Triple Alliance wins Great War ... (some help needed)

Italy gains: Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, Cyprus, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia.
There is absolutely no way that Britain would surrender both Malta and Cyprus to Italy and thus the security of the entire eastern half of the Empire without being resoundly defeated at sea, or invaded.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Have Austria cede Trentino and Gorizia to Italy instead, I'm quite convinced the only way to keep the Italians in the Triple Alliance is for Austria to bite it's tongue and promise concessions.
 
Have Austria cede Trentino and Gorizia to Italy instead, I'm quite convinced the only way to keep the Italians in the Triple Alliance is for Austria to bite it's tongue and promise concessions.
Not gonna happen. Italy's demands were as ridiculous and unlikely to be accepted as A-H's ultimatum to Serbia. I'm convinced that both were designed to be refused.

Italy (or, at least, its government) had no intentions of joining the war in the OTL circumstances on the CP side. I'm also convinced that better A-H performance is key to changing that.
 
Not gonna happen. Italy's demands were as ridiculous and unlikely to be accepted as A-H's ultimatum to Serbia. I'm convinced that both were designed to be refused.

Italy (or, at least, its government) had no intentions of joining the war in the OTL circumstances on the CP side. I'm also convinced that better A-H performance is key to changing that.

Well taking in consideration that for mantaining neutrality favorable to the CP (not a very painless thing), what Rome will have gladly accepted were some useless strategic and economic land aka Trentino and with a border that was extremely favorable to A-H in miliary term, the western board of Isonzo and Albania (that Italy already occupied for an half, so while that was the most honerous strategic demand there were just to accept the current situation ); so in general i fail to see were this was all ridicolous, except the fact that Italy wanted the payment up front due to the (rightly) lack of trust towards Wien.
What is needed for Italy to not break with the CP, are better or at least normal relations with A-H in the years before the war, while in Rome there were the most pro-cp goverment possible in Italy (and A-H in the end pissed off even them)
 
Well taking in consideration that for mantaining neutrality favorable to the CP (not a very painless thing), what Rome will have gladly accepted were some useless strategic and economic land aka Trentino and with a border that was extremely favorable to A-H in miliary term, the western board of Isonzo and Albania (that Italy already occupied for an half, so while that was the most honerous strategic demand there were just to accept the current situation ); so in general i fail to see were this was all ridicolous, except the fact that Italy wanted the payment up front due to the (rightly) lack of trust towards Wien.
What is needed for Italy to not break with the CP, are better or at least normal relations with A-H in the years before the war, while in Rome there were the most pro-cp goverment possible in Italy (and A-H in the end pissed off even them)
Strategically useless, perhaps, but still core Austrian lands. Albania absolutely wasn't useless; A-H knew (and was proven correct) that being bottled in the Adriatic would destroy them.

The lack of trust was also abaolutely mutual- Italian demands were for neutrality, and A-H had no reason to trust Italian overtures.
 
Strategically useless, perhaps, but still core Austrian lands. Albania absolutely wasn't useless; A-H knew (and was proven correct) that being bottled in the Adriatic would destroy them.

The lack of trust was also abaolutely mutual- Italian demands were for neutrality, and A-H had no reason to trust Italian overtures.

As said, i perfectely know the strategic importance of Albania...unfortunely for A-H, Italy already occupied an half of it, plus what do you want that Italy has done, accepting that in the end A-H bring Montenegro and Serbia in his sphere and make move on Albania without getting anything out of it? THat zone was strategic also for Italy and a division into sphere it's what called compromise in diplomatic circles, ok you don't get everything you want out of if, welcome to life.
Same for Trentino, sure it was an historical core zone (and Savoy and Nice were historical part of the Kingdom of Sardinia neverthelss)...but in pratical terms was useless and frankly it was a very very low price for not having the Italian front to deal, as said it's called compromise, you give up something to obtain more (Serbia, Montenegro, Poland and Galicia, Romania maybe), so in the end not being willing to give up a little finger cost the empire his entire existence.
Regarding trust, it's not the italian chief of staff that proposed a couple of time a punitive action towards their supposed ally to teach them a lesson
 
What are good fleet-in-being bases for Italy? Are there good fortified ports in threatening places like western Sicily, Pantelleria, southern Sardinia where a destroyer flotilla and a couple of cruisers could duck out, make an attack and get back under the coastal guns before the RN/MN can get to grips with them?

In theory of course, I wouldn't expect miracles from them.

Taranto was built as the main base for the Italian Navy in that field; you'd need the coastal fortifications built pre-war in order to make them easily defendable, and its in a great position in that case to co-operate with the Hapsburg Navy and play merry hell with Entente shipping in the Eastern Med. This alone would make the Suez Canal route for supplies from the east problematic without strong military escort (Add in German raiders and submersibles to the combined A-H and Italian fleets) which would necessitate re-routing around the Cape which adds weeks and sucks tonnage from the Franco-British. The Western Med., with British ships based out of Gibralter and the French navy off its southern shore, woulden't be a good place for attacking provided the Entente keeps their navy close to home... which would be the point of acting as a Fleet in Being. La Spezia would probably be the best harbor in that case.

The question really is weather the C.P go for a deterrent or denial strategy as to where the Italians point the bulk of their fleet. Off the top of my head, I'd say the former fits better with the doctrines in place (and recognizes the difficulty in getting Rome and Vienna to co-operate), so the Italian navy would concentrate in La Spezia to keep the bulk of the Entente forces in the Western Med. (Dispersing them runs the risk of getting picked off in detail) while the Austrian and German ships (And perhaps Ottoman) keep up the pressure in the Eastern Med.
 
I'm thinking along the lines of the German position in Flanders; guns, mines, coastal T/Uboats in early 1915, 3 destroyers from early 1916 and 13-23 from mid-late 1916. It was this threat that saw the Harwich Force gain more cruisers as the war progressed in order to overpower these destroyers.

An Italian destroyer flotilla based in western Sicily, assuming its base could be protected from sea-borne attack by mines, guns and coastal submarines/torpedoboats, could exert a similar influence on the Med (even if it rarely went to sea) the way the battle-fleet in Taranto could not.
 
I'm thinking along the lines of the German position in Flanders; guns, mines, coastal T/Uboats in early 1915, 3 destroyers from early 1916 and 13-23 from mid-late 1916. It was this threat that saw the Harwich Force gain more cruisers as the war progressed in order to overpower these destroyers.

An Italian destroyer flotilla based in western Sicily, assuming its base could be protected from sea-borne attack by mines, guns and coastal submarines/torpedoboats, could exert a similar influence on the Med (even if it rarely went to sea) the way the battle-fleet in Taranto could not.

The problem being western Sicily, though a very sound position in terms of power projection both in its forward positioning and proximity to key chokepoints in the Mediterranean (One of the reasons it was so highly valued by the Carthaginians and Romans both), its also rather isolated in an underdeveloped region of Italy; separated from the Italian mainland by mountains, under-railed coastlines, a strech of ocean, and the length of the penninsula from the main industrial-population centers of the north from which it would have to be supplied. Simply put, an extended basing of a large naval force out of the harbor (assuming you even had a large and fortified enough military harbor to begin with; building one up facing the same problems on an even larger scale) would be difficult and such up along of Italian rail capacity. Far more efficent to stage your operations out of the already-established bases on the mainland, particularly if you have intentions to seize Corsica and the south-east of France to claim them in post-war negotiations (Which would be key Italian war aims). Hence why I believe the Italians would chose La Spezia as their main port-of-call.

Granted, this leaves Tripolitania pretty much isolated, but they barely had taken control of the region as-is.
 
The problem being western Sicily, though a very sound position in terms of power projection both in its forward positioning and proximity to key chokepoints in the Mediterranean (One of the reasons it was so highly valued by the Carthaginians and Romans both), its also rather isolated in an underdeveloped region of Italy; separated from the Italian mainland by mountains, under-railed coastlines, a strech of ocean, and the length of the penninsula from the main industrial-population centers of the north from which it would have to be supplied. Simply put, an extended basing of a large naval force out of the harbor (assuming you even had a large and fortified enough military harbor to begin with; building one up facing the same problems on an even larger scale) would be difficult and such up along of Italian rail capacity. Far more efficent to stage your operations out of the already-established bases on the mainland, particularly if you have intentions to seize Corsica and the south-east of France to claim them in post-war negotiations (Which would be key Italian war aims). Hence why I believe the Italians would chose La Spezia as their main port-of-call.

Granted, this leaves Tripolitania pretty much isolated, but they barely had taken control of the region as-is.

There's the dilemma; an efficient running but tactically/operational/strategic impotent naval force or doing it tough in a threatening position.

I'm not talking about battleships and armoured cruisers, I'm talking about a 5 or 6 ship squadron of destroyers, a fast scout cruiser or two and a couple of submarines. The Germans supported a similar force from Belgian ports that their initial investigation found to be totally unsuitable for naval operations.
 

trajen777

Banned
That is a very tough series of annexations :to cover --- here might be one way to do it -- you need to roll 12's 5 x to get this done -- but their is a plausible situation
1. You need a stronger AH which has the artillery it planned for 1916 to be ready in 14. You also need them to choose Russia as the primary adversary and be defensive vs Serbia. In this case they do well vs Russia and cause massive Russian causalities, and retain their core trained officers for the future. This will help keep Russia neutral
2. You need Moltke to not pull the corps east pre the B of M. You also need some luck (ie GB has a bit more panic and pulls the BEF pre B of Marne (they almost did) ) with perhaps the loss of the 5th French army. Also have the Germans use the original plan and take Netherlands.
2a. Have Russian admiral attack Sweden (that is the only way u get Sweden in on the war -- Have GB invade Norway and Sweden & German force them out of the war (Germans and Swedes invade Denmark to close the Baltic) in this way you have Norway conquered by Sweden as well as Denmark to achieve your objective.
3. GB gets caught and loses one of its BB or BC divisions (came close several times - you need more aggressive German commanders) so no Dardanelles
4. French withdraw west and lose Paris, AH success vs Russia, a naval setback (still dominate but a bit closer naval forces), and no invasion of OE, prob gets Italy into the war on CP side
5. In 15 French hammer its forces against Germans (get slaughtered just like real 15), Russian army series of defeats (this will hurt your Romanian situation because they come in on CP side).
6. France pushed back in 15 / 16 by Italy and Germany and forced to sign surrender. Part of the deal is they surrender their fleet to Italy
7. Italy,AH,OE, and French fleet takes Mediterranean (Malta, Gibraltar, and Egypt ?)
8. Belgium Surrenders, France Surrenders,
9. Russia Knocked out in 17 --- Russian fleet turned over the Germans
10. GB agrees to terms (per yours) with the OE, French, Italian, Captured Russian Black sea fleet, & AH fleet in Gibraltar as well as the German, Swedish, and captured Russian fleet in black sea

Any way lots of things going perfect for CP --- however i can see this is possible (JUST )
 
There's the dilemma; an efficient running but tactically/operational/strategic impotent naval force or doing it tough in a threatening position.

I'm not talking about battleships and armoured cruisers, I'm talking about a 5 or 6 ship squadron of destroyers, a fast scout cruiser or two and a couple of submarines. The Germans supported a similar force from Belgian ports that their initial investigation found to be totally unsuitable for naval operations.

I fail to see how a fleet operating our of La Splenza on Italy's North-western coast, at least once Corsica is effectively isolated, is impotent if its purpose as to act as a deterrent to major Entente fleet movements outside the Western Med. or dispersing their forces to escort commerce/hunting down Hapsburg-German raiding formations/attacking or supplying a land attack on the Straits in the eastern Med. Italian raiders, certainly, can operate out of smaller bases, but what I'm saying is without said battleships and armoured cruisers providing a "screen" Entente squadrons will be free to attack said bases, and the isolated position in Western Sicily can't be built up in time with limited Italian infastructure and industry to endure such an attack. I think we're talking about different elements of the fleet here, with me discussing how they'd deploy their main battle squadrons while you're talking about how they'd deploy their lighter ships. In that context , you're absolutely right.
 
As said, i perfectely know the strategic importance of Albania...unfortunely for A-H, Italy already occupied an half of it, plus what do you want that Italy has done, accepting that in the end A-H bring Montenegro and Serbia in his sphere and make move on Albania without getting anything out of it? THat zone was strategic also for Italy and a division into sphere it's what called compromise in diplomatic circles, ok you don't get everything you want out of if, welcome to life.
Same for Trentino, sure it was an historical core zone (and Savoy and Nice were historical part of the Kingdom of Sardinia neverthelss)...but in pratical terms was useless and frankly it was a very very low price for not having the Italian front to deal, as said it's called compromise, you give up something to obtain more (Serbia, Montenegro, Poland and Galicia, Romania maybe), so in the end not being willing to give up a little finger cost the empire his entire existence.
Regarding trust, it's not the italian chief of staff that proposed a couple of time a punitive action towards their supposed ally to teach them a lesson
Don't get me wrong, I wasn't saying that the Italians should've trusted the Austro-Hungarians. I just meant that both the Italians and Austro-Hungarians had legitimate reasons to mistrust each other.
 
I think we're talking about different elements of the fleet here, with me discussing how they'd deploy their main battle squadrons while you're talking about how they'd deploy their lighter ships.

We were, but I'm catching what you're throwing now.

The whole Adriatic is a dead zone, I could see the AH main fleet forward deployed as far south as it can, and Taranto is a bit far away from the central Med so would leave the Italian fleet vulnerable during its long transit to and from action. La Spezia is pretty threatening to the french southern coast and communications to Corsica and close to Italian industrial centres.
 
We were, but I'm catching what you're throwing now.

The whole Adriatic is a dead zone, I could see the AH main fleet forward deployed as far south as it can, and Taranto is a bit far away from the central Med so would leave the Italian fleet vulnerable during its long transit to and from action. La Spezia is pretty threatening to the french southern coast and communications to Corsica and close to Italian industrial centres.

No problem; everybody tends to get a little bit of tactical tunnel vision since its pretty hard to describe combined grand strategy in a harmonious, easily digestible whole as opposed to its component parts. As for Taranto, its certainly well-defended and built up as well as perfectly positioned as a base for supplying land forces in North Africa and making a quick strike on Malta (Which, at this point, the Italians could probably win an uncontested lung for and win if they were to prepare everything during the winter of 1914 if they dedicated their heavy ships to the harbor assaults), but that would require them prioritizing Triopolitania as a theature, which given continued resistance by the locals, their tenious hold on the province in the first place, and the intrafactional tension it would create with the Turks I doubt they'd do. Simply neutralizing Malta as base from which the Royal Navy could operate/refuel and repair during the first few months before redeploying north is probably their best stratagy, lest the effectiveness of their raiding being heavily blunted by British abilities to easily repair lightly damaged ships half way through a trans-Med. trip.

As for the AH fleet, yes they'd deploy as far south as they can in order to maximize their efficency/threat in the eastern Med. , provided said bases are A-H or at least not Italian-managed for political reasons. It'd also run into ALOT of problems co-ordinating with the Italian admirality, so we can strike out any major combined operations.
 
As for the AH fleet, yes they'd deploy as far south as they can in order to maximize their efficency/threat in the eastern Med. , provided said bases are A-H or at least not Italian-managed for political reasons. It'd also run into ALOT of problems co-ordinating with the Italian admirality, so we can strike out any major combined operations.

This was pretty much standard for OTL with the British, French and Italians, the Med wasn't well organised or as effective as it could have been mainly because the Italians were reluctant to put their ships under French command. The British and French did have joint command arrangements, but these weren't too bad because they were reciprocal with French command in the Med being balanced by British command in the Channel.

No problem; everybody tends to get a little bit of tactical tunnel vision since its pretty hard to describe combined grand strategy in a harmonious, easily digestible whole as opposed to its component parts.

The big unanswered question here is; did the change elsewhere that convinced Italy to join the CP change the naval balance, and by how much?

The strategic big naval move once the Germans had been cleaned up around the world was the disbanding of the Channel Fleet and the redeployment of its pre-dread battle squadron to the Med for the Dardanelles campaign. This could be plausibly changed by either the Germans winning the RttS or by the HSF engaging the small portion of the GF during the Yarmouth raid and sinking a number of GF capital ships.

Without the 5th BS in the Med from Feb 1915 the possibilities for the Italian fleet look rosier.
 
This was pretty much standard for OTL with the British, French and Italians, the Med wasn't well organised or as effective as it could have been mainly because the Italians were reluctant to put their ships under French command. The British and French did have joint command arrangements, but these weren't too bad because they were reciprocal with French command in the Med being balanced by British command in the Channel.



The big unanswered question here is; did the change elsewhere that convinced Italy to join the CP change the naval balance, and by how much?

The strategic big naval move once the Germans had been cleaned up around the world was the disbanding of the Channel Fleet and the redeployment of its pre-dread battle squadron to the Med for the Dardanelles campaign. This could be plausibly changed by either the Germans winning the RttS or by the HSF engaging the small portion of the GF during the Yarmouth raid and sinking a number of GF capital ships.

Without the 5th BS in the Med from Feb 1915 the possibilities for the Italian fleet look rosier.

1. The problem with joint command situations is the stigma attached to them, as the secondary participants lose the ability to control/protect their own national assets as effectively or direct strategy, implies that they're weaker/less important/'second fiddle' to the commanding power, and means they have less control over the grander aims of the campaign to push their national agendas. Especially in the AH/Italian case, the relationship between the two is... tense, and both powers are close enough in strength that neither is likely to find the material weight of aid from the other worth submitting to their dictates since in the event of a CP victory they become major rivals for influence in the eastern Med. and Adriatic (Not like they weren't before...)

2. I've been operating under the assumption that there's no major change navally to this scenario, as my mind defaults to OTL or a very obvious logical conclusion direction from the POD in regards to anything not directly stated in the OP for the sake of clarity. What I will say, though, is that even if the 5th moves to the Med. they aren't going to be doing so for the sake of conducting the Dardanelles Campaign, as the Italians and less-restricted Hapsburgs provide a more formidable blocking/interception force than our timeline. To be entirely honest, I'm not sure where they WOULD go in the Med. that would be considered strategically useful by the British, and so are more likely to be kept in home waters.
 
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