Yes, tell the Soviets that the Soujuskunta were mere speedbumps. Lokalförsvaret were sturdy troops on the defence, guys that knew the terrain and especially in western Sweden hated the Germans with good passion due to what they did to Norway.
There were no Suojeluskunta / Skyddskåret units in Second World War, the reservists of the volunteer defense organization were sent into normal reserve units to stiffen them up. What I meant were the Finnish emergency outfits from the last weeks of the Winter War. Despite military training and better equipment than that of Lokalförsvaret units of 1941 and worse opponents they proved mostly to be just speedbumps.
Artillery is the big weakness of the Swedish ww2 army yes, but considering how little effect artillery had during the winter war due to the impossibility of forward observing (the Finns and Americans solved that problem with pre-calculated terrain data by 1944, but that is not in this perspective) and the similarity of terrain.
Artillery was devastating in the Winter War, both Soviet (when it hit something) and Finnish (when munitions were available). The method mentioned was introduced in 1920's to Finnish artillery and I'm fairly sure Sweden had already copied it by 1941 (just like in the post-war period Finland was quick to adopt whatever Swedish methods possible).
Total number of artillery battalions in case of a full mobilisation is 44, plus probably about 10-15 battalions worth in older artillery in reserve.
Listing I've seen (and probably copied from the very good book on Swedish military preparedness during the Second World War whose name I've forgotten)
http://www-solar.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/~aaron/sweeds.html
mentions 39 for 1941. The older pieces would have been 19th century pieces unusable for modern conditions (as experienced by Finns in 1941).
There's not enough bases in Denmark (and those are liable to attack by Swedish coastal artillery) nor Norway to keep all Swedish 40+ bases (not even talking about the wartime emergency grass fields) covered.
Swedish coastal artillery, unless it has nuclear grenades, won't be able to cut off aerial operations entirely from Denmark and not even from Sjaelland.
WIth a devastated infrastructure in Själland and mines preventing the usage of large Swedish ports, I can't see the Germans coming that far into Scania. Landing is one thing, supplying a drive inland a completely different matter.
I wouldn't be that optimistic. By 1941 Germany had literally of hundreds of landing craft very suitable for crossing the Danish sound and ferrying military equipment and supply trucks and later on, rail cars, to Sweden proper. Much in similar ways as Germany did in smaller scale between Sicily and mainland Italy in 1943.