I hope there's an update soon. This is kind of morbidly fascinating.
Count me in the "eagerly waiting" crowd.
Your wish is my command:
Behold a Pale Horse
Excerpt from The Korean War by Thomas Jones
By the spring of 1953 the negotiations at Panmunjom had become completely gridlocked. The Chinese and North Koreans were utterly unwilling to compromise on the POW issue[1] with the UN. This situation suited Joseph Stalin just fine. Many times Stalin declared that a stalemate in Korea was to the advantage of the Communist world, such as in a March 25th telegram to Mao in which he said “Right now the Americans are stuck in little Korea. As long as they are trapped there we need not worry about another major war.” In Stalin’s mind Korea thus became an opportunity for respite, a way to prepare the Soviet Union for World War III. In January 1951 Stalin launched a rearmament campaign, telling his Eastern European puppet that they should take advantage of the Korean War to rearm. The Korean War served Stalin in other ways. Stalin never fully trusted Mao, mainly because the Chinese dictator had come to power independently. For all his talk about “socialist brotherhood” Stalin was only comfortable (or as comfortable as a pathologically paranoid man can be) with men who were as obedient to him as his cronies in Moscow. Stalin also knew that China was the only Communist power that could ever challenge the Soviet Union’s preeminence. By convincing Mao to enter the Korean War then Stalin had both made the Chinese more dependent on him (in the form of military aid) and weakened them.
For President Eisenhower however this situation was unacceptable. Eisenhower had been elected in part to end the war, and having gone to Korea in November of 1952 he had concluded that “Small attacks on small hills will not win this war.” This left Eisenhower with two options: find a way to end the war diplomatically, or expand the war. Diplomatically Stalin (through the Chinese) was able to block Eisenhower’s every effort. By May the situation had reached a breaking point. On May 20th Eisenhower met with the National Security Council to discuss the use of nuclear weapons in Korea. The idea of using nuclear bombs against North Korean and Chinese forces had long been considered, but until now it had always been rejected. Part of the reason was fear of Soviet retaliation. If Stalin decided to respond he could hit Western Europe and the poorly defended cities of Japan, thus starting World War III. Even at the May 20th meeting, which was less about if nuclear weapons were going to be used than how they were going to be used, this threat hung in the air like a Sword of Damocles. Aside from this there were other issues over using the bombs, most notably how the bombs would be deployed. The JCS and other commanders believed that the bombs would be most useful in striking airfields and industrial centers in Manchuria, while Eisenhower thought they could have a tactical role inside North Korea itself. He could not be dissuaded from this idea, and eventually the JCS was forced to acquiesce. The end result of the meeting was NSC Action 794, which authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Korea. Two days later General Mark Clark, commander of UN forces in Korea, gave the Chinese a final offer in the negotiations. The Chinese rebuffed it, with Mao reportedly saying that Eisenhower “could wipe his ass with it.” The US broke off the Panmunjom talks shortly thereafter and on June 1st Eisenhower issued the order to begin the execution of NSC Action 794[2].
Excerpt from The Big Cigar: Curtis LeMay and the Making of the Modern Air Force by Stephen Ambrose
Of all the commanders who planned the use of nuclear weapons in Korea LeMay was the most belligerent, vocally supporting hammering the Chinese with nuclear weapons. “By the time I’m done with them the Red Chinese will be roasted like a Peking duck” LeMay boasted. Under LeMay’s plan US forces would have not only struck targets in North Korea and Manchuria, but would also have destroyed Beijing with two atomic bombs and nuked cities up and down the Chinese coast (with the side benefit of weakening the PRC for a Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces to invade). But in one important aspect LeMay and Eisenhower’s strategic visions differed: Eisenhower wanted to end the war in Korea, while LeMay sought to destroy Communist China. As a result Eisenhower and the other commanders made some important revisions to LeMay’s plan. Beijing was taken off the table, at least for the first strike, to avoid killing the Chinese leadership, and the idea of a Kuomintang invasion facilitated with nuclear weapons was moved to a contingency plan.
Even with these changes Operation North Star (as the final plan was called) was still unimaginably destructive. Starting on May 28th[3] bombs were to be dropped on targets across North Korea and Manchuria, such as airfields, dams and brides on the Yalu River, and Manchurian industrial centers. On the ground a general offense would be launched. Mustard gas would be used to drive the Communists from their fortified positions, whereupon bombers or the M65 Atomic Cannon would make short work of them. Secondary strikes would then focus on other Chinese cities and any targets that were missed the first time (about a quarter of the bombers used were expected to be shot down). The hope was that China, having suffered millions of casualties and seeing its army crushed, would offer peace. More plans were drawn up in case this failed or the Soviets got involved.
Excerpt from The Bulganin Diaries by Nikolai Bulganin
12 December 1953: Stalin called an urgent meeting today. When we got to his office Ignatyev dropped a (no pun intended) bombshell: the Americans were planning to launch nuclear strikes on Korea. This would seem to indicate that the Americans weren’t bluffing when they said that they would expand the war[4], but the evidence seems pretty slim (rumors coupled with some vague reports from spies). However Stalin believes it, and that is what matters. We discussed what the response would be if America launched these weapons. Stalin was particularly worried about the size of our nuclear stockpile, and gave orders to speed up production as much as possible.
21 December 1953: Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow to discuss the situation in Korea. From what Ponomarenko[5] has told me it seems Stalin agreed to support the Chinese if the Americans attacked. When Stalin brought up the issue later however he said that he thinks if we show our muscle the Americans will back down. I don’t know what will happen if the Americans call his bluff, but I have the sinking feeling that it won’t end well for anyone.
[1] The POW issue emerged when many Chinese and North Korean POWs requested that they not be repatriated to their respective countries. The US wanted to honor their wish, which was unacceptable to the Chinese and North Korean governments.
[2] NSC Action 794 is a real order.
[3] It would take until May to get the bombs there and ready for action.
[4] IOTL America made some vague threats to the Chinese, but it's unclear if the threats reached the Chinese. ITTL there are several more months of such threats, so the threats do reach the Chinese.
[5] After Andrei Vyshinsky was dismissed as Foreign Minister (more on his fate later) in October Panteleimon Ponomarenko was appointed in his place.
And who's that, erm, enlightened person?
