To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory
- Thread starter TheReformer
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From what i understand the Zentrum party had both left and right wings and was a broadly Catholic party in Germany, so its possible Hertling is from the right of his party and views the more peace-supporting left and "centre" unfavourably.
Winning the Peace: British Negotiations (October 1918)
Winning the Peace
British Negotiations
October 1918
With the general strike over and the Military Government having been partially toppled at least, Chancellor von Payer sought to establish order in the country while satisfying his partners in the SPD and Zentrum. It should be made clear though, while Germany was now politically in the hands of the interfactional committee, they did not have total control over the state - and had no direct control over the military.
A liberal aimed at reforming the state, but unwilling to act directly against the monarchy or limit German war aims, von Payer straddled both the nationalist military clique and the pacifist socialists bloc and aimed to establish a lasting peace that would satisfy all parties. First and foremost though, this required securing talks with the British.
Contacting German ambassador to Denmark Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau and instructing him to approach the British delegation with a proposal for talks, von Payer made clear to the stalwart liberal but proud patriot von Brockdorff-Rantzau that he should approach Britain for serious negotiations for an armistice.
Von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the man instrumental in delivering Lenin to Russia and close with SPD leader Ebert, made the approach on October 19th. He was a cautious man, but equally a very pragmatic one. Widely considered an option to become Germany’s Foreign Minister, Von Brockdorff-Rantzau would be a trusted figure able to negotiate an amicable deal with Britain - provided he was left to his own devices and interference from the OHL was kept to a minimum.
The meeting with the new British ambassador in Copenhagen Sir Charles Marling took place in a ‘chance encounter’ at near Frederiks Kirke. Of course in actual fact Marling had received a memo from an assistant to Von Brockdorff-Rantzau asking that the two meet nearby the castle, prompting both men to set out on midday walks nearby the church and ‘bump into one another’ without the constraints of their extensive staff.
Von Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposals were simple; Germany was willing to agree to a conditional armistice with Britain immediately provided that Britain accept guarantees that the blockade would be lifted upon the completion of peace negotiations in Copenhagen.
Building on preliminary discussions about peace in 1917 by then foreign secretary Kühlmann, Von Brockdorff-Rantzau’s immediately conceded that there would be no German bases in the channel. Further, Germany would surrender to British demands for a politically independent Belgium under King Albert. This would however require border adjustments, and the Ambassador made clear that Germany in surrendering control of Belgium would be forced to seize what it labelled as ‘forward defences’ from both France and Germany to assure Germany’s longer term security. This would primarily be focused around the Ardennes region.
This peace would be negotiated between the two parties in Copenhagen, with issues such as the future of Germany’s colonies being open for discussion - albeit with great hesitation on the part of Germany. The German Government would also would insist that Britain respect the terms of the new settlement in eastern Europe, while Germany would honour British arrangements with the Turks.
Finally, Germany would agree to surrender her pacific territories - often seen as a burden more than a benefit - after a period of peace to either Britain, the United States or Japan.
Taken aback by the proposals in a position so unfamiliar to the war cabinet, Denmark Minister Sir Charles Marling immediately relayed the offer to the British Government and Prime Minister Bonar Law.
Aware of the political strife in Germany, the British cabinet had become divided between two new peace and war parties.
The war party, led by War Minister Alfred Milner, 1st Viscount Milner, firmly believed that to prevent later German expansionism, Germany must be pushed to the brink of catastrophe before any peace could be negotiated by economically isolating her, potentially for years.
The peace party meanwhile, led by Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain, believed firmly that Germany could be contained using international treaty obligations and organisations such as the American-backed League of Nations, and that without peace soon Britain would be susceptible to major social unrest.
Bonar Law for his part straddled the two groups. His priority was political unity in the country and providing the British people with ‘compensation’ for their immense sacrifice in France. However, like Lloyd George and Asquith before him, he feared that a Germany unleashed upon the world would create an irrevocably unstable influence in Europe and would threaten British national security.
For Bonar Law two questions stood out though; how long could Britain realistically resist Germany without herself appearing the aggressor, and if the new German Government failed to secure peace, what would replace it?
Both questions were vital for British interests. If Britain continued to prosecute the war alone, it may alienate the overwhelming trade and navigation focused Americans and paint Britain as the belligerent state. While it is unlikely America would ever demand Britain withdrew the blockade, she risked being seen as an obstacle in the way of peace, rather than the side attempting to limit German demands. This would isolate her during a period where she would need allies to isolate Germany.
Further, if Britain rebuffed the Germans now when they were offering Britain influence over the final European settlement, would Germany’s new more liberal regime survive, or would it be replaced by nationalists who would further dominate the continent by force? Or even, if Germany failed to do that, might she herself fall to Bolshevism in the longer term?
Ultimately, the Prime Minister chose to walk a steady and specific line towards peace. This was not controversial among the cabinet or Parliament, in fact Britain had very seriously considered a settlement with Germany in 1917 with assurances over Belgium. Her main priorities, after all, were preventing German naval access to positions that would undermine British security, even in the worst case a weakened France would be preferable to German control of Belgium.
Agreeing to begin negotiations in Copenhagen between British and German delegates, the two parties officially opened talks at Denmark’s Christiansborg Palace on October 21st. This would be a negotiation where there was no armistice, both sides would merely have to agree on terms, or there would be no peace.
While British warships and German submarines would pull back to an extent to avoid dramatically damaging the morale of either Government, with Germany suspending unrestricted submarine warfare on October 20th, both sides would fight until the moment the ink was on the paper.
For Germany, Britain’s agreement to the plan was bitter sweet. News of the talks in Copenhagen instantly electrified the German public after it was revealed in the monday morning papers on the 21st. Carefully worded, the Government had ‘guided’ the papers on how to present the story, aiming to spin it less as a British capitulation and more as a British admission of futility in a longer term conflict.
The German public quickly took to the streets to celebrate, while German diplomats continued their exhaustive work drawing up fine print for the Germans to present Britain in the initial proposals on both sides. Discussions would no doubt take months as both sides haggled over the fate of western Europe, but for a moment the world all at once celebrated - the war was at last coming to a close.
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:cries in Flanders-Wallonia:
🤣
Britain gets to keep their synthetic country, I guess.
Out of curiosity, will of the presumed reforms or changes to the German Empire in the aftermath of WW1 be detailed in future updates (things such as changes to the voting franchise in terms of age, gender, method of voting; changes in terms of government policy, such as if an SPD government were to implement or increase government healthcare assistance/benefits to veterans/their dependants or implement/expand unemployment insurance etc)?
I'll be going into more detail on the domestic side of things post peace treaties mainly, but I'll touch on post-truce reforms in a not so far away future update.
One thing worth considering when you get around to dealing with the tricky business of the colonies. Smuts was adamantly opposed to returning Namibia to Germany no matter what happened in France. However Germany's biggest interest in Southwest Afrika was the very small but diamond rich Sperrgebeit. If they could get that back they would be willing to write off the rest of the colony as a tax loss (so to speak). Botha might then be willing to tell Smuts, "Hey we're only giving up this tiny sliver. Our subjects will look at the map and feel that keeping most of the land is good enough."
Would Britain? IRL, Britain could accept the Naval treaty because their most direct rivals (Russia and Germany) had just gotten smacked down. Sure, France and the US, etc, were concerns, but Britain didn't need to maintain quite as strong an advantage over them given the context.
ITTL, Germany dominating the continent still leaves Britain needing all the navy it can get.
ITTL, Germany dominating the continent still leaves Britain needing all the navy it can get.
Hard to say. On one hand, it would allow them to purge any leftist sympathesizers and their track record in the war was not exactly rife with success.
A couple of factors to consider when talking about the German fleet is it size was controlled by the German Naval Laws. A key element was the age of replacement. 20 years for Battleships and Large Cruisers (BCs). So that huge mass of ships ordered as part of the first Fleet Law in 1898 is due for replacement. The Reichstag isn't going to be thrilled to pay for all that. Especially with the large number of war appropriation and replacements for war loss ships either under construction or at least on order.
So I can see a German government willing to do a deal to control costs and not have to build that huge mass of ships they are on hook for over next 5 years.
At same time fleet wants to revise the laws. With Tirpitz gone HSF can move to a unified type between the Large Cruiser and Battleship as some have been pushing for roughly a decade.
You could see a WNT analog as part of the peace treaty.
USA/UK/Ger/Jpn/Fra/Itl/AH
5/5/3/3/1.67/1.67:/1.67
Assuming that AH survives to sign such a treaty.
Question is UK willing to accept a German fleet 60% size of RN? In 1914 they were but would they be in 1918?
EDIT
Another thing to consider is that in 1918 Germany had second largest cruiser fleet and a mass of U Boats. Fear over trade will drive much of the British thinking about any naval deal with Germany. So the German light cruisers and U Boats will need to be included in any such deal.
Michael
So I can see a German government willing to do a deal to control costs and not have to build that huge mass of ships they are on hook for over next 5 years.
At same time fleet wants to revise the laws. With Tirpitz gone HSF can move to a unified type between the Large Cruiser and Battleship as some have been pushing for roughly a decade.
You could see a WNT analog as part of the peace treaty.
USA/UK/Ger/Jpn/Fra/Itl/AH
5/5/3/3/1.67/1.67:/1.67
Assuming that AH survives to sign such a treaty.
Question is UK willing to accept a German fleet 60% size of RN? In 1914 they were but would they be in 1918?
EDIT
Another thing to consider is that in 1918 Germany had second largest cruiser fleet and a mass of U Boats. Fear over trade will drive much of the British thinking about any naval deal with Germany. So the German light cruisers and U Boats will need to be included in any such deal.
Michael
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I think the HSF can secure funding for the 2 last Bayern class BBs easly, could be named Wurttemberg and Saxony to keep the kingdom theme going. After that though, would they jump straight to 420mm (16.5") or built one more class of 4 ships with 380s (15")? Also at this point the usefulness of the Nassau class is probably being questioned.
The problem with an analogue of the WNT including Germany is manyfold:
1) the US will not accept to be second to anyone, hence their request that the japanese-british Alliance be dropped
2) if the Japanese are not their allies anymore and their are getting a 3 ratio, this combined with Germany's 3nand US 5 would out the RN at risk of being outnumbered
3) Japan is not going to accept anything less than a 3 ratio
4) the same applies to germany
5) even if the Germans accept 1,75 the problem would stay
6) the building holiday clause woul be untenable, ad the whole german battlefleet was obsolete, apart from the Bayern class
6b) no building holiday means a lot of money spent
Of course the situation is different than WNT but all of the same drivers are in place.
As to the Germans and out of date ships there is a lot of that going around.
One option is go for a more limited agreement(s).
1) Have the ratios at first be between UK and Germany; perhaps the other European powers. UK agrees to minimum fleet size but not maximum for themselves. If UK feel need to build more ships they can but Fra/Ger/Ita/AH then can build more.
2) All powers adding the US and Japan do a deal on limiting size of warships but not on numbers of warships. The increasing size of ships had been a major drive on sky rocketing construction costs.
Michael
In terms of costs the Germans are on the hook for a bunch of ships.
The above doesn't account the various BBs and BCs that should have been laid down in 1916, 1917 and 1918 that were not.
I believe that is four more BBs and three more BCs. Then in 1919 you have a wave of required construction as Braunschweig and Deutschland PDNs and I do not know how many ACs reach replacement age.
I do not see the Reichstag wanting to pay for this mess.
Michael
| Name | Type | Class | Laid Down | Launched | Note |
| Württemberg | BB | Bayern | 1/4/1915 | 6/20/1917 | |
| Sachsen | BB | Bayern | 4/15/1914 | 11/21/1916 | |
| Mackensen | BC | Mackensen | 1/30/1915 | 4/21/2017 | |
| Graf Spee | BC | Mackensen | 11/30/1915 | 9/15/1917 | |
| Prinz Eitel Friedrich | BC | Mackensen | 5/1/1915 | ||
| Fürst Bismarck | BC | Mackensen | 11/3/1915 | ||
| Yorck | BC | Yorck | 6/?/1916 | ||
| Ersatz Gneisenau | BC | Yorck | Material collected but not laid down | ||
| Ersatz Scharnhorst | BC | Yorck | Material collected but not laid down | ||
| Ersatz Prinz Adalbert | BC | TBD | Not yet ordered but required by law | ||
| Ersatz Pommern | BB | TBD | Not yet ordered but required by law | ||
| Ersatz Lützow | BC | TBD | Not yet ordered but required by law |
The above doesn't account the various BBs and BCs that should have been laid down in 1916, 1917 and 1918 that were not.
I believe that is four more BBs and three more BCs. Then in 1919 you have a wave of required construction as Braunschweig and Deutschland PDNs and I do not know how many ACs reach replacement age.
I do not see the Reichstag wanting to pay for this mess.
Michael