Trying to Achieve a Successful Suez Crisis

I have been reading up on the Suez Crisis, looking for ways to get a more successful end result for Britain and at least prolonging somewhat higher power status. This seems quite hard to achieve, as the lynchpin of any such POD has to involve US support or at least a lack of disapproval.

So, the first major goal must be to get Eisenhower to support the British position. Unless the POD is moved farther back, Britain will be very dependent economically on the US, so we need to get the US to feel that Nasser must be removed somehow. The best way I see for this to happen is if Nasser moves much closer to the Soviets openly. More Soviet arms shipments in addition to the first Czechoslovakian shipment, and/or more Soviet aid funding for domestic Egyptian projects will certainly alarm Eisenhower. If Nasser is viewed as an effective Soviet ally, getting US support in a Suez operation will be much easier.

However, even if Nasser has many more direct links to the Eastern Bloc, I still think that Eisenhower will still want the British to go through several diplomatic options first. This poses a problem, as Britain's legal standing in the nationalization crisis is weak as Egypt hasn't really violated any of the agreements pertaining to the canal by force nationalizing it. The British position is further undermined as they conducted a similar forced buyout with the coal industries under the Atlee government. So, we need more deadlock in the UN and a more confrontational Egypt to have the diplomatic option fall through. This is especcially where I would like people's ideas.

So, if we are able to get US and some international support for the British position in the Suez Crisis, we have several alternatives on the actual military plan. If the US is supporting due to a want to topple Nasser, the larger Musketeer operation that involved landings at Alexandria and other larger centers being implemented. Also, the need for the agreement with Israel will be removed if Eden is not searching for a stronger pretext for the operation. Removing Israeli help will certainly get on Frech nerves a bit if they try to push an agreement with Israel, but it will certainly help preserve British standing among the Arabs a bit more.

So, Israel will probably be off the table, and the French and British will probably be occupying most of Egypt's major population centers in this scenario. The war will certainly be bloodier and more difficult, but I believe that the French and British will be able to win the conventional struggle. Then the British and French are stuck in a quagmire though as any government put in the place of Nasser will probably be viewed as illegitimate by the people due to his popularity and a dislike of Britain and France. Britain and France may very well just topple Nasser and then pull out, maintaing forces around the canal and leaving Egyptians to sort out their own problems.

Anyway, enough of this. If anybody has ideas on how to make the Suez Crisis more successful, I am eager to hear them as the task seems daunting enough.
 
I see Suez as the point where Britain accellerated it's decline into an artifically weak medium power. From Suez flowed the Sandy's declaration that manned aircraft were obsolete and the subsequent destruction of the Brit aero industry, the CVA01 and TSR2 debacles and the penetration of the Med East by the Soviets and thus proloning of the Cold War. So if the Suez result can be reversed in Britain's favour there are huge butterflies to be had.

From what I understand the Brits farted around for several months because they didn't have the military resources available in the early part of the crisis. By the time the military force had gathered the diplomatic climate had turned from pro British to anti British. So the POD should be having power projection forces available in July 1956 similar in strength to those which successfully carried out the OTL military action; ie several fleet carriers and large amphibious ships.

I'm going to Geelong today to find the book, but just postwar the RN looked at their options for how they would deal with the early Cold War, defence against submarines with frigates etc or detterence/offence against their bases with carriers and amphibious forces. The RN plumped for defence for those crucial 7 or so years, so completed/converted light forces while carriers/lpds languished on the slipways and anchorages. If the RN plumped for deterrence/offense they would have completed the WW2 carriers and and them in service from the late 40s. So plenty of serious power projection capability would be available to intervene with force early on in the crisis while opinion was pro British.
 
I see Suez as the point where Britain accellerated it's decline into an artifically weak medium power. From Suez flowed the Sandy's declaration that manned aircraft were obsolete and the subsequent destruction of the Brit aero industry, the CVA01 and TSR2 debacles and the penetration of the Med East by the Soviets and thus proloning of the Cold War. So if the Suez result can be reversed in Britain's favour there are huge butterflies to be had.

From what I understand the Brits farted around for several months because they didn't have the military resources available in the early part of the crisis. By the time the military force had gathered the diplomatic climate had turned from pro British to anti British. So the POD should be having power projection forces available in July 1956 similar in strength to those which successfully carried out the OTL military action; ie several fleet carriers and large amphibious ships.

I'm going to Geelong today to find the book, but just postwar the RN looked at their options for how they would deal with the early Cold War, defence against submarines with frigates etc or detterence/offence against their bases with carriers and amphibious forces. The RN plumped for defence for those crucial 7 or so years, so completed/converted light forces while carriers/lpds languished on the slipways and anchorages. If the RN plumped for deterrence/offense they would have completed the WW2 carriers and and them in service from the late 40s. So plenty of serious power projection capability would be available to intervene with force early on in the crisis while opinion was pro British.

I agree with you with most of those butterflies, but I don't think an earlier operation would have changed much. The US is the crucial opinion here, if they don't support it, it doesn't matter who else supports it. The fact is that Eisenhower said to Eden at the beginning of the crisis with the nationalization that force had to be a last resort and that diplomatic channels had to be pursued to the fullest. That was one reason for the delay as the British tried to appease the American demands diplomatically with 2 London Conferences and talks in the UN.
 
Striking while the iron is hot confers huge advantages, US opinion wasn't so set in stone in July/August as it was in November. The full 3+ months between action and reaction had proved that the sky wasn't going to fall with Egypt running the canal, that the new status quo was good enough compared to the old status quo. Rapid reaction by the Brits could play on the uncertainty of the new status quo, speed up diplomacy and resolve it in Britain's favour. The Cold War conclusively proved that speed of reaction is vital for a democracy to maintain it's support for war.
 
How willing was the United States to see Nasser overthrown in an internal coup? Could such a thing be arranged?

The Dulles brothers were very active against regimes that they considered to be communist or communist sympathizers, helping to overthrow regimes in Latin America. If Nasser's Arab nationalism could be painted as properly fellow-traveler with communism, then how's an American supported coup of Nasser by more properly capitalist people.

Ba'athism seems to be a good alternative to Nasser's Arab socialism. Its more technocratic, and the United States was willing to play ball with another Baathist regime in Iraq. So were any of Nasser's general Baathists?
 
1. The US wanted to be in charge of any empire building, thank you very much.
2. If Britain had "won", it would have just bled more money maintaining the empire.
 
1. The US wanted to be in charge of any empire building, thank you very much.
2. If Britain had "won", it would have just bled more money maintaining the empire.

To your first point, the US if anything wanted decolonization from France and Britain, so that was one reason they were hostile to what they viewed as an "Imperial" adventure to preserve colonialism.

I'm aware that Suez isn't going to solve many of the long-term problems that Britain has, but I'm just trying to prolong the illusion of strength for a little longer. Also, even with the inevitable decline, Britain will still probably be a little stronger than in OTL.
 
How willing was the United States to see Nasser overthrown in an internal coup? Could such a thing be arranged?

The Dulles brothers were very active against regimes that they considered to be communist or communist sympathizers, helping to overthrow regimes in Latin America. If Nasser's Arab nationalism could be painted as properly fellow-traveler with communism, then how's an American supported coup of Nasser by more properly capitalist people.

Ba'athism seems to be a good alternative to Nasser's Arab socialism. Its more technocratic, and the United States was willing to play ball with another Baathist regime in Iraq. So were any of Nasser's general Baathists?

Well, any action against Nasser wouldn't be US led, as the Middle East was still seen as a British area of influence at this time. They may provide some intelligence and material aid, but any kind of operation would be Anglo-French. I'm not sure if a coup could be arranged, but if Nasser can be linked to communism, I don't see the US being any more hostile to a British invasion than a coup.
 
Nasser did buy Mig 15s not long before the crisis, surely that could be spun into the beginnings of support for communism.

But the US doesn't have to actually support the Brits, they just have to do nothing, which should be achieveable if Britain strikes while the iron is hot and nothing is set in stone. It's only after everyone has had 3 long months think about things, and Britain is seen as being unreasonable, do people turn against Britain enough to actually do stuff like hinder the movement of combattants and undertake economic action. Britian should have been able to wrap the crisis up by the end of August or so without having to spend money on bringing ships back into service and the like. The resources should/could have been available on July 27th when the decision to use force was made by Eden.
 
Nasser did buy Mig 15s not long before the crisis, surely that could be spun into the beginnings of support for communism.

But the US doesn't have to actually support the Brits, they just have to do nothing, which should be achieveable if Britain strikes while the iron is hot and nothing is set in stone. It's only after everyone has had 3 long months think about things, and Britain is seen as being unreasonable, do people turn against Britain enough to actually do stuff like hinder the movement of combattants and undertake economic action. Britian should have been able to wrap the crisis up by the end of August or so without having to spend money on bringing ships back into service and the like. The resources should/could have been available on July 27th when the decision to use force was made by Eden.

He did buy the MiGs after nobody in the west would sell him arms, but that still wasn't enough for the US to support Nasser's toppling. I think we need at least one or two more purchases to swing the US in that regard.

If the British could begin launching the attack around the 27th, that preempts Eisenhower's first warning against the use of force by 4 days, but I still have a feeling that there will be at least a little bit of US protest.
 
If miltary action could take place within 2 or 3 weeks from the 27th July decision, and the US didn't say anything for 4 days then the Brits could dissemble. With timely military action opinions against the intervention don't have time to solidify into positions where the US screws over it's closest ally.
 
Operation Musketeer was ill timed in regards to Eisenhower's reelection, where he did not want to look like he was supporting old-style Imperialism in the Middle East. Had the Operation taken place after the election, or at a significantly earlier date, Eisenhower would've been under less pressure to oppose Britain and France.
 
If miltary action could take place within 2 or 3 weeks from the 27th July decision, and the US didn't say anything for 4 days then the Brits could dissemble. With timely military action opinions against the intervention don't have time to solidify into positions where the US screws over it's closest ally.

A bit of a bump, but I have just finished reading another book on the crisis which provided some interesting stuff.

Anyway, I'm going to agree with you now Rianin. The British and French could have easily sped up the process of the invasion. We have the 1956 Defense White Paper which called for the military to be ready to respond quickly to small wars, if this had been listened to more closely, deployable forces could have been ready. Also, if Eden is able to avoid being bogged down in one diplomatic iniative after another, it should be easy enough to launch it fairly quickly.

Another interesting idea that came up while reading Suez: the Double War was the possibility of Egyptian shelling hitting American citizens. Apparently soon after Israel launched its invasion of the Sinai, an Egyptian destroyer was shelling Haifa while the Sixth Fleet was evacuating American citizens from Israel. In OTL, a French destroyer took it out of action before anything happened, but if you get a stray shell from the Egyptian destroyer to hit an American vessel and kill some citizens, then America may be a little more inclined to help Britain. Of course, this is far enough along in th operation, where the delay has occurred, and many of the problems with the operation are present.
 
Well, any action against Nasser wouldn't be US led, as the Middle East was still seen as a British area of influence at this time. They may provide some intelligence and material aid, but any kind of operation would be Anglo-French. I'm not sure if a coup could be arranged, but if Nasser can be linked to communism, I don't see the US being any more hostile to a British invasion than a coup.

A British invasion, and an American-backed coup are two totally different responses to the Suez Crisis.

Even if Nasser can be linked to communism, the Anglo-French invasion would be opposed by the Americans because it reeks of the kind of colonial-era European interventions that the Americans opposed.

Basically, the Americans could want a government overthrown, but they didn't want Western troops on the ground. With a coup the Americans can pretend that they are assisting that country's domestic fight against communism (this is third party involvement). An invasion on the other hands denotes an inability to convince people in that country that communism is bad. It means that if the United States can invade countries that have embraced communism, the Soviet Union can invade countries that have embraced the Free World (tbis is first party involvement). This kind of precedent setting would be harmful to the post-WWII balance of power. Third party involvement was okay, first party involvement was not okay. American support for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt would have been first party involvement.

Looking at what happened as the British and French colonial empires withered, the Americans basically picked up the slack for maintaining international order. In certain places, this slack meant that the United States began to fund native efforts to battle communism (Turkey, Greece), and in other places it meant the Americans continuing a battle started by the withering colonial power against communism (Vietnam). So if the Anglo-French become long-term involved in a new colonial project in Egypt (and that is what would happen if the United States allowed the invasion to proceed) then the Americans would inevitably have to provide higher and higher levels of support as the Europeans realize that this new project is far beyond their capabilities to support.

Basically, an invasion sets a precedent which will lead to more and more dangerous military confrontations between the USA and USSR. Dangerous military confrontations = WWIII = nuclear war = end of humanity.
 
Another interesting idea that came up while reading Suez: the Double War was the possibility of Egyptian shelling hitting American citizens. Apparently soon after Israel launched its invasion of the Sinai, an Egyptian destroyer was shelling Haifa while the Sixth Fleet was evacuating American citizens from Israel. In OTL, a French destroyer took it out of action before anything happened, but if you get a stray shell from the Egyptian destroyer to hit an American vessel and kill some citizens, then America may be a little more inclined to help Britain. Of course, this is far enough along in th operation, where the delay has occurred, and many of the problems with the operation are present.

If Americans are killed by Egyptians, that could be a very late POD that causes Eisenhower to not interfere.
 
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