UK intervention in Franco-Prussian war of 1870

it's not like British policies discovered Germany only in the latter part of the XIXth century.
True, but the phenomenon of Britain more-or-less permanently siding with a group of European powers instead of deciding who to back on a crisis-by-crisis basis is very much an early 20th-centry phenomenon: 1875 isn't dramatically different from 1864 in that respect. The Dreikaiserbund and Reinsurance treaties also suggest that Russian support for France in 1875 was more of a conditional phenomenon than might be implied by your citation of the crisis.

...actually, how big was the British home army (as in, the standing force) in 1870?
Regular army at home: 89,670 all ranks, 180,444 overseas.
[Class I reserve: 1,930; Class II reserve: 1,151; Reserve of 1859: 2,734]
Militia: 97,040 present at training, including 26,542 efficient militia reserve [Confusingly, the militia reserve is not a reserve for the militia but militiamen who have signed up to serve with the regulars in the event of war (e.g. the Boer) or crisis (e.g. 1878); effectively, an early version of the Special Reserve]
Volunteers: 170,761 efficient, 23,222 non-efficient.
Only good summary for artillery I've got is for 1st January 1872, but at home there were 30 field batteries with the 12pdr Armstrong, 1 field battery in South Africa with the 7pdr RML, and 16 horse and 10 field batteries with the 9pdr RML.

The Nafziger collection has details of the stations as at 1st April 1870, in case someone gets inspired to knock up a TL.
 
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True, but the phenomenon of Britain more-or-less permanently siding with a group of European powers instead of deciding who to back on a crisis-by-crisis basis is very much an early 20th-centry phenomenon
I agree : my point was more that Britain did saw Germany as a potential threat, more so than France already by the late 70's especially when it would have come to Germany making errands along the Channel.
 
my point was more that Britain did saw Germany as a potential threat, more so than France already by the late 70's especially when it would have come to Germany making errands along the Channel.
It depends what you mean by 'threat'. If you mean they see them as the pre-eminent military force on the continent and occasionally fall out with them, then I agree. If you mean that by 1875 they already see them as a sufficient existential threat to make peacetime military commitments to another European power, as they did when Germany started trying to build a navy, then I disagree.
 
The premise behind the OP smacks of presentism to me. In addition to the fact that France had been discredited in the eyes of the British public by the revelation that they wanted to annex Belgium during the Austro-Prussian War, Gladstone would ultimately be declaring war...in support of the obvious aggressor. That doesn't sound like maintaining a balance of power, does it?

In fact, Britain and nearly every other power expected France to mop the floor with Prussia in 1870. OP is basically asking Britain to rush in to help a big bully against a weaker, smaller child.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Actually, it's the US Army Command and General Staff College,

The Nafziger collection has details of the stations as at 1st April 1870, in case someone gets inspired to knock up a TL.

Actually, it's the US Army Command and General Staff College, which is what I linked to in the previous post.

If you go through the list for stations in the UK/Ireland and the Med, one gets roughly ~82,000. What is interesting, of course, is that the only place in the UK where there are actually 10K troops in the same location is Aldershot, which suggest there might have been one division-sized formation ready to go - anything else would have to be organized from the brigade level, or even brigaded first, before a division could even be formed.

Sounds more like the French Army in 1870 than the Prussians, actually.;)

The Spectator editorial from 1870 is presumably a fair summation as far as how long it might have taken the various elements of the army at home to actually form up and be deployed; given the problems inherent in any mobilization, a month for the first corps overseas in 1870 is quite likely to be generous, especially given that Cardwell was doing his reorganization simultaneously.

Best,
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Regular army at home: 89,670 all ranks, 180,444 overseas.
Militia: 97,040 present at training, including 26,542 efficient militia reserve [Confusingly, the militia reserve is not a reserve for the militia but militiamen who have signed up to serve with the regulars in the event of war (e.g. the Boer) or crisis (e.g. 1878); effectively, an early version of the Special Reserve]
Volunteers: 170,761 efficient, 23,222 non-efficient.
Only good summary for artillery I've got is for 1st January 1872, but at home there were 30 field batteries with the 12pdr Armstrong, 1 field battery in South Africa with the 7pdr RML, and 16 horse and 10 field batteries with the 9pdr RML.

The Nafziger collection has details of the stations as at 1st April 1870, in case someone gets inspired to knock up a TL.
So... pretty much the capacity to field on fairly short notice an expeditionary force equal in size to the French army at Gravelotte (110,000) with modern guns (30 batteries 12pdr Armstrong) and rifles (Snider), and enough volunteers to replenish it one and a half times over.

That's not enough to win a continental war by itself, but it's certainly enough to influence the outcome.
If the British feel the need, of course.
 
Have France intervene in the Prusso-Danish War against the Prussians would be quite interesting, as both had "a hand tied behind their back" : Italy/Mexico for France, Denmark for Germany.
 
Have France intervene in the Prusso-Danish War against the Prussians would be quite interesting, as both had "a hand tied behind their back" : Italy/Mexico for France, Denmark for Germany.

Wouldn't that be contradictory with imperial diplomatical policies (Politique des pourboires, about selling-out non-intervention) as well with Bismarck's policies (Promise a lot, never giving anything)?
 
At the time the British rivalry with France was quite strong. It wasn't what it had been a decade earlier, France's failings in Mexico had damaged their image, but they were still seen as a major threat and the leading power of the continent.
I don't get how Britain could logically manage to forsee the future

In fact, Britain and nearly every other power expected France to mop the floor with Prussia in 1870. OP is basically asking Britain to rush in to help a big bully against a weaker, smaller child.
I wouldn't go as strong as mop the floor but a resounding Prussian victory- yeah, that really was not on the cards.
 
The Prussians couldn't back down, as it was France that declared war on them, not vice versa.

Given that Bismarck more or less goaded Napoleon III into declaring war on Prussia I guess in a situation where England can be assumed to ally with France he simply won't pull such a stunt.
 
In fact, Britain and nearly every other power expected France to mop the floor with Prussia in 1870. OP is basically asking Britain to rush in to help a big bully against a weaker, smaller child.

The problem with the OP is that the UK has a rather open, non-authoritatrian system with a free press etc.
Any British politician who claims "contary to what everyone else believes, I just know that Prussia will become a bigger danger than either France or Russia" would be unable to find a majority for his continental adventures.
I mean, Bismarck has just released the memos of Count Benedetti asking in 1866 for Belgium as compensation for Prussias annexations in Hanover and Hesse.

To get an UK willing to overlook these French attempts to break the London Protocol, you need an much earlier PoD. Like, say, a seriously erratic Prussia diplomatically siding with Russia during the Crimean War. IMO even a serious UK-German (ie including Austria) disagreement over Denmark in 1864 is not enough

And such an early PoD makes the Franco-Prussian war as we know it rather implausible.
 
So... pretty much the capacity to field on fairly short notice an expeditionary force equal in size to the French army at Gravelotte (110,000)
Less, certainly, because some of the soldiers at home will be too young to serve overseas. The real effect would have come when the French were scrabbling round trying to organise armies after Sedan: the British have in store in August 1870 231,250 Sniders and 298 20-, 12- and 9-pdr Armstrong guns. Of the latter, there are 8 20pdr and 14 12pdr/9pdr batteries complete with carriages. It wouldn't have fixed all the Army of the Loire's problems, but it would have fixed some.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Less, certainly, because some of the soldiers at home will be too young to serve overseas. The real effect would have come when the French were scrabbling round trying to organise armies after Sedan: the British have in store in August 1870 231,250 Sniders and 298 20-, 12- and 9-pdr Armstrong guns. Of the latter, there are 8 20pdr and 14 12pdr/9pdr batteries complete with carriages. It wouldn't have fixed all the Army of the Loire's problems, but it would have fixed some.
Fair enough - adjust down to "one of the two Prussian armies at Gravelotte", then. (90k or so.)
And yes, enough guns and rifles to equip an entire replacement French army two and a half times over would also likely be appreciated. ;)
 
British intervention would probably lead to Austrian intervention, and it is this latter which might prove disastrous for Prussia. Britain can put an army in the field but only so far as to stabilise one portion of the front. But British money to Austria, funding that end of things could see an immediate invasion of either Silesia or the South German states.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I dont think so. The moment Austria intervenes, then Russia intervenes on Prussia's side. The one thing that kept Austria from joining the Franco-Prussian War OTL was that Russia told them that if they intervened on France's side then Russia would intervene on Prussia's. Simple as that.
 
What if the Brits intervene in a different way.

Perhaps they use diplomatic means to ease the situation
Wiki said:
Bismarck adroitly created a diplomatic crisis over the succession to the Spanish throne, then rewrote a dispatch about a meeting between King William of Prussia and the French foreign minister, to make it appear that the French had been insulted.

If the Brits could demonstrate that the Bismarck was fiddling with dispatches (and was trying to lure France into a war), then maybe she could get the French to slow down.

If France can't be tricked into declaring war, then the rest of Germany is far less likely to join in.

Britain doesn't want Germany to get too powerful, so it takes several steps. 1) if Bismarck doesn't apologize, Britain will support France; 2) if France attacks unilaterally, Britain will support Prussia; 3) negotiations with the rest of Germany warns them of British displeasure if they join in - AND point out Bismarck's perfidy; 4) discussions with Austria to help ensure that the other German states stay out, and to provide additional threat to Prussia if they get too aggressive.

Possibly, quite possibly, there will be a war anyway, but one where 1) the escalation has been more gradual, and it's not France just attacking suddenly; 2) Prussia's cheating is exposed leading to the rest of Germany staying neutral (due to this and item 1); 3) Prussia probably stomps on France like OTL (just not as fast or thoroughly as OTL); 4) but Prussia doesn't end up uniting Germany.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
What if the Brits intervene in a different way.

Perhaps they use diplomatic means to ease the situation


If the Brits could demonstrate that the Bismarck was fiddling with dispatches (and was trying to lure France into a war), then maybe she could get the French to slow down.

If France can't be tricked into declaring war, then the rest of Germany is far less likely to join in.

Britain doesn't want Germany to get too powerful, so it takes several steps. 1) if Bismarck doesn't apologize, Britain will support France; 2) if France attacks unilaterally, Britain will support Prussia; 3) negotiations with the rest of Germany warns them of British displeasure if they join in - AND point out Bismarck's perfidy; 4) discussions with Austria to help ensure that the other German states stay out, and to provide additional threat to Prussia if they get too aggressive.

Possibly, quite possibly, there will be a war anyway, but one where 1) the escalation has been more gradual, and it's not France just attacking suddenly; 2) Prussia's cheating is exposed leading to the rest of Germany staying neutral (due to this and item 1); 3) Prussia probably stomps on France like OTL (just not as fast or thoroughly as OTL); 4) but Prussia doesn't end up uniting Germany.

Fun. I like it!

You could call it "Two Hurrahs for Prussia".
 
What if the Brits intervene in a different way.

Perhaps they use diplomatic means to ease the situation


If the Brits could demonstrate that the Bismarck was fiddling with dispatches (and was trying to lure France into a war), then maybe she could get the French to slow down.

If France can't be tricked into declaring war, then the rest of Germany is far less likely to join in.

Britain doesn't want Germany to get too powerful, so it takes several steps. 1) if Bismarck doesn't apologize, Britain will support France; 2) if France attacks unilaterally, Britain will support Prussia; 3) negotiations with the rest of Germany warns them of British displeasure if they join in - AND point out Bismarck's perfidy; 4) discussions with Austria to help ensure that the other German states stay out, and to provide additional threat to Prussia if they get too aggressive.

Possibly, quite possibly, there will be a war anyway, but one where 1) the escalation has been more gradual, and it's not France just attacking suddenly; 2) Prussia's cheating is exposed leading to the rest of Germany staying neutral (due to this and item 1); 3) Prussia probably stomps on France like OTL (just not as fast or thoroughly as OTL); 4) but Prussia doesn't end up uniting Germany.


Cool idea! Definitely sets the stage for a completely divergent 20th century,
 
If France can't be tricked into declaring war, then the rest of Germany is far less likely to join in. .


Join in what? There would have been no war had those cretins in Paris not declared it.

And what do you mean exactly by "tricked"? After all, the abbreviated version of the Ems Telegram was still perfectly accurate. The French had made certain demands under threat of war, and the King of Prussia had refused them. All Bismarck's editing did was to strip away the diplomatic niceties and make this a bit more obvious.
 
The French had made certain demands under threat of war,

Erm...No.

There's the two different texts. The real one, then Bismarck's editing.

Count Benedetti intercepted me on the promenade and ended by demanding of me, in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself in perpetuity never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns renewed their candidature.

I rejected this demand somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind [for ever and ever]. Naturally, I told him that I had not yet received any news and, since he had been better informed via Paris and Madrid than I was, he must surely see that my government was not concerned in the matter.

[The King, on the advice of one of his ministers], decided, in view of the above-mentioned demands, not to receive Count Benedetti any more, but to have him informed, by an adjutant, that His Majesty had now received [from Leopold] confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already had from Paris and had nothing further to say to the ambassador.

His Majesty suggests to Your Excellency, that Benedetti's new demand and its rejection might well be communicated both to our ambassadors and to the Press.


After the news of the renunciation of the Prince von Hohenzollern had been communicated to the Imperial French government by the Royal Spanish government, the French Ambassador in Ems made a further demand on His Majesty the King that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King undertook for all time never again to give his assent should the Hohenzollerns once more take up their candidature.

His Majesty the King thereupon refused to receive the Ambassador again and had the latter informed by the Adjutant of the day that His Majesty had no further communication to make to the Ambassador.

Even in Bismarck's version, there's no mention of threat of war, but about an arrogant diplomat while changing the meaning (It's not just removing diplomatical niceties, but making the whole thing a much more tensed political issue). I wonder where that comes from, to be entierly honest.

(Not that French understanding of Bismarck's text was far better, but effectively, they were tricked by his editing and not even considered Benedetti's own remarks).
 
Even in Bismarck's version, there's no mention of threat of war, but about an arrogant diplomat while changing the meaning (It's not just removing diplomatical niceties, but making the whole thing a much more tensed political issue). I wonder where that comes from, to be entierly honest.

(Not that French understanding of Bismarck's text was far better, but effectively, they were tricked by his editing and not even considered Benedetti's own remarks).



"Tricked" in what way? Thy had made a demand and it had been refused. That's clear enough even in the original, and the amended version only emphasises it.
 
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