Yo - so y'all know there likely will not be an update this weekend as I've got the most hellishly busy weekend ever. Another will follow later.
Glad y'all enjoyed the last update!
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Glad y'all enjoyed the last update!
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To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
- Start date
This was one of the most pithy comments I have seen in all my years on this site.
For the record, there is an update coming before Tuesday. Just had a rather hellish week at work and now given I'm currently in Heathrow waiting for a flight to France figured it'd be funnier to post about a French defeat TL (or is it?) while In France.
It could be neither a France defeat nor a German victory timeline, maybe one where both are neither OP or screwed but end up doing better than OTL (Which is easier for Germany in any case).
Honestly if you want a totally sort of 'honest' insider perspective on how I view this timeline most likely progressing, basically don't expect anyone to 'win'.
I think one of the bigger errors in alternate history, which is reflected in history, is the view that one power becoming ascendent leads to peace, or stability, or a morally positive world. The simple fact is, the world since the 1940's has largely been run by the Americans (the Soviet Union was never really an active participant in global affairs even if they pretended to/bullied their way into being) and in that 80 or so years the world has seen countless wars, American foreign policy errors on a collosal scale and genocides, crises, etc.
My aim in this timeline is to show that a post-CP victory will still see major global actors playing their own unique roles, there will be some horrendous episodes of history, and some admirable ones. There will be men (and women) who do great things for the worst people, and some horrible people who do the best things for the worst causes. The trend will neither be positive, nor negative, just 'different' - and that difference will largely stem from differing geopolitical confrontation zones, and alternative ideological fronts per nation.
So to be honest, the thing I quite like about this TL and the way I've planned it is that while I call it a CP victory, it's less the central powers just trouncing everyone, and it's more exploring what happens if they win the war - without the certainty that many TLs give to them winning the peace.
I think one of the bigger errors in alternate history, which is reflected in history, is the view that one power becoming ascendent leads to peace, or stability, or a morally positive world. The simple fact is, the world since the 1940's has largely been run by the Americans (the Soviet Union was never really an active participant in global affairs even if they pretended to/bullied their way into being) and in that 80 or so years the world has seen countless wars, American foreign policy errors on a collosal scale and genocides, crises, etc.
My aim in this timeline is to show that a post-CP victory will still see major global actors playing their own unique roles, there will be some horrendous episodes of history, and some admirable ones. There will be men (and women) who do great things for the worst people, and some horrible people who do the best things for the worst causes. The trend will neither be positive, nor negative, just 'different' - and that difference will largely stem from differing geopolitical confrontation zones, and alternative ideological fronts per nation.
So to be honest, the thing I quite like about this TL and the way I've planned it is that while I call it a CP victory, it's less the central powers just trouncing everyone, and it's more exploring what happens if they win the war - without the certainty that many TLs give to them winning the peace.
And also the greatest economic growth and rise in living standards in human history. Deaths from wars have also declined drastically compared to the levels throughout most of history. There's a reason the post-WW2 era has been called the Long Peace or the Pax Americana.
Indeed, financial strength also does a lot to determine the direction of global affairs. For example, Britain became a global power primarily because by controlling trade initially it allowed her to amass enormous national wealth, followed by creating a global finance system based in London. The US then followed that model, and because of her greater national wealth, combined with trade wealth, she took to dominating the entire globe financially. But, states like the USSR rejected the premise of that global order - and in focusing on ideology, the concept of power, strength politics, etc, they created their own bloc aversed to monetary global systems that the US made universal - where Imperialists had previously used them for direct national gain via exploitation.
Germany ittl meanwhile presents a unique geopolitical divergence from OTL. Germany, being an expansionist revisionist power, has partly achieved it's goal of revising the geopolitical order in it's own design. That in itself is a rare undertaking in modern geopolitics. in OTL for example, the geopolitical scene was only ever significantly changed by the United States - which was done with consent from the previous hegemons in Britain and France. The USSR revised the global order too, but only within a limited sphere.
Here, you have a unique situation where Germany now holds a significant sphere in Europe and has the ability to negotiate with/enter a global order of nations that are politically but not ideologically opposed to it. That makes it rather similar to the Soviet Union in many respects with the focus on 'spheres', but less when it comes to ideological focus.
As such, the direction of global geopolitics ittl will largely be orientated around Anglo-German relations, the rise of a revisionist state potentially in Italy and Russia, with limited capacities to revise the order dependent on their strength (which you shall see in future updates), and the influence of an isolationist but financially dominant US.
*Also, please forgive any spelling errors. I am approx 5 rum + coke's in, along with four beers.
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Diplomatically, the postwar situation ITTL almost seems like an update of the situation a century prior. A revisionist, continentally dominant power that is nonetheless incapable of defeating the British bloc due to the naval imbalance, and a probable continuation of the old European diplomatic style of congresses of powers instead of Wilson's idealistic drivel.
And there's always potential for another 1848 instead of a second Great War...
And there's always potential for another 1848 instead of a second Great War...
If there's one thing I want most, it's for realpolitik to remain the dominant strain in foreign affairs publicly ITTL. It's still what countries do OTL, but they have to dress it up. If wilsonian Idealism never takes hold (and then isn't reinforced by FDR's admittedly more practical and sane strain of it)...
So I guess that mean the traditionalist imperialism of the British/French world systems are likely to last longer, presuming this isolation the US feels last longer then OTL. With the German, and maybe whatever comes out of Russia and Japan as alternatives to the system. Which is a lot less sustainable for all these powers then the near global US financial domination of OTL.
An economically behemoth US that retreats into an even grumpier isolationism than OTL is something I don’t think I’ve ever seen properly explored so I’ll be curious where you take that
I feel skeptical that a Germany that dominates all of Eastern Europe (bar a rump Russia), the Balkans and has friendly relations with the Nordics wouldn't "win the peace". 20's, 30's and 40's France will be puny compared to OTL, both militarily and economically. Italy will become a failed state in the short term(I don't see how this can't happen the way things are being portrayed) that will be incapable of exerting itself militarily after it attempt to reorganize itself. Russia will also pose no threat, having lost Ukraine, Belarus and perhaps the north Caucasus. How is it supposed to develop the heavy industry of OTL without these regions providing food and oil? If Russia is Bolshevik then not even Britain will prop them up. Many Americans probably will feel sympathetic to German in this scenario, they will see the war as having been a useless one against a country who wasn't fundamentally hostile to America. For example, I don't see how when Republicans take back the white house they would have any incentive in continuing the pro-British, anti-German foreign policy of Wilson. That would just hurt America economically.
In short, a victorious Germany has 0 military threats on the continent. If tensions ratchet up in the 30's or 40's, they could march into Paris, the Po valley, or Petrograd no problem. If they are militarily, economically, and diplomatically stronger than OTL Nazi Germany then this should be easy for them. As just one example, most of Eastern Europe, bar perhaps Poland, should be strongly pro-German and anti-Russian, as long as the Germans play their cards right. That's Finland, the Baltics and Ukraine as a buffer against a weakened Russia.
TLDR, Revisionist Italy, France and Russia don't stand a chance against the Central Powers, Germany will dominate Europe for the next few decades.
Other then the fact the Balkans are hardly anything but stable and not exactly happy at the current situation. Nordic countries completely uninterested in military and economic domination and want to keep the Germans at a healthy distance. Germans already hard handed policy in the east would not make them popular, as we can see in Poland. France, Italy and Russia who are nothing to be dismissed and I doubt they would truly care to much about how it’s allies are like to get what they want. And the UK has all the reason to completely oppose Germany.
They might be able to militarily dominate the 20s, but beyond that? Your overestimating the stability of the German control
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Anti-Russian, sure. Pro-German ehhhh, I'm not sure that they will like the country that is trying to make their country into a colony. If anything, I expect there to be a lot of unrest in Eastern Europe,
I beg to differ. France has lost 2 wars in a row, is demographically weak, has lost major coal and steel producing regions, a has a populace who have every reason to oppose anti-German militarism.
Italy, who could barely fight in ww1 against an unstable multiethnic empire fighting on two fronts, and whose OTL ww2 performance we are well aware of, will surely pose no threat to germany. Also the Alps exist.
Then Russia, as I have already argued, will be stripped of economically important regions, and will have neighbours who are much more anti russian than they are anti german. That doesn't even consider the potential russia has for terrible or mediocre leadership in the post war years.
If you are Ukrainian, Baltic, or Finnish in this scenario, which would you rather, looking through the lens of realpolitik:
1. Economic vassal of Germany but with German guarantee against Russian revanchism. Ability to promote your own culture, language, and identity.
2. Severing ties with Germany. No protection against Russian revanchism. Must fight on own if Russia invades, potentially losing and now having your native culture, language and identity supressed.
Possibly in the Baltics in particular, there is a threat of German cultural domination. However, which os worse? German aristocrats or Bolsheviks and/or Russian ethnonationalists? In OTL it took until Germany and Russia destroyed themselves through totalitarianism and war for the Baltics to gain full sovereignty. That is clearly not an option post-war ITTL. WRT Ukraine, I don't know of any evidence that suggests Imperial germany had any intention to "Germanize" Ukraine. AFAIK they just wanted the weat and useful buffer+dependency.
Well, in the immediate aftermath of WWI, I imagine the Brest-Litvosk territories will tend to lean hard pro-Germany. But long-term, that depends on how hard the German Yoke weighs on them. IIRC, there was a time when the Ukrainians were quite eager for Russia to annex them way back when in the 1700s (could be remembering what I read wrong) or at least preferred Russia to their other alternatives at the time.
If Germany starts to become intolerably assholeish - especially if the Ludendorf/Hindenburg-style tendencies, or worse, take legitimate power again, or if they place too onerous demands on the Ukrainian economy, then Russia may start to look more attractive. Especially if the Russia that comes out of the violence in that country looking less awful than the USSR or the Russian Empire (which is a fairly low bar to set).
The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence, after all.
If Germany starts to become intolerably assholeish - especially if the Ludendorf/Hindenburg-style tendencies, or worse, take legitimate power again, or if they place too onerous demands on the Ukrainian economy, then Russia may start to look more attractive. Especially if the Russia that comes out of the violence in that country looking less awful than the USSR or the Russian Empire (which is a fairly low bar to set).
The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence, after all.
The Peace Conferences: The Treaty of Zurich & the Revolt of the Bersaglieri (November 1918)
The Peace Conferences
The Treaty of Zurich & the Revolt of the Bersaglieri
November 1918
With the opening of negotiations in Vienna had come great danger for Italy. The path she chose to tread down was one of peace - not continued war. This was in reality her only real choice, but nonetheless did not satisfy the revanchists and irredentists who had been so key in pushing Italy towards war in the first place. It is worth noting, for example, that Italy was a rare case where its Socialist party had actively opposed the conflict from the offset and maintained that policy.
This was a sharp contrast to Britain, France and Germany where in all cases Socialists backed war credits and the war effort, even if on principle they disagreed with it. This had divided the Italian socialist movement, but equally created an adversarial nature between the socialist interventionists and the socialist pacifists. This hostility would play a key part in determining how Italy would react to the conclusion of the conflict as a whole.
The issue for Italy’s Government is that they were essentially doomed to dissatisfy not just the pacifists, but the nationalists too. Territorial acquisitions by Italy would anger the pacifists, who sought a status quo peace on all fronts, while the nationalists would not be satisfied with even minor territorial annexations. While their leaders were of course pragmatic, and interventionist politicians were accepting of minor border changes given the circumstances, the real sense of anger was felt among the Italian people themselves. They had bought into this war on the idea that they’d see real national change - and yet by the end of negotiations at Zurich in November all they could see was a lot of dead sons, brothers and fathers.
Ending the War
The bigger threat in negotiations for Italy was actually the negotiators in Vienna, not those in Zurich. The Austrians and Germans had sent to Zurich their ‘C-team’ of negotiators. Individuals without enormous credibility, many of whom were replaced after the ascension of the Interfactional Committee to power in Germany. Once the war was over at Vienna, the Italian hand would massively weaken. After all, the entire German army would be free to operate on every front as it chose to do so, demobilization or not - she would still no doubt have the continent’s strongest army.
This was reflected more and more on a daily, not monthly, basis along the Italo-Austrian line. German forces from the Balkan Western Fronts poured into the region, joined by troops of the Austrian army corps in Albania and Hungarian forces in Romania. By now the Treaty of Bucharest had been long signed, and thus Hungary was free to move as she saw fit.
While the domestic mood and financial system in Austria was certainly waning, and the political instability across the Empire was absolutely growing, financial strength and economic security is largely defined by a single factor; stability. With the war clearly at an end, and clearly to Austria’s benefit, the financial system of the Empire survived - albeit only just. This gave Austria some wiggle room, and would allow the Imperial Government one solid chance at holding together the mess - but more on that later.
In the buildup to the peace at Vienna Italy had, as aforementioned, sought a few specific terms. These were concentrated around the Austrian Litoral and Trentino; but as discussed in the previous update, Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino had largely abandoned this policy as the terms at Vienna came closer to conclusion.
Thus when Vienna was signed on November 23rd, Italy’s final conclusive offer to Germany was this; give us Trentino and South Tyrol and we can call it a day. Unfortunately, the Austrians would not condone that. At many points throughout this process the idea that Germany has been leading negotiations has been alluded to, with Germany being the ones to dictate who gets what and what land Austria might surrender. This was not an unfair description - but came with caveats. Germany’s position in the conflict had led her ultimately to be the main determiner of terms, but throughout negotiations Austria had, ultimately, been given a fair say. Austrian refusal to adjust the borders in their littoral for example had prevented Italian seizure of land, because Germany accepted Austria would not willingly surrender it. Here with South Tyrol it was the same.
The northern, primarily German speaking territory of South Tyrol was simply too naturally part of Austria for the Habsburgs to ever accept the loss of - and thus Germany would not accept it’s loss. The southern, primarily Italian speaking territory of Trentino, or Austrian Tyrol, would however be permitted to join Italy. This was convenient for Germany in several ways, as it allowed her to claim wilsonian principles had dictated the peace, placating domestic left wing critics of the SPD’s part in negotiations, while Austria accepted the territorial loss as something of a fait accompli. While Austria had no doubt that if negotiations collapsed Germany could retake Trentino, Germany had no desire to do so and Emperor Karl had no real incentive to want to hold the territory - particularly as from the outset of the war with Italy, Hungary had made clear that Cisleithania should not expand territorially - particularly into Italy. This made holding Italian territory less inherently valuable, and Habsburg officials feared that an Italian region in Trentino would only serve to further divide the empire in the long term as the Emperor sought to introduce his ‘people’s manifesto’ later in the year.
Offered Trentino for their trouble, Italy’s negotiators solemnly took what they could get and on November 26th 1918 signed peace with the Central Powers of Austria, Bulgaria and Germany, before agreeing to a normalisation of relations with the Ottomans several days later conditional on Ottoman acceptable of Italian ownership of the Italian Islands of the Aegean.
Some might ask, in hindsight, why Italy essentially agreed to fall back from key Italian speaking cities like Gorizio in the Austrian Littoral that they had seized in their advance. The answer to this is simple; it might seem an easy solution to just refuse to leave and force Germany and Austria to take it back - but should this have happened it is extremely unlikely that German forces would have accepted any territorial concessions at all. It is important to remember that for Italy to refuse to return this territory it would have forced the Austrians to leave the negotiations if they were unwilling to concede the territory - which they were. If they had left, the negotiations would have broken down, and conflict would thus resume.
German forces, while tired, were motivated to get over the red line and complete the conflict on their terms. Had negotiations broken down, this would have certainly meant the re-capture of the occupied cities, and the potential for a further advance into Veneto and whatever consequences would come of that. For Prime Minister Giolitti therefore the optimal outcome was minor territorial concessions wherever he could grab them, followed by a rapid transition to a post war focus on domestic politics to calm down the ever changing political situation.
Of course, no plan though when dealing with high stakes tends to go as expected.
Striking the Match
At home in Italy things had already further degraded. On November 4th a new organization had entered the political frontline, the National Combatants Association. This group was dedicated to the protection of the rights of veterans, having emerged from a similar group dedicated to protecting disabled war veterans. While in hindsight some have been quick to label this organisation as some kind of extremist political group of rabble rousers, in reality it was led by remarkably liberal, moderate men.
While Mussolini and his followers no doubt had influence over the group from his business-sponsored magazine Il Popolo d'Italia, men such as Gaetano Salvemini in actual fact led the organisation and spoke for it. A dedicated Republican and moderate on the political centre-left, Salvemini had a cordial relationship with both the nationalist camp led by Alceste De Ambris, and the socialist camp in the organisation. Dominated by peasant veterans of the war who made up approx 90% of all serving frontline troops, the NCA tended towards the political left - triggering fears that the ‘red guard’ units of militia currently occupying much of the country’s north unofficially were organising.
This in actual fact was far from the truth. The Red Guards in fact were largely just peasant militias formed by frustrated left wing peasant farmers who wanted the land they had been promised during the war and reform to Italy’s long suffering peasant land system. They were often lightly armed, and rarely organised, but simply acted as something of a threatening force to local Government administrations that allowed factory and peasant councils to de-facto control much of the north of the country.
This was not without contest, and in fact Mussolini’s own Fascio d'Azione Rivoluzionaria, or ‘fasces’ tended to end up brawling with them in the streets of cities such as Milan over differing priorities. For the revolutionary right, the priority was if not kick starting the war then at the very least refusing to evacuate conquered lands in Istria. For the left, the priority was domestic reform and political change. But the peace treaty changed this.
Infuriated by the news that Italian forces would be ordered to withdraw to pre-war boundaries within just a matter of days, besides the tiny territory of Trentino, many troops of the Italian Army in Istria in particular simply refused to leave. The war had been hard fought, and after such a massive advance and some real progress the idea that they would now be forced to abandon cities like Udine and Gorizia infuriated the nationalists among the rank and file of the army - particularly elite units such as the Arditi and Bersaglieri.
One unit in particular would prove impervious to the order to withdraw; the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment. Decorated for their service in the Italo-Ottoman war of 1912, and having served with distinction throughout the war, the 11th Regiment were one of Italy’s most capable and most elite units, and even at one point included Mussolini himself in their ranks. On November 28th though they were ordered out of the hard-won city of Gorizia and back to pre-war boundaries, and miraculously they refused.
This triggered a bizarre and politically confusing period in the city that would last well over a week, as the nationalist-leaning Bersaglieri found immense support among the local populace in the city itself, along with the vital southern cities of Veneto. Overthrowing their commanding officer Colonel Gino Graziani, the regiment called on the resignation of the Government and the continuation of general war with the Germans and Austrians in a naive attempt to hold onto their gains.
The NCA soon backed the decision, calling on the resignation of the Government and the election of a new Parliament to debate the Treaty of Zurich. When the Government refused to resign and dispatched loyal forces to crush the rebellion the next day, they called on the King to remove the Government entirely and began arranging veterans marches in the capital and protests.
On the Socialist side meanwhile, while the goals of the Bersaglieri and the PSI did not match up at all, the idea of the Government crushing the rebellion ignited a fear that any such later attempt at revolution by the people may itself be crushed by the military unless the trade unions were to take a stand now. This was further escalated when Red Guard militias throughout the Veneto region who took the revolt as an invitation to seize total control.
On the first day of the revolt socialists militias in Gorizia seized much of the city alongside the Bersaglieri, however by the second day the revolt had quickly spread. Behind the lines, socialist militias and left-leaning units seized the cities of Monfalcone, Udine and Lignano Sabbiadoro, while frontline units established control along the Istrian frontline. Popular writers such as Gabrielle D’Annunzio spurred the army into revolt, writing a well publicised piece calling on the military to remove the Government and fight to defend ‘rightful’ Italian territory to the bitter end.
While the larger trade union blocs hesitated, paralyzed between their extremist wings on the left demanding strike action and those on the right who sought to avoid direct confrontation with the Government, the rail workers unions in Ancona, Tuscany and Veneto took direct action alone. Declaring a general strike of all workers, rail transport by day three of the revolt in those regions ceased to operate. Military units dispatched by the Government to forcibly remove the Bersaglieri and now other revolting units were forced to travel by road, with elements of the Royal Guard itself being used in the effort.
Venetian socialist Giacomo Matteotti, a major force in the success of the PSI in Veneto, would be the first to issue a national rallying call in favour of the Bersaglieri. Calling on the workers of Veneto to resist the advancing Royalist force, he attempted to rally a significant resistance against the Royalist forces in the province - but ultimately failed to make a significant impact. This was largely on account of Veneto’s lack of significant industrialization - and thus lack of workers. Peasants across the countryside did respond, joining the peasants in the Padan valley in protesting the military action, but this made no direct impact on the outcome of the incident. By day four, the Bersaglieri had been brought back under control and the general withdrawal was in order.
In the end, the Revolt of the Bersaglieri would prove somewhat less dramatic than some may have hoped. But for the ordinary soldiers on the frontline it was a major lesson - it was a clear indication that the Italian Government was not to be trusted. With Matteotti’s rallying cry too, many socialists across the country had seen that the soldiers, if pushed, would rally to the cause of the left - even with differences of opinion over the war. Zurich had left nationalism empowered in the minds of ordinary soldiers, but had left the nationalists with no clear path forward - while the Socialists carried a popular, clear message.
The Government must go.
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Well the war is over. Germany limps over the finish line half starved, France's morale crushed into powder, cobwebs massing in the Bank of England's empty vault, Italy crumbling, Russia [REDACTED] and the Ottomans ottagone.
Can't wait for the madness of round two
Can't wait for the madness of round two