Uboats stay in Atlantic in WW2

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

Ultimately over 60 Uboats tried or successfully made it into the Mediterranean from 1939-1945, while over 30 Italian submarines made it into the Atlantic during the war; what if instead of the Germans and Italians breaking into each others zones they stayed in the areas their boats were designed for? The Germans noted they wasted a lot of effort trying to operate in the Mediterranean and the Italians had problems in the Atlantic, while in the process the Germans lost over 13 Uboats trying to get into the Mediterranean.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic_(1939–1945)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean_U-boat_Campaign

How would this affect the Battle of the Atlantic and Mediterranean?
 
Well the German submarines were in response to British success operating out of Malta late 41 and sunk some British capital ships correct?. Would the Italians be able to do that?

So its likely less supply to Africa vs more shipping sunk in the Atlantic.

If you can sink enough extra Atlantic shipping to delay or diminish Torch then that is a major thing.

If the thought is that that everyone is operating out of their ideal area, then its a bonus for the Axis all around.

Maybe the extra Italian subs could be used as convoy escorts or limited supply runners to Bardia or such forward places.
 
U-81 failed in its first attempt to enter the Med through Gibraltar, but tried again. The second time was successful, and 23 ships were sunk during her time in the Italian Sea. One was called Ark Royal, sunk with a single eel.
 

Deleted member 1487

U-81 failed in its first attempt to enter the Med through Gibraltar, but tried again. The second time was successful, and 23 ships were sunk during her time in the Italian Sea. One was called Ark Royal, sunk with a single eel.
Arguably the Mediterranean designed Italian submarines would have been able to kill it instead.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic#Italian_submarines_in_the_Atlantic
The Germans received help from their allies. From August 1940, a flotilla of 27 Italian submarines operated from the BETASOM base in Bordeaux to attack Allied shipping in the Atlantic, initially under the command of Rear Admiral Angelo Parona, then of Rear Admiral Romolo Polacchini. The Italian submarines had been designed to operate in a different way than U-Boote, and they had a number of flaws that needed to be corrected (for example huge conning towers, slow speed when surfaced, lack of modern torpedo fire control), which meant that they were ill suited for convoy attacks, and performed better when hunting down isolated merchantmen on distant seas, taking advantage of their superior range and living standards. While initial operation met with little success (only 65,343 GRT sunk between August and December 1940), the situation improved gradually over time, and up to August 1943 the 32 Italian submarines that operated there sank 109 ships of 593,864 tons.[31][32] The Italians were also successful with their use of "human torpedo" chariots, disabling several British ships in Gibraltar.
Despite these successes, the Italian intervention was not favourably regarded by Dönitz, who characterised Italians as "inadequately disciplined" and "unable to remain calm in the face of the enemy". They were unable to cooperate in wolf pack tactics or even reliably report contacts or weather conditions and their area of operation was moved away from those of the Germans.[33]
Amongst the more successful Italian submarine commanders that operated in the Atlantic were Carlo Fecia di Cossato, commander of the submarine Tazzoli, and Gianfranco Gazzana-Priaroggia, commander of the Archimede and then of the Leonardo da Vinci.[34]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean_U-boat_Campaign_(World_War_II)#The_early_years
This mission was summed-up in the BdU Kriegstagebuch (KTB) War Diary thus:[7]
It was a mistake to send U-25, U-26 and U-53 into the Mediterranean. U-25 had to return before she ever got there, U-53 did not get through and U-26 hardly encountered any shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the disadvantages of a long outward passage.
Plus not even bothering in 1939-40 would have been helpful, same with not going in 1941-43 in the Atlantic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medit...gn_(World_War_II)#Supporting_the_Afrika_Korps
Plus several were lost trying to get into the Mediterranean. In the end all 62 sent to the Med were lost.
 
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