These “soldiers’ parties” might not be paramilitaries or militias but I can definitely see them becoming either or if the situation in Britain spirals out of control.
To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
- Start date
Honestly I’m already in the “I’ll fuck off as soon as I get my degree” stage, but tbf Argentina is kinda worse off than Brazil rn.
To be fair, South America is a wonderful place to visit, just not to live.
Shhhhhh I was being nice
Social Conflict & Elections: Germany (January 1919)
Social Conflict & Elections
Germany
January 1919
Post-War Germany was a state extremely politically divided, and economically weakened. Unlike western Governments, which had largely issued bonds and mobilised their economic industries or taken on foreign loans to keep the war economy functioning, German economic strategy was to essentially create new sources of currency. This meant that in many spheres, while the German Government did issue a large number of war bonds and encourage investment, the German economy was essentially printing money and cannibalising it’s economy, while devaluing the spending power of that currency.
Essentially Germany had encouraged its citizens to give their wealth to the state on the promise of later repayment, while making the money of all of their citizens less valuable.
For ordinary Germans this, combined with the blockade, meant that spending power in the state rapidly declined and the cost of goods - particularly luxury goods - skyrocketed. By the end of the war though due to the removal of working men from the agricultural sector and the stress on the food economy due to Germany being a net importer of foodstuffs pre-war, Germany’s necessities market was also inflating and basic goods were becoming increasingly scarce.
For Germany’s domestic political scene this was extremely divisive. Not helped further by Germany’s constitutional division that had grown throughout the war.
Prior to the war, Germany had been seeing the rise of increasingly left leaning and socially liberal political power blocs. This was especially notable in the Reichstag, but much less prevalent in the actual Government itself. This was partially the fault of a rebound growth of the party after years of being banned, while the absence of socialist ministers was simply the consequence of the Kaiser refusing them entry into power. The rise of the SPD after the end of the party’s ban also meant that the working classes - long denied significant political rights in Germany - were slowly becoming a relevant voting bloc in the country. This again boosted SPD poll numbers, particularly after the introduction of universal male suffrage.
During the war meanwhile the Reichstag’s hesitation to continue the war on account of its ‘liberal’ and ‘peace’ majority meant that there was a growing divide in the political institutions of the Empire. The Civil Service and office of the Chancellor, which were both beholden to the Kaiser rather than the Reichstag, were dominated by Prussian militarists and supporters of the Kaiser’s Government. This became particularly prevalent too as the war reached its zenith in 1916 when Hindenburg and Ludendorff were appointed to lead the army and established a de-facto military state. This cut the Reichstag out of political relevance entirely, not just in practice and further divided the state and elected institutions of the state.
Politically this meant that by the time of the General Strike in late 1918 and the appointment of the von Payer Government comprised of the liberal parties of the Reichstag, the country was in a deep constitutional split. The civilian Government and Civil Service were now directed by the Reichstag, who carried the power to paralyse the state through direct civil action, while the military and constitutional apparatus were governed by the Kaiser and the military clique.
This was an unsustainable split, and was reflected in the public forum of debate too. The Fatherland Party, under Alfred von Tirpitz, by January 1919 had started to fragment and collapse, leaving Tirpitz himself considering it unfit for Government. Beset by Radicals and incompetent or inexperienced officials and former soldiers, the bloc seemed destined to make the mark that it's members expected to make - a fact recognized by some of its leaders. This most notably included civil servant Wolfgang Kapp who, partly in a bid to unify the party and right, had sought to take the mantle of party leadership through making hopeless promises to defeat the British and complete German hegemony over Europe.
With the signature of the Treaties in Brussels and Vienna though, this dream fell on deaf ears among the public. This was only made worse though when Kapp near enough called on the Kaiser's son and heir, also Wilhelm, to remove the Kaiser who the radicals on the right felt was too weak and feeble to lead the country and protect it against socialism. He had already called on Ludendorff and Hindenburg to remove the interfactional committee from power by force and install a military stratocracy, so this was just another grand exaggeration.
This view was particularly supported by members of the upper middle class, the aristocracy and parts of the nationalist working classes - many of them soldiers, particularly those who served on the eastern front. The support of the interfactional committee parties meanwhile largely rested in the working classes, lower middle classes, women and the soldiers who had served on the highly stagnant western front who now had largely become influenced by Socialism and thus backed the SPD.
Elections would eventually be set for late January 1919. This was intentionally picked to immediately follow the peace with Britain, and was agreed to by the Kaiser in hope to play on patriotic fervour, and by the liberals in order to create legitimacy for continued democratic ‘rule’ of the state.
Prior to the vote the liberal bloc had also sought to strengthen the power of the Reichstag to prevent political uncertainty after the election. While the prospect of a group of laws called the ‘November Proposals’ aimed at greatly weakening the OHL’s political authority and undermining the Kaiser were considered, ultimately only one major change was made by von Payer’s Government. This change strengthened the influence of the Reichstag by dictating that all future Chancellors should be beholden to a confidence vote by the legislature, even though the Kaiser would continue to nominate a candidate for the role.
This mildly reduced the power of the Kaiser but in practice did not actually change the constitutional order, and frankly the rule was itself relatively unenforceable. A confident anti-Reichstag group led by the Kaiser would likely be able to circumvent it by launching a constitutional crisis and governing by decree, but for now that was not an immediate concern for the Reichstag had the backing of the German public and the Kaiser was greatly weakened politically - and alienated from the OHL.
While von Payer may have been able to abuse the upcoming elections to attempt to sneak through greater political change in the short term, ultimately the breadth of the coalition in power and the strength of the militarists among the state apparatus limited his options.
The Red Winter
While the war was won and political violence in Germany was growing, but limited, the use of direct action through the general strike had left the door to revolutionary direct action not open, but ajar for some more radical political figures after the war.
Many revolutionaries remained in jail; individuals like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg were never released as neither the moderates who seized limited power through the Reichstag and strike, nor the militarists, had any reason or desire to unleash them on the country. There were however notable extremists, particularly among the revolutionary shop stewards movement and the internally divided USPD, the Independent Social Democrats.
The USPD, while having formed an alliance during and prior to the strike, quickly found that the Majority SPD cared little for more radical action in Germany and simply desired to form a part of a liberal German political system after the war. For many in the USPD this was not enough, wanting the total removal of the military leadership, military councils, the abdication, if not total removal of the Kaiser and Monarchy, and the abandonment of Germany’s war gains in the west - along with Alsace Lorraine.
This, remarkably, was not fully endorsed by the USPD though and the party had become far more fractured after the end of the war. Like before the war and in Britain, the left constantly battled over the issue of how to attain power; revolution or democracy. This left the USPD, which represented the most extreme elements of the former SPD, the most fractured of the two successor blocs from the party - as the MSPD was unified in its view that it could both attain and hold power following the general strike. Bolshevik sympathisers for example made up a small minority of the USPD’s leadership and rank and file, while the majority of the party wanted to compete in direct elections independently of the MSPD as a more politically radical alternative. A revolution simply seemed too dangerous and unlikely to succeed in absence of any clear revolutionary moment yet to emerge in Germany - no matter how close the strike came.
The extremists though stubbornly and accurately recognized that direct action against the military clique would become harder the longer that the country was at peace. Further, they recognized that the election of an assembly would greatly undermine the legitimacy of any radical attempted overthrow of the Kaiser.
Thus emerged the red winter. Between late November 1918 and late January 1919 revolutionary groups attempted to stir up major discontent among the populace in order to trigger a second, more aggressive strike and subsequent revolution. The continuing blockade prior to the end of January also was an effective driver of this action, though a single trigger event to justify a major strike refused to emerge throughout the period.
Led by the revolutionary shop stewards under USPD leader Emil Barth, sporadic wildcat strikes, street marches and attacks on Government property and offices rose rapidly throughout the winter - as did an effort to form both workers and soldiers councils nationally. This culminated in the January 5th march on the Reichstag by a column of roughly ten thousand workers.
Met by over a thousand armed soldiers of the local Berlin garrison and the Berlin police, the march was set upon by the soldiers who beat protesters relentlessly - some to death. This finally gave the USPD an excuse to attempt something of a justified trigger for a second general strike aimed at overthrowing the Kaiser prior to elections and breaking the OHL.
The march created an extremely varied and confused reaction in Germany’s new ruling ministry, with Chancellor von Payer being more than willing to look the other way against the violence by police, and the MSPD failing to protest the crackdown under pro-Kaiser leader Ebert. The event triggered the immediate exit of any remaining pro-government USPD legislators from the liberal bloc, and calls by party Chair Hugo Haase for a second general strike.
The attempted January general strike was significantly less effective than the first. Condemned by the MSPD as an attempt at revolutionary agitation, Germany’s trade unions opposed the strike on their request and as a result only three of the previous twelve million strikers turned out, and that, frankly, was a good turnout. The public, it seemed, felt that the political polarisation and marches, strike action and aggressive campaigning by the left felt damaging to the state just as it finally achieved peace - not constructive as most Germans sought.
Despite the lower turnout though, fear did spread throughout the German Government and even internationally that Germany may be on the brink of political collapse. Among the bolsheviks figures such as Nicolai Bukharin, the leading opponent of the Brest Litovsk treaty among the party, even began to question whether now would be the ideal time for the recovery of the vital territories in Ukraine and the Caucuses from the Germans and a repudiation of the treaty. This ultimately fell on deaf ears among the Sovnarkom, particularly Lenin, who had firmly remained against a break with Germany since the end of the war.
Faced with continued strikes primarily in the Berlin, Hamburg, Lusatia, Saxony and Thuringia regions, the economy continued to slow throughout January 1919, adding to the financial difficulties Germany could expect after the war. Largely involving the occupation of factories by far-left leaning workers, the German Government turned to violence in the period leading up to the election to prevent any kind of insurrection. A large-scale workers’ march in Hamburg on January 15th for example was equally aggressively repressed as the one ten days prior in Berlin. Police and local military units once again deployed and met the march, this time controversially resorting to gunfire to halt advancing crowds killing 21 and injuring nearly 200.
Then came the signing of the Treaty of Copenhagen, and suddenly the tension eased. On January 18th the treaty was in effect, and suddenly thousands of idle port workers in Germany’s northern ports were faced with the possibility of work, food and security. The failure of the strike to deliver a clear revolutionary moment in effect rendered it a failure, and with peace and elections due on January 31st the MSDP sought to end the threat to state security.
Arrests of prominent far left figures such as the radical Richard Müller of the council movement and revolutionary shop stewards such as Emil Barth meant that the extreme fringe of the USPD were decisively defeated politically. The USPD would continue on in Germany, but its far left anti-state fringe would find itself isolated and near enough persecuted by the regime and even to an extent within their own party. The mood was clear; this was not the time for revolution, even if one may come in the coming years.
This further allowed the socialists to crack down on the workers councils that were established by the extreme left during the original general strike, and created a more ‘legitimate’ look for the SPD and liberal bloc in the eyes of the military and Kaiser who saw that the grouping were less of a threat to their influence than assumed.
Domestically this left the two political elites battling for control over the Reich being the military clique, who favoured the Conservative Party of Ernst von Heydebrand and Lasa and the Fatherland party of Kapp, against the interfactional committee of Ebert and von Payer and the SPD-FVP-Zentrum bloc.
The 1919 Election
Held on January 31st, the elections of 1919 proved extremely chaotic, often violent and politically divisive. With such high stakes, the situation was made worse by the continued existence of politically motivated subversive elements within the state; particularly paramilitary units continuing from the war who would patrol the streets to attempt to break up socialist meetings.
While these paramilitaries were rarely organised and were not permitted to engage in police action on account of the continued existence of a large, organised German army uninhibited by war term restrictions, they nonetheless presented a destabilising factor and engaged in political gang violence on an unacceptable scale across the country.
Despite disruption though, the election and voting itself went largely as planned by the civilian Government. Consent to the vote by the military ensured that in practice there was no disruption of voting, even if in some areas the aforementioned nationalist mobs sought to influence the result.
The result in the end though was decisive. Of the two main ‘blocs’, the liberals would end up with around 66.1% of the vote, with the SPD far out front as the strongest party within the liberal bloc under a determinedly moderate Ebert. Winning a record 164 seats, the SPD won 37.50% of the vote - just 36 shy of an overall majority.
The FVP, under still Chancellor von Payer, also racked up some modest gains. Prior to the poll their closest ideological rivals, the National Liberal Party, had suffered their own ideological split over the war. The party itself had drifted firmly to the right during the first years of the 20th century on account of their pro-business attitude in competition with the SPD, but the war had also left them as a party of the right in a country dominated now by the centre and left. This left the party’s left wing vulnerable, allowing the FVP to recover some seats from the NLP.
The FVP ultimately landed with 47 seats and 10.6% of the vote, a gain of six seats. The NLP meanwhile were all but annihilated, winning just 14 seats and 4.40% of the vote as their left wing voters went to the FVP, and their right went to the Fatherland Party who the NLP had allowed their members to hold joint membership with.
The moderate Conservatives in the Zentrum, or Catholic Centre Party, would take something of a hit in the election, losing sixteen seats down from their 1912 total of 90 to 74. This represented the party’s worst result since its formation besides its first ever competitive election in 1871 where it won 58 - but was not actually a terrible result. The party had led the Government throughout the war and had suffered significant internal dispute over the direction of the war and the cooperation owed to the military, with Chancellor Georg von Hertling being a particularly convinced puppet of the OHL regime, while Bethmann Hollweg and Michaelis were both technically independents.
meant that come election time in 1919 the party had become somewhat ‘squeezed’ between the Conservatives and Fatherland Party on the right, and the popular FVP and SPD on the left - in the end being seen more as a ‘continuity’ pro-Kaiser and pro-stability party vote. This had it’s benefits and its negatives, ultimately seeing the party retain a fair vote share of 18% - up 1.7% on their 1912 result but down on seats.
The Conservatives on the right overall won around 22% of the vote, with the German Conservative Party (DKP) winning 35 seats and 8.3% of the vote - a moderate fall on their pre-war results of around 41 seats and continuing the party’s fall from relevance. They were closely followed by the Fatherland Party (DVLP), whose chaotic leadership and politically irrelevant stand on seeking a more aggressive peace treaty with Britain left the party seeming backwards and desperate to continue a war at an end. The party would win 22 seats and 10% of the vote - a fair result for their efforts, but would gravely underperform compared to their initial expectations of uniting the entire German right.
The party’s biggest shock was it’s failure to win many traditionally military districts, instead largely winning east of the elbe and among rural junker estates while the SPD swept seats associated with ‘soldiers districts’ on account of Germany now having a largely conscripted ‘peasants’ army rather than the crack professional military force it once had.
On the opposite fringe, the USPD would land a small but still relevant result with 15 seats and 6.1% of the vote - ironically being outvoted by the National Liberal Party but becoming the larger party in the Reichstag.
Other results included a boost for the Polish People’s Party, winning 7 seats and 1.5% of the vote after a consolidation of the Polish nationalists through absorbing the pre-war Polish Catholic Party, while Independent Polish candidates would retain their 10 seats prior to the war and 2% of the vote.
Finally, the Alsace Lorraine caucus, a collective bloc of independents from the region - particularly the Lorrainian north endorsed individually by the SPD, Zentrum and other national parties for their individual views, won 7 seats in their home region, while the Bavarian Peasants' League held onto their 2 seats in Bavaria proper.
Government Formation
Despite the landslide victory of the liberal parties, seizing the mantle of Government would not prove something easy for the liberals - and especially the SPD. Now able to nearly govern alone, the SPD’s position in German politics was essentially unassailable. Alone the party had over twice the seats of the next party, the Zentrum, who themselves were uncertain about a continued deal with the SPD. Governing together during wartime was one thing, but the Zentrum were both a religious, moderate conservative and anti-statist party - not the natural allies to the statist, atheistic, socialist SPD.
The war had also dramatically shifted how almost all of Germany’s political parties were viewed, and viewed each other. The SPD prior to the war for example was seen by Germany’s ruling elite very much as a party that would destroy Germany’s militaristic and aristocratic Junker ruling caste. Yet by the end of the conflict the SPD had proven themselves to be firmly dedicated to the German imperial system - even if with limitations rather than unquestioning loyalty.
As a result, even the Kaiser no longer felt as averse to the idea of a SPD led Government, though the military hierarchy remained bitter about the SPD and liberal parties’ ‘defeatism’ in their peace resolution. However, now the war was near enough won, these concerns suddenly seemed less serious. Hindenburg and co were able to say ‘we told you so’ and the SPD were happy to let the period slide by in exchange for getting the keys to the Government.
Further, the SPD had proven themselves loyal to the military in their willingness to suppress the more radical socialists during the red winter. This had left the military leadership willing to work with the new civilian Government and for the first time was an example of the two actively cooperating, with the SPD playing a pivotal part by condemning the planned general strike advocated by the revolutionary shop stewards.
Despite all this though, the Kaiser and military clique still wanted to try and avoid an SPD led Government for the time being so that the post-war period could be steered in a manner acceptable to the ruling elites. For this they turned again to Chancellor Friedrich von Payer in an attempt to form a coalition with the conservative parties, which Payer at 72 years old refused , having been reluctant to take the job the first time.
The Kaiser then sought out alternative candidates to lead a Government, offering the Chancellorship to the Zentrum’s Adolf Gröber if he were to form a Government with the right. While Gröber himself was receptive to the idea, his party was not. Buoyed by fears that exclusion of the SDP would not be viable due to the left’s willingness to use strikes to secure political influence, most of the Zentrum’s elected members preferred the prospect of an SPD coalition Government under Ebert.
The bigger issue too was that there simply were not the numbers for a Government of the right. Even with an alliance of the Zentrum, the FVP, DKP, the Fatherland Party, the NLP and the Bavarian Peasants there would still be only 194 of the 199 necessary seats involved.
In a final bid to find an alternative to the SPD, the Kaiser then turned to former Chancellor Georg von Hertling’s suggested candidate Prince Max von Baden. While a relatively obscure figure, Baden had made a name for himself in recent years as he campaigned to take the reins of power. Something of a grey eminence, Prince Max was a liberal who didn't want a parliamentary Germany, but who had close ties with the SPD, FVP and Zentrum liberal bloc. This made him an ideal ‘Kaisers candidate’ for the Chancellorship who could build a coalition without giving the SPD total power.
Prince Max was quickly called upon to form a Government, which he accepted on February 4th. Opening discussions with the liberal Interfactional Committee, the new Chancellor unlike usual would have to be subject to a confidence vote of the Reichstag after the passage of the November laws. This meant totally locking down the SPD would be necessary, and thus talks with the Interfactional committee began on the 5th.
What immediately became clear was that any von Baden Government would require the SPD to hold a significant number of seats in the cabinet. Demanding the Foreign, Interior, Justice, Treasury and Economy ministries, the SPD would dominate virtually all of the major offices with the exception of the military, which the SPD insisted should gain its own War Ministry but were willing to grant to the FVP.
Baden, for his part, was open to heavy SPD inclusion in Government. However the SPD’s policy of industrial nationalisation alienated and concerned many in the high echelons of German power. Ultimately a cabinet would be agreed, with SPD politicians Gustav Noske, Otto Landsberg, Rudolf Wissell and Frederich Ebert taking the Interior, Justice, Treasury and Vice Chancellorship ministries respectively. Popular politician Philipp Scheidemann meanwhile would become minister without portfolio, Gustav Bauer would head a new Labour ministry and Robert Schmidt would lead a new ‘food’ ministry.
The FVP meanwhile would take the economics ministry under former banker Bernhard Dernburg under the conditions that the SPD would have influence in the expansion of a German welfare state and a more aggressive economic policy. The Independent and SPD leaning Ambassador to Denmark, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, would then take the foreign ministry due to his familiarity with the British. FVP politician Georg Gothein and Chancellor von Payer would then become Ministers without Portfolio.
Finally, the Zentrum would also join the Government with Matthias Erzberger as Minister for the Army - a newly established office intended to be used as a civilian liaison between the OHL and the civilian Government, while Johannes Bell would become Colonies minister. Johannes Giesberts meanwhile would become Postal minister, with Adolf Gröber becoming a minister without portfolio.
The new Army ministry, or Office as it was known, was a novel concept. Initially being met with hostility by the OHL - particularly due to the Government’s choice for the role being Erzberger who Ludendorff and Hindenberg disliked - the role was designed to allow a civilian to sit on the so called ‘military cabinet’. This was aimed at increasing the cooperation between the two governing councils of the country, particularly given the new peacetime conditions, while giving the von Baden Government a trusted man on the inside of the military leadership.
Of course the military were under no legal obligation to include Erzberger in their dealings at all, and the Zentrum politician had no vote on military matters, but simply by gaining the blessing of Kaiser Wilhelm to have the role exist at all it sent a message throughout the Government that the Kaiser wanted stability - not hostility - among his governing bodies.
Despite having reservations about the radical Scheidemann and not knowing how well equipped the inexperienced von Baden would be for the role, Wilhelm and Hindenberg were initially hesitant to give the new Government their blessing. However, keen to balance the two warring political blocs in the country and wary of alienating the populace, particularly given the economic weakness of the country, Kaiser Wilhelm gave his consent to the Government on February 7th. A vote by the Reichstag quickly endorsed the Ministry on February 10th and the Government immediately took office to the broad support of the general public.
While not the revolutionary ministry some in the SPD might seek, it was clear that for the time being at least the traditionally conservative and military-led Germany would be taking a more reformist, liberal path forward... reluctantly.
Reading this reminds me a bit of wages of destruction where post war Germany something like half the population lived in small towns and was disturbingly poor with 53% of income spent on things like food, both because of the time almost all of Europe was poor and Germany itself was surprisingly low income nation.
So while the German people do want improved conditions in life what they want is ''easy'' to satisfy compared to say a complete societal change the communists want.
So while the German people do want improved conditions in life what they want is ''easy'' to satisfy compared to say a complete societal change the communists want.
It's back! Wow Imperial Germany is a mess, I know this is 'slightly' better than Germany's fate after WW1, but wow is it still brutal even with the 'victory'. Germany is going to have to rebuild it's economy and has no real major allies to draw on for capital for loans. Now if they could detach America from it's friendship with Britain they could, but I don't see it happening.
1919 German Federal Election Results Graphic
1919 German Federal Election
MSPD: 164 Seats (+54)
Zentrum: 74 Seats (-16)
FVP: 47 Seats (+6)
DkP: 35 Seats (-6)
DVLP: 22 Seats (New Party)
USPD: 15 Seats (New Party)
NLP: 14 Seats (-31)
Ind. Polish: 10 Seats (=)
Ind. Alsace: 7 Seats (-2)
PSL: 7 Seats (+4)
BB: 2 Seats (=)
(I couldn't resist
)
MSPD: 164 Seats (+54)
Zentrum: 74 Seats (-16)
FVP: 47 Seats (+6)
DkP: 35 Seats (-6)
DVLP: 22 Seats (New Party)
USPD: 15 Seats (New Party)
NLP: 14 Seats (-31)
Ind. Polish: 10 Seats (=)
Ind. Alsace: 7 Seats (-2)
PSL: 7 Seats (+4)
BB: 2 Seats (=)
(I couldn't resist
)
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Inb4 the author threadmarks and canonizes this post1919 German Federal Election
MSPD: 164 Seats (+54)
Zentrum: 74 Seats (-16)
FVP: 47 Seats (+6)
DkP: 35 Seats (-6)
DVLP: 22 Seats (New Party)
USPD: 15 Seats (New Party)
NLP: 14 Seats (-31)
Ind. Polish: 10 Seats (=)
Ind. Alsace: 7 Seats (-2)
PSL: 7 Seats (+4)
BB: 2 Seats (=)
(I couldn't resist
A little bit better?The ITTL situation for Germany compared to OTL is massively better. Germany has a government recognised as legitimate by the absolute majority of the population, civil servants, the military and the other power blocs.
That is something the Weimar Republic did not really have.
The war is over and it was long and bloody and not all objectives were achieved, but Germany has more than consolidated its position as one of the great powers in Europe.
The colonies we lost were primarily non-economic anyway and in return we gained a thick block of buffer states to the east in which our industry can invest in the long term and which could protect us from the privations of the blockade in a second round against England.
Our rivals on the European continent are massively weakened and will not be able to cause problems for years.
Germany's economic situation is grave , but compared to OTL downright paradisiacal. As long as the new government provides stability and the right incentives, Germany can recover relatively quickly, while the state is relatively unencumbered by foreign currency debt.
Will say Wilhelm's hatred of the left by the end of the war had somewhat waned irl as it has here. The general view among the prussian aristocracy and military was that the left couldnt be trusted because of internationalism and pacificism, but this was heavily challenged during the war. By voting for war bonds, the SPD made clear they were primarily a German, not internationalist party, which came as something of a surprise to the elite. Ebert's pretty staunch backing of the Kaiser also came as a welcome development later. Here too by engaging with the regime, the regime would largely have come to accept the SPD as a potential player in Government, even if they didn't want it to govern alone.
Of course there are still areas of contention, like the militarists hated the SPD's role in the interfactional committee and their peace motion during the war, and there are certainly figures within the MSPD and definitely the USPD who would just be absolutely rejected by the Kaiser. But overall, much like in Britain really the war sort of showed the SPD have a place and aren't that scary.
But anyway, one thing I will add is just because the SPD are doing well now, doesnt mean they always will be - just in case anyone is wondering if this is gunna become a left wing Germany TL where they're lovely and nice and never do anything backwards and/or evil.
Anyway, thanks for all the good feedback all - Peru was fun! Next update is about la France.
I don't think is realistic for them to always be doing so well. I think they have a solid quarter or so of the German electorate locked down, but the 37.5% of the vote will likely decline in the next election (just like 1919 to 1920 OTL), especially as they are effectively an accepted party of the political establishment and that there is now a further left-wing party that could siphon votes off from them because they refuse to overthrow the greedy, corrupt capitalists
.Apparently the SPD was fairly nationalistic around this time, so I wonder if given the right prodding they could end up going in a Nazbol-esque direction of ultranationalistic communism/socialism?
Depends on how stable that further left-wing party is tbf, it didn't end so well for the USPD in our timeline 🤔I don't think is realistic for them to always be doing so well. I think they have a solid quarter or so of the German electorate locked down, but the 37.5% of the vote will likely decline in the next election (just like 1919 to 1920 OTL), especially as they are effectively an accepted party of the political establishment and that there is now a further left-wing party that could siphon votes off from them because they refuse to overthrow the greedy, corrupt capitalists
Apparently the SPD was fairly nationalistic around this time, so I wonder if given the right prodding they could end up going in a Nazbol-esque direction of ultranationalistic communism/socialism?
"wholesome" imperialism and colonialism time. Also, can the MSPD make at least a national/State railway company?
And are we getting anything about german plans for the colonies?
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I know they were supplanted by the KPD, but I'm guessing part of the reason they were done in was Weimar-era German political instability and right-wing of German politics being all to gleeful at suppressing them?
The right wing in Weimar wasn't able to do much until much later in the 20s, or at least they were not the ones holding institutional power. Weimar era instability was important yeah, but tbf I wouldn't discount TTL imperial Germany from having some difficult party politics itself.