TSR2 & F111 TL; shorter Cold War?

I've seen analysis that Cruise was a major factor in the ending of the Cold War. With every major USN ship a potential strategic nuke platform, as well as GLCM in Europe and wherever else they get deployed in a crisis and ALCM B52/B1, the pre-emptive task was impossible. In addition with thousands of low level cruise missile to defend against PVO Strany was in conniptions, where was the look down-shoot down capability to get all of these missile coming from?

WI an analgous situation had occured in the early 70s instead of the mid/late 80s but with TSR2 and F111 instead of cruise? I think everybody knows the TSR2 story, but WI the RAF got at least the 150 it planned? Not everybody knows the saga of USAF F111s. The USAF wanted some 1600 planes, but when trouble struck they built them in fits and starts in 5 variants, totalling about 560 planes. I've seen it suggested that a better solution would have been once trouble struck they should have stopped production and gone back to the drawing board, sorted the problems out and then re-started production with the definitive variant. This certainly would have reduced costs and lead to increased production, perhaps double OTL numbers.

With 2 F111 wings alongside 2 TSR2 wings in Britain where does the USAF station it's other 8 F111 wings? Japan, Sth Korea, Alaska, Turkey? How does the Soviet Union respond, can they respond? Does the USSR go broke trying to invent AEW&C and interceptors with the flight performance and look down-shoot down capabilities needed to intercept over 1000 planes skimming the treetops at Mach 1?
 
well, heck, WI the RAAF held onto the 24 -odd F4 Phantom IIs borowed from the USAF in the early 70s instead of actually taking on the F111s ? I saw 1 on display at RAAF Museum Point Cook...
 
I've seen analysis that Cruise was a major factor in the ending of the Cold War. With every major USN ship a potential strategic nuke platform, as well as GLCM in Europe and wherever else they get deployed in a crisis and ALCM B52/B1, the pre-emptive task was impossible. In addition with thousands of low level cruise missile to defend against PVO Strany was in conniptions, where was the look down-shoot down capability to get all of these missile coming from?


I am not sure this theory is correct, because pre-emptive task was made impossible far earlier due to submarine based nuclear weapons. If the USSR wiped out all land based nukes in a perfect strike, then the USA's submarines would still wipe out the USSR. So I think the advent of the cruise missle really changes the dynamic.
 
SLBMs, much like ICBMs were countered by opposing SLBMs and ICBMs but Cruise was possibly akin to 1962 but without the opportunity to emplace counter-weapons in Cuba. The Soviets couldn't counter cruise with their own counter-deployments because their navy wasn't powerful enough to position itself close the the USA and it lacked Allies which could host this sort of theatre weapon. This leaves offensive/defensive defence as the only choice to counter Cruise, but of course that means attacking dozens of warships, attack subs, mobile missile units and stand-off bombers and when these means fail shooting down hundreds of targets flying down in the ground clutter.

I think that a similar situation could occur if the TSR2 was produced in number for the RAF and the F111 programme went much better than IOTL. The Soviets wouldn't be able to position their own theatre strike assets in areas where the USA was under threat, so would have to attack the airbases which are potentially plentiful and deep inside defended territory or shoot down the planes themselves, which is a big ask for the Soviets in the 70s and early 80s. Addressing this dilemma could lead to a meltdown.
 

Sandman396

Banned
SLBMs, much like ICBMs were countered by opposing SLBMs and ICBMs but Cruise was possibly akin to 1962 but without the opportunity to emplace counter-weapons in Cuba. The Soviets couldn't counter cruise with their own counter-deployments because their navy wasn't powerful enough to position itself close the the USA and it lacked Allies which could host this sort of theatre weapon. This leaves offensive/defensive defence as the only choice to counter Cruise, but of course that means attacking dozens of warships, attack subs, mobile missile units and stand-off bombers and when these means fail shooting down hundreds of targets flying down in the ground clutter.

I think that a similar situation could occur if the TSR2 was produced in number for the RAF and the F111 programme went much better than IOTL. The Soviets wouldn't be able to position their own theatre strike assets in areas where the USA was under threat, so would have to attack the airbases which are potentially plentiful and deep inside defended territory or shoot down the planes themselves, which is a big ask for the Soviets in the 70s and early 80s. Addressing this dilemma could lead to a meltdown.

I am afraid that your concept is flawed in terms of the impact of cruise.

Cruise was a political red-herring of massive proportions.

The balance of power in nuclear terms was only massively changed by the introduction of Trident (especially the D5).

For the first time there was the possibilty of a decapitation and counterforce strike taking place from SLBM sources rather than ICBM.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Cruise missiles were not the tipping point. If there WAS a single bit of tech that was the last straw (something that I believe would be a considerable over-simplification) it was stealth. Stealth technology did two things to the USSR, both extremely disquieting to the leadership.

1) It undercut the center of Soviet planning for WW III survival. The belief at the command levels of the USSR was that Nuclear war was survivable as a "state" as long as the NCA/Soviet/CP leadership survived. Most of the USSR's planning was built around this basic belief, from the placement of their ABM treaty permitted defenses being centered on Moscow to the rather elaborate shelter system for the leadership's use. Stealth killed that at a stroke. Stealth provided a ZERO WARNING scenario which would have meant the high probability of loss of the "state". That was unacceptable.

2) Cost. Stealth did two things on the cost level. At a stroke it drove the unimaginably expensive Soviet air defense system and PVO into obsolecense AND ensured that the USSR would have to recreate the entire stealth program itself at ungodly cost and uncertain success (interestingly, despite the many gaffes by Western intel, it seems that stealth tech was never successfully penetrated). For a nation on the verge of economic implosion that was beyond daunting. Combined with the fact that # 1 was in effect it gave the USSR remarkably few choices.
 
The main advantage of SLCMs was that they dealt a major blow to the Soviet maritime recon capability. Before, they really only had to track the carriers. Now they had to track everything. Much harder.
 
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