Two Alternate Pearl Harbor WIs

Geon

Donor
I’d like to propose the two following Pearl Harbor scenarios.

This isn’t actually “my” scenario; rather it was done as part of a two part Unsolved History episode entitled, “Myths of Pearl Harbor.” The first scenario was a war game simulation run by noted war game designer (i.e. Harpoon), author, and naval historian, Larry Bond. The teams were made up of naval strategists and military historians. In the scenario the assumption is no surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel has enough warning and enough time to act. In the scenario that was played, the team playing the Americans succeeds in getting the Fleet out of Pearl Harbor and engages the IJN. An air/surface naval engagement follows. During the battle I believe 2 battleships are sunk on the American side. The IJN loses one carrier and at least a hundred planes before it retires. Several other battleships and cruisers are also damaged.

What was emphasized by the participants after the battle was that the battleships that are sunk are not recoverable nor are their crews. Unlike Pearl Harbor in our time line these two battleships sink in deep water and are not salvageable. In addition there are more causalities because sailors are not able to simply go over the side and swim to shore.

Given the above scenario does the Pacific War play out differently? [P.S. If anyone has a better memory of the actual losses in the war game please correct me, I believe the above results are accurate.]

There is a second scenario that I’d like to explore here: One major weakness of the above scenario is that both teams were played by Americans. I don’t think the mindset of Admiral Nagumo was considered as part of this war game. Nagumo was extremely cautious. So, assume a second WI based on the same presuppositions. Except that this time, Nagumo on learning that the Americans are coming out of Pearl Harbor cancels the attack and withdraws back to Japan. Again, what happens next? Certainly, war is still declared in the Pacific but now the Americans have not lost their naval/air power or their battleships. How does this affect the Pacific War?

Geon
 
American losses very similar

In the first scenario, American losses sound lighter than in OTL. At Pearl, we lost two battleships completely (Arizona and Oklahoma) and Califonia and West Virginia sunk, with Nevada very heavily damaged. In this scene, the damaged battleships would be repaired faster than California and West Virginia in OTL--getting ripped apart as thouroughly as West Virginia, a ship at sea could not have made port. Likewise, I'm confident that damage to shore facilities and the like would be reduced, and planes like the PBY's and B-17's wouldn't be wiped out wholesale.

Overall, a worse result for Japan.
 
If the Japanese lose a substantial part of their attack force, that will have a large impact on the later Japanese offensives in SE Asia. The IJN was operating on a very tight schedule with very little room for error. Knock a carrier or two out early, and the whole southern offensive is jeopardized.

I think the Philippines and Singapore could probably hold out in this scenario, and the Japanese could be forced back to the Home Islands by late 1944. This is likely to lead to an invasion of the Home Islands, since the Bomb will be a year away and there will be no other choice. Rather worse than OTL, methinks.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Japanese lose either way.

The Fleet comes out and Pearl defenses are alerted the U.S. loses several BB permanently (2 were lost IOTL, so figure four lost in this scenario). No major issue in the long term, although the U.S. now might not stop at 4 Iowas and finish off the class. The Japanese lose way more aircraft and aircrew than IOTL meaning they have earlier trouble down the road.

Nagumo doesn't attack at all and they lose even the six months they had IOTL. This scenario is almost breathtakingly unlikely given Nagumo's orders and his professionalism.

Nagumo gets an undeservedly bad rap for following orders at Pearl and again at Midway. He followed the book both times. At Pearl he exceeded ALL expectations, and is belittled for it because he didn't do something that was never even considered in the LONG planning process and that put his early successes at great risk. At Midway he followed the mission plan and the doctrine he had been taught (a doctrine that he used to drive the Royal Navy out of the entire Indian Ocean). The mission plan at Midway was fatally flawed, but Nagumo didn't write that Plan, Yamamoto and his planning staff did.
 
Pearl Harbor in the OTL was about what was one of the least worse things for the USN as all the ships hit could be repaired, save the three CTL's Arizona, Oklahoma and the Utah. If the fleet had been out at sea in deep water, the same number of hits as in the OTL would also have resulted in the loss of USS Nevada, Callifornia and West Virginia, which were all settled at the bottom in the OTL Pearl Attack. Also USS Helena and Olgala would have been lost this way, as would most likely USS Raleigh, which all had been torpedoed in the OTL Attack. (as would a number of DD's, which were divebombed and suffered magazine detonations. These would be USS Shaw, Cashin and Downes).

So pound for pound, the USN might have been in a worse possition, with the fleet outside, than when bottled up in port, as the port was a relatively save place to absorb damage and get the damage fixed relatively fast. The Kido Butai was not likely to suffer much damage from the USN as the only weapon that could hurt her was the submarineforce of the Pacific Fleet, which in those days had actually no teeth, since it suffered from very poor quality torpedoes.

The USAAF on Hawaii might try to have engaged the Kido Butai, but was not equipped with the right tools to do so, relying too much on large level bombers and not the more precission attack divebombers, and lacked completely a torpedobomber divission. Only the large number of USN PBY's was very usefull, but mostly as a search tool, not one to use in an attack, as the PBY was too valuable to risk in dangereous torpedoattacks, being a bit too slow and too large a target themselves. The only teeth on Hawaii in the airforces were the small contigent of Marine SBD's stationed there, which simply were too small in numbers to be a real factor.

It should be noted that the USAAF was not very used to operate on the sea in escort and CAP missions for the USN and therefore a weak link in the defense plans of the USA on Hawaii. Navy aircraft were better trained in this sort of operations, but lacked the numbers and often quality of the newer IJN planes. (Most USN Airgroups still had obsolete equipment on both carirers and airbases, such as the Buffalo fighter, Vindicator divebomber and TBD torpedoplane. there simply were too few SBD's and F4F's in service, to make a difference.)
 

Markus

Banned
There is a second scenario that I’d like to explore here: One major weakness of the above scenario is that both teams were played by Americans. I don’t think the mindset of Admiral Nagumo was considered as part of this war game. Nagumo was extremely cautious. So, assume a second WI based on the same presuppositions. Except that this time, Nagumo on learning that the Americans are coming out of Pearl Harbor cancels the attack and withdraws back to Japan. Again, what happens next? Certainly, war is still declared in the Pacific but now the Americans have not lost their naval/air power or their battleships. How does this affect the Pacific War?

Geon

Why would he do that? He´s still got twice as many CV as the US Pacific Fleet. edit: Actually four times. Saratoga wasn´t there. IF the battle happenes outside the range of PH-based planes he could have won a much bigger victory. First attack the US carriers, than take out the BB while they try to get back to the safety of PH.
 

Geon

Donor
Scenario Discussion

Just to respond to some of the comments I have read here.

First off if anyone saw "Myths of Pearl Harbor" and remembers the results of the wargame please e-mail them to me. I can then repost more accurately.

Let me pose this question. Remember that at Pearl Harbor many men survived by jumping off their ships and swimming to the nearest moored ship that wasn't ablaze or to the shore. If as Calbear indicates the USN loses four battleships (and remember these are lost permanently, no salvage since they sink in deep water), do you think the loss of trained crews will also be a problem. Also, given that in this wargame scenario the planes on the various airfields are left largely untouched is there a chance to offset some of Japan's successes at Wake Island or say the Philippines, and how would this affect future engagements such as Coral Sea and Midway?

As to the second scenario, I agree with the idea that Nagumo would not simply turn tail and run, he was too much of a professional. If he could inflect any damage he would consider it a victory.

Geon
 
Scenario 1: two USN BB sunk in trade for 1 IJN CV and 100 aircraft.

That's MUCH worse than OTL. US manpower casualties probably won't be much higher, and two BB were lost for good IOTL. The point that ships that make it back to port will be easier to repair than those resting on the bottom of Pearl IOTL is also a good one. The war is shorter, but the US is less enraged. Japan might even be allowed a negotiated peace in later 1944/early 1945 (having clearly lost the war by that point).

Scenario 2: Nagumo retreats without engaging.

Again, shorter war. The IJN is only a hair better off materially, lacks the morale boost from Pearl (replaced with the shame of being chased off without even putting up a fight), and the US fleet is intact. For all the handwaving that the old USN BB's were obsolete, they provided good service during the war (up to and including Surigao Strait). The USN has more PBY's available, two more DD... and so on.

The latter scenario is also pushing ASB territory, again as has been noted. Nagumo had orders, and the IJN wargames had indicated the possibility of loosing a CV or two, and deemed this acceptable. He'll risk his forces to carry out his mission as ordered, just as he won't (and didn't) risk his forces once that mission is/was carried out. To get this you need a change in Nagumo's mindset about the battle, not just the circumstances.

I actually saw a claim on the Pacific War Online Encyclopedia that Yamamoto had ordered the strike be carried out (with lesser forces) even in the event refueling at sea proved impractical. If that's true, the IJN was prepared to write off three carriers and their entire air groups (out of fuel in Hawaiian waters = dead) just to launch the attack.

Edit: wrong citation for one of the ideas fixed.
 
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