Tsushima amnesia: A Donitz in the Pacific (a World War II thread))

This is another World War II thread, but unlike many of them that proposes some contingency in the course or outcome of a specific battle, this thread concerns itself with a doctrinal difference.

Since the title refers to Tsushima, this quote from Wikipedia seems apropos:

[Tsushima] created a legend that was to haunt Japan's leaders for forty years. A British admiral once said, 'It takes three years to build a ship, but 300 years to build a tradition.' Japan thought that the victory had completed this task in a matter of a few years ... It had all been too easy. Looking at Tōgō's victory over one of the world's great powers convinced some Japanese military men that with more ships, and bigger and better ones, similar victories could be won throughout the Pacific. Perhaps no power could resist the Japanese navy, not even Britain and the United States
Wikipedia: Tsushima

Needless to say, the Mahanian "Kantai Kessen" doctrine failed Japan.

Now, suppose there was some influential "submarine faction" in the Imperial Japanese Navy, and resources instead were allocated towards the construction of submarines instead of the Yamato and Mushashi. Also assume that the IJN's subs would be as good as the Germans.

What if the Japanese deployed more submarines in the Pacific? How would this affect the early battles of the war (assuming that they would occur) such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal Campaign if the density of submarines increased to patrol and observe the area around Port Moresby and the Solomons?

Although submarines probably require local air superiority (as they cannot stay submerged while traveling for a prolonged amount of time, unlike the U-boat type XXI) in order to prevent enemy aircraft from locating them and interrupting their operations, they could act as reconnaissance (to aid the fleet in locating enemies) and interdict commerce. One reason why the Japanese wanted Guadalcanal and constructed an airfield there was to have a base to interrupt shipping. At best, they could act as area denial in a certain region of the ocean, but unlike Kessen Kantai, the enemy's fleet would not be destroyed in a decisive battle, but instead be denied from interrupting certain expansionary operations.

Submarine coordination to destroy a significant portion of a fleet would be difficult, especially in the expanse of the Pacific, when compared to destroying convoys as a fleet as a wider range of defenses at its disposal. It would involve radio communication to coordinate attacks against a fleet that may be running anti-submarine patrols with its aircraft and destroyers (and maybe Allied signal intelligence may negate any advanced coordinated tactics would furnish).

Still, I doubt it would affect the outcome of the war of an unconditional surrender of the Japanese because the Allies would just build more destroys and escort carriers. Maybe it would allow enough time for the Soviets to get Hokkaido for themselves.

Maybe I am not asking for history, but a analysis of a war game involving more Japanese submarines in the Coral Sea and the Solomons. And maybe to be educated about the limits of WWII submarine technology and tactics.
 
>Also assume that the IJN's subs would be as good as the Germans.

Non sense. It's as "assume that something designed for a huge pacific is as good as something designed for a much smaller place" and "assume that basically japanese trash their whole docrina".

>What if the Japanese deployed more submarines in the Pacific? How would this affect the early battles of the war (assuming that they would occur) such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal Campaign if the density of submarines increased to patrol and observe the area around Port Moresby and the Solomons?

Given they way they were using them... nothing.

>Although submarines probably require local air superiority

non sense in the Pacific

> (as they cannot stay submerged while traveling for a prolonged amount of time, unlike the U-boat type XXI) in order to prevent enemy aircraft from locating them and interrupting their operations, they could act as reconnaissance

no they are almost blind above some miles

The whole idea of commerce raiding is nonsense for the japanese: they assume that the war will be short and victorious. You do commerce raiding for long wars. You can not reconciliate that.
 
>Also assume that the IJN's subs would be as good as the Germans.

Non sense. It's as "assume that something designed for a huge pacific is as good as something designed for a much smaller place" and "assume that basically japanese trash their whole docrina".





I realized when I posted the thread that the Pacific was much larger. Maybe they would be used as surveillance and reconnaissance in supporting fleet actions. Japanese submarines possible cannot control the vast Western Pacific. Instead, I specifically focused on the possibility of an increased submarine presence in the Coral Sea and the Solomon Islands.

>What if the Japanese deployed more submarines in the Pacific? How would this affect the early battles of the war (assuming that they would occur) such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal Campaign if the density of submarines increased to patrol and observe the area around Port Moresby and the Solomons?

Given they way they were using them... nothing.
The IJN managed to sink a fleet carrier, a CV, the USS Wasp with a submarine.

The whole idea of commerce raiding is nonsense for the japanese: they assume that the war will be short and victorious. You do commerce raiding for long wars. You can not reconciliate that.
Wiki said this:

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew large when, in early July 1942, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal—from such a base Japanese long-range bombers would threaten the sea lines of communication from the West Coast of the Americas to the populous East Coast of Australia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal_Campaign

Maybe it does not specifically indicate "commerce" but it does involve interdicting shipping.
 
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Had the Japanese employed their submarine force more rationally, it would have made the US (and Allies) worry more about convoys than they did OTL as the submarine threat to merchant shipping in the Pacific was never much because of Japanese doctrine. The problem is the Pacific is big, transit times to places to attack convoy routes were long, and the Japanese did not have the capability to build the sort of submarine force that could seriously threaten US/Allied shipping given these additional constraints the Germans did not have to deal with. Sure, don't build an aircraft carrier (and associated escorts) and you can build more subs, but then what do you do against the USN if you have a fleet of subs and not much else. It certainly can't support attacks on the PI, Malaya, DEI etc.

The Germans did not need a large surface fleet, and would have been better building more subs and fewer Bismarcks. All the Japanese subs in the world could not have done what the IJN did in 1942. Sure, using what they had better would have made life more difficult for the US/Allies but once their subs were sunk they would have a hard time replacing them. The Germans needed one sort of navy, the Japanese another.
 
Wiki said this:

Quote:
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew large when, in early July 1942, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal—from such a base Japanese long-range bombers would threaten the sea lines of communication from the West Coast of the Americas to the populous East Coast of Australia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal_Campaign

Maybe it does not specifically indicate "commerce" but it does involve interdicting shipping.

I wonder who wrote the Wiki entry??? Get out a map & trace the range of the best Japanese bombers on it. Closes the distance to South American right? Just a little gap between max range & Peru? How much of a gap?

Most historians of the Pacifc war; Costello, Franks, ect.. describe how the airfield on Gudalcanal was intended to: A. act as a outpost defending the eastern approach to Rabual & the ongoing battle for New Guinea. B as a suppport base for operations further east towards Fiji & Samoa, the "FS" operation. In February & March the USN had raided the region, & again in the run up to the Coral Sea battle. Protecting this region by extending the "defense" peremeter eastwards was part of the Japanese strategy that led to Guadalcanal.
 
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