The Offensive of Victory
Excerpt from The Soviet Civil War by Joshua Reddings
In February 1968 the Soviets decided to march on Moscow. Propaganda proudly declared this “the Offensive of Victory”, and the Soviets devoted a huge chunk of their resources to it. Over two million men, 5000 tanks, and 7000 aircraft were put on the line. The timing of the attack proved fortuitous for the Soviets, since the rebels were in the midst of reorganizing their military. Most of the military, particularly the officer class, had sided with the Soviets, which created leadership and training problems in the rebel armies. Over the first 5 months of the war this had proved to be a major albatross across the rebels’ neck. The Soviets managed to win battle after battle, and by February the city of Voronezh, about 330 miles from Moscow, was in Soviet hands.
The offensive started off slow. The rebels proved to be a much tougher enemy than the Soviets had anticipated, and it took a month and a half to advance to the town of Yelets, about 90 miles from Voronezh. But at Yelets the Soviets won one of the biggest victories of the war. On March 20th the worn-out and battered 5th and 6th Armies decided to halt and reorganize. Rebel general Ivan Veremei decided to use this opportunity to launch a counterattack. Veremei had been promoted following the August Revolution, and wanted an opportunity to prove himself further. From March 21st-28th the rebel armies pounded the Soviets, and the Soviet center seemed to give way. Veremei didn’t notice that, like the Romans at Cannae, his men were moving into a pincer. On April 1st that pincer slammed shut. Aided by fresh troops the Soviets cut through the rebel lines and quickly surrounded about 70,000 men. In a panic Veremei threw troops at the Soviets in an attempt to break through and rescue the trapped men, but this failed. With a whole army’s worth of men lost the rebels were forced to retreat in disarray. Using the tactics of deep battle, the Soviets were able to push to the city of Tula by the beginning of May, leaving them only a little more than 100 miles from Moscow.
Excerpt from A History of Atomic Warfare by Jack Bridges
Throughout May and June, the rebels kept losing and giving ground around Moscow. By June 15th the Soviets were at Serpukhov, about 60 miles from Moscow. By this point the CNS was desperate. The rebel armies were exhausted and beaten down, barely holding the line. It seemed that Moscow’s only hope was the roughly 200,000 troops from the east, but those wouldn't arrive for another 3 weeks. It was at this time that the CNS began considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons. A large scale nuclear attack could seriously damage the Soviet armies, giving Moscow valuable time. But there were many risks. The foremost of these was the fear that things could devolve into a general nuclear war. Both sides had enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other, so such a war would mean the end of the Russian state. It was Kashnikov who convinced the CNS to use tactical nukes. As he put it “If we do not use nuclear weapons we shall lose Moscow, and losing Moscow is a physical and morale blow that we cannot recover from. If death is our lot either way, then I say that we take the Soviet Union with us!”
The nuclear attack was launched on June 20th. 10 nuclear-tipped Scud B missiles, with payloads ranging from 5 to 20 kilotons, were launched at various points along the Soviet lines. The missiles’ effect was incredible. One Soviet soldier recalled that “For an instant I was blinded by a flash of light; I thought to myself “Is this the end of the world?” As my sight came back I gazed at a scene of horror. All around men lay dead or horribly burned, with their uniforms fused to their bodies. Our tanks and artillery had been ripped apart and scattered like a child’s toys on the floor.” While the damage had been minimized by the fact that the Soviets anticipated such an event, and structured their armies accordingly, it was still tremendous. Around 100,000 soldiers were killed, along with an untold number of civilians. Despite Soviet preparations the army’s medical system was completely overwhelmed with wounded, to the point where all civilians were turned away and left to die.
News of the attack quickly reached Stalingrad, where the ruling troika gathered to determine what to do next. Since it was unclear if the attack was localized or if it was the start of a general nuclear strike a decision had to be made quickly. Ustinov wanted to strike and use as many nukes as possible. Thankfully for the world Kulakov and Polyansky disagreed. Both felt that the Soviets were too close to victory to risk escalating the conflict, particularly if the rebels only meant to use nuclear weapons in a tactical setting. The previous use of nuclear weapons by both the US and the USSR in Asia had also done a lot to influence nuclear strategy. The idea had developed that it was possible to use nuclear weapons in a tactical setting, and that nukes were just another level of escalation rather than being a game-ending move. This view was challenged by many, but Kulakov and Polyansky were willing to accept it. Instead the Soviets decided to respond with a tactical nuclear strike of their own. 8 nuclear missiles were detonated around Moscow, to much the same effect as the rebels’ attack.
Although the destruction of Russia had been avoided it proved impossible to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. Throughout the rest of the Soviet Civil War tactical nuclear weapons were used with every major offensive. In the rest of the world the Russian experience confirmed the idea of nukes as a tactical element, something which would prove to have a devastating impact in both the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan wars.