It'd probably be better for them to annex the Sudetenland and establish a Bohemian puppet state in the rest of the country.
To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
- Start date
You know, all of this is depending on if AH collapses...which really, it could still do so, Hungarian Nationalists gotta Nationalist, and I feel they're the ones who would initiate stupidity like that. But I feel AH isn't going to fold anytime soon. Then again, I could be wrong.
Probably not much longer. The war ate a lot of men and money, and they're not likely to make any reforms that could stave off revolts. All this did was kick the can down the road some.
Thing is, France without the iron ore has been effectively defanged; this may not be completely evident by now, but even OTL after having won WW1, France was weaker than Germany, despite the latter having had only 5 years to rearm when WW2 broke out. Without reparations french industry will be crippled for years, as it was largely devastated during the war, and now they have limited access to iron as well. Germany faced the same problem with iron before WW2, and they bought It from Sweden, which, btw comes at a cost: this means that you just can't buy all the iron ore you would need in order to build everything you wish you could build.
Concerning Italy, the country is on the verge of a civil war. Even OTL they were utterly unprepared for modern war, their industrial base being far too small. Also, without the substantial natural barrier provided by the alps, Italy's industrial heartland lies barely weeks away from a determined assault: if Lombardy falls, Italy will follow suit
Disagree. You got it backwards.
It might fall apart in the upcoming decade, as certain issues come to a head. But if it survives the short term, it's long term chances are better than even.
^ This, it has won the war, and for all intents, won the peace, but it's long term survival depends on winning the immediate "post-war."
I'm really curious to see how the Entente continues after this. Anglo-French co-operation is practically necessary to prevent German domination of Europe in the long run, but keeping to that will require level heads and adroit diplomacy after a loss like this.
How Germany develops will matter a lot. Easier for France and Britain to march in lockstep if it's a hostile and aggressive Germany attempting to fully destroy the balance of power. Harder to march in lockstep if Germany is more pivoting to soft power, building economic links, etc.
How Germany develops will matter a lot. Easier for France and Britain to march in lockstep if it's a hostile and aggressive Germany attempting to fully destroy the balance of power. Harder to march in lockstep if Germany is more pivoting to soft power, building economic links, etc.
The Peace Conferences: The Treaty of Vienna (November 1918)
The Peace Conferences
The Treaty of Vienna
November 1918
The Treaty of Vienna, despite involving by far the most powers, in reality involved very little real negotiation or haggling, unlike the Congress just over a century prior.
Involving the entire Central Powers bloc, along with the United States, Italy, Greece, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Treaty would essentially end the conflict broadly in southern Europe.
Stabilising the Balkans
German demands were relatively simple. German geostrategy relating to the Balkans emphasised the idea of a strong Bulgaria as a stabilising influence on the Balkans, along with a weakened Italy, a nearly eradicated Serbia and a friendly Greece. This was in line with German desires to see a conclusive solution to the eternally divided and warring Balkans, aimed at protecting German trade interests on the Danube.
Poor Serbia, completely occupied by Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary since 1916, bore the brunt of these strategic goals. Central Powers negotiators, without concerns relating to Britain or any other power interfering besides the United States, demanded their maximum demands.
Britain for its part did not want a powerful Bulgaria in the Balkans, primarily due to the threat posed by Bulgaria to the historic British ally of Greece and potential for Bulgarian conquest of Constantinople. While the British had long been the principal arbitrator on the ‘eastern question’ during the 19th century, by the 1890’s Germany had largely seized this position.
Britain now was largely willing to entirely concede that role to Germany. While the Balkans were no doubt resource rich and Britain preferred a balanced series of near equally sized and competitive states in the region, Britain had little interest in arbitrating further conflicts in the region and had no capacity to dictate a settlement. This was particularly after the exhaustion of British political capital with Germany over the western front settlement.
As a result, Serbia would be more than halved; being returned to a size barely larger than her 1813 borders at Independence from the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria, seeking to ‘pacify’ the country, would annex her maximum claims over the territory - setting the new border at the Velika Morava River and annexing the entire south of the country, including the largely Bulgarian ‘vardar Macedonia’.
Serbia further would be prohibited from unifying with Montenegro in the treaty’s terms, a policy that ended the threat of Yugoslavism that Austria-Hungary had grown to fear by the end of the war.
Additionally, Serbia would be subject to Austrian and German economic domination through the amendment of the Danube Commission to exclude Britain and only admit Black Sea and Danubian states, along with the mandatory repayment of significant reparations and declaration of Austria-Hungary as Serbia’s most favoured nation for trade. This had largely been established in the Treaty of Bucharest in May, but now would be firmly set in place by the Central Powers.
Finally, Serbia would be forced to admit guilt for the war, in effect admitting blame for a conflict after they were themselves attacked - albeit due to tentative complicity in the asssassination of Frans Ferdinand. King Paul, already having been in effective retirement since the start of the war, would also be required to abdicate, and his second son and regent Alexander was forced to abandon his claim to the throne.
This left Serbia in a precarious and constitutionally bizarre position, as now both of Peter's sons had abandoned their claims to the throne. With neither son having had children yet, this in theory left Peter’s younger brother Arsen as heir to the throne, however Arsen was a known member of the Black Hand organisation, and thus vetoed in Austria - not to mention his war service, nationalism and current exile in France after having fought in Russia and being tried by the Bolsheviks. The final candidate, the nephew of King Paul, would be Arsen’s son - Paul. Prince Paul, whose military service in 1914 had been described as ‘undistinguished’, had lived in London for the last year and thus was an acceptable candidate to the British, and was both young and largely irrelevant politically.
For Germany Paul proved a ‘perfect’ candidate, even if he was far from perfect for Serbia itself - particularly due to his sympathies with Croatian nationalism and opposition to the Yugoslav project. Reluctantly taking the role, Paul would be acclaimed as King of Serbia shortly after the signing of the Vienna Treaty in early December as leader of a greatly demoralised nation.
Greece meanwhile suffered relatively little for her participation in the conflict on account of it’s political reversal and British opposotion to excessive consequences. Losing its northern territories along with direct access to southern Macedonia and the city of Thessaloniki, it would not be forced into any kind of unfavourable economic relationship and largely left to its own devices. This was part of a German aim to stabilise the country in the direction of pro-German Monarchism over the Venizelist nationalism that had seized the country in 1916.
Albania, for its part, would see their Prince Wilhelm of Wied restored to his position, proclaiming himself as its King and ceding some small eastern territories to the Bulgarians. This was aimed at balancing the Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims in the territory and stemming competing desires to install a pro-Bulgarian or pro-Austrian monarchy in the country after the war. This also was an effective means of applying pressure on Italy, whose control of the mouth of the Adriatic could now be challenged by a pro-German Albania.
Finally, in Montenegro the situation would remain largely the same. Crown Prince Danilo, son of the reigning King Nicolas of Montenegro, would inherit the title after his father’s abdication. In reality though upon the signing of the treaty the prince would in the space of a week refuse, accept, re-refuse, re-accept and then refuse the title on an almost daily basis - ultimately passing the throne to his brother Marko at age 13, who subsequently was overthrown in a crisis-triggering revolution later.
Bulgaria as such ascended to the most powerful role in the Balkans, doubling in size and dooming much of the new territories to a period of Bulgarization and brutality at the hands of their new occupiers.
A Fragile Italy
The situation in Italy by November 1918 was verging on anarchy. While there was not a state of civil conflict in the country, much of the country’s north and parts of the south had essentially become resistant to government authority as councils established by workers and peasants largely began to ignore their local administrations.
One might assume the Government would just send in police or army forces, but while there were some examples of this taking place - particularly around Rome and in isolated southern Italian regions - the police were no longer reliable in areas such as the Padan valley. The fact was, police largely sympathised with or were numerically incapable of opposing the tens of thousands of politicised trade unionists throughout the country who continually executed disorganised wildcat strikes.
The army too was no longer seen as reliable. While Italian army forces had advanced through Veneto with high spirits, the announcement of a truce had seen many peasant soldiers immediately decide that the conflict was essentially over and go AWOL. While the initial tide resulted in harsh crackdowns by officers, with dozens of soldiers being shot for desertion, by early October the Italian army was fraying at the edges and beginning to quickly dissolve.
Germany by contrast was in an increasingly stronger position. While negotiating additional German forces had been deployed to the rear of the Austro-Italian frontline, creating an ominous pressure in Rome on the Italian Government under Giolitti that Germany could at any day launch a second Caporetto.
Despite this, Italian delegates continued to negotiate optimistically at Zurich. The delay in the negotiations had led to the Prime Minister and King ultimately agreeing to suspend the planned elections expected in October, aiming to wrap up negotiations during November and then go into a full democratic debate over the path forward.
Increasingly fraught over the potential outcome of negotiations though, Italian negotiators at Zurich led by Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, who had remained in post under Giolitti, had rapidly begun to soften demands.
While initially Italy had demanded the seizure of significant territories in the Austrian Littoral and Trent regions, Sonnino by the start of November had essentially been whittled down to “we’ll take whatever you’ll give us” while desperately trying to make clear the threat of revolution to the Germans.
To an extent the Germans were sympathetic to this, particularly after the general strike and the accession of the von Payer administration. However, this was a double edged sword.
The SPD in particular were firmly against the idea of territorial annexations where there were not nationalities seeking to be brought into a new state along the lines of a wilsonian peace. Worse still, the SPD firmly believed that annexations would likely lead to an upsurge in nationalism in Austria or even outright revolution - the worst outcome. They also disliked the idea of handing German territories over to the Italians at all, which in effect ruled out the annexation of all of Trent province.
While it could have been worse, the Government could have opposed any territorial changes at all along a socialist ‘peace without annexations’ doctrine, in the end what Germany was willing to offer was small and simple; Southern Trent.
This was a tiny concession, and would no doubt infuriate the Italian people, but it was equally the only territory currently occupied by Italy besides some territory west of the Isonzo. Italian delegates had spent virtually all of October attempting to secure additional concessions in the Austrian Littoral, with Italian military leaders even suggesting a naive and almost certainly vain attempt at a twelfth battle of the Isonzo - but this was ultimately scrapped after desertions became too prevalent.
As such, by the time the Treaty of Vienna was signed in late November, Italy was just about ready for peace.
Dealing with the United States
The US had decided to negotiate at Vienna for two reasons. First; she saw Vienna as the weaker front for the Central Powers and aimed to emphasise the self-determination clause of the 14 points here both to weaken Austria and to limit Central Powers demands. Secondly, she sought to negotiate at Vienna as it allowed the United States to observe the treaty without binding her hands in Brussels before Vienna was completed - limiting her ability to steer German demands.
Despite the intention though, the United States quickly found that her moral authority at Vienna was essentially ignored. While often referring to the principles of self determination, Central Powers negotiators often fell back on flashy lines vaguely speaking in favour of the 14 points, while in reality ignoring them. This included the many times re-iterated claim that Vardar Macedonia had to be protected by Bulgaria, along with the claim that Croatia must be protected from the Serbs.
This left Wilson in an embarrassing and rapidly weakening position, which became far worse as soon as Britain and Germany began negotiating. Germany, while threatened by the United States naval power, was far more concerned with the threat of the British blockade compared to potential American merchant raiding. Trade being harassed after all was far less threatening than no trade at all - particularly if the bases for that trading were across an ocean.
As such, by November with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels the American negotiating position had largely collapsed and the US congress in practice withdrew all support for any Treaty dictated by Wilson. This crushed the President, who became relegated to quickly declining political relevance at home - blamed for a foreign, valueless war seen only as costly to the American public, even if he refused to accept it.
This meant that come the time to sign the Treaty, the United States had achieved only two things. She had secured theoretical free passage of American ships through the Bosporus straits into the Black Sea from the Turks in an independent treaty agreed after Turkish exclusion from the Central Powers, and she had been required to pay nothing in compensation to Germany besides returning her seized merchant vessels.
For the United States this was satisfactory, with the same being held for the Germans who sought little from the US other than an end to hostilities. In theory, the United States did also secure some potential openness from Germany over joining an eventual League of Nations - but this was in practice just a pipe dream.
Analysis
The Treaty of Vienna was ultimately signed on November 23rd, while the Treaty of Zurich would be signed just days later. This ended the conflict in Europe for good just before Christmas - albeit four years after the public of most states had assumed.
The Treaty of Vienna is remembered primarily for two things; for essentially denying the Serbian people a relevant state of their own and triggering decades of unrest in the Balkans as a result, and for the utter failure of the United States to extract anything of value from the conflict at all.
The treaty in the United States is further remembered with deeply mixed feelings. For American isolationists, the treaty proved the death knell for Wilsonian interventionism, with the entire political culture regressing quickly into isolationism once more after the war. Wilson himself would struggle on in his presidency until 1919 when he suffered a major health decline, while the American political system would see a distinct split in it’s approach to geopolitics.
While ascendent in both parties after the war, factions within the GOP in particular, and particularly Progressives, viewed the war as a completely missed opportunity to reshape the world for the better in an American limelight.
Individuals such as Theodore Roosevelt, Leonard Wood and former commander of American Forces Pershing viewed the conflict’s loss as a key indicator that the United States needed to be better prepared to engage in a conflict abroad, subsequently providing ample justification for a post-war preparedness movement rebound in opposition to the growth of isolationism.
As such, overall the treaty has become a hallmark of Imperialist underestimation of the new era of social nationalism across Europe, particularly among the younger states in Europe. It is often blamed by historians for causing later instability, and ultimately instability in the Austro-Hungarian empire as well.
But the treaty ultimately paled in comparison to another treaty in terms of it’s immediate social consequences - that signed in Zurich.
Well the sky is still blue, and fire is still hot. Balkans gotta Balkans.
Sounds like spiritual successors to the Black Hand are going to be quite plentiful in the post-war Balkans -- and ITTL, they may even get Montenegrin support depending on the nature of that crisis-causing revolution. Bulgaria may have the upper hand and the strongest allies, but they have no diplomatic way to prevent combinations of Romania, Serbia, and Greece from wanting to gang up and retake their claims. The Romano-Serb axis could also ally against the Hungarians if they manage to cause the political dissolution of the Dual Monarchy with their intransigence, and the Serbo-Greek axis would have room to strike against Albania as well.
If there comes a moment where Germany is deeply occupied elsewhere (perhaps with the other mess of conflicting ethnonationalist claims in the former PLC), then Bulgaria would find itself fighting all its enemies at once again, and thats if the Turks don't decide to strike opportunistically. For the Croats, if they can stomach a loss of Dalmatia I think Italy is their natural patron and ally (unless Albania manages to have more leeway, perhaps in a scenario where the AH situation deteriorates quickly).
Britain is going to be leaning on Turkey even more now that they've essentially conceded the European Balkans to the German bloc (for now).
If there comes a moment where Germany is deeply occupied elsewhere (perhaps with the other mess of conflicting ethnonationalist claims in the former PLC), then Bulgaria would find itself fighting all its enemies at once again, and thats if the Turks don't decide to strike opportunistically. For the Croats, if they can stomach a loss of Dalmatia I think Italy is their natural patron and ally (unless Albania manages to have more leeway, perhaps in a scenario where the AH situation deteriorates quickly).
Britain is going to be leaning on Turkey even more now that they've essentially conceded the European Balkans to the German bloc (for now).
The Balkan crabpot now sees Bulgaria ascendant, but it's the Balkans so the next coming wars will probably see the Bulgarians get their wings clipped.
Austria-Hungary is still clanking along, but there isn't any driving force within the Austro-Hungarian government that is strong enough to reform it into something sustainable. It's still at high risk of collapse. But maybe the Habsburgs can defy gravity and pull off a miracle. I know they've done it before.
Serbia's been cut down, but is not out of the game and Serbian nationalism is very resilient, Greece came out relatively ok considering the situation, Albania has it's German Prince/King back (is his title still Prince of Albania?) and is basically a German-puppet state, Italy is taking blow after blow and more are too come, and Montenegro is going to undergo some sort of revolution, does this mean a new monarchy or a republic?
I know that the German Empire wanted to set up buffer-states in the Baltics lands that the Bolsheviks gave up, but in RL Russia got back when it was obvious that Germany would lose WW1.
In this TL... What happened to the Baltic region?
Austria-Hungary is still clanking along, but there isn't any driving force within the Austro-Hungarian government that is strong enough to reform it into something sustainable. It's still at high risk of collapse. But maybe the Habsburgs can defy gravity and pull off a miracle. I know they've done it before.
Serbia's been cut down, but is not out of the game and Serbian nationalism is very resilient, Greece came out relatively ok considering the situation, Albania has it's German Prince/King back (is his title still Prince of Albania?) and is basically a German-puppet state, Italy is taking blow after blow and more are too come, and Montenegro is going to undergo some sort of revolution, does this mean a new monarchy or a republic?
I know that the German Empire wanted to set up buffer-states in the Baltics lands that the Bolsheviks gave up, but in RL Russia got back when it was obvious that Germany would lose WW1.
In this TL... What happened to the Baltic region?
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Heh! The more things change, the more they stay the same. Wilson's 14 points still get trashed on.
This is an interesting butterfly that I never thought about. Most CP Victory timelines I've seen have the US become more isolationist and I agreed with this view as I figured that a US that comes out of WW1 with even less gains would be even more inclined to be isolationist. But looking at this from another angle, it is completely plausible that without knowledge of how things turned out for the US in OTL, where it won WW1, Roosevelt and other interventionists can make the argument that interventionism isn't necessarily bad or wrong, but that Wilson was a flawed champion of it because he was indecisive, intervening in WW1 too late to prevent a German victory.
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Yeah, that's not going to go over well.
Germany gives away what many consider core Austrian/Tyrolean territories. Even if we may be only dealing with Southern Trento/Trentino here, not Tyrol 'proper'.
If we get the Brenner border TTL too, there will be riots in the streets and Austrian German-nationalists (getting confused yet) out to lynch any German socialist they can get their hands on. (Because they will be the ones who will take the majority of the blame - no border change policy or not.) Talk about alienating ones closet ally. (And that border very much was the Italian aim - not for cultural reasons, no matter how much they like to pretend, but for strategic ones.)
However if that really is 'southern Trent' aka maybe the line up to Riva and Rovereto as the frontline often was - then they might accept it with grumbling. Not sure why the Italians would take that deal however, aside from preventing Austria to put boats on Lake Garda (again) it would hardly give them any advantage.
The traditional language line - aka the Salurner Klamm might too be acceptable - but then the naming as 'Southern Trent' is all wrong - it'd be Tento without maybe bits like the German speaking Fersental.
And that's one of the things that annoys me with that update at all: It's Germany negotiation, A-H is hardly ever mentioned.
Again: reiterating what I stated earlier: I can't really see a Third Piave-esque collapse early, in the knowledge that Entente forces were already pulling out. But even then the complete government collapse of October 1918 would still likely not happen, if the idea was that they'd just have to hold out 'until France was done'.
And even then with a victory under their belt, some concessions to autonomy to Prague made, the Cisleithanian part is basically stabilized for things to come. (Okay, simplified, but...) However the Treaty of Zürich might threaten that. After all, Slovenia is dependant to a large part of not loosing out to Italian advances. And here is Italy nibbling at the edge. And the German-nationalists are the ones most offended by territorial concessions in Tyrol - being one of the pillars of the Austrian-German alliance.
So if we get the idea that Germany is giving away Austrian territories....
However as mentioned Hungary is more problematic. But TTL Hungary didn't hold out to 'get a better deal' long after Cisleithania surrendered. That should give them some stability until renegotiating the Ausgleich is on the table - and even then the threat of a Hungarian uprising has less tooth than it appears at first. Because that'd be a revolt of the Hungarian elite first and foremost.
The real threat would be a civil war by the Hungarian minorities (and maybe Hungarian peasants) against Vienna and Budapest - but from what I know Karl should be shrewd enough to avoid that one at least - if Germany doesn't undermine him all the way.
(Sorry for my rambling - but the ambiguity and the lack of comment on 'Germany giving away Austrian territory' kind got to me. - As were some A-H is doomed comments in here. Bloody (literally) century old Anglo propaganda still working.)
Edit: I might be misremembering, but shouldn't there be a Obrenovic pretender floating around somewhere too, who might get discusses as King of Serbia?
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