Udet dies, Richthofen stays in T-Amt

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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I think in this scenario, the Fw 187 enters service by late 1940, powered by two DB 601 engines.

Even in that early form, the Fw 187 would be faster than the Supermarine Spitire I, and unlike the Bf 109E models the Fw 187 would have the range operating from bases in northern France to operate well north of London. In short, Fw 187 pilots would use the speed advantage of the Fw 187 to outfly Spitfires and cause no end of trouble for the RAF.

By 1942, the Fw 187 would switch over to the even more powerful DB 605 engine, which will push the plane's top speed to circa 420-430 mph with MW50 boost. At that speed, it would be POTENT bomber interceptor, and even the arrival of the P-51B/C Mustang in early 1944 may not completely help the Allies gain air superiority given the Fw 187's high top speed.
 
No, they were not as they were sourcing very important machinery and fuel from external sources that climbed heavily throughout 1942 and into 1943.

It only climbed heavily in '43. In '42, it practically was all on their own resources. Overy indicates that less then 10% of total lend-lease arrived in the '41-'42 period.

He states that one unit was getting 20-30 hours in combat types then says he assumes 120 hours. I'm not counting assumptions as anything.
Then his 20-30 hours estimate is just as trustworthy (particularly given that the document he linked too doesn't work), so why bring it up?

From what to what? That's the whole point.
From 50-60 to 100-120 hours.

In 1941 Soviet numbers were pretty meaningless and in 1942 their numerical advantage was not nearly as high as it was in 1943.
Indeed. The key difference was the improvement in quality. Indeed, when the Soviets moved to successfully seize air superiority over the battlefield during Operation Uranus, they were acting at only a 1.6:1 numerical superiority against the Germans (1,401 Soviet aircraft versus 842).

90%? The Allies were facing 45-55% in 1943 in overall aircraft and about 70% in terms of fighters.
Re-read what that lresponse was in response was in response (now that was confusing to type) again, I'll highlight the relevant point:

And thus they would not have made much of a difference. WWII air combat was always defined by the scores of a small handful of aces. The Germans took that to extremes, but the trend was universal. Generally the top 10% of pilots on all sides responsible for about 80% of the kills. Had those aircraft been employed in the East, they likely would have done no better against the rebuilt VVS then they did against the RAF or USAAC.
So what I was saying was that the overwhelming number of kills achieved in the East were achieved by the German's. Any German novices who were assigned there from 1943 onwards (and there were precious few likely died as quickly as their Soviet counterparts. Pretty much the only thing that held the German air force together in the east during the last few years were their "experten".

Yeah. And as you can see in that very graph, in each theater the losses are roughly 1/3rd. The Germans have 1/3rd of their air force in the Med and hence suffer 1/3rd of their casualties in the Med. During the summer of 1943 the Germans have 1/3rd of their air force in the west and thus suffer 1/3rd of their losses in the west. And finally, they have 1/3rd of their air force in the east and thus lose 1/3rd of their air force in the east. Of course then in the autumn they shift even more aircraft away from the east and their losses there consequently drop.

Wallies were fighting everywhere that wasn't the Eastern Front so in terms of losses everything not against the Soviets gets lumped in. The Wallied air forces were killing the majority of the LW despite facing 50% of it +/- 5% in 1943, with that ratio climbing to 60-75% or more in 1944.
Except according to your little spiel on fighters earlier,

No there was 1399 by July 1943 that was on all other theaters against the Wallies vs. about 500 on the Eastern Front. All deployments not in the East were against the Wallies, so they count as a block in terms of Luftwaffe distribution against the Wallies vs. VVS.

And again, that works out to the numbers I stated on a per theatre basis. According to Hyperwar, ~600 of those fighters were in northwest/west Europe, deployed for home defence. That leaves ~800 for the Med.

And those newbies would have survived and racked up greater scores in the East than west

This is not supported by actual historical air combat.

Really??? A couple of anecdotes tells us little more than a couple of personal stories.
No. They illuminate a broader picture that simply stating "the Germans lost 1/3rd against the Soviets and 2/3rds against the WAllies" does not.


A couple of men said that.


The men who actually fought the VVS, yes. In fact, some of the best men who fought them. And the premiere scholar on the air war on the Eastern Front. Those are some pretty hefty credentials to overcome.

surviving Soviet pilots from 1941-43 were getting quiet good due to experience, but they were a vast minority of fliers.

As were the Germans. Again: 10% of the fliers are responsible for about 80% of the losses. Veteran pilots would learn how to survive, and maybe pick up a kill here and there, but they lacked the true fusion of abilities ever to become top scorers. Many pilots could manage to fly well enough to get an enemy in their sights, but most lacked the shooting ability to inflict lethal damage once they'd done so. Missiles have probably changed this equation in the modern age, since they reduce the skill required for one of air combat's most difficult tasks, that is, aiming.

The entire point of this thread is that any change for the better is a noticeable improvement.
And I'm rather dubious that is true in the larger scheme of things.


As an aside, this dumb italics thing just turned on with a bit of copy-pasting and won't bloody turn off oh god help me!
 
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Lend-Lease

It is an often occuring debate as to when Lend-lease makes an effect. The source of 1/11th by end 1942 strikes me as hard to qualify. Rather, how large a fraction of the Soviets use of key ressources and material were derived from LL by say mid 1942 or end 1942 would be more relevant.

It is not relevant how much they received after the Germans had been finally broken at Kursk (or Stalingrad, a matter of preference).

Total sums make little meaning as well. Say the soviets makes 95% of their material themselves, but 90% of their aviation fuel and trucks are from LL. Not something they would do well without I suppose?

I don't know these figures, but this way of looking at it would provide more information.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think in this scenario, the Fw 187 enters service by late 1940, powered by two DB 601 engines.

Even in that early form, the Fw 187 would be faster than the Supermarine Spitire I, and unlike the Bf 109E models the Fw 187 would have the range operating from bases in northern France to operate well north of London. In short, Fw 187 pilots would use the speed advantage of the Fw 187 to outfly Spitfires and cause no end of trouble for the RAF.

By 1942, the Fw 187 would switch over to the even more powerful DB 605 engine, which will push the plane's top speed to circa 420-430 mph with MW50 boost. At that speed, it would be POTENT bomber interceptor, and even the arrival of the P-51B/C Mustang in early 1944 may not completely help the Allies gain air superiority given the Fw 187's high top speed.

It would change the game leading up to that. Over Tunisia/Sicily it would have been quite beastly against the P-40s and -38s they were flying against, much more so than the Bf110/Me210s that were used IOTL (plus of course drop tank Bf109s). As a bomber killer it would have done the job better than the Bf110 in terms of surviveability against escorts while also having more range with internal fuel than the Bf110, which would mean it wouldn't be weighed down by external drag and not need to wait for escorts, burning up fuel in the rendezvous process.
 
FW187 - total number built : 9 according to wiki (across what, 5 or 6 different variants trying out different engine and cooling combos)

Of course its bound to be the game changer that the Axis wankers (and i mean that in the nice AH way) wish it to be

;-)
 

Deleted member 1487

It only climbed heavily in '43. In '42, it practically was all on their own resources. Overy indicates that less then 10% of total lend-lease arrived in the '41-'42 period.
See Gudestein's comment; its not just numbers but quality of what was received and whether was was received in 1941-42 could have been made in the USSR.

Then his 20-30 hours estimate is just as trustworthy (particularly given that the document he linked too doesn't work), so why bring it up?
Then we're back at square 1.

From 50-60 to 100-120 hours.
Again based on what source? We don't have one as the link I posted was based on assumptions and you don't have a cited one.

Indeed. The key difference was the improvement in quality. Indeed, when the Soviets moved to successfully seize air superiority over the battlefield during Operation Uranus, they were acting at only a 1.6:1 numerical superiority against the Germans (1,401 Soviet aircraft versus 842).
During Operation Uranus the weather prevented air ops; how many of those aircraft you mention were fighters on both sides and how many aircraft were operational during and after Uranus?

Re-read what that lresponse was in response was in response (now that was confusing to type) again, I'll highlight the relevant point:
So what I was saying was that the overwhelming number of kills achieved in the East were achieved by the German's. Any German novices who were assigned there from 1943 onwards (and there were precious few likely died as quickly as their Soviet counterparts. Pretty much the only thing that held the German air force together in the east during the last few years were their "experten".

Except you haven't proven it, just asserted it. We know the German pilots in the East lived longer, given the casualty rates we have and overall numbers. So they survived for longer to build up combat experience. No matter where the replacements did not have as long of lives, but we have little record of what the loss rates were for newbies in the East compared to the old eagles because of the destruction of Luftwaffe records at the end of the war and perhaps the Russians hiding some stuff still in archives. So its really difficult to say for sure what the pattern was, just that the East was drawn down for the West and the guys there were there in 1941 stayed there pretty much until the end, scored the most victories of all (Hartmann, Rall, Barkhorn, Kittel, Nowotny, Batz, Rudorffer, etc. basically the top 50 Luftwaffe aces made most of their kills in the East especially in 1941-43 because it was far easier to wrack up kills)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World_War_II_flying_aces

Yeah. And as you can see in that very graph, in each theater the losses are roughly 1/3rd. The Germans have 1/3rd of their air force in the Med and hence suffer 1/3rd of their casualties in the Med. During the summer of 1943 the Germans have 1/3rd of their air force in the west and thus suffer 1/3rd of their losses in the west. And finally, they have 1/3rd of their air force in the east and thus lose 1/3rd of their air force in the east. Of course then in the autumn they shift even more aircraft away from the east and their losses there consequently drop.

You can see that despite having ~50% of the overall Luftwaffe in the East in July 1943 it suffered less than 1/3rd of the July 1943 losses in the East. The Mediterranean with just LF 2 suffered well over 1/3rd of the overall losses for the entire LW that month. Despite Western Europe/Germany begin defended by around 25% of the Luftwaffe in July 1943 it suffers nearly as many losses as the Eastern front in toto which had double the aircraft of the Western air fleets.

Except according to your little spiel on fighters earlier,
And again, that works out to the numbers I stated on a per theatre basis. According to Hyperwar, ~600 of those fighters were in northwest/west Europe, deployed for home defence. That leaves ~800 for the Med.

And? The loss rates were far higher in either non-East Front theater relative to the overall Luftwaffe commitment; in July 1943 roughly 50% of the overall LW was in the East yet less than 1/3rd of the losses were there, leaving the remainding ~50% of the overall Luftwaffe against the Wallies suffering more than 2/3rds of the losses. Breaking it down by theater is pointless because we are talking about the casualties suffered against the Wallies vs. Soviets and in that vein the Wallies inflicted FAR higher losses on the overall LW compared to the Soviets in 1943 and pretty much from that point on. The bulk of the LW was in the East from June 1941-42 so consequently the bulk of the losses were there until Autumn 1942 when the shift west happened and the vast majority of the losses were inflicted there from late 1942 until the end of the war. The Soviets did damage, but it was sustainable damage to the Luftwaffe if that was their only front; it was the Wallies that inflicted the death blows to the LW that the Soviets massively benefited from and were therefore able to recover and never face the majority of the LW from 3rd quarter 1942 to the end of the war.

This is not supported by actual historical air combat.

No. They illuminate a broader picture that simply stating "the Germans lost 1/3rd against the Soviets and 2/3rds against the WAllies" does not.
Not if they are cherry picked; hard data shows where the losses were taking place and where it was easier for the LW experten to wrack up kills and survive. Its not great mystery when the top killers in the LW made most of their kills in the East and survived the war or later then died in the West. Individually the Soviet fighter pilots might have been better than the Wallied pilots due to surviving longer, but they were not getting the kills on the LW pilots that the Wallies did; the combat environment was far more lethal to the LW in the West due to the huge numerical superiority of the Wallies that they used to best effect; the VVS potentially could have been more lethal to the LW had it not been tied to army support ops, but the fact was Soviet doctrine limited fighter protection to supporting the army rather than killing the LW and they didn't have the training, technical, and doctrinal advantages the Wallies did and leveraged against the Luftwaffe that ultimately killed it. Overall I'm willing to state that the Soviets just by dint of facing the LW for longer amassed better individual fighter pilots if they survived than the Wallies due to the rotation program and sheer mass of fighters they could put out limiting the chance for Wallied individual fighter pilots to score kills and get combat experience, but in terms of damage inflicted on the LW the Wallies killed the LW and gave the VVS the breathing space it needed to recover and win.

The men who actually fought the VVS, yes. In fact, some of the best men who fought them. And the premiere scholar on the air war on the Eastern Front. Those are some pretty hefty credentials to overcome.
What makes them best? That they survived the longest and were able to kill the most because their opposition was so shoddy? They became the most experienced due to having a far less lethal combat environment as we can see from loss rates of the East vs. all other theaters. Bergstrom is a specialist in the East and has myopia for this chosen theater, which limits his overall perception of events; that's a common problem for scholars that specialize in something because they lack perspective. Economists are notorious for that and I was just having a rather acrimonious debate on reddit over reparations payments from the ToV where the guy arguing with me kept citing one scholar whose entire argument came from working in the French archives and he couldn't accept that that colored that one scholar's perspectives on the issue. So while I accept that Bergstrom is pretty good on Eastern Front air war issues, he's got myopia from primarily working on the one front that has been neglected for too long in the West.

As were the Germans. Again: 10% of the fliers are responsible for about 80% of the losses. Veteran pilots would learn how to survive, and maybe pick up a kill here and there, but they lacked the true fusion of abilities ever to become top scorers. Many pilots could manage to fly well enough to get an enemy in their sights, but most lacked the shooting ability to inflict lethal damage once they'd done so. Missiles have probably changed this equation in the modern age, since they reduce the skill required for one of air combat's most difficult tasks, that is, aiming.
Got a source to back up that number?

And I'm rather dubious that is true in the larger scheme of things.
Depends on what area we are talking about. In terms of the German night fighters and daylight heavy fighters they suffered very badly from technical inferiority. At night they lost massive effectiveness from not having the right weapons to fight the war. Their lagging in radar was horrifically crippling and led to things like the firebombing of Hamburg that left the attacking force pretty much untouched. That was the primary result of technical failures to develop the next generation of LW aircraft, engines, and radar due to Udet and Goering; the shift to fighters came too late, and the lack of a working strategic bomber was badly crippling; even Eric Brown said in 'Wings of the Luftwaffe' that had the He177 worked it could have been a game changer for the Luftwaffe. He also said the lack of the Jumo 222 for the German nightfighters, which according to modern German scholarship on the technical side of things said it was ready but for a political struggle that killed its chance to getting into production, caused existing designs like the He219 from being able to match or exceed RAF designs, which would have been a game changer from 1942/43 on in the night bombing campaign. Had there not been the fumbling of technology from the Luftwaffe after Wever's death the LW would have been a much more dangerous foe that could have extended the war significantly and inflicted a lot more damage on the Allies.

Udet and Goering deserve a medal from the Allies for their contribution to the German defeat.
 

Deleted member 1487

FW187 - total number built : 9 according to wiki (across what, 5 or 6 different variants trying out different engine and cooling combos)

Of course its bound to be the game changer that the Axis wankers (and i mean that in the nice AH way) wish it to be

;-)
What does that have to do with anything? It wasn't taken into production so it had 9 test models. From the test model info it had a lot of potential if it had been given the green light.

Seriously its these sorts of snarky, asinine comments that add nothing to the discussion that really frustrates me about this board; if you have a serious point to make go ahead and make it, but if you're just interested in poking fun and not contributing to the discussion keep it to chat.
 
What does that have to do with anything? It wasn't taken into production so it had 9 test models. From the test model info it had a lot of potential if it had been given the green light.

It means it's quite difficult to extrapolate actual mainstream performance based against prototype performance

There are quite a few examples of prototypes that did'nt meet service expectations, or manufacturers tweaking prototypes to meet specifications, or just downright lying about prototype performance
 

Deleted member 1487

It means it's quite difficult to extrapolate actual mainstream performance based against prototype performance

There are quite a few examples of prototypes that did'nt meet service expectations, or manufacturers tweaking prototypes to meet specifications, or just downright lying about prototype performance
That's fine, but the records of official test data still exist and even though it hasn't appeared on wikipedia there are books that do cite the documents:
http://www.schifferbooks.com/focke-wulf-fw-187-an-illustrated-history-1669.html
 
It means it's quite difficult to extrapolate actual mainstream performance based against prototype performance

There are quite a few examples of prototypes that did'nt meet service expectations, or manufacturers tweaking prototypes to meet specifications, or just downright lying about prototype performance

It's not always difficult to extrapolate potential performance, but does require an effort. I must admit that I have never investigated the possibility of installing a Haha , or MW tank within the airframe of the Falke. Me bad. There are people who do extrapolate future performance of 4 engined Manchesters and Griffon Spifires. Sometimes, they're right.
 
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