structure
- Fought "varied" enemies ranging from tribes to fourth rate nations
- Can fight in the jungle!
- Strength in navy, poor army high command and logistics
- Good troops!
- Tactical superiority

Prussia:
- Lots of troops under a machinelike mobilization and logistics structure
- Inferior weapons
- Top of the line strategic doctrine
- Best artillery in the world
- Experienced, efficient high command and general staff

This is just stuff we roughly agree on. Think about what the british would have to do to "win". Kick the Prussians out of France on the backs of a British expeditionary force and a broken French army, while both these forces combined are badly outnumbered by the German coalition. Do you really think they can do it just because they have superior arms and infantry tactics?
 
SNIP
Sedan didn't end the war, though: even if we pretend the British spend two months loading the expeditionary force's tea supplies onto ships, I can still see three main strategies for the British after Sedan.

1) Contribute to attempts to lift the siege of Metz (which only falls on 27 October 1870), liberating c.180,000 French troops to continue the fight.
2) Support the French Army of the North after the fall of Metz (defeated in the battle of Bapaume on 3 January 1871) in their attempts to relieve the siege of Paris
3) Support the French Army of the Loire, again trying to draw off forces from the siege of Paris.

It could also support the French war effort by supplying their provincial armies with modern rifles, artillery, and drill instructors, all of which they lacked and all of which would have had a significant effect on their fighting capacity. Finally, a declaration of war would have lifted the restriction on volunteering for the French army by British citizens, encouraging Volunteers (who, despite all their flaws, do have the basics of military training) to serve in French formations as well as British.

While none of these moves would win the war for the French, they would undoubtedly increase the probability that Prussia satisfies itself with having smashed the myth of French military prowess and either signs a white peace or abandons claims on Alsace-Lorraine in favour of a simple indemnity.


IMO Sedan is a turning Point in the war. After the battle France had lost one of ist two main armies and the other was besieged in Metz.

France could also muster 5 NEW armies - but those were new and IMHO can not compared with the "Veteran" troops in Frances first two armies.

Between Metz and Sedan you have 8 weeks - plenty time for any British army, but arriving and lifting the siege the Brits need a victory against the remaining German Forces dispatched to delay them.

Not thats impossible but not easy. And depends much on WHEN the relief attempt is done.

I believe France had not lost (OTL) in January 1871, but I somehow am under the Impression France did not want to fight on.
 
The war in Europe would be consistent and predictable between Prussia and England so that doesn't count against the Germans.
What you're doing here is trying to twist my argument to suit your own, and doing a rather poor job of it. You can't use minor setbacks encountered by the British in minor theatres to argue that the Prussians are superior, when those setbacks almost exclusively result from the fact that the British fight more battles and their battles are individually harder to plan for. The tactics that the British were using in 1871 were overwhelmingly framed to fight against European opponents based on the lessons of European conflicts at the time. Unsurprisingly, they occasionally failed against enemies fighting in a completely different style. If the Prussians had been building an empire rather than the British, we might be here arguing about whether the massacre of the Infanterie-Regiment Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (4. Posensches) Nr.59 at Khambula shows that Prussian swarm tactics would fail against British open-order lines.
I don't know if you read but I didn't say the British infantry tactics were bad.
If you're going to lie about what you said, probably best to do it in a place where every comment you make isn't time-stamped and recorded.
As for this thread, nothing would happen. The British land forces in 1871 were pitiful, with terrible coordination, Crimea war era doctrine, and a string of military defeats up until the Boer wars.
You know that the 1870 Field Exercise and Evolutions is online, right? You can even compare it to the 1859 version, which itself had been updated to take into account the lessons of the Crimea and the Indian Rebellion, to see what changes were made even after the point at which you assume they're frozen in time.
their army even after reading that manual, anyone can conclude is inept for the continent and not ready for that kind of war.
Actually I did...There ya go, please read the post not just one line. This is a recurring theme in your replies.
This would be a more convincing if you had linked a post made before I provided you with FE&E rather than after. Being wrong is fine: it happens to everyone at one point or another. The only question is whether you act like a grown-up about it or not.
Makes things better for the Germans if anything.
A common thread of weak arguments is to make an unfounded claim, and then when it's proven false double-down by claiming that this supports your point. Allow me to remind you of your original statement:
proclaiming a German empire united by a national myth that Britain is causing suffering from blockade. Resources would be an immediate problem so they and Russia would drift close.
In actual fact, I wasn't really bothered about the contraband question: I just thought it symptomatic of the generally weak grip you had on the realities of the period.
Imperialists won in better odds before. The reason they lost so fast is they were incompetent leading the defense and didn't even fortify until six months into knowing the city would be attacked. Their communications were cut and they only had food for a couple months. Logistics.
Again, you seem to be struggling with the fact that this is not a British army you are talking about. Unless you believe that Gordon completely recreated the British army's logistics system using British officers, and that it should have worked as well as the Army Service Corps (formed as the Military Train during the Crimea) then Khartoum has absolutely no relevance to the argument. The actual relevant event, which you've studiously ignored, is that the British completely improvise a relief expedition of five thousand troops which travels the seventeen hundred miles up the Nile and arrives only two days too late to rescue the town.

German strength is in their high command, where both their enemies were terrible at the time.
You still haven't had a guess at my general.
Seventy-four years old when granted a key field command, considered senile by some of his fellows, obsessed with the lessons of the previous war, fails to follow the strategic plan for the conflict, launches repeated artless and suicidal attacks on the enemy; relieved from command due to incompetence but, because of his friendship with the monarch, appointed to a prestigious post, promoted, given a peerage and a pension.
Do you want a hint or something? It might make it too obvious, but here goes: his first experience of combat was as a junior officer in the Napoleonic Wars.
The war really was over in a matter of weeks. Northeast France was almost totally occupied.
Rubbish. Bazaine still has 180,000 men at Metz until four months into the war, and the Army of the North has 30,000 men safe behind fortresses and beats a Prussian army within 100 miles of Paris. If the British stiffen the Army of the North with 60,000 troops and help lift the siege of Metz, while simultaneously providing both the Army of the North and the Army of the Loire with modern weapons and artillery- which, after all, is the strategy I'm suggesting- Prussia has a serious problem on its hands in maintaining the siege of Paris.

As an aside, I must say that I find it fascinating how you highlight and glorify British defeats against supposedly weak colonial enemies while simultaneously ignoring the Prussian defeats against the hastily-scraped-together, poorly-supplied scratch forces the French were fielding in the later stages of the war (Coulmiers, Villepion, Hallue, Villersexel). I know how you'll rationalise it, of course- those were only small engagements, the Prussians won the war overall, a lot of the time the French had superior numbers despite poorer equipment- but I can't for the life of me work out why that logic applies to Prussian defeats and not to British ones.
Think about what the british would have to do to "win". Kick the Prussians out of France on the backs of a British expeditionary force and a broken French army, while both these forces combined are badly outnumbered by the German coalition. Do you really think they can do it just because they have superior arms and infantry tactics?
Again, any time you want to talk to me rather than the strawman you've created, I'm right here. I've suggested ways in which British assistance might have contributed towards the French army not being broken, how their assistance might have helped redress the balance with the German coalition, and some reasonable tactics that would have led to a peace that, while not a victory by any means, would have been a far less substantial defeat than the one France fighing alone suffered.
France could also muster 5 NEW armies - but those were new and IMHO can not compared with the "Veteran" troops in Frances first two armies.
No, they can't. But they would have fought dramatically better with a stiffening of regular troops, both newly-arrived British troops and French troops liberated from Metz, and a supply of modern weapons and artillery. And I think it's a fairly short logical step to the proposition that much more efficient provincial armies might have brought Bismarck to acceptable terms well before Paris falls. Remember that the French position is "not one inch of our territory, nor one stone of our fortresses": they might well have accepted reparations, as the Austrians did in 1866.
 
What you're doing here is trying to twist my argument to suit your own, and doing a rather poor job of it. You can't use minor setbacks encountered by the British in minor theatres to argue that the Prussians are superior, when those setbacks almost exclusively result from the fact that the British fight more battles and their battles are individually harder to plan for. The tactics that the British were using in 1871 were overwhelmingly framed to fight against European opponents based on the lessons of European conflicts at the time. Unsurprisingly, they occasionally failed against enemies fighting in a completely different style. If the Prussians had been building an empire rather than the British, we might be here arguing about whether the massacre of the Infanterie-Regiment Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (4. Posensches) Nr.59 at Khambula shows that Prussian swarm tactics would fail against British open-order lines.

They didn't really use swarm tactics but a creative series of Miss control measures, all of which involved having fighting generals who gave the impression of swarming because they were willing to sacrifice and didn't give up. If one approach failed, they tried another.

I don't see how the French army with the best tech in the world and the most veteran troops, tested in battle in not just the Crimean war but in wars in Italy and Mexico, considered the best tech in the world with a professional core numbering in the hundreds of thousands, not to mention reserves, would be a harder fight on their own turf than colonial-trained troops with no mobilization structure, numbering far fewer, and with a history of blunders at the top that greatly exceeded the French. Yes, French high command was swashbuckling and like Enver Pasha at Sarakamis in its fantasies about complicated plans. There's no evidence the British would have been better, however. They changed tactics in the Boer war more than Kaiser Wilhelm changed outfits. After 6 tries, it worked! But against Prussia you don't get 6 tries. And British troops being better than French in the first place? The French were continental war veterans with breech loaders and machine guns.

This would be a more convincing if you had linked a post made before I provided you with FE&E rather than after. Being wrong is fine: it happens to everyone at one point or another. The only question is whether you act like a grown-up about it or not.

Woah don't be so easily offended a conversation is not a personal attack against you

You know why I said the British army wasn't ready for continental warfare? Again
please read the post not just one line

I didn't say anything about their tactics except that they were better. Their logistics - terrible, and proven so many times. Logistics won the Franco-Prussian war.

A common thread of weak arguments is to make an unfounded claim, and then when it's proven false double-down by claiming that this supports your point. Allow me to remind you of your original statement:

In actual fact, I wasn't really bothered about the contraband question: I just thought it symptomatic of the generally weak grip you had on the realities of the period.

Big words don't count as evidence, all those lines said absolutely nothing. Anyone reading this will pretty much back that up.

Again, you seem to be struggling with the fact that this is not a British army you are talking about. Unless you believe that Gordon completely recreated the British army's logistics system using British officers, and that it should have worked as well as the Army Service Corps (formed as the Military Train during the Crimea) then Khartoum has absolutely no relevance to the argument. The actual relevant event, which you've studiously ignored, is that the British completely improvise a relief expedition of five thousand troops which travels the seventeen hundred miles up the Nile and arrives only two days too late to rescue the town.

And you're missing that I think the British army's troops were fine, but think their command was incompetent.

You still haven't had a guess at my general.

Not on topic

Rubbish. Bazaine still has 180,000 men at Metz until four months into the war, and the Army of the North has 30,000 men safe behind fortresses and beats a Prussian army within 100 miles of Paris. If the British stiffen the Army of the North with 60,000 troops and help lift the siege of Metz, while simultaneously providing both the Army of the North and the Army of the Loire with modern weapons and artillery- which, after all, is the strategy I'm suggesting- Prussia has a serious problem on its hands in maintaining the siege of Paris.

As an aside, I must say that I find it fascinating how you highlight and glorify British defeats against supposedly weak colonial enemies while simultaneously ignoring the Prussian defeats against the hastily-scraped-together, poorly-supplied scratch forces the French were fielding in the later stages of the war (Coulmiers, Villepion, Hallue, Villersexel). I know how you'll rationalise it, of course- those were only small engagements, the Prussians won the war overall, a lot of the time the French had superior numbers despite poorer equipment- but I can't for the life of me work out why that logic applies to Prussian defeats and not to British ones.

The difference is every time the Prussians lost they had a contingency plan already. Moltke's orders during the war were all missives, not micromanaging directives, and they all said "do this, if it doesn't work, do this". Napoleon III was actually upsetting his expectations and trailblazing for a while in the Sedan campaign, but the Prussians weer way more adaptable. Try to lift the siege of Metz? Prussia would probably retreat, let you in, bring up the strategic reserve in Alsace and surround both forces. For the rest of the war they wouldn't do much.

As for this impregnable French army, the French tried mobilizing over a million men. If 180,000 are left, that's a worse fraction than during their surrender in world war 2.

Again, any time you want to talk to me rather than the strawman you've created, I'm right here. I've suggested ways in which British assistance might have contributed towards the French army not being broken, how their assistance might have helped redress the balance with the German coalition, and some reasonable tactics that would have led to a peace that, while not a victory by any means, would have been a far less substantial defeat than the one France fighing alone suffered.

How is asking what their goals are a strawman?

Yes of course the British would have helped, like blowing air on a boulder to move it. Force is being applied. But when you say it would just be a small expeditionary force because Brits aren't used to mobilizing against an innovative army of 800,000, I'm sorry they don't win.

What is this reasonable tactic? The longer France fought on, the longer Germany suffered, and Bismarck knew. However, France was suffering at a much faster rate. Paris was being shelled, the country had lost confidence, first deposing the Emperor, then moving against the transitional government. If you're saying 60,000 British are charging into France to relieve the Siege of Metz or something after France already had lost so many battles and their forces were in rout, it won't make much of a difference. Also Metz is basically on the German border.
 
They didn't really use swarm tactics but a creative series of Miss control measures,
Swarm (schwarm in German) is the technical term for the Prussian policy of waves of supporting skirmish lines. As ordered at Wissembourg: "Regiment! Form attack columns! First and light platoons in the skirmish line! Swarms to left and right!"
British troops being better than French in the first place? The French were continental war veterans with breech loaders and machine guns.
Firstly, this isn't an either-or situation: we're talking about adding the British (and their industrial capacity) to the French. Secondly, we're comparing the performance of British regular forces to the scratch French forces assembled after the defeat of the main French field forces. Thirdly, the French have substantial deficiencies which the British don't. These include both munitions - it's interesting that you say breech-loaders, because though the French have a breechloading rifle they don't have breechloading artillery with percussion fuses like the British and Prussians - and manpower.

For instance, officers: the average age of a French lieutenant is 37, a captain 45, a major 47 (though the Prussians capture French junior officers in their fifties and sixties). They show little interest in their men, resulting in widespread disobedience. The 1869 inspection of the 99th Infantry Regiment, for instance, notes "dirty rifles and kits, troops lolling unsupervised in the shade of their gymnastics equipment, choristers who could not sing, a fencing instructor who could not fence, and a disturbing number of NCOs either in jail or... busted down to private for various crimes" (Wawro, Franco-Prussian War p. 44). These circumstances did not change dramatically until the First World War, and the fact that in 1917 the French army mutinies and the British army doesn't has been ascribed to superior man-management techniques at the junior officer level.

Like the British, the French have long service: however, because Neil stopped paying bounties to encourage re-enlistment, thousands of veterans chose to leave the army in the years immediately before the war. The burden of administration is far lower in a British army of fewer than a hundred thousand than a French army of 400,000, meaning the administrative chaos would be commensurately lower. The French have a policy of requiring all reservists to report to their regimental depot for equipment before proceeding to their regiments, which leads to circumstances like Zouave reservists trekking from metropolitan France to Oran and Algiers before making their way back to northern France to join the fight. On the other hand, the 26,542 men of the British militia reserve can be ordered to join any regiment and receive their arms, clothing and kit from the regimental stores of the regiments they join, as can volunteers from other infantry regiments in the UK (the traditional method of bringing regiments for foreign service up to strength).

There are even more technical reasons I suspect the British would peform better against the Prussians. French tactics are to keep skirmishers very close to the main line to maximise defensive fire, leaving the already very narrow French formations blind to flanking attacks. This is unfortunate, because in 1868 the Prussians noticed French narrowness in defence and amended their swarm tactics to thin the centre and strengthen the flanks. On the other hand, the British drill manual which I previously linked you to stipulates that "skirmishers protect and overlap the flanks of the main body they are intended to cover... the distance of supports from the skirmishers, and reserves from the main body, must depend on circumstances and the nature of the ground". I appreciate it's not as simple as "Zulus beat British, Prussians beat Zulus, Prussians beat British" but I find this more nuanced approach quite interesting.
I didn't say anything about their tactics except that they were better.
The British land forces in 1871 were pitiful, with terrible coordination, Crimea war era doctrine, and a string of military defeats up until the Boer wars.
So when you were talking about "Crimea war era doctrine" that resulted in "a string of military defeats", you weren't actually talking about the systems with which the British fought on the battlefield on which those defeats took place? You, in fact, wanted us to conclude that the British lost those battles not because they were poorly led or because they were bad soldiers, but because they had insufficient supplies? And when you said:
their army even after reading that manual, anyone can conclude is inept for the continent and not ready for that kind of war. This "updated" manual also says nothing about logistics
this was intended to mean that you were actually talking about logistics in the first place and not that logistics was an afterthought?
Big words don't count as evidence, all those lines said absolutely nothing. Anyone reading this will pretty much back that up.
You said that lack of food would be the key factor in both uniting the German nation and bringing them closer to the Russians. You were then informed that there wouldn't be a lack of food, and then decided it didn't matter anyway. Like I said, I don't mind people being wrong: I have a professional interest in the law of blockade which others don't. What I mind is the way in which they react to being wrong.
think their command was incompetent.
Not on topic
Tell me who it is, and you'll see how it's on topic. I'm not sure you'll get the point- after all, you cite an example of a current British general organising an extraordinarily complex rescue mission for an ex-British general and conclude that the ex-British general proves that current British generals were logistical incompetents- but give me a name and we'll see how things go.

Try to lift the siege of Metz? Prussia would probably retreat, let you in, bring up the strategic reserve in Alsace and surround both forces. For the rest of the war they wouldn't do much.
Clearly you've decided the Prussians are psychic supermen who have to handicap themselves by leaving hundreds of thousands of troops in "strategic reserve" (rather than besieging French fortifications in area like Strasbourg, or guarding their long supply lines against francs-tireurs. At the very least, though, you could try and get to grips with the point of breaking a siege: it's to create a gap to let the force inside escape, not to have the relieving force blunder in and get itself trapped.
As for this impregnable French army, the French tried mobilizing over a million men. If 180,000 are left, that's a worse fraction than during their surrender in world war 2.
It doesn't matter: what matters is what was accomplished by the existing forces, and what could be accomplished under these circumstances. Historically, the Army of the North was c.40,000 and the Army of the Loire c.60,000. Adding 60,000 British troops to that will have a massive effect; providing those two armies with proper weapons will have an even greater effect; freeing 180,000 French regular troops from Metz could be a game-changer.
How is asking what their goals are a strawman?
Perhaps the problem is that you're writing in a second language, but you didn't actually ask what their goals were. What you did was created an artificially high set of win conditions, and then deliberately restricted the argument I was making. Witness:
Think about what the british would have to do to "win". Kick the Prussians out of France on the backs of a British expeditionary force and a broken French army, while both these forces combined are badly outnumbered by the German coalition. Do you really think they can do it just because they have superior arms and infantry tactics?
Firstly, that isn't a quote-unquote win: recovering from a defeat like that and kicking the Prussians out of France would have been an actual win on a par with some of the greatest victories in history. Secondly, that isn't the "win" condition I suggested was achievable: what I suggested was that with British aid the French could have secured a more creditable result than historically. Thirdly, my argument was not solely "superior arms and infantry tactics": my point was that Britain was peculiarly placed to help resolve many of the problems France encountered.
Paris was being shelled,
And what I'm suggesting is a means of breaking the siege, or at the least giving hope to both Parisians and the wider French population that it could be broken.
the country had lost confidence, first deposing the Emperor, then moving against the transitional government.
Both after the point of departure here, the Commune actually coming after the end of the war. Though the emperor might have been deposed, on 3 November 1870 the Government of National Defence got a 90% majority of Paris voters to vote in favour of its strategy. Clearly there was a substantial honeymoon period in which the country had not lost confidence in eking out a reasonable result, a period which would have lasted longer in the event the government appeared to be doing better.
What is this reasonable tactic?
I've laboriously walked you through them already. The problem is that if nothing but God himself can beat the Prussians, if the British can't get more than fifty starving troops across the Channel without the ship sinking, and if the French were begging for peace the moment the moment the first needle-rifle fired at Wissembourg, then obviously even the most moderate proposals are going to seem unreasonable.
 
Firstly, that isn't a quote-unquote win: recovering from a defeat like that and kicking the Prussians out of France would have been an actual win on a par with some of the greatest victories in history. Secondly, that isn't the "win" condition I suggested was achievable: what I suggested was that with British aid the French could have secured a more creditable result than historically. Thirdly, my argument was not solely "superior arms and infantry tactics": my point was that Britain was peculiarly placed to help resolve many of the problems France encountered.


But this, of course, is precisely the problem with the whole TL.

If the only likely result of British intervention is to put the Franco-German border a few miles further east, and/or reduce the size of the French indemnity - then why should Britain bother? How does she benefit from either of these changes?
 

Perkeo

Banned
[A naval blockade would have been helpful]In the long run? Sure. The war didn't last that long though.

It lastes five months. That may be just enough to make a difference. Either way the knowledge of the long term effect would be huge. France could well have fougt on for a while, if there had ben hope that the Prussians would run out of supplys.
 
why should Britain bother? How does she benefit from either of these changes?
Of course, Britain wouldn't know these were the only changes they were going to get out of the war when they joined it: the French didn't exactly benefit from a humiliating defeat, a massive indemnity and territorial sequestration either. However, since we sorted the question of whether Britain would actually intervene by post 10, I'm treating this more as a thought experiment to determine relative strengths and weaknesses and to explore the course of the war itself by considering counterfactuals.

It lastes five months. That may be just enough to make a difference.
Actually, the French navy did blockade the Prussian Baltic coast: the Channel fleet under Admiral Louis Bouet-Willaumez and the Mediterranean squadron under Admiral Fourichon both enter the Baltic, but a lack of land attack capacity and limited supplies of coal mean they achieve almost nothing before retreating to Cherbourg and Dunkirk in September 1870. The Royal Navy definitely had a better handle on logistics, but I'm not that the blockade would have the war-ending effect sometimes hinted at- someone with a better grasp on the Prussian economy in the 1870s might be able to chip in.

The war at sea is interesting, though, because the British deployment is likely to be framed in the context of the Baltic campaign. Pre-war French planning will probably include the British as part of the planned invasion of the northern German coast, which it was hoped would encourage the Danes to join the war. The Prussians planned to deploy up to 160,000 troops to the coast to defend against this historically, though when no attack emerged they redeployed the token force of the 17th Division and some Landwehr which they had there. As such, the British are less likely to be thrown immediately into the fray than they are to organise in Britain before deploying- either to Germany or to northern France depending on the course of the war. On the other hand, they may see how things go and decide not to enter the conflict after all...
 
Of course, Britain wouldn't know these were the only changes they were going to get out of the war when they joined it: the French didn't exactly benefit from a humiliating defeat, a massive indemnity and territorial sequestration either..

Sorry, don't follow.

How is it of the slightest importance to Britain whether France gets any benefits or not?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Sorry, don't follow.

How is it of the slightest importance to Britain whether France gets any benefits or not?
They'd see it as making sure that, say, Germany didn't replace France entirely as European hegemon. They'd consider that the case without intervention would be worse than, in fact, it was OTL.
 
Sorry, don't follow.

How is it of the slightest importance to Britain whether France gets any benefits or not?
The point I was making was that no country knows with 100% certainty what it's going to get out of a war when it joins it. France went into the war expecting to shore up domestic unity and check the ambitions of an upstart rival and wound up with a humiliating defeat, a massive indemnity and territorial sequestration. As such, the question "why should Britain bother" is irrelevant when framed only in terms of the actual benefits available part-way through the war, which is what you were asking. What matters is the potential benefits available at the start of the war.

In this case we've assumed those benefits to be sufficient to merit intervention, but- whatever they were- they're now off the table thanks to the French defeats. At that point, Britain faces two choices. It can abandon its ally, pull its army back to Britain and sign a separate peace: not only losing the war, but raising the question in the mind of future potential allies as to whether they can trust them. Alternatively, it can continue to prosecute the war even if it doesn't get a great deal in return for the incremental costs incurred in the hope of maintaining honour and prestige.

This is a relatively common phenomenon. Think of the potential benefits to Britain from joining the Crimean War; the actual benefits which could be realistically obtained from a continuation of the war in 1855; and how little Britain gained from prosecuting the war beyond the point at which the Russians had been pushed out of the Principalities by the Ottomans. Alternatively, compare the scope of the German September program with the scope of the 14 Points on which they asked the peace to be based, and in turn compare those with the scope of the peace for which they reluctantly settled.
 
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