What you need to understand is that this isn't Imperialism: Total War: you don't move your troops, hit the auto-resolve button and win every single battle as long as you've bought the breech-loading rifle upgrade for your infantry. Sometimes, no matter how well you prepare, how well you plan, how superior your military is, things go wrong. The key is whether you can overcome those setbacks and move on: it's what the Prussians do, and it's exactly what the British do.
Between the Crimean war and the First Boer War, Prussia fought three wars, in Europe, close to home, against other European powers fighting in a consistent and predictable way. In the same space of time Britain had to fight dozens of wars- all across the globe, in terrain ranging from desert to rainforest, against a range of opponents with vastly differing capabilities. It's completely understandable that things went wrong: it's commendable, given how many variables the British face, that they don't go wrong more often than they did. An open-order firing line designed for use against European opponents, is overwhelmed by a vastly superior force armed with melee weapons. An Indian regiment breaks under modern artillery fire, and the rest of the line is swamped under odds of ten to one. A force sent to support its allies in the field is hastily redirected to besiege one of the world's strongest fortresses and, though ultimately victorious, suffers from disease and cold.
The war in Europe would be consistent and predictable between Prussia and England so that doesn't count against the Germans. Why? The English would either not be fighting Prussia directly in some side-theater like Turkey against Russians, more likely, or, if theyre in France will need to coordinate with the French, who did fight in this predictable way. Conventional military doctrine is conventional for a reason. Doctrine from a colonial war does not revolutionize how you fight war in the heartland.
You're saying a lot of principles none of which apply. Sure Britain fought "a range of opponents with vastly differing capabilities", but these ranged from spears to poorly used second hand European equipment with little to no focus on modern doctrine. This kind of claim is like what a propagandist would do to convince his people his country will win in 2 weeks. Look at how we beat these tribesmen, and these tribesmen! The Prussians only fight one way!
That's because it's the best way or the time. Against Denmark, nobody was surprised they won, but they were surprised by how quick. Against Austria, the enemy used shock tactics and was considered a massive threat. Prussia won. Against France, a country that spoke one language, unlike Austria, with the
best military tech in the time and a totally different army than Austria depending on "professionalism" and an elite core force. Prussia won. The combination was big emphasis on artillery, modern, calculated, rapid mobilization, calculated moves scrutinizing every possibility and pre-planning, sticking to general command's plan, and using mission command to avoid messups.
Prussian and British enemies are both varied, just the variety Britain was fighting nobody expected Britain to lose to. Everyone expected Prussia to lose to Austria and France, Britain fought a variety of mice and Prussia fought a variety of goliaths.
Maybe you could run us through the logic by which you conclude this, then- assuming you've actually read the manual, and haven't just concluded it's inept based on your existing prejudices. I'm particularly keen to learn why you think it's so far inferior to Prussian infantry tactics, given that in 1870 the rashness of said tactics lead to vast numbers of Prussian troops being thrown away in futile assaults against prepared French defensive positions, with battles being largely won thanks to superior Prussian artillery blowing the French out of their trenches.
I don't know if you read but I didn't say the British infantry tactics were bad. I said not a single thing mentions logistics. I agree - Prussian infantry tactics were awful. They were much worse than French infantry tactics. Man to man the Prussians often lost more than the French. The French infantry had the best rifle in the world. And the French lost. Why? Prussian artillery, mobilization structure and logistics.
The clue is sort of in the title - Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry. It doesn't say anything about cavalry or digging latrines either, but- as I'm sure you remember- what you said was
not
an inadequate logistical support system
Actually I did.
The Prussian mobilization structure was fast and their logistics to the tee. Their doctrine was mission command and orders planned out, predicting uncertainties.
Britain's logistical structure as the boer wars proved was cluttered and terrible, worse than France's.
^
There ya go, please read the post not just one line. This is a recurring theme in your replies.
Can you explain exactly what you think one British officer serving as an official in the Egyptian government leading an army of seven thousand Egyptian soldiers in a ten-month siege against fifty thousand Mahdists proves? Because I don't see its relevance to this particular set of circumstances other than a rather ineffective bludgeon.
Imperialists won in better odds before. The reason they lost so fast is they were incompetent leading the defense and didn't even fortify until six months into knowing the city would be attacked. Their communications were cut and they only had food for a couple months. Logistics. I've got nothing against British soldiers, but while the strength of Britain or France might be in individual troops, German strength is in their high command, where both their enemies were terrible at the time.
Why wouldn't the British introduce conscription? The answer is the same: because war changes betwen 1870, which is the date we're supposed to be talking about, and 1914, which is the date you're talking about. The first time that food had been included on that blockade was by the Union during the American Civil War, and only then as conditional contraband (i.e., only food destined directly for the Confederate military was subject to seizure). In 1904, the Russians declared food as an absolute contraband and the British condemned the move.
Makes things better for the Germans if anything. They then just have an annoying fly swatting around on the fringes who doesn't recognize their conquests. They won't even need to deal with rationing.
During the Boer War, all the supplies for the British army have to be shipped seven thousand miles to South Africa, and then carried by rudimentary rail systems and ox-cart four hundred into the continent. During the Franco-Prussian war, the supplies from the British army will have to be sent twenty seven miles to northern France and then carried by an extensive road and rail network to wherever the British army happens to be. That's ignoring the fact, of course, that there's a lot more stuff for sale in northern France than the South African veldt.
The war really was over in a matter of weeks. Northeast France was almost totally occupied. Brits had their own people and regulations in SA. In France, they'd use someone else's railroad gauge and stress the French logistical system even more, which by the way was terrible. They had these beautiful Napoleonic grand victory plans, but their carriages ended up cluttering roads that were too narrow and stores were packed into railways that didn't have enough rolling stock. What are the British going to do? Ship over some French-gauge boxcars which they have no reason to have?
While none of these moves would win the war for the French, they would undoubtedly increase the probability that Prussia satisfies itself with having smashed the myth of French military prowess and either signs a white peace or abandons claims on Alsace-Lorraine in favour of a simple indemnity.
Why would they do that when Britain can't win on the continent? France was also on the verge of total collapse in the historical armistice. It's not like the Communards, opportunists, Republican remnants, and Monarchists suddenly get together after the British intervene, sing songs, and save themselves from infighting and defeat. As a lot pointed out, the gap in mobilization structure is so big that Sedan and Paris would have already happened by the time Britain gets a sizable force to France.
No doubt it would be good for Prussia if they didn't take Alsace Lorraine, Bismarck didn't even want to. But they wouldn't because of law one of politics: don't back down and seem spineless or your government won't last for long. In the war ferver after Sedan, let's say Britain declares war. Do you think Bismarck would really be able to say "okay guys let's call it quits, we'll just leave cause ya know we defended ourselves and now these big nasty British re coming for us". Of course not, the generals will scream that the British are historically terrible at fighting modern wars against Europeans, even the incompetent Russian army, have no mobilization structure, and quickly be proven right.
You're missing the obvious here: for Germany, mobilization is something they do on a massive scale every so often. For the British, mobilisation- equipping troops for foreign service, moving them to ports, sending them overseas- is something they do all the time, either on a small scale to relieve troops or on a large scale in response to a crisis (see also: Trent Affair, Crimean War, Ashanti War). What we're proposing here is that the British send a small supporting field force and logistical support to a continental ally, which - and I don't know if you've noticed this yet - is pretty much what you've conceded has been their way of war for centuries.
Oh absolutely that's my point exactly. They'd send a puny, irrelevant force to some fringe area while their ally collapses, Communards take the capital, the government is ejected from their last holding near Paris in Versailles, and the Prussians already threw the French into a rout, while 800,000 Germans run around in North France. They won't make a big difference, then use their traditional tactic of sitting and pouting behind the English channel, saying mean things while the Germans beat what's left of the French government until it gives up. Then the English will sit for a bit more and find a face saving way to call it a day.
I mean so far:
Britain:
- Sends a small force to help
- No mobilization structure
- Fought "varied" enemies ranging from tribes to fourth rate nations
- Can fight in the jungle!
- Strength in navy, poor army high command and logistics
- Good troops!
- Tactical superiority
Prussia:
- Lots of troops under a machinelike mobilization and logistics structure
- Inferior weapons
- Top of the line strategic doctrine
- Best artillery in the world
- Experienced, efficient high command and general staff
This is just stuff we roughly agree on. Think about what the british would have to do to "win". Kick the Prussians out of France on the backs of a British expeditionary force and a broken French army, while both these forces combined are badly outnumbered by the German coalition. Do you really think they can do it just because they have superior arms and infantry tactics?