In a post at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/ZOirMAuCWv4/_ESOLAZa3hAJ I described how volcanic activity in 1902 (both in real life and on postage stamps) helped to lead to the rejection of the Nicaraguan route for an isthmian canal (though some high-powered lobbying helped, too...) Still, the US Senate's 42-34 vote for the Panama route was by no means the end of the story. The Colombian Senate's rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hay–Herrán_Treaty presented new problems.
What if the Colombian Senate had ratified the Hay-Herran treaty? (Would there even be a Panama today?) OK, given that it unanimously rejected it, that may seem unlikely. But while some of the Colombian senators opposed the treaty out of patriotism (even though the treaty specifically stated that Colombia would remain sovereign over the canal zone, they thought this was insufficient--even though a few US senators led by Spooner, Hanna, and Foraker objected to the treaty because they didn't think it gave the US *enough* rights in the canal zone), at least some members would have been willing to ratify it had the compensation been more adequate. (They wanted to assess the French company $10 million for transferring its property and to raise the initial American payment to $15 million.)
Perhaps the POD is for John Hay to have been a little less irritated by these belated demands--he replied in a contemptuous and threatening way that made defeat of the treaty inevitable. (Remember that this was a man who viewed all Latins as "dagos".) However, once the Colombian Senate turned the treaty down, there were essentially four options for the US:
(1) Negotiate anew with Colombia. This would entail delay and probably larger payments.
(2) Turn to Nicaragua, as the Spooner Act provided. This would involve a more costly route and exposure to sharp bargaining by the government in Managua.
(3) Do nothing. Assume that Colombia was just bluffing and that ultimately the lure of ready cash would bring a reduction in its demands. This course could backfire because if no settlement were reached by October 31, 1904, the franchise of the New Panama Canal Company would expire.
(4) Take advantage of the disappointment on the isthmus "where there had been fifty-three rebellions in as many years and where as late as September 6, 1902, the authorities at Bogota had appealed for American aid to maintain their control." Richard Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy*, p. 230. (My discussion in this post is mostly based on this book.)
Even without the wisdom of hindsight, no prizes for guessing which course TR--given his opinion of the "foolish and homicidal corruptionists of Bogota" and his impatience to get on with an isthmian canal--was most likely to follow. [1] There *were* two men who *might* have exercised a restraining influence on him: Root and Lodge. Unfortunately, they were both in London, serving on the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal...
[1] Actually, had no rebellion broken out--and it must be emphasized that TR did not instigate the uprising in Panama, though of course he did not *need* to do so, because the secessionists knew they could count on his backing even without any prior assurances--there is a fifth possibility: simply going ahead and building the canal without Colombia's assent. TR thought he had found justification for this in a memorandum prepared by John Bassett Moore, then a professor of international law at Columbia University. Moore argued that in the past only the US had fulfilled the mutual obligations under the US-Colombia (technically US-New Granada) treaty of December 12, 1846. It had frequently landed troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus, while Colombia for its part had done nothing and was still bound to let the US government or its citizens use the right of way to build a canal. In October 1903 TR sketched a message he might send to Congress when it would convene in December. He said he would not submit to Bogota's "extortion", and that if Congress approved he would buy the New Company's property and begin building without consulting Colombia. If not, he would turn to Nicaragua instead. Would Congress have gone along with TR's plan? Probably, given the predominance of Republicans there and the fact that many Southern Democrats were eager to have a canal.
What if the Colombian Senate had ratified the Hay-Herran treaty? (Would there even be a Panama today?) OK, given that it unanimously rejected it, that may seem unlikely. But while some of the Colombian senators opposed the treaty out of patriotism (even though the treaty specifically stated that Colombia would remain sovereign over the canal zone, they thought this was insufficient--even though a few US senators led by Spooner, Hanna, and Foraker objected to the treaty because they didn't think it gave the US *enough* rights in the canal zone), at least some members would have been willing to ratify it had the compensation been more adequate. (They wanted to assess the French company $10 million for transferring its property and to raise the initial American payment to $15 million.)
Perhaps the POD is for John Hay to have been a little less irritated by these belated demands--he replied in a contemptuous and threatening way that made defeat of the treaty inevitable. (Remember that this was a man who viewed all Latins as "dagos".) However, once the Colombian Senate turned the treaty down, there were essentially four options for the US:
(1) Negotiate anew with Colombia. This would entail delay and probably larger payments.
(2) Turn to Nicaragua, as the Spooner Act provided. This would involve a more costly route and exposure to sharp bargaining by the government in Managua.
(3) Do nothing. Assume that Colombia was just bluffing and that ultimately the lure of ready cash would bring a reduction in its demands. This course could backfire because if no settlement were reached by October 31, 1904, the franchise of the New Panama Canal Company would expire.
(4) Take advantage of the disappointment on the isthmus "where there had been fifty-three rebellions in as many years and where as late as September 6, 1902, the authorities at Bogota had appealed for American aid to maintain their control." Richard Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy*, p. 230. (My discussion in this post is mostly based on this book.)
Even without the wisdom of hindsight, no prizes for guessing which course TR--given his opinion of the "foolish and homicidal corruptionists of Bogota" and his impatience to get on with an isthmian canal--was most likely to follow. [1] There *were* two men who *might* have exercised a restraining influence on him: Root and Lodge. Unfortunately, they were both in London, serving on the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal...
[1] Actually, had no rebellion broken out--and it must be emphasized that TR did not instigate the uprising in Panama, though of course he did not *need* to do so, because the secessionists knew they could count on his backing even without any prior assurances--there is a fifth possibility: simply going ahead and building the canal without Colombia's assent. TR thought he had found justification for this in a memorandum prepared by John Bassett Moore, then a professor of international law at Columbia University. Moore argued that in the past only the US had fulfilled the mutual obligations under the US-Colombia (technically US-New Granada) treaty of December 12, 1846. It had frequently landed troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus, while Colombia for its part had done nothing and was still bound to let the US government or its citizens use the right of way to build a canal. In October 1903 TR sketched a message he might send to Congress when it would convene in December. He said he would not submit to Bogota's "extortion", and that if Congress approved he would buy the New Company's property and begin building without consulting Colombia. If not, he would turn to Nicaragua instead. Would Congress have gone along with TR's plan? Probably, given the predominance of Republicans there and the fact that many Southern Democrats were eager to have a canal.
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