U.S. nukes the Soviets before 1949

That, and the US military really doesn't, or didn't, have the freedom of action to launch pre-emptive attacks of such a scale. If such a thing were being planned, the Soviets would have caught wind of it from the very beginning.
Not until Eisenhower, where he gave pre-delegated launch authority to the Military in case ofnSneak Attack.

Had LeMay been as much a psycho as his successor, General Powers, he could have set WWIII in motion without even the Navy knowing about it, let alone anyone in Russia.

USSR had a lot of spies. They didn't have a realtime way to know what SAC was doing at any given minute. They had no spysats, no BMEWS, little radar coverage over the Pole.

The Soviets had real difficulties, late into the '60s to have warned their entire Military that SAC had gone past their FailSafe points in bombers, let alone what Atlas, Titan, Thor and Jupiter, were up to, along with what Navy was doing with Polaris, till Mushroom Clouds sprout.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Pro-tip. You need a fleet train if you plan to fight a sustained naval war even with a BASTION DEFENSE. Your floating ASW fence and forces need supply at sea. ESPECIALLY in the arctic.

And if you fight the USN, you better bring reloads.
Uhhhhhh, you do realize that the Red Fleet had bases only a few days away from their bastions, right? They didn't need a massive fleet train to support the ships because it was a damn sight easier to just rotate the units home to refit and replenish than it was to UNREP. Also, have you ever actually seen the weather conditions in the Arctic? You know, the exact area you just said a fleet train was vital in? The weather there is so God awful bad most of the time that conducting an UNREP is physically impossible. So, again, no need for a fleet train. Especially when you're just rotating units in and out and can be at your own home base in a few days (compare that to the USN, who was expected to fight anywhere in the world at any time and to stay there for weeks or months on end)
 
Okay. And how does that at all refute the assertion?
That the Soviets were better bulletstoppers than Allied troops? Getting vast numbers of your countrymen killed for the idiocies of Fearless Leader's command, isn't a great metric to use.

US generally tried to send a bullet in place of a man. Uncle Joe was stingy with his bullets, when he had such vast manpower.
 
That the Soviets were better bulletstoppers than Allied troops? Getting vast numbers of your countrymen killed for the idiocies of Fearless Leader's command, isn't a great metric to use.

US generally tried to send a bullet in place of a man. Uncle Joe was stingy with his bullets, when he had such vast manpower.

Leaving aside all the problems in this post of excessive historical reductionism, undertones of Nazis propaganda about Soviet hordes, and the fact it's a completely different argument then the one you used before, I'm still rather at a loss as to how this refutes the original assertion. Here, let me rejog your memory:

Keep in mind, WW2 only ended four years ago, and the broad consensus among Europeans then (particularly the working-classes) was that it was the Soviet Union, not the United States or Great Britain, that played the decisive role in defeating Nazism.

So, again, how does any of your statements refute the argument that the greater mass of the European public in the late-1940s believed that it was the Soviet Union who played the decisive role in defeating Nazism?
 
Leaving aside all the problems in this post of excessive historical reductionism, undertones of Nazis propaganda about Soviet hordes, and the fact it's a completely different argument then the one you used before, I'm still rather at a loss as to how this refutes the original assertion. Here, let me rejog your memory:

So, again, how does any of your statements refute the argument that the greater mass of the European public in the late-1940s believed that it was the Soviet Union who played the decisive role in defeating Nazism?

I don't think they are arguing that, rather that said belief was wrong.
 
I don't think they are arguing that, rather that said belief was wrong.

That would likewise require the points he made to be somehow in contradiction with the base assertion underpinning that belief. Yet that isn't quite the case. That the USSR was assisting the Nazis prior to being attacked does not suddenly mean the Soviets were not a/the decisive element in subsequently defeating them. That the Soviets also bore the brunt of the blood price in fighting the Nazis (regardless of precisely why that was so) also is not in contradiction with the Soviets being a/the decisive elements in subsequently defeating the Nazis. None of these statements are mutually exclusive.
 
I don't think they are arguing that, rather that said belief was wrong.

That 80% to 85% of all Wehrmacht casualties throughout the course of the Second World War were had on the Eastern Front (1941-45) is broadly regarded as historical consensus, not just limited to Soviet/Russian historiography. It is undoubtably the case that Lend-Lease played a major role in materially aiding, possibly in a decisive way, the Soviet war effort. However, it was men and women on the front who made use of that aid with their lives in the millions. I don’t want to belittle the bravery of the British and American men and women who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism. But I doubt that if winning the war against Nazi Germany required of those nations taking even a fraction (if not less) of the civilian and military deaths the Soviet Union endured, that they would have continued without signing a peace treaty with the Germans.
 
That 80% to 85% of all Wehrmacht casualties throughout the course of the Second World War were had on the Eastern Front (1941-45) is broadly regarded as historical consensus, not just limited to Soviet/Russian historiography. It is undoubtably the case that Lend-Lease played a major role in materially aiding, possibly in a decisive way, the Soviet war effort. However, it was men and women on the front who made use of that aid with their lives in the millions. I don’t want to belittle the bravery of the British and American men and women who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism. But I doubt that if winning the war against Nazi Germany required of those nations taking even a fraction (if not less) of the civilian and military deaths the Soviet Union endured, that they would have continued without signing a peace treaty with the Germans.

That's dramatically overstating Wehrmacht casualties on the Eastern Front, as it was actually about 50/50. As for Lend Lease, it was decisive and without it the Soviets would not have been able to resist; as @marathag said, there is nothing noble about taking tens of millions of losses.

That would likewise require the points he made to be somehow in contradiction with the base assertion underpinning that belief. Yet that isn't quite the case. That the USSR was assisting the Nazis prior to being attacked does not suddenly mean the Soviets were not a/the decisive element in subsequently defeating them. That the Soviets also bore the brunt of the blood price in fighting the Nazis (regardless of precisely why that was so) also is not in contradiction with the Soviets being a/the decisive elements in subsequently defeating the Nazis. None of these statements are mutually exclusive.

Again, I think you're missing the point being made. The Soviet contribution made to the defeat of Nazi Germany must likewise be balanced against their aid for the same, given that allowed Hitler to become as big of a threat as he was in the first place. Likewise, the blood price payed by the Soviets is irrelevant to deciphering who played the biggest impact on winning the war.
 
That's dramatically overstating Wehrmacht casualties on the Eastern Front, as it was actually about 50/50.

Depends on how one plays the accounting games. Tossing in the surrenders toward the very end of the war, when it was practically over and these surrenders could in no way be decisive, does the weight of losses slide toward 50/50. Up through the first quarter of 1945 though, the number of POWs was about the same (the WAllies only being slightly behind the Soviets), but the KIA and WIA rates consistently were 3-4 times higher on the Eastern Front then in the West.

As for Lend Lease, it was decisive and without it the Soviets would not have been able to resist;

An assertion that remains a constant source of debate, even among professional historians.

Again, I think you're missing the point being made. The Soviet contribution made to the defeat of Nazi Germany must likewise be balanced against their aid for the same, given that allowed Hitler to become as big of a threat as he was in the first place.

Sure, but even in that balance is comes up rather more favorably to the Soviets given that their efforts in ending Germany were far greater then their efforts in ending Germany.

Likewise, the blood price payed by the Soviets is irrelevant to deciphering who played the biggest impact on winning the war.

Kinda? I mean, the fact the Soviets smashed more German forces then the Anglo-Americans is rather more the bigger impact, but even absorbing German ammunition does have it's role.
 
Depends on how one plays the accounting games. Tossing in the surrenders toward the very end of the war, when it was practically over and these surrenders could in no way be decisive, does the weight of losses slide toward 50/50. Up through the first quarter of 1945 though, the number of POWs was about the same (the WAllies only being slightly behind the Soviets), but the KIA and WIA rates consistently were 3-4 times higher on the Eastern Front then in the West.



An assertion that remains a constant source of debate, even among professional historians.



Sure, but even in that balance is comes up rather more favorably to the Soviets given that their efforts in ending Germany were far greater then their efforts in ending Germany.


Kinda? I mean, the fact the Soviets smashed more German forces then the Anglo-Americans is rather more the bigger impact, but even absorbing German ammunition does have it's role.
In my view the contributions of the Allied Air campaigns, and the war at sea should also be looked at as well.

The economic warfare aspect and the allied dealings with Neutrals vis a vis German interests should also be looked at as well.

Soviet Neutrality towards Japan for most of the war while the Chinese and the Western Allies were actively fighting the Japanese should probably be factored in as well.

I expect there are other factors one could look at as well.

Edit to add:
I am not trying to down play the pivotal role of the Soviets in defeating the Nazi's but I think it is important to look at all the activities that took place during the war by all the beligerants.

Perhaps some recognition also needs to be given to Nations that chose to proactively declare war against Nazi Germany vs waiting for the Germans to invade them or declare war on them first. The French, the UK, the commonwealth and probably a number of other nations deserve major kudos in my view for choosing to go to war in 1939. To give credit where credit is due I would also suggest that the U.S. more or less managed to goad the Nazis into declaring war on them.

All that being said I have a lot of empathy for the Soviet citizens vis a vis world war 2.
 
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Depends on how one plays the accounting games. Tossing in the surrenders toward the very end of the war, when it was practically over and these surrenders could in no way be decisive, does the weight of losses slide toward 50/50. Up through the first quarter of 1945 though, the number of POWs was about the same (the WAllies only being slightly behind the Soviets), but the KIA and WIA rates consistently were 3-4 times higher on the Eastern Front then in the West.

A casualty is a casualty no matter how or when it occurs, and to do otherwise is to engage in the same semantics in which you were accusing marathag. Also, I seem to recall most German casualties in the war occurred in the last few months of the war as well for both sides.

An assertion that remains a constant source of debate, even among professional historians.
A cop out. Glantz as far back as 2001 was saying it played a decisive role, arguing that it prevented the war at the least from lasting another 12-18 months and made Soviet Deep Battle possible. Hunger and War, which I and Wiking both have cited numerous times, within this decade blew open the gate concerning the food situation alone. Reviewing HyperWar and other sources show it was Lend Lease materials that enabled Soviet production in such sectors as aircraft and aviation fuel even possible.

Sure, but even in that balance is comes up rather more favorably to the Soviets given that their efforts in ending Germany were far greater then their efforts in ending Germany.
Really? Giving them a free hand in Europe to conquer the industrial rich Western Europe while supplying them with war materials that sustained their conquests up until July of 1941, thus likewise enabling them to invade the USSR in the first place, says otherwise.​

Kinda? I mean, the fact the Soviets smashed more German forces then the Anglo-Americans is rather more the bigger impact, but even absorbing German ammunition does have it's role.
The Anglo-American air offensive alone consumed one fourth of German's artillery munition production, tied down hundreds of thousands on Flak duty and all together consumed about 25% of Germany's war budget. Add in the resources used for the submarine offensive, and you're approaching 40-50% of the budget as early as 1942 with around half of the Wehrmacht as a whole likewise tied down.
 
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undertones of Nazis propaganda about Soviet hordes,
Others have made the point for me, except for this.

The 'Russian Steamroller' of huge mobs of Men goes a longs ways back, farther back than the invention of Steam Road vehicles, back to when Tsar Peter the Great introduced Conscription, with a tour to last last the entire recruit's remaining life in the 18thC

Romans only had to put in 20 years, 1300 years before.
 
8/15 Incident aborts the surrender of Japan, but the U.S. elects on the "starve and bomb" strategy; there's no invasion of Japan, but instead actions directed at other portions of the Empire such as an American landing in Korea. Japan finally surrenders in the Summer of 1946, with the U.S. occupying all of Korea, Japan and the Kuriles. Stalin is upset at being denied a Korean buffer and the Kuriles, thus resulting in the Soviets being more pushy in Europe and Northern Iran. The U.S. by this time is still fairly mobilized and has sorted out the issues in nuclear weapons production.

Going back to the main point of the thread and my own proposed scenario, by late Alt-1946 serial production of nuclear weapons would be available along with large numbers of crew trained, combat ready B-29s and B-50s in service with the B-36 and possibly even the B-47 soon to follow. This makes an American first strike far more plausible by giving the capacity to do such on the part of the USAAF.
 
Re: Early Cold War, Nuclear development

*Gehlen et al were interested in promoting the idea of a vastly more powerful Soviet Union than actually existed to save their (ex)Nazi behinds and make their (ex)Nazi intelligence network more valuable. They deserve some of the blame for the Cold War IMO.

*American designers were working on a derivative nuclear weapon in the 100s of kT range in 1946/7, this is what often got produced between 1948 and Castle Mike.

*Russians are both paper tigers and desperate tigers in the late 1940s but they have the army and manpower to win a ground war to at least the Pyrenees if not all of Continental Europe outside Switzerland. It was the fear of nuclear retaliation, specifically after what happened at Stalingrad and the possibility of even worse damage across his country, that kept Stalin in check after 1948.

*Khrushchev managed to get -some- Soviet economic development underway after the war but Brehznev managed to undo much of it in the late 60s and 70s.
 
That the Soviets were better bulletstoppers than Allied troops? Getting vast numbers of your countrymen killed for the idiocies of Fearless Leader's command, isn't a great metric to use.

US generally tried to send a bullet in place of a man. Uncle Joe was stingy with his bullets, when he had such vast manpower.
Sorry, but WTF?
The UK was bombed. The US was fighting an expeditionary war, essentially of choice.
The USSR was fighting for the very right of its people to **live**.
The choice was fight or be killed or become a slave. As the Germans openly said.

If the US or UK had that choice, they would have seen similar levels of fanaticism.
Just for scale.
The USSR invasion superimposed on a map of the US, to illustrate.

https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/barbarossa-usa

Tony Starkesque quips miss the point that, it was a completely different situation
 
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