TSR2 Conspiracy Theories

Does anyone have any details re how "stick bombing" with several free fall nuclear bombs would have worked ? Did they plan on dropping them far enough appart so the detonation of the first one wouldn't damage the subsequent ones or did they plan to detonate them all at the same time using very accurate timers (sort of like a "time on target"). I can see possible issues with both approaches but presumably this was thought thru by experts. I wonder if this concept was ever actually tested (using either above ground or under ground nuclear tests ?)

I also wonder if the bombs they planned on using were specifically designed for this application (perhaps they were designed to be particularly resistant to the prompt radiation from near by nuclear explosions ?)

You've laid out the problem succinctly, and I don't know if there is a solution to it in practical terms hence its impact on the TSR2 programme. I think not having the yeild cap from 1962 might be a good AH thread, but I don't know if enough people know anything about it to get traction.

I'm thinking that having a credible "stick bombing" capability would imply a fairly advanced UK nuclear weapons program.

Yes they do. They demonstrated that they independently could create advanced thermonuclear weapons by their 1957 tests so the US entered into the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement with the US and used US warhead designed. However they found the US designs to be a bit shit so after their first attempt never directly copied a US design again and have always ensured that they have something advanced to offer the US as their part of the bargin; Three-dimensional quartz phenolic (3DQP) developed for the Chevaline and since used on US RVs is a prime example of this contribution.
 
You've laid out the problem succinctly, and I don't know if there is a solution to it in practical terms hence its impact on the TSR2 programme. I think not having the yeild cap from 1962 might be a good AH thread, but I don't know if enough people know anything about it to get traction.



Yes they do. They demonstrated that they independently could create advanced thermonuclear weapons by their 1957 tests so the US entered into the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement with the US and used US warhead designed. However they found the US designs to be a bit shit so after their first attempt never directly copied a US design again and have always ensured that they have something advanced to offer the US as their part of the bargin; Three-dimensional quartz phenolic (3DQP) developed for the Chevaline and since used on US RVs is a prime example of this contribution.
Interesting.. Thanks
 
I'm uncertain about the ability to 'stick bomb' in this case, but looking onto OR.1177 and OR.1176 (the requirements for an improved kiloton range weapon and its warhead respectively), one of the requirements was the ability to lay down these weapons from low level. This would prevent exposure to enemy radar during a 'pop up' bomb run. As such, parachute retarding was a necessity. The OR's actually suggest a velocity of 40ft/sec for the standard 'fragile' warhead, or 250ft/sec for a 'ruggedized' version. WE177 was supposed to be deliverable from altitude, by dive/toss from medium altitude (both of these seem to go against the idea of avoiding enemy radar as much as possible) or by laydown from a height of 50ft (hence the need to be retarded by parachute). At the same time yield of WE177 went from the low yield of the A version to the higher yields B version, which perhaps would have been uncomfortable for crews laying them down at low level, even if retarded (bombs not crew!!). Almost half of bombs planned for TSR2 use would have been the B variant. By 1963 there was a perceived need for a standoff weapon to attack defended Soviet cities, and Bristol went as far as initial designs on a missile with nuclear warhead. Costs of the TSR meant that there was no money to fund development however. Again this showed the confusion over TSR2's role. It had gone from a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft to one expected to undertake strategic missions; such changes as stated only adding to cost increases during development. Of course 2 years later TSR2 would be gone.
It is probable that had TSR2 been bought into service the RAF would have only been able to afford a fraction of what they needed and it would have also gained a more conventional role, using weapons later fitted to Tornado Gr's.
 
The Plan at March 1964

Plan P March 1964 Total Royal Air Force Aircraft by Type and Mark.png
 
The two lists don't match, the orders list has 193 TSR2 and 162 P1154 but the squadron list had less than half of those numbers in service. Does the RAF consider aircraft on deeper level maintenance not in service? Even if they do that's a lot of aircraft 'spare'.
 
Yes, it's all very well to have an Ah-Ha! moment about the WE 177 C, but that bomb was predicated on the availability of the 'Reggie' secondaries made redundant by the Polaris Chevaline programme which didn't get the decision to procure until 1971. In the 60s several ideas were kicking around for the Polaris fleet, there was some momentum behind getting the new, longer ranged Poseidon to maintain commonality with the US, and if this had happened I think a secondary effect would have been that the Posiedons would have to have re-used the Polaris warheads upgraded to Chevaline specs rather than have the UK develop an entirely new design and build them by the hundreds. If that had occurred then the WE 177 C may not have been built, so not used on the TSR2 fleet; so the stick bombing problem is a real one.

The main difference between Polaris an Poseidon was that Poseidon was repackaged to allow more MIRV's amd a somewhat extended range. iirc it could carry 10-14 4kt warheads
 
The main difference between Polaris an Poseidon was that Poseidon was repackaged to allow more MIRV's amd a somewhat extended range. iirc it could carry 10-14 4kt warheads

I could, but would it in British service? IIRC the warheads on the British Polaris were not based on the US Polaris but rather on the Minuteman III warhead, Anglicised to suit British requirements and industrial methods. I think that if faced with a choice of re-using the existing Polaris warheads, suitably updated with new primaries but using the existing secondaries like the Chevaline programme, or designing a totally new warhead and then building hundreds of them for the 48 in-service missiles I think the British would choose the former.

Bear in mind that nuclear materials are so valuable to the British that they didn't retire the ~50 secondaries made redundant by Chevaline, but re-used them in the WE 177 C.
 
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