The Middle East: The Smyrna Question & the Adana Offensive (October 1918)
The Middle East
The Smyrna Question & the Adana Offensive
October 1918
While the defeat of Ottoman forces at Megiddo had been dramatic and bountiful for Britain, the capture of large swathes of what was essentially arabian tundra occupied by a people resistant to any foreign interference left Britain unwilling to simply sit back and allow the Ottomans to continue to ride out the war. Britain desired not just battlefield victories, but a capitulation of a Central Powers state to legitimise their continued war and justify the conflict in the eyes of their people.
What had become clear to Prime Minister Bonar Law was that the Ottomans, despite being heavily defeated in Arabia, cared little for their Arab provinces and instead sought to seize territory in the Caucuses as compensation for projected losses. This created a strategic dilemma; Britain could not easily compel the Turks to surrender, nor could she easily march forces into the Turkish heartland to compel their capitulation due to the natural defences of the Taurus mountains and Dardanelles straits. This left British forces stuck either marching along the rail line over the Taurus Mountains to Afyonkarahisar, or having to complete a naval landing at Smyrna.
An attack on Smyrna presented a strategic dilemma too though. Since the fall of Greece to anti-British Royalists, the country had firmly fallen into the backing of Germany and would be sure to alert the Germans of any major British naval movements into the Agean. Further, any landing would surely be faced with resistance from Ottoman forces in strength, and thus any attack would require significant force being landed in Aydin vilayet. Britain meanwhile had only recently withdrawn troops six divisions from Macedonia and three from Italy. With some sent home or now in Palestine, this gave Britain essentially five divisions able to be deployed at Smyrna for a landing.
This left Britain essentially with three choices; either to expend large amounts of time and resources driving by land towards Afyonkarahisar, to land at Smyrna in a risky operation that might prompt Turkish capitulation and better terms, or to negotiate a conditional peace securing lands in Arabia from the Turks.
Britain ultimately decided that Smyrna was too risky and a total victory over the Ottomans not necessary - provided that the Turks prove willing to accept British terms. In the meantime, British forces continued to drive towards the Taurus mountains and Adana.
The Adana Offensive
The main target of British offensive operations was the city of Adana. A vital railway junction and the first at least partially Turkish city in the empire that would fall under attack, Adana presented the perfect chance for a morale victory and also to drive the nascent Turkish army north of the Taurus mountains.
Defeated at Aleppo, the Ottoman army under Mustafa Kemal Pasha barely struggled to re-form a force in strength in the wake of the British advance, but after becoming slowed in the mountain passes between Aleppo and Alexandretta Mustafa Kemal Pasha was able to form a defensive line and slow the British advance.
Heaped with praise for his impromptu planned defence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not halt the British advance, but slowed it enough to prepare a defence of Adana, which soon fell under attack from both air, ground and even sea as the Royal Navy Fleet in the Med launched minor landing operations against the port of Mersin south of the city.
Ultimately the city would fall in early October, providing the impetus for talks between the British and Turks over the future of their relations and the war. But this proved too slow to stop Turkish forces from locking down the Taurus Mountains into the Anatolian Plateau - greatly slowing the British advance and forcing both sides to consider terms.