Top 10 Civil War Generals

For those who were interested in the last few threads about Civil War generals and ranking them that have been created, I have found something new to be added to the discussion. In the Civil War Book of Lists (one of the first and favorite Civil War books, even if it is quite dated), they have a list (big surprise) of the top 10 generals for both sides on the American Civil War. I was wondering what the thoughts of my fellow Alternate History enthusiasts were for them. I will write them here. All credit for the list goes to Combined Books Inc., which published the book.

Top 10 Union Generals:

  1. Ulysses S. Grant
  2. Benjamin Grierson
  3. George H. Thomas
  4. William T. Sherman
  5. Winfield S. Hancock
  6. John A. Logan
  7. Quincy Gillmore
  8. Andrew A. Humphreys
  9. James B. McPherson
  10. John M. Schofield
My thoughts on this list: I can understand why they placed Grant in the top spot, as he was the general who was General-in-Chief when the war was ultimately won, as well as having a great mind for logistics and strategy. Personally, I would not place Grierson on this list. He had one main accomplishment during the war, Grierson's Raid, which while impressive, certainly does not merit a place on this list of many more competent generals, especially considering his less than brilliant showing at Brice's Crossroads. Personally, I would have given the number two spot to Thomas. Sherman is another general where his ranking could be highly debated, but he did show a brilliant understanding of how war works, even if he did not perfectly understand the art of battle. I would switch around Hancock and Logan in their rankings, and remove Gillmore altogether, as while he was a brilliant engineer, he was no general. Humphreys is another understandable choice, as he did serve well throughout the war. I personally wouldn't put McPherson among the top ten Union generals, and I certainly would place Schofield anywhere near the top ten. Upon reading this list, I was surprised to find Philip Sheridan, who is usually ubiquitous in these kinds of lists, was absent, as I think he might deserve to be near, if not among, the top ten Union generals due to his masterful skills with multiple arms warfare, although his career certainly had many less than stellar moments as well. On to there Confederate generals list.

Top 10 Confederate Generals:
  1. Nathan B. Forrest
  2. Robert E. Lee
  3. Patrick R. Cleburne
  4. Thomas J. Jackson
  5. James Longstreet
  6. A.P. Hill
  7. J.E.B. Stuart
  8. John B. Hood (1862-1863)
  9. D.H. Hill
  10. William J. Hardee
My thoughts on this list: This list seems to be a roll call for most of the Army of Northern Virginia's senior officers, with a few Western Theater generals thrown in for good measure. Unsurprisingly for a list of Confederate generals, Forrest takes the top spot, although in my opinion, he is fairly overrated, and probably deserves to be ranked lower, as he is far from the flawless general he is sometimes depicted to be. IMO, it is Lee that deserves the top spot, as while he too was far from a perfect general, he commanded on a larger scale than Forrest, and has more impressive victories and accomplishments to his name. Cleburne, Jackson, and Longstreet all make sense as picks, although their rankings certainly can be debated (personally I would place Cleburne at the bottom of the three, as while he was a very capable division commander, he lacked the corps commander skill displayed by Longstreet and Jackson). Hill is a much more controversial ranking. If he had died of his wound at Chancellorsville, he certainly would have merited his place here, but his time as a corps commander severely damaged his reputation in my eyes, so much so that he quite possibly deserves being dropped from the list (although Cleburne went through the exact same thing as Hill, although his time as a corps commander had much less of a disastrous effect as that of Hill). Stuart makes sense in his placing, as he certainly was one of, if not the best cavalryman of the Confederacy. Hill and Hardee are two similar controversial choices, both had their moments of brilliance, as well as shows of their terrible short comings. In comparison with the rest of the Confederacy's high command, I guess I can understand why they are placed here. Hood seems to be placed here for his fearless and aggressive style, given the time parameters given, although personally I would have swapped him out for Richard "Dick" Taylor, who combined that with more brains in his head.

In conclusion, while these lists are far from perfect, they are interesting none the less, and can provided an interesting glimpse into the historiography of Civil War generals, considering that the list was first published in 1993. If the list was created today, I would expect Philip Sheridan, George Meade, and Joshua Chamberlain to take places on the Union list, and Forrest to have a much lower ranking on the Confederate one, with Hood likely dropped altogether along with A.P. and maybe D.H. Hill.

I'm interested in what you guys think of these lists, as well if you have found any other similar lists in your readings about the American Civil War. Also, if anyone is interested in this book's list of the worst generals on either side and my thoughts on that, I'll be glad to provide it.
 

Ficboy

Banned
If I were to name the Top 10 Best Civil War Generals then my picks are 1. Ulysses S. Grant, 2. Robert E. Lee, 3. William Tecumseh Sherman, 4. Stonewall Jackson, 5. J.E.B. Stuart, 6. James Longstreet, 7. George Thomas, 8. Philip Sheridan, 9. Nathan Bedford Forrest and 10. Winfield Scott.
 
For those who were interested in the last few threads about Civil War generals and ranking them that have been created, I have found something new to be added to the discussion. In the Civil War Book of Lists (one of the first and favorite Civil War books, even if it is quite dated), they have a list (big surprise) of the top 10 generals for both sides on the American Civil War. I was wondering what the thoughts of my fellow Alternate History enthusiasts were for them. I will write them here. All credit for the list goes to Combined Books Inc., which published the book.

Top 10 Union Generals:

  1. Ulysses S. Grant
  2. Benjamin Grierson
  3. George H. Thomas
  4. William T. Sherman
  5. Winfield S. Hancock
  6. John A. Logan
  7. Quincy Gillmore
  8. Andrew A. Humphreys
  9. James B. McPherson
  10. John M. Schofield
My thoughts on this list: I can understand why they placed Grant in the top spot, as he was the general who was General-in-Chief when the war was ultimately won, as well as having a great mind for logistics and strategy. Personally, I would not place Grierson on this list. He had one main accomplishment during the war, Grierson's Raid, which while impressive, certainly does not merit a place on this list of many more competent generals, especially considering his less than brilliant showing at Brice's Crossroads. Personally, I would have given the number two spot to Thomas. Sherman is another general where his ranking could be highly debated, but he did show a brilliant understanding of how war works, even if he did not perfectly understand the art of battle. I would switch around Hancock and Logan in their rankings, and remove Gillmore altogether, as while he was a brilliant engineer, he was no general. Humphreys is another understandable choice, as he did serve well throughout the war. I personally wouldn't put McPherson among the top ten Union generals, and I certainly would place Schofield anywhere near the top ten. Upon reading this list, I was surprised to find Philip Sheridan, who is usually ubiquitous in these kinds of lists, was absent, as I think he might deserve to be near, if not among, the top ten Union generals due to his masterful skills with multiple arms warfare, although his career certainly had many less than stellar moments as well. On to there Confederate generals list.

Top 10 Confederate Generals:
  1. Nathan B. Forrest
  2. Robert E. Lee
  3. Patrick R. Cleburne
  4. Thomas J. Jackson
  5. James Longstreet
  6. A.P. Hill
  7. J.E.B. Stuart
  8. John B. Hood (1862-1863)
  9. D.H. Hill
  10. William J. Hardee
My thoughts on this list: This list seems to be a roll call for most of the Army of Northern Virginia's senior officers, with a few Western Theater generals thrown in for good measure. Unsurprisingly for a list of Confederate generals, Forrest takes the top spot, although in my opinion, he is fairly overrated, and probably deserves to be ranked lower, as he is far from the flawless general he is sometimes depicted to be. IMO, it is Lee that deserves the top spot, as while he too was far from a perfect general, he commanded on a larger scale than Forrest, and has more impressive victories and accomplishments to his name. Cleburne, Jackson, and Longstreet all make sense as picks, although their rankings certainly can be debated (personally I would place Cleburne at the bottom of the three, as while he was a very capable division commander, he lacked the corps commander skill displayed by Longstreet and Jackson). Hill is a much more controversial ranking. If he had died of his wound at Chancellorsville, he certainly would have merited his place here, but his time as a corps commander severely damaged his reputation in my eyes, so much so that he quite possibly deserves being dropped from the list (although Cleburne went through the exact same thing as Hill, although his time as a corps commander had much less of a disastrous effect as that of Hill). Stuart makes sense in his placing, as he certainly was one of, if not the best cavalryman of the Confederacy. Hill and Hardee are two similar controversial choices, both had their moments of brilliance, as well as shows of their terrible short comings. In comparison with the rest of the Confederacy's high command, I guess I can understand why they are placed here. Hood seems to be placed here for his fearless and aggressive style, given the time parameters given, although personally I would have swapped him out for Richard "Dick" Taylor, who combined that with more brains in his head.

In conclusion, while these lists are far from perfect, they are interesting none the less, and can provided an interesting glimpse into the historiography of Civil War generals, considering that the list was first published in 1993. If the list was created today, I would expect Philip Sheridan, George Meade, and Joshua Chamberlain to take places on the Union list, and Forrest to have a much lower ranking on the Confederate one, with Hood likely dropped altogether along with A.P. and maybe D.H. Hill.

I'm interested in what you guys think of these lists, as well if you have found any other similar lists in your readings about the American Civil War. Also, if anyone is interested in this book's list of the worst generals on either side and my thoughts on that, I'll be glad to provide it.

A. Chamberlain never rose above the rank of brigadier general.

B. Stuart is not the best cavalry commander of the Confederacy

C. Hardee, if anything is consistent. If he is to be on the list, I'm happy he's at 10.

D. To what extent is Lee to get credit for his victories since all of his corps commanders made the top ten list as well.

E. Who the hell is John Schofield?

F. Longstreet should be lower, although reliable under Lee, his independent commands in 1863/1864 were bad.
 
Top 10 Union Generals:
  1. Ulysses S. Grant
  2. Benjamin Grierson
  3. George H. Thomas
  4. William T. Sherman
  5. Winfield S. Hancock
  6. John A. Logan
  7. Quincy Gillmore
  8. Andrew A. Humphreys
  9. James B. McPherson
  10. John M. Schofield
That's certainly an interesting list... I agree that Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Hancock and Logan deserve a place on that list, but I wouldn't have put Grierson, Gillmore, Humphreys, McPherson and Schofield on the list, though most were capable. Grierson did not perform very well at Brice's Crossroads and the Tulepo Campaign. When A.J. Smith was returning to base, Grierson's rearguard was pressed hard and Grierson was visibly panicking in front of the men and the general. A.J. Smith promptly told the man to shut up and told Joseph Mower, his premier division commander, to handle the situation. Mower promptly whipped Forrest's pursuit force and allowed the XVI Corps to have a clean getaway. I have no earthly idea as to how Gillmore got on that list.

Humphreys, McPherson and Schofield are fairly competent, but I wouldn't put them on the list for several reasons. Humphreys performed well, but his tenure as corps commander is rather short (although fairly impressive). McPherson, in my opinion, was promoted too quickly for his own good. He did not play a major role as a division commander during the Second Corinth Campaign; Grant held his hand throughout the Vicksburg Campaign; and McPherson himself admitted to his mother that he did not feel ready to command the Army of the Tennessee. McPherson's inexperience and cautiousness left the Snake Creek Gap unexploited and cost Sherman another chance to capture Atlanta early by being passive on July 20, 1864 (to be precise, McPherson could've ordered Logan to help Blair sweep Wheeler away and then enter Atlanta with Blair's XVII Corps). Schofield has no real highs that didn't originate from his talents.

In their places, I would add George G. Meade, A.J. Smith, Samuel R. Curtis, Phillip Sheridan (probably near the bottom of the list) and most controversially William S. Rosecrans.

Top 10 Confederate Generals:
  1. Nathan B. Forrest
  2. Robert E. Lee
  3. Patrick R. Cleburne
  4. Thomas J. Jackson
  5. James Longstreet
  6. A.P. Hill
  7. J.E.B. Stuart
  8. John B. Hood (1862-1863)
  9. D.H. Hill
  10. William J. Hardee
I think Nathan B. Forrest should be much lower, if not off the list. While he has his brilliant victories and was an excellent raider, Forrest was weak at performing "traditional" duties of the cavalry, such as screening and reconnaissance. During the Chickamauga Campaign, did well in taking prisoners, but did a poor job of screening the army's advance and watching the flanks for the enemy, and seemed to lose track of his larger responsibilities whenever there was a fight he could pitch into. With Hood, he actually did well in fighting a rearguard action to protect the retreat of Hood's army, but before that, he was beaten off by Union cavalry at Franklin, and before that, had a share of the blame in the Spring Hill fiasco.(Along with many other Confederates officers, and definitely less blame than Hood and Cheatham, but still, he pulled his men away from watching/blocking a key road without authorization at a critical time because of lack of ammo, but whose job was it to keep them supplied with ammo?)

I'd much rather have Longstreet above Jackson, but both deserve a place on this list. Cleburne also belongs in this list, although I would downgrade him a bit. A.P. Hill and D.H. Hill probably deserve to be booted off this list. Both were outstanding division commanders, but both were also poor corps commanders that had seriously negative consequences for the CSA. I would definitely boot Hood off the list; he was an outstanding division commander, a mediocre corps commander and a poor army commander that never learned from his mistakes. In their place, I would add Wade Hampton (Stuart's worthy successor), Richard Taylor and A.P. Stewart.
 
Now Rosecrans does seem like a controversial choice. I do think he was not entirely to blame for Chickamauga, but it seems... strange to put him on a Top 10 list.
Do allow me to defend my choice. Rosecrans is admittedly best known for his defeat at Chickamauga. However, he was more than just that commander who lost at Chickamauga. He was an excellent logistician, trainer, organizer, an innovative commander and a brilliant operationalist. He helped create the Lightning Brigade and Morton's Pioneers, and encouraged innovations such as advance firing among his subordinates. He whipped the battered Army of the Cumberland into shape after the mismanagement of Don Carlos Buell. He then defeated Bragg at the Battle of Stones River, in which he deserves credit for personally stabilizing his lines and determining that the army would continue to fight despite the collapse of McCook's Corps. Rosecrans failed to vigorously pursue Bragg, but in his defense, any pursuit would have been hampered by the terrible weather, severe casualties and inferior cavalry.

After Stones River, Rosecrans used the time to rebuild the army. Here, we see his strengths and flaws. Bragg's army was operating in "the Barrens", an area of rough hills, narrow valleys and very little farm land. There was no way for Rosecrans to temporarily live off the land so he gathered supplies, especially since the railroad his army depended on was raided every now and then. And so Rosecrans had to wait to gather a mountain of supplies before moving forward (something most politicians did not appreciate). Rosecrans did an excellent job of training and drilling the newcomers, and succeeded in creating the Lightning Brigade. However, Rosecrans had very serious flaws.

The first flaw is that Rosecrans was tone-deaf to political nuances. Stanton disliked Rosecrans after the two argued over troop movement during the Valley Campaign. Now Stanton might have forgiven Rosecrans after the victory at Stones' River, but in the early months of 1863, Rosecrans sent a new and seemingly unending flow of "suggestions", including, among other things, direct authority over the Union Navy vessels then patrolling the Cumberland River. Stanton seriously resented Rosecrans' suggestions, viewing them as Rosecrans' meddling with his authority. Rosecrans also failed to win over Charles C. Dana, Stanton's "spy". When Dana was sent to join Grant's army, Grant recognized Dana for what he was and quickly integrated the man into his headquarters. Dana, impressed with Grant's plans, became an ardent supported of the general. In contrast, Dana was greeted with barely concealed hostility, and responded in kind.

And yet, Rosecrans did ultimately launch one of the war's finest campaigns against Bragg's position at Tullahoma. Utilizing misdirection, he fooled Bragg into pulling forces away from his right, and then slammed his army through the weakened forces guarding the gaps there. Bragg was completely outmaneuvered and it seemed that Rosecrans had him in the bag. Well, until fate intervened. Heavy rains fell, turning the roads to mud, and aiding in slowing Rosecrans down enough for Bragg to make good his escape. With very negligible casualties, Rosecrans had maneuvered Bragg out of a strong position, taken 1600 prisoners and inflicted a unknown amount of casualties on him, and sent Bragg running almost 80 miles to Chattanooga.

However, with the grand victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Army of the Cumberland's efforts were overlooked. Rosecrans showed his somewhat unique talent for offending his superiors by complaining that his army had not received the praise it justifiably deserved. After another month of logistical buildup, Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg out of his strong position at Chattanooga and sent him running. Unfortunately, his irritated superiors in Washington threatened to sack Rosecrans if he stopped to regroup, and so Rosecrans recklessly pursued. Here, his second flaw started to show. Rosecrans' personality defects significantly affected his generalship. Rosecrans was high-strung, tended to work himself to exhaustion, and micromanaged too much. He was also volatile, swinging from gloom to a deluded belief that Bragg was broken and running.

In reality, Bragg was being reinforced and turned to fight at Chickamauga. Rosecrans held his own initially, but I think he made three errors. After the first day of Chickamauga, Thomas was constantly calling for reinforcements and he had a point. If Thomas' line broke, Rosecrans' route to Chattanooga would be cut. Rosecrans should have shifted his forces north to better defend against this threat and moved to a better position. The second error was the "fatal gap", but I would argue that Wood's small division had no chance of stopping Longstreet. Rosecrans' career-ruining decision, however, was listening to the advice of staff officer and future president James A. Garfield to retire to Chattanooga while Garfield made contact with Thomas, who was still fighting with his corps on the battlefield. Despite commendable efforts to fortify the approaches to Chattanooga and prepare for a siege, Rosecrans looked like a cowardly fool to Washington, and Grant eventually relieved him of command, which he accepted graciously. Rosecrans later played a supporting role in the Westport Campaign. It seems a waste that Rosecrans was sent to rot in Missouri while incompetents like Banks, Sigel, and Butler led armies, but that was the price of Rosecrans' constant irritation of his superiors. But he made an extremely valuable contribution to the Union's final victory, and doesn't deserve the poor reputation he gets.
 
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But he made an extremely valuable contribution to the Union's final victory, and doesn't deserve the poor reputation he gets.

That I can agree with. Rosecrans certainly deserves a command more than men like Butler. You also raise a good point regarding why it took so long between Stones River and the next campaign. I was, admittedly, not aware of just how difficult it would be to gather supplies for the next campaign, which has always seemed to me like a brilliant success. Oh well, poor Rosecrans. I guess this leaves us the lesson of just how important it is to appeal to your superiors and try and please them.
 
Rosecrans also is responsible for driving the Confederate Army out of West Virginia in 1861 (Meclellan stole the credit), and defeated Sterling Price's 1864 Invasion of Missouri.

Also, Rosecrans was supposed to be Abraham Lincoln's 1864 vice president candidate and when Lincoln asked him he said yes via telegram but Secretary Stanton hid the telegram from Lincoln due to personal beef with Rosecrans

Edit: Outside of Chickamauga, Old Rosy had a pretty decent career.
 
D. To what extent is Lee to get credit for his victories since all of his corps commanders made the top ten list as well.
Lee didn't just battles; he managed campaigns. In general, Lee's strategic ability as an army commander was good although his grand-strategic vision can be criticized.
While serving as Davis' military advisor, Lee actually devised the grand plan for Jackson's Valley Campaign. Then, Lee further displays sound judgement at the end of the Valley Campaign; when Jackson wants to continue north and continue threatening Washington, as appealing as this might have sounded, Lee correctly judges that Jackson's diversion has served its purpose and brings his troops to Richmond in time to achieve near-parity with McClellan's forces for the Seven Days Campaign. The resulting campaign was not coordinated very well, but Lee's strategy plays out and McClellan is neutralized for the time being. Lee plans well and across a broad area, incorporating multiple forces, and seizes the initiative and does not relinquish it.

The Second Manassas Campaign is in many ways Lee's crowning achievement strategically. Faced with the dual threat of McClellan on the James and John Pope's advance in Northern Virginia, Lee carefully managed his forces, detaching enough troops to blunt Pope's advance while keeping McClellan from marching on Richmond. When McClellan showed signs of withdrawing, Lee acted immediately and decisively, racing north with most of his army to confront Pope. Pope eluded Lee and used the Rappahannock river as a defensive line. Lee took a risk to seize the initiative again, detaching Jackson to strike into the rear of Pope's army at his supply lines, and causing Pope to lose control of the campaign. Lee and Longstreet followed, and at the Battle of Second Manassas, a battle fought on as even terms as Lee ever gets, he decisively defeated Pope and brought the Union war effort in the east to its nadir.

The Maryland Campaign is far more questionable. Shifting the war into Maryland made good strategic sense, but Lee wore out his army with rapid marches, going from close to 60,000 men following his previous victory to just 40,000 at Antietam. He over-divided his army and his decision to fight the Battle of Antietam was an inexcusable error. He had no reason to fight and nothing to gain and everything to lose from the battle. Despite a excellent tactical performance, he gained nothing other than a fourth of his army as casualties and a propaganda victory for the Union.

The Chancellorsville Campaign was another showcase of Lee's flaws and strengths. He was outmaneuvered by Joseph Hooker to start the campaign, but through sheer nerve and possibly contempt for his opponent, whom he disliked, Lee attacked Hooker, confusing him into halting in the Wilderness, a terrible and fateful decision. The idea for Jackson's flank attack was Lee's, and through the combining of his army and the Battle of Salem Church, Lee's execution was virtually flawless. Yet had Hooker not withdrawn, Lee planned to launch a potentially suicidal frontal assault against the entrenched Union army.

The Gettysburg Campaign, to summarize briefly, was an error in execution. Lee won a tactical victory on the first day, but erred in choosing to continue to fight on ground chosen by the enemy where he had little to gain. Lee's overconfidence and contempt for the enemy's own designs cost him dearly here. At this point, I should bring up that at this point Lee should have stopped the "strategy of annihilation" - destroy an army, shatter enemy morale. The North's overall morale has become inured to major shifts in opinion even from major defeats like Chancellorsville. That's probably the most reasonable criticism of Lee's strategic ability; he continues to pursue a strategy of annihilation for some time after it has ceased to hold any real promise for the Confederacy. The move to Pennsylvania, however, was absolutely strategically sound. The forage Lee could and did acquire was vital for the army's existence. Virginia, after 3 years of war, could no longer support Lee's army and needed respite. By bringing the fight north, Virginia could recover and Lee could acquire the resources necessary for another year of war.

The Overland Campaign was a clash of titans and I'd argue that both Lee and Grant performed superbly. Lee was mostly reactive in this campaign, but still did a good job of grappling with Grant. Both commanders pulled off brilliant moves; and even after Lee lost Longstreet and was stuck with his B-team Corps commanders, he still managed to check Grant on the battlefield. Ultimately, Lee was outmaneuvered by Grant's move across the James, which eventually spelled doom for his army, though his use of Jubal Early in the Valley was a brilliant move that prolonged the war considerably.

E. Who the hell is John Schofield?
John Schofield was the commander of the Army of the Ohio. In all honesty, the Army of the Ohio was a glorified corps command, but Schofield's ego perhaps made this necessary (but effectively, he usually worked under Thomas). He has been praised and held in high regard for a while, but a further analysis of his abilities could leave one disappointed. He started off in the Trans-Mississippi Theater and was generally uncooperative and had a tendency to backstab others. He was eventually chosen to command the Army of the Ohio in the Atlanta Campaign, Hood's Tennessee Campaign and the North Carolina Campaign. In the Atlanta Campaign, he got a bloody nose at Resaca, argued with his division commanders after Resaca, dodged a bullet at Cassville, missed out on the battles of Dallas, Pickett Mill and New Hope Church, lucked on having the easiest mission during the frontal assault on Kennesaw Mountain, missed out on Peach Tree Creek and Bald Hill and got butchered at Utoy Creek (not 100% his fault). During Hood's move north, he almost got cut off from Thomas by Hood (he was saved by pure dumb luck), he won a famous victory at Franklin when Hood charged against his fortifications, sent false reports that Thomas was delaying to Grant and participated in the Battle of Nashville. Finally, Schofield captured Wilmington and joined Sherman after a fight at Wyse Fork. Overall, Schofield was better at backstabbing than being a general.
 
For those who were interested in the last few threads about Civil War generals and ranking them that have been created, I have found something new to be added to the discussion. In the Civil War Book of Lists (one of the first and favorite Civil War books, even if it is quite dated), they have a list (big surprise) of the top 10 generals for both sides on the American Civil War. I was wondering what the thoughts of my fellow Alternate History enthusiasts were for them. I will write them here. All credit for the list goes to Combined Books Inc., which published the book.

Top 10 Union Generals:

  1. Ulysses S. Grant
  2. Benjamin Grierson
  3. George H. Thomas
  4. William T. Sherman
  5. Winfield S. Hancock
  6. John A. Logan
  7. Quincy Gillmore
  8. Andrew A. Humphreys
  9. James B. McPherson
  10. John M. Schofield
My thoughts on this list: I can understand why they placed Grant in the top spot, as he was the general who was General-in-Chief when the war was ultimately won, as well as having a great mind for logistics and strategy. Personally, I would not place Grierson on this list. He had one main accomplishment during the war, Grierson's Raid, which while impressive, certainly does not merit a place on this list of many more competent generals, especially considering his less than brilliant showing at Brice's Crossroads. Personally, I would have given the number two spot to Thomas. Sherman is another general where his ranking could be highly debated, but he did show a brilliant understanding of how war works, even if he did not perfectly understand the art of battle. I would switch around Hancock and Logan in their rankings, and remove Gillmore altogether, as while he was a brilliant engineer, he was no general. Humphreys is another understandable choice, as he did serve well throughout the war. I personally wouldn't put McPherson among the top ten Union generals, and I certainly would place Schofield anywhere near the top ten. Upon reading this list, I was surprised to find Philip Sheridan, who is usually ubiquitous in these kinds of lists, was absent, as I think he might deserve to be near, if not among, the top ten Union generals due to his masterful skills with multiple arms warfare, although his career certainly had many less than stellar moments as well. On to there Confederate generals list.
Why do you have union generals based on their preformance as army commanders while you have southern generals that most were corps commanders under Lee? Burnside was better as a corps- than a armycommander. Meade was a great brigade commander before being thrown in command of the army of the Potomac.
 
Giving the top confederate slot to Forrest is legitimately insane.

If I had my way, the lists would be restricted to army commanders, though then it'd be harder to fill out ten slots without dipping heavily into tertiary armies. For all his flaws, I think McClellan deserves a spot in the top ten more than corps commanders like Hancock. Incidentally, framing it in terms of army commanders illuminates why the Confederacy was in such a tough spot; they had one guy who could really, really lead an army [Lee, in case it needs to be said], while the Union had three [Grant, Sherman, and Thomas].
 
Why do you have union generals based on their preformance as army commanders while you have southern generals that most were corps commanders under Lee? Burnside was better as a corps- than a armycommander. Meade was a great brigade commander before being thrown in command of the army of the Potomac.
Again, as it is says in the post and is bolded, I am NOT the author of this list. Combined Books Inc. is. I have no responsibility in how they were ranked.
 
Why do you have union generals based on their preformance as army commanders while you have southern generals that most were corps commanders under Lee?
I think this raises an important problem for the Confederacy; other than Lee, most of their army commanders were very lacklustre. Aside from Lee, I can think of only three actually competent independent generals. Joseph Johnston rejuvenated the Army of Tennessee after the utter disaster of Chattanooga and recognized good talent (he was partially responsible for the rise of Longstreet and Stuart), but Earl J. Hess has criticized his strategy during the Atlanta Campaign to be "overly simplistic."
For the most part, he acted on the defensive, encouraging his troops to dig in ever more strongly upon defensible ground in the hopes of wearing down Sherman’s manpower and will to continue the campaign. Only occasionally was Johnston willing to mix limited tactical offensives with his defensive policy, and those few occasions offered little trouble to the Federals. It also has to be pointed out that Johnston did not always do a good job of watching his flanks and was too ready to abandon his fortified positions at the first hint that the enemy was about to turn them. In short, Johnston was good at judging defensive ground and authorizing a stand on it, but he was not tenacious at keeping that position when threatened by anything except a direct frontal assault—and Sherman did not oblige him in offering such assaults very often.

P. G. T. Beauregard is also quite competent and deserves a lot of credit for saving Petersburg and prolonging the war. Although Beauregard had nonsensical strategic suggestions and his performance at Shiloh was pretty poor, he was at least competent enough to manage an army and could earn the respect of his men and officers (unlike a certain someone), and he was willing to take risks and strike at the enemy to seize the initiative.

Richard Taylor has the most respect from me. He basically built his army from a scratch force of apathetic troops (Taylor was stunned when he found out that most troops in the District of Louisiana were not too motivated to defend their state). Although he had a very small force, Taylor must be credited for establishing repair shops, arsenals, supply depots and munition states across Louisiana. He ensured his troops were well-fed, well-dressed and well-equipped. On a strategic level, he did identify his strategic situation correctly for the most part, but it must be said that he could be overly-ambitious in planning. That said, his near-capture of New Orleans could have compelled Banks to drop the siege of Port Hudson and save the garrison.

Of these three commanders, Uncle Joe and Beauregard were basically sidelined because Davis didn't like them, leaving less than suitable commanders in charge. The most infamous example is probably Braxton Bragg. While Bragg had genuine strategic insight, had a talent for planning and was more popular than what popular history would have you imagine, he could not carry a good campaign idea through to fruition, failed to adapt to the circumstances when things don't go to plan, practiced cronyism, is a martinet, and absolutely could not work with anyone. Earl van Dorn and Sibley were pretty much unmitigated disasters.

John C. Pemberton made for a better staff officer than general. In all honesty, he held himself together pretty well until Champion Hill. Pemberton understood how to fortify a good defensive position; his passiveness made sense when one realizes how little he had in terms of reconnaissance assets; he successfully predicted one of Grant's targets (Edward Station) until Grant shifted the focus of his army to Jackson after the battle at Raymond; and Pemberton was probably right when he wanted to stay at the fortifications at Edward Station over his council of war's consensus to march to Dillon). That said, he was hesitant and unable to commit decidedly to a course of action, a product of inexperience and contradictory orders. But the Battle of Champion Hill really shows his inexperience. First, he was fixated on McClernand's XIII Corps and ignored C.L. Stevenson's warnings that Grant was about to hit his flank. Second, when C.L. Stevenson's division collapses, Pemberton tries to convince Bowen and Loring to attack McClernand and then turn around to help C.L. Stevenson. Pemberton only acts decisively when there is a flood of rebels outside his HQ's doorstep. Really, only McClernand's lack of initiative and slow communications between Grant and McClernand save Pemberton.

E. Kirby Smith is something of an enigma for me. He directly commanded two tactical engagements; one of them was a crushing victory (Richmond, KY) and the other was a complete fiasco (Jenkins' Ferry.) He also ran what was virtually an independent subdivision of the Confederacy in the trans-Mississippi. Strategically I'm a little unsure about him. He also tends not to play well with others though; Taylor hated him, and Smith absolutely refused to cooperate with Bragg during the Kentucky campaign.

I think that the large number of incompetent Confederate army commanders comes from Davis' tendency not to replace the incompetents. Davis valued personal loyalty over talent while Lincoln, on the other hand, was willing to tolerate a disrespectful attitude if the commander got the job done. Davis created and supported the disaster that was van Dorn solely because van Dorn was a West Pointer. He did the same with Leonidas Polk out of personal friendship. Davis hated Price but I think he had to tolerate him because Price had other political support and he didn't want to offend the pro-Confederate Missourians. Authorizing Sibley's expedition was pretty much pure idiocy though. Although, in fairness, the case of Braxton Bragg wasn't 100% his fault; he at least investigated potentially replacing Bragg at earlier points, but Joe Johnston begged off, and Hardee was hilariously passive-aggressive about attaining higher command.
 
Here is my own personal top ten list for the Union generals. For the moment, I will just have the list and no explanation, but if anyone is curious to as to my rankings, feel free to ask.
  1. George H. Thomas
  2. Ulysses S. Grant
  3. William T. Sherman
  4. John A. Logan
  5. Samuel R. Curtis
  6. Andrew Jackson Smith
  7. George G. Meade
  8. Winfield S. Hancock
  9. Philip H. Sheridan
  10. Alpheus S. Williams
 
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I would include Joseph Johnson on the confederate list. He is kind of Rodney Dangerfield is he gets no respect. In the memoirs his men believed in him and appreciated the way he managed the army. If he had been left alone playing defense against Sherman he might of delayed the capture of Atlanta and affected the Northern election. Instead they put Hood, a total disaster, in charge and he went on the offensive and got his hat handed to him.

On the Union side I think Thomas was particularly effective. He was a Southerner after all.
 
I would include Joseph Johnson on the confederate list. He is kind of Rodney Dangerfield is he gets no respect. In the memoirs his men believed in him and appreciated the way he managed the army. If he had been left alone playing defense against Sherman he might of delayed the capture of Atlanta and affected the Northern election. Instead they put Hood, a total disaster, in charge and he went on the offensive and got his hat handed to him.
Although I used to accept the "Johnston retains command, Atlanta doesn't fall, Lincoln loses election" at face value, with more analysis, I'm not quite sure how much of a difference Johnston instead of Hood would make in terms of holding on to Atlanta. At the time of Johnston's relief, July 17, the Confederate Army of Tennessee was just outside of Atlanta. This effectively gave Sherman roughly three and a half months to capture Atlanta before the election, which was occurring on November 8. Judging on his behavior when in a similar situation (The Peninsula Campaign and Richmond), as Johnston is pushed into a corner at Atlanta, I'd expect him to lash out and attack Sherman's Army when it was divided, such as attacking the Army of the Cumberland at Peachtree Creek, similar to how he attacked a separated portion of McClellan's army at the Battle of Seven Pines.

With this in mind, we come to the battle itself, and the odds don't look that great for the Confederacy. Not only would Johnston start outnumbered and on the offensive, which was far from his strong suit, but he would also be facing one of the Union's best generals, George H. Thomas. With all of this in mind, I severely doubt Johnston's ability to pull off even something resembling a victory. After this, he probably retreats from Atlanta, giving it to Sherman with the mindset of "Better to lose the town and keep the army, rather than losing both." After this, he is relieved, Davis probably appoints Hood with orders to recapture Atlanta, which almost certainly results in a Franklin level massacre.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Here is my own personal top ten list for the Union generals. For the moment, I will just have the list and no explanation, but if anyone is curious to as to my rankings, feel free to ask.
  1. Ulysses S. Grant
  2. George H. Thomas
  3. William T. Sherman
  4. John A. Logan
  5. Samuel R. Curtis
  6. Andrew Jackson Smith
  7. George G. Meade
  8. Winfield S. Hancock
  9. Philip H. Sheridan
  10. Alpheus S. Williams
Move up Thomas, move down Grant. Grant while a good strategist and good at operational maneuvers is a bad to mediocre tactician.
 
Move up Thomas, move down Grant. Grant while a good strategist and good at operational maneuvers is a bad to mediocre tactician.
Yeah, I see that. I will do that. In my opinion, Thomas was probably the best all-around commander that the Union had, and was one of the few Union generals to win a full on Napoleonic victory.
 
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