U.S joins Crimean War in late 1854/early 1855- how is it likely to go down?

yboxman

Banned
OK, the subject of a third Anglo American war pops up occasionally on the forum... and generally devolves into a flame war. Still, let's give it another go, shall we?

Let's suppose, for whatever reason, that Anglo-French operations in the Pacific are more energetic and succesful- perhaps they are able to enlist Tokugawa Japan to join the War against Russia and get a near infinite, if low grade, source of infantry to throw at the scant Russian garrisons in the North pacific (Which would make a fascinating POD for Japan all on it'sown- but let's stay focused on the Anglo-American balance of forces).

Nicholas realized he can't hope to hold on to Alaska and convinces President Pierce to take it off his hand (and allow the transport of Russian garrisons and ships to Europe, etc) for a bargain price. Only trouble is, the Anglo-French-Japanese forces have already begun landings in Alaska before the deal is signed- and the UK is none to inclined to let Cousin Jonathan outflank Vancouver any which way.

A few half-hearted attempts of mediation by Napoleon III end badly, Pierce gets up on his high horse and won't back down and Palmerton sees a chance to cut the U.S down to size. war breaks out. What next?

1. Is Britian likely to be able to entice Mexico and/or Spain into the war with subsidies? Who would be their best bet to do it with- Santy Annie or someone else?
2. As i recall the U.S army at the time was only 16,000 regulars. How effective were the state millitas at the time? How long would it take the U.S to expand into something capable of defending a Mexican or Anglo-Canadian invasion and going on the offensive- and what would Britain be likely to do on land until it did? How many troops would be tied down defending the coasts from raids?
3. Would Britain be likely to try to carry on trade favoring it with the southern states (As it did with Napoleon I'sts sattelites) even while imposing a blockade cutting other European powers out? Would Southern State governments play along?
4. How vulnerable is the U.S Pacific Coast and what kind of power projection does Britian have there? enough to enable conquest of Oregon and California?
5. Come 1856 is war, assuming the issue is not decided by then, likely to favor a renomination of pierce as Democratic candidate if the U.S is doing tolerably well in the war? if it is losing by points (Ongoing blocakde, stalemated fighting on land) or is sufferring badly (British occupation of pacific ports, stalled fighting elsewhere?)
6. Do the Know nothings still coalensce into a party or does the war, and the diminutation in immigration the blocakde entails, render the issues they are running on mute?
7. Is a split between Northern and Southern Democrats likely if the war is still raging in 1856?
8. Are the Republicans and Fremont (assuming he does not take up a commission or is not given one by a democratic administration)likely to win the Midwestern swing states, and the electoral votes in 1856 if the war is still raging on?
9. How radical of a abolitionist is Fremont likely to be as a president in 1856, and how would he be perceived by the South? Enough to cause some of the Southern States to bolt in the middle of a war?
10. How would the war against Russia go if Britain pulled out it's troops to Canada, or at least stopped reinforcing them? WOuld France be likely to abandon the siege on Sevastopol, and move to a strategy focused on assisting the Ottomans on the Armenian front?
11. If U.S involvement means a longer war what happens when the Indian mutiny breaks out, more or less on schedule?
12. Is Austria likely to continue fence-sitting even if the war is extended?
 
The US was in absolutely no mood to either buy Alaska or get into a European war in 1854-55. Pierce's territorial ambitions were directed southward.
 
The US would be mad to go to war for Alaska, which as far as they're concerned is just a barren, desolate wasteland with nothing in it except snow. Plus, as you said, their army is just 16,000 strong, which isn't strong enough for a successful push into Canada or even to defend against a British counter-invasion. I don't know much about the militias during this period, but since they don't seem to have been much use in either the War of 1812 or the American Civil War, I suspect they weren't very effective.
 
Just a an interesting side note, the US Army officer who was assigned to go and observe the Crimean War was none other than the future Civil War Union General, then Captain George B. McClellan. I have not heard of what his thoughts were on the war or any possible US involvement. Any one know of any thoughts or reports he submitted?
 
For the US to actively consider a foreign war in the 1850s means that a Congress so divided that a member of the Senate was nearly beaten to death in chambers would have to agree to such, and we are talking about a division growing increasingly worse every year. It makes the current political divisions look like a minor spat in comparison.

Even buying some foreign territory is probably out of the question by 1854 as things are so tense (there is already fighting breaking out in Kansas).
 

yboxman

Banned
I'm thinking more of a war caused by miscalculation, and the collision of national and personal egos, rather than one caused by U.S (or British for that matter) deliberately aiming to conquer Canada/ Crush the U.S before it becomes a real threat. That's how the 1812 war, which was arguably far more suicidal for the U.S, broke out. For that matter that is how the Crimean war broke out. Or WWI.

The US was in absolutely no mood to either buy Alaska or get into a European war in 1854-55. Pierce's territorial ambitions were directed southward.

I would debate the First: "Franklin Pierce was famous as the fourteenth President of the United States of America. He was incapable of stemming the march towards Civil War and one of his few accomplishments was initiating discussions on acquiring Alaska."
http://www.datesandevents.org/american-timelines/franklin-pierce-timeline.htm

"A staunch believer in the concept of Manifest Destiny and the acquisition of land, Franklin Pierce took office in 1853 with his eye on Alaska, Hawaii and Cuba."


https://indiancountrymedianetwork.c...tector-of-white-settlers-in-indian-territory/

From a internal politics point of view, an Alaskan purchase brands the Democratic party as the one commited to non-sectional fulfillment of manifest destiny, a concept popular in the old Northwest swing states.

I would certainly agree as to the second- but both Pierce and Buchanan were quite prepared to rattle sabres Vs Britain (see the Pig War And Pierce's expuslion of British diplomats over enlistment of U.S volunteers in British army during the Crimean war) in order to safeguard points of honor/national interest, grandstand for the public, and divert attentions from sectional strife.



The US would be mad to go to war for Alaska, which as far as they're concerned is just a barren, desolate wasteland with nothing in it except snow. Plus, as you said, their army is just 16,000 strong, which isn't strong enough for a successful push into Canada or even to defend against a British counter-invasion.

Again, I agree. Rationally it is mad. So was the war of 1812. Or OTL's Crimean war for that matter. Question is whether sabre rattling might place either Britain or the U.S in a position where backing down is less palatable than duking it out. And it only takes one side to start a fight. That side would not neccesarily be the U.S- I would not put it past Palmerston to set out to present Pierce with a situation which would compel him to undertake steps which would justify, to the British electorate and decision makers, a British response. One such dynamic could, for example, be a bill for the expansion of the army/navy following tensions Vs Britain. While U.S war making *capability* at the beginning of the crisis is low, it's potential expansion, at least on land, is high- as the ACW showed. That might place Britain in the position of having to decide between trying to crush the USA before it mobilizes it's potential (or threatening to do so in order to deter against such mobilization) or coming under increasing pressure to give way in the crisis- and face a growing threat even if they do. Sort of a slow motion August 1914 scenario.

I don't know much about the militias during this period, but since they don't seem to have been much use in either the War of 1812 or the American Civil War, I suspect they weren't very effective.

The question, I suppose, is how effective millitas would be viewed by decision makers in the U.S BEFORE the fighting started. Where any state millitas other than texas involved in the Mexican war?

For the US to actively consider a foreign war in the 1850s means that a Congress so divided that a member of the Senate was nearly beaten to death in chambers would have to agree to such, and we are talking about a division growing increasingly worse every year. It makes the current political divisions look like a minor spat in comparison.

Well, that is partially true. following the midterm elections and the Kansas Nebraska act congress was splintered. But with most of COngres still either "pro" (Democrats) or "neutral" (Know nothing) on the Slavery issue I think it would be wrong to backproject the dynamics of 1856-1858 and (especially) 1858-1860 when the issue dominated congressional debate and legistlation on the situation between 1854-1856. An Alaska purchase, and upholding the honor of the American flag Vs Britain is at any rate, is a slavery neutral issue. For Pierce, who was in a vulnerable emotional state, it might seem tempting to try to distract the electorate and congress with. And of course, if the issue becomes an issue BEFORE the midterms t might lead to a different congressional makeup..

OTL the siege of Petropavlosk took place on September 1854 and the midterms started in August. If the former is pushed forward by three or four months, and is successful, then Alaska might become an issue by the time the midterms begin.

Even buying some foreign territory is probably out of the question by 1854 as things are so tense (there is already fighting breaking out in Kansas).

Significant, national attention grabbing fighting, seems to have broken out in early 1855- past the hypothetical purchase point. Of course, fighting will likely break out in Kansas regardless of international politics. Which should be "interesting.

 

Saphroneth

Banned
Functionally the US has no fleet as compared to the British. The British are in the process of rolling out major steam upgrades to their fleet (including both new-build and conversions of steam liners and frigates) and the US has exactly three steam frigates of any type - the Mississippi, Susquehanna and Powhatan - and a single steam sloop (Saranac). With US naval efforts focused on Japan in this period, it's entirely possible if not likely that at least one of these ships is overseas.

Functionally the entire US steam navy could probably be beaten by two British steam liners.

In terms of the army, the US regular army is 16,000 strong - and is going to have a huge logistical problem projecting force against Canada, it's simply not big enough to run its own supply lines (unless they launch what functionally amounts to a raid). The US is going to have to recruit up a larger army to be able to take the fight to Canada, and that gives time for Canada to do the same.


In terms of force deployment, depending on the timing there may indeed be almost no reaction force in Britain (during the end of the Sevastopol siege there were maybe half a dozen battalions in the home islands, plus a much larger number of militia). However, this doesn't mean there's no troops at all for the British - they had about fifty battalions who were not in the Crimea (including six battalions and the RCR in Canada or Nova Scotia), and given the weakness of the US Army a single extra division (six battalions) could prove to be very useful. The British also have the advantage that they're essentially swimming in gunboats, and that the Welland Canal can pass gunboats into the Great Lakes - thus the British can gain control of the Great Lakes without huge difficulty, and with British control of the Lakes then that's all she wrote for invading Canada.


I could see two US land operations intended to secure the Lakes:

1) Take the Welland Canal. This neutralizes the ability of British gunboats to get onto Lake Erie.
2) Go for Montreal and cut the St Lawrence there. Much harder, but also gives you Lake Ontario as well.

The problem the US has doing this is that their ready reaction force of 16,000 troops (inf,cav,art) includes men who are to man the coastal defences, and that there's already a British division in Canada. Tricky one! (they certainly can't do both above options with their on-hand forces...)
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Okay, so, ops and stuff. The later the war kicks off (in the OTL Crimean war pre-surrender of Sevastopol) the better for the US in the short term, in a purely military sense - near the end of the Sevastopol siege there's about half the entire British Army deployed there.
If the war kicks off at or near the end of the campaign season (which ends roughly December and doesn't open again until May) the British have a lot of time to react; the Siege of Sevastopol was September 1854-September 1855.

This to me suggests that the best time for things to kick off in terms of the British reaction would be in or around June or July 1855. The Siege of Sevastopol is still raging so the British army is largely pinned there (later on it would be able to get moving) and the British navy is operating against Russia so has less force available to deploy.

The problem is that by this point Kansas is already Bleeding, so things are getting domestic. But I could see it being pushed ahead as a Short Victorious War to try and unite the country - and I could see it causing massive problems as a result! (The British are in Hythe by that point and as such devastating in set-piece or field battles, though I don't have the figures for the specific battalions in BNA.)


If the war breaks out earlier, then the problem is that the British Army still has a lot of force at Home (which would gradually be sucked into Sevastopol OTL, here it would be available to go to Canada instead).
 
the US has exactly three steam frigates of any type - the Mississippi, Susquehanna and Powhatan - and a single steam sloop (Saranac).
San Jacinto?

six battalions and the RCR in Canada or Nova Scotia
This depends on timing, though, as the battalions in Canada were in the process of being withdrawn.

August 1854: 16th Jamaica, 26th Canada, 36th Barbados, 54th Quebec, 56th Bermuda, 66th Quebec, 69th Barbados, 2/71st Canada, 72nd New Brunswick, 76th Nova Scotia
December 1854: 16th Jamaica, 26th Canada, 36th Barbados, 56th Bermuda, 69th Barbados, 76th Nova Scotia
April 1855: 16th Nova Scotia, 26th Bermuda, 36th Jamaica, 69th Barbados, 76th Nova Scotia

The British also have the advantage that they're essentially swimming in gunboats, and that the Welland Canal can pass gunboats into the Great Lakes
It does mean delaying operations in the Baltic, though. So if the Russians come to the table, they're likely to get a better peace treaty out of the whole thing. Siding with a slave-owning autocrat to attack the British may not do the US's international reputation much good, though.

(The British are in Hythe by that point and as such devastating in set-piece or field battles, though I don't have the figures for the specific battalions in BNA.)
I don't think the lessons were that well bedded in across the army, though. The Crimean army did a lot of training in the field, but I can see other battalions not being as effective.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
San Jacinto?
Whoops, missed that one. Though, in fairness, she could be undergoing repairs at Southampton depending on the timing of the declaration.

This depends on timing, though, as the battalions in Canada were in the process of being withdrawn.

August 1854: 16th Jamaica, 26th Canada, 36th Barbados, 54th Quebec, 56th Bermuda, 66th Quebec, 69th Barbados, 2/71st Canada, 72nd New Brunswick, 76th Nova Scotia
December 1854: 16th Jamaica, 26th Canada, 36th Barbados, 56th Bermuda, 69th Barbados, 76th Nova Scotia
April 1855: 16th Nova Scotia, 26th Bermuda, 36th Jamaica, 69th Barbados, 76th Nova Scotia
Fair enough. On further examination I was looking at an 1856 Stations (though it had a lot of regiments in Crimea).
 
Whoops, missed that one.
Wikipedia doesn't include it on the lists of frigate or sloops, so it's easy to miss.

Though, in fairness, she could be undergoing repairs at Southampton depending on the timing of the declaration.
It's a reasonably narrow window:

Arrived at Southampton from Boston, 20 September 1854; sailed from Southampton to Kronstadt, 27 September 1854; returned to Southampton after breaking its propeller off the Texel, 2 October 1854; left Southampton for Bordeaux, 8 November 1854; left Bordeaux for Santander, 20 November 1854; arrived Gibraltar 12 December 1854; left Gibraltar to return to the US 20 December 1854.

Also worth noting that the Dahlgren gun hasn't yet been introduced.
 
If this did happen you really did a very rapid coup de main, pretty much aiming straight for the vipers head and maybe also affect New England trade so much that they force a major rethink and US to back down?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
If this did happen you really did a very rapid coup de main, pretty much aiming straight for the vipers head and maybe also affect New England trade so much that they force a major rethink and US to back down?
By the British, you mean?

I don't think the British have the men available for a rapid strike - not while Crimea's still going on. (Though if the US really screws up by the numbers they could end up declaring war just as the Russian War ends in a peace, which would mean about 50,000 British troops available to head over and cause damage.)

I think the likely British strategy is pretty simple - hold in Canada, and set up a blockade of the US as far as is practicable. With their active alliance with the French at this point they don't need much of a home fleet.

If they send over the gunboats, OTOH, they'd be able to just blast their way into pretty much any US fortified position - you could see gunboats off Washington, frankly, the US forts are not up to the new reality of steam ships.
 
I did mean Britain. Obviously main focus is the Crimea, but if you have a belligerent US government, but then one that's in all probability, split, then a quick jab.....and the cards come flying down. But that kind of swift decapitation strategy is probably not feasible?
 
The report, sadly, was not published by the government until 1860, and only in a very limited print run at that
The fact that the copy I linked dates from 1857, and that five thousand were printed (of which a thousand were reserved for the War Department), does rather tend to contradict that. Though I'll concede there's no guarantee anybody in the US army bothered to read it.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I did mean Britain. Obviously main focus is the Crimea, but if you have a belligerent US government, but then one that's in all probability, split, then a quick jab.....and the cards come flying down. But that kind of swift decapitation strategy is probably not feasible?
It depends on the timing, but I don't think there's any point the British have enough military force available. Their quick-reaction force is already in the Crimea and they're mobilizing the Militia (a painful process before the fairly major reforms of the second half of the 1850s and without the Rifle Volunteers) to use them to free up more regular battalions to go to the Crimea.

That said, if the British did have a corps spare after Canada was secure (a corps for the British is about twelve battalions) then they'd have been able to pretty much march where they wanted so long as it was close to navigable water, and the Potomac qualifies. The difficulty is shaking loose the troops, not the capability of troops if available.
 
The fact that the copy I linked dates from 1857, and that five thousand were printed (of which a thousand were reserved for the War Department), does rather tend to contradict that. Though I'll concede there's no guarantee anybody in the US army bothered to read it.

I stand corrected. McClellan's report was indeed put out in 1857. It was the reports by his two fellow officers which were delayed until 1860. Thanks!
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Something it's interesting to look at is that the British Army of the Crimea period is one of the times in history when the infantry arm of one army has been simply one of the best there's ever been relative to what's around it. British riflemen of the period could outshoot pretty much anyone else in terms of range and accuracy (cf: Inkerman), British rifles could shoot out enemy artillery (being able to deliver effective fire on Russian batteries at 600-800 yards while in skirmish order) and they could also stop an enemy cavalry charge without bothering to form square (the 93rd at Balaklava). And with all that, they make a mockery of defended forts by taking them at the bayonet at the top of a 350-foot hill.

What this means for a Britain-vs-US war is that the British infantry are basically their finest weapon. They don't have the Armstrong artillery that they'd have later in the decade (and in the ACW era) but the US doesn't have any significant rifled field artillery either (or even the Napoleon smoothbore) so the British riflemen are the longest ranged thing on the battlefield.
 
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