UK and France intervene in the Spanish civil war.

What would have happened if the UK and France had intervined in the Spanish Civil War to the extent that Germany and Italy did IOTL?
 
It seems that the issue was that neither the British or French were enamored with the socialist government of Spain. Officially they were not a proponent of fascism, at least Germany and Italy economically followed capitalism and the both preferred it over the Spanish socialism emerging before the war began.
 
There were really two reasons why Blum reversed course and decided not to intervene in Spain. The first, often mentioned, was pressure from the British. But there was another aspect--the fear of civil war in France itself:

"...The proposal of a non-intervention pact was the result of a French initiative, it is true, but an initiative that was undertaken not without the very strong influence of Britain, at a time when the French were not strong enough to risk any breach with London. The British Government considered that it was best for the French Government to take this initiative for two reasons: first, because it thought that if the initiative came from London the French Government would be unable to withstand opposition to such a proposal from its own Popular Front; second, because if the initiative came from Paris, from a Socialist Prime Minister, the opposition of the British Labour Party would be effectively silenced.

"While therefore there is some truth in Eden's statement in the Commons on 29 October 1936 - 'It is suggested that the French Government took their initiative under strong British pressure. Some even go so far as to say that we threatened the French Government with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do this thing. Of course there is not a word of truth in that story. It is pure fabrication' - there can be no doubt that if strong positive pressure was not applied, strong negative pressure, in the intimation of withdrawal of the support upon which the French depended so much, was nonetheless brought to bear. Only Czechoslovakia and Rumania were willing to give France unqualified support for the policy of intervention. Jeanneney's fears proved to be justified; at his trial Blum said: 'We felt almost totally isolated in Europe as far as coming to the assistance of the Spanish Republican Government was concerned.'26 The historian of the Civil War put it more directly: 'Had it not been for Britain, France and probably the USA would have permitted the Republic to buy arms freely.'27

"The British attitude made it appear likely that a European war might follow an intervention or at least a serious intensification of the arms race. These considerations outweighed the arguments in favour of intervention - support for another Popular Front government and the desire to prevent the creation of a third hostile government on France's southern frontier. As Blum said in the National Assembly on 5 December 1936: 'Gentlemen, I personally believe that last August Europe was on the verge of war, and I believe that Europe was saved from war by the French initiative.' This danger was indeed the all-important argument in the discussions concerning the non-intervention pact, an argument repeated time and again, by Eden in the Commons and by Blum in the National Assembly, and notably in the latter's speech at Luna Park on 6 September 1936.28

"Behind this concern for European peace, however, lay a deeper concern, the peace of France. Blum was deeply aware of the danger of inciting civil war within France by the adoption of the policy of intervention. As he said in a letter to his wife in 1942: 'The situation had only to become more dangerous and more critical and we should have had the rebound of Franco's rebellion. Before any foreign war, France would have had civil war, with precious little chance for a victory for the Republic.'29 Curiously enough, this was the only argument that Blum failed to advance publicly. He believed that France could play no role in Europe if she were herself engaged in a civil war. The politico-ideological battles that were being fought in secret in France had now found their concrete realization on the battlefields of Spain. The memory of February 1934 was too real, and Blum was not prepared to take any risks, although in fact the danger of a civil war was not perhaps so great as he believed, the 'Leagues' being quiet in the summer of 1936 (the Comite Secret pour l'Action Revolutionnaire was formed only in the winter of 1936). Nonetheless, the obstinacy of the French and British Governments in pursuing the policy of non-intervention, in face of open breaches of the agreement by Germany and Italy, had serious consequences in France, for it only emphasized that lack of the national unity which Blum was striving to maintain..." http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Blum and Spanish Civil War.pdf

It is sometimes argued that the "non-intervention" policy didn't really make a difference because Republican Spain was able to get arms "illegally" anyway. For a strong rebuttal of this notion, see Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 250-251: "Arms could not 'always be obtained for gold or hard currency': on the contrary, the Republicans rarely obtained more than a fraction of what they needed and even then only after long delays and at a terrible cost...they were faced by a wall of blackmail wherever they turned: by ministers of government, chiefs-of-staff and other officers and officials in more than thirty countries who demanded bribes of between £5,000 ($25,000) and £45,000 ($275,000) a time, in 1937 money, for their signatures on dubious export licenses. Below them were officials down to harbour- and station-masters who not only demanded bribes but found pretexts to delay transportation in order to charge accumulating 'storage fees,' of which one, it may be remembered, rose to as much as £10,000 ($50,000). How often, too, the ministers and officials changed their minds, found ways to withhold delivery of the material and to refuse to return the money! And below them again were the arms dealers, brokers and other go-betweens. Yet such behaviour appears trivial beside that of the Soviets, whose defrauding of the Spanish government of millions of dollars, by secretly manipulating the exchange rates when setting the prices for the goods they were supplying, belied everything they professed to stand for..."
 
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There were really two reasons why Blum reversed course and decided not to intervene in Spain. The first, often mentioned, was pressure from the British. But there was another aspect--the fear of civil war in France itself:

"...The proposal of a non-intervention pact was the result of a French initiative, it is true, but an initiative that was undertaken not without the very strong influence of Britain, at a time when the French were not strong enough to risk any breach with London. The British Government considered that it was best for the French Government to take this initiative for two reasons: first, because it thought that if the initiative came from London the French Government would be unable to withstand opposition to such a proposal from its own Popular Front; second, because if the initiative came from Paris, from a Socialist Prime Minister, the opposition of the British Labour Party would be effectively silenced.

"While therefore there is some truth in Eden's statement in the Commons on 29 October 1936 - 'It is suggested that the French Government took their initiative under strong British pressure. Some even go so far as to say that we threatened the French Government with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do this thing. Of course there is not a word of truth in that story. It is pure fabrication' - there can be no doubt that if strong positive pressure was not applied, strong negative pressure, in the intimation of withdrawal of the support upon which the French depended so much, was nonetheless brought to bear. Only Czechoslovakia and Rumania were willing to give France unqualified support for the policy of intervention. Jeanneney's fears proved to be justified; at his trial Blum said: 'We felt almost totally isolated in Europe as far as coming to the assistance of the Spanish Republican Government was concerned.'26 The historian of the Civil War put it more directly: 'Had it not been for Britain, France and probably the USA would have permitted the Republic to buy arms freely.'27

"The British attitude made it appear likely that a European war might follow an intervention or at least a serious intensification of the arms race. These considerations outweighed the arguments in favour of intervention - support for another Popular Front government and the desire to prevent the creation of a third hostile government on France's southern frontier. As Blum said in the National Assembly on 5 December 1936: 'Gentlemen, I personally believe that last August Europe was on the verge of war, and I believe that Europe was saved from war by the French initiative.' This danger was indeed the all-important argument in the discussions concerning the non-intervention pact, an argument repeated time and again, by Eden in the Commons and by Blum in the National Assembly, and notably in the latter's speech at Luna Park on 6 September 1936.28

"Behind this concern for European peace, however, lay a deeper concern, the peace of France. Blum was deeply aware of the danger of inciting civil war within France by the adoption of the policy of intervention. As he said in a letter to his wife in 1942: 'The situation had only to become more dangerous and more critical and we should have had the rebound of Franco's rebellion. Before any foreign war, France would have had civil war, with precious little chance for a victory for the Republic.'29 Curiously enough, this was the only argument that Blum failed to advance publicly. He believed that France could play no role in Europe if she were herself engaged in a civil war. The politico-ideological battles that were being fought in secret in France had now found their concrete realization on the battlefields of Spain. The memory of February 1934 was too real, and Blum was not prepared to take any risks, although in fact the danger of a civil war was not perhaps so great as he believed, the 'Leagues' being quiet in the summer of 1936 (the Comite Secret pour l'Action Revolutionnaire was formed only in the winter of 1936). Nonetheless, the obstinacy of the French and British Governments in pursuing the policy of non-intervention, in face of open breaches of the agreement by Germany and Italy, had serious consequences in France, for it only emphasized that lack of the national unity which Blum was striving to maintain..." http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Blum and Spanish Civil War.pdf

It is sometimes argued that the "non-intervention" policy didn't really make a difference because Republican Spain was able to get arms "illegally" anyway. For a strong rebuttal of this notion, see Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 250-251: "Arms could not 'always be obtained for gold or hard currency': on the contrary, the Republicans rarely obtained more than a fraction of what they needed and even then only after long delays and at a terrible cost...they were faced by a wall of blackmail wherever they turned: by ministers of government, chiefs-of-staff and other officers and officials in more than thirty countries who demanded bribes of between £5,000 ($25,000) and £45,000 ($275,000) a time, in 1937 money, for their signatures on dubious export licenses. Below them were officials down to harbour- and station-masters who not only demanded bribes but found pretexts to delay transportation in order to charge accumulating 'storage fees,' of which one, it may be remembered, rose to as much as £10,000 ($50,000). How often, too, the ministers and officials changed their minds, found ways to withhold delivery of the material and to refuse to return the money! And below them again were the arms dealers, brokers and other go-betweens. Yet such behaviour appears trivial beside that of the Soviets, whose defrauding of the Spanish government of millions of dollars, by secretly manipulating the exchange rates when setting the prices for the goods they were supplying, belied everything they professed to stand for..."
Thanks for the great reply! I had no idea the French political situation was that bad, was France serially that close to civil war whith ww1 behind them and a resurgent Germany coming up?
 
It seems that the issue was that neither the British or French were enamored with the socialist government of Spain. Officially they were not a proponent of fascism, at least Germany and Italy economically followed capitalism and the both preferred it over the Spanish socialism emerging before the war began.

So basically France and Britain needs to see fascism as a bigger threat than socialism. Should be doable.
 
So basically France and Britain needs to see fascism as a bigger threat than socialism. Should be doable.
It should be. But it didn't happen. 1936 George V dies, his Fascist sympathizer son Edward VIII succeeds. Of course the British are embroiled in his crises with Wallis Simpson. By the end of the year George Vi succeeds. Also, 1936 is still the Depression years, and socialist threats due to poor economies and unemployment make the movement scary for the powers that be in Britain and France.
 
It seems that the issue was that neither the British or French were enamored with the socialist government of Spain. Officially they were not a proponent of fascism, at least Germany and Italy economically followed capitalism and the both preferred it over the Spanish socialism emerging before the war began.
I don't know, wasn't a big problem whith the republicans the fact that it was a left wing coalition ranging from moderate democrats to anarchist, whith no solid adiology beyond anti-fashisum, not that the nationalist where much better, just had better leaders able to unify the right wing coalition.
 
It should be. But it didn't happen. 1936 George V dies, his Fascist sympathizer son Edward VIII succeeds. Of course the British are embroiled in his crises with Wallis Simpson. By the end of the year George Vi succeeds. Also, 1936 is still the Depression years, and socialist threats due to poor economies and unemployment make the movement scary for the powers that be in Britain and France.

So a longer living George V and Britain not being as hard hit by the depression as in otl could work?
 

elkarlo

Banned
There were really two reasons why Blum reversed course and decided not to intervene in Spain. The first, often mentioned, was pressure from the British. But there was another aspect--the fear of civil war in France itself:

"...The proposal of a non-intervention pact was the result of a French initiative, it is true, but an initiative that was undertaken not without the very strong influence of Britain, at a time when the French were not strong enough to risk any breach with London. The British Government considered that it was best for the French Government to take this initiative for two reasons: first, because it thought that if the initiative came from London the French Government would be unable to withstand opposition to such a proposal from its own Popular Front; second, because if the initiative came from Paris, from a Socialist Prime Minister, the opposition of the British Labour Party would be effectively silenced.

"While therefore there is some truth in Eden's statement in the Commons on 29 October 1936 - 'It is suggested that the French Government took their initiative under strong British pressure. Some even go so far as to say that we threatened the French Government with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do this thing. Of course there is not a word of truth in that story. It is pure fabrication' - there can be no doubt that if strong positive pressure was not applied, strong negative pressure, in the intimation of withdrawal of the support upon which the French depended so much, was nonetheless brought to bear. Only Czechoslovakia and Rumania were willing to give France unqualified support for the policy of intervention. Jeanneney's fears proved to be justified; at his trial Blum said: 'We felt almost totally isolated in Europe as far as coming to the assistance of the Spanish Republican Government was concerned.'26 The historian of the Civil War put it more directly: 'Had it not been for Britain, France and probably the USA would have permitted the Republic to buy arms freely.'27

"The British attitude made it appear likely that a European war might follow an intervention or at least a serious intensification of the arms race. These considerations outweighed the arguments in favour of intervention - support for another Popular Front government and the desire to prevent the creation of a third hostile government on France's southern frontier. As Blum said in the National Assembly on 5 December 1936: 'Gentlemen, I personally believe that last August Europe was on the verge of war, and I believe that Europe was saved from war by the French initiative.' This danger was indeed the all-important argument in the discussions concerning the non-intervention pact, an argument repeated time and again, by Eden in the Commons and by Blum in the National Assembly, and notably in the latter's speech at Luna Park on 6 September 1936.28

"Behind this concern for European peace, however, lay a deeper concern, the peace of France. Blum was deeply aware of the danger of inciting civil war within France by the adoption of the policy of intervention. As he said in a letter to his wife in 1942: 'The situation had only to become more dangerous and more critical and we should have had the rebound of Franco's rebellion. Before any foreign war, France would have had civil war, with precious little chance for a victory for the Republic.'29 Curiously enough, this was the only argument that Blum failed to advance publicly. He believed that France could play no role in Europe if she were herself engaged in a civil war. The politico-ideological battles that were being fought in secret in France had now found their concrete realization on the battlefields of Spain. The memory of February 1934 was too real, and Blum was not prepared to take any risks, although in fact the danger of a civil war was not perhaps so great as he believed, the 'Leagues' being quiet in the summer of 1936 (the Comite Secret pour l'Action Revolutionnaire was formed only in the winter of 1936). Nonetheless, the obstinacy of the French and British Governments in pursuing the policy of non-intervention, in face of open breaches of the agreement by Germany and Italy, had serious consequences in France, for it only emphasized that lack of the national unity which Blum was striving to maintain..." http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Blum and Spanish Civil War.pdf

It is sometimes argued that the "non-intervention" policy didn't really make a difference because Republican Spain was able to get arms "illegally" anyway. For a strong rebuttal of this notion, see Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 250-251: "Arms could not 'always be obtained for gold or hard currency': on the contrary, the Republicans rarely obtained more than a fraction of what they needed and even then only after long delays and at a terrible cost...they were faced by a wall of blackmail wherever they turned: by ministers of government, chiefs-of-staff and other officers and officials in more than thirty countries who demanded bribes of between £5,000 ($25,000) and £45,000 ($275,000) a time, in 1937 money, for their signatures on dubious export licenses. Below them were officials down to harbour- and station-masters who not only demanded bribes but found pretexts to delay transportation in order to charge accumulating 'storage fees,' of which one, it may be remembered, rose to as much as £10,000 ($50,000). How often, too, the ministers and officials changed their minds, found ways to withhold delivery of the material and to refuse to return the money! And below them again were the arms dealers, brokers and other go-betweens. Yet such behaviour appears trivial beside that of the Soviets, whose defrauding of the Spanish government of millions of dollars, by secretly manipulating the exchange rates when setting the prices for the goods they were supplying, belied everything they professed to stand for..."
Was only vaguely aware of this. This is a massive POD. I wanna see some threads on this, or even here see what happens if the French govt intervenes in the SCW to varying degrees
 
So a longer living George V and Britain not being as hard hit by the depression as in otl could work?
I don't know if a longer living George V would make things better. I only mentioned it because Edward VII openly showed a preference of Fascism, and George V to be honest was anti-socialist considering who happened to his Russian relatives.
 
I don't know, wasn't a big problem whith the republicans the fact that it was a left wing coalition ranging from moderate democrats to anarchist, whith no solid adiology beyond anti-fashisum, not that the nationalist where much better, just had better leaders able to unify the right wing coalition.
The question I think isn't whether it was a problem with the republicans in Spain, but that it bothered the French and the British to the point they did not give aid for support to fight the Fascist Franco and his Nationalists.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
If the Brits and French are to intervene, it must be before the Russians do. This stigmatized the Republicans in the eyes of the Western democracies. The real problem for the Republican forces was lack of organization until the Soviets appeared.

It would be a perfect proving ground for the western militaries theory of battle.
 
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