A long time lurker here - I was wondering if this thread would be resurrected. Of course - it's not the first thread on this topic that's been vetted around here.
It's an intriguing "what if" in view of the unfulfilled promises of the shuttle program - which turned out to be far more expensive, risky and difficult to operate than was projected by NASA in the early 1970's when the program was first approved. The apparent return to expendable rockets seems to confirm the wisdom of continuing Apollo/Saturn in some form, albeit at a reduced tempo given the budget realities NASA faced in the 70's.
A glimpse at what was lost can be read in Thomas Frieling's Quest article,
"Skylab B: Unflown Missions, Lost Opportunities." Frieling's article is profoundly sympathetic to NASA's plight as it considered every possible option for using its second Skylab station and its other remaining Saturn/Apollo hardware (two Saturn V launchers, two essentially complete Saturn 1b's, and at least 3 largely complete CSM's and two partially complete LM's). The realities of shuttle development costs, which were quickly absorbing the bulk of NASA's budget, precluded the use of this hardware without additional funding, which was not forthcoming. Put simply: NASA could not continue Apollo Applications and develop the shuttle at the same time. One had to go. NASA chose the shuttle, and not for irrational reasons - the shuttle's promise of economical reusability seemed like an easier sell to a skeptical Congress.
Link to article pdf:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sour...89GjDQ&usg=AFQjCNHSTijW0s8gaG9KyFyg-mazZmiSYw
All of which is especially frustrating when you consider that the International Space Station - now essentially complete -
has taken 40 launches (employing the NASA shuttles and Russian Proton rockets) to assemble the 417,000kg of the station mass. Yet it would have taken
only four Saturn V launches to lift the same mass to LEO. (The configuration of the station would have to significantly change, of course; but the point is a comparison of payload capability of the STS versus Saturn V).
A few points, and then perhaps a tentative new ATL:
1) Methuslah's premise is this:
"The idea here is that NASA is to use all the hardware currently in inventory up. (That and complete the last two LM, and finish CSM-115a). No new development is to take place other than modifications of the hardware currently in the inventory." This makes it a more likely premise to work with in the short term, but also one that leaves enormous unanswered questions about NASA's future after that hardware is used up - and new hardware requires lots of lead time. I think the premise has to consider what NASA would attempt, long-term, if the shuttle were DOA.
The two commonly discussed limiting factors in that equation are 1) NASA's declining budgets, which peaked in 1965 at about $34 billion in 2007 dollars, and then began a steady slide to about one third that by 1974 - all reflecting reduced public support for NASA; and 2) the skepticism and limited political capital of the new Nixon Administration, which was by most accounts less supportive of NASA and the moon missions than the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations had been. This second point is hotly debated, of course, as we have seen on this thread. Nixon was not in fact as irrationally opposed to NASA for personal reasons as is often suggested - he could see the public relations value of the thing as well as anyone - but it was a noticeably lower priority, as evidenced by his willingness to consider cancelling even Apollo 16 and 17 before Caspar Weinberger talked him out of it. Still, Nixon did keep sufficient funding to complete the bulk of the H and J missions, and did in the end approve the shuttle program. The larger factor may be his reduced capital before a strongly Democratic Congress, even well before Watergate. It would be an interesting variant on this ATL is if we elect a Democrat in 1968 (Johnson, Kennedy or even McCarthy) - they would have greater commitment and greater capital, most likely, which might result in at least a modest reduction in NASA's budget cuts. I might discuss that later if there is any interest.
2) What might be possible with existing budgets, then, if we assume the shuttle is scuttled and NASA invests instead in continuing Apollo Saturn at a reduced tempo? Consider the basic costs involved:
Titan IIID Flyaway cost: $52.2million (1965 dollars)
Saturn 1B Flyaway cost: $55 million (1972 dollars)
Saturn V Flyaway cost $185 million (1969 dollars) - 1.11 billion in 2011 dollars
Cost of Apollo moon mission - $350 million (H mission) -$450 million (J mission)
Even at NASA's reduced 1970s' funding levels (about $3.5 billion in nominal dollars), the 60% or so available for manned flight could, as we can see, support at least a reduced tempo Apollo Applications schedule -at least one Saturn V flight (devoted to either a moon mission or lifting a Skylab "dry workshop" station), and possibly even a couple of Saturn 1b LEO flights to a space station. I say "Saturn 1b" because, as noted above, it wasn't that much more expensive than a Titan III and it was at least man rated.
So NASA would have to buy more rockets and more manned hardware after the existing hardware was used. The good news is that the (canceled) second production run of Saturn Vs would very likely have used the F-1A engine in its first stage, providing a substantial performance boost, and possibly a stretched S-IC first stage to support the more powerful F-1As; and uprated J-2s for the upper stages. This matters because it makes more readily possible more ambitious LEO construction or extended moon missions, such as were planned for the Apollo Extension Systems (AES) and Lunar Exploration System for Apollo (LESA). It is also true that alternate Saturn vehicles were considered (as others, like Truth Is Life, have noted here and on previous threads), such as Saturn INT-20 or a Saturn II, providing an intermediate heavy lift capability. But that would have required significant development costs, so I set that aside for longer term development, say for the early 1980's.
So let us consider a possible timeline that works on these assumptions - Nixon approves another limited buy of Saturn rockets in the FY 1970 budget, say five new Saturn V's and a few more Saturn 1b's, and the other requisite hardware, costs to be spread out over the next several years:
Code:
Apollo 7 C Manned CSM evaluation in low Earth orbit Oct. 1968 Sat Ib 11 day
Apollo 8 "C Prime" Manned CSM only operation in lunar orbit Dec. 1968 Sat V 8 day
Apollo 9 D Manned CSM and LM development in low Earth orbit March 1969 Sat V 10 day
Apollo 10 F Manned CSM and LM operations in lunar orbit May 1969 Sat V 8 day
Apollo 11 G First Manned landing on Moon July 1969 Sat V 9 day/1 day
Apollo 12 H Precision landings with up to two-day stays on the Moon Nov. 1969 Sat V 10 day/1 day
Apollo 13 H Precision landings (Mission aborted) Apr. 1970 Sat V 5 day
Apollo 14 H Precision landings with up to two-day stays on the Moon Jan. 1971 Sat V 9 day/1 day
Apollo 15 J Longer three-day stays using Extended LM, rover July 1971 Sat V 12 day/3 day
Apollo 16 J Longer three-day stays using Extended LM, rover Apr. 1972 Sat V 12 day/3 day
Apollo 17 J Longer three-day stays using Extended LM, rover Dec. 1972 Sat V 12 day/3 day
Apollo 18 J Longer three-day stays using Extended LM, rover Apr. 1973 Sat V 12 day/3 day
Skylab 1 - Unmanned launch of Skylab station July 1973 Sat V -
Skylab 2 SS1 28 day scientific mission in Skylab station July 1973 Sat 1b 28 day
Skylab 3 SS1 59 day scientific mission in Skylab station Sept 1973 Sat 1b 59 day
Skylab 4 SS1 84 day scientific mission in Skylab station Jan. 1974 Sat 1b 84 day
Apollo 19 LOSM Lunar Orbit Survey Mission using lunar orbital module Oct. 1974 Sat V 28 day
Apollo-Soyuz Joint US-Soviet LEO scientific mission using ASTP dock July 1975 Sat 1b 9 day
*Apollo 20 AES 1 Delivery of LEM Shelter to Moon for Apollo 21, Oct. 1975 Sat V"b" 11 day
*Apollo 21 AES 2 14 Day stay using LEM Shelter, Extended CSM, rover Nov. 1975 Sat V"b" 32 day/14 day
*Apollo 22 AES 1 Delivery of LEM Shelter to Moon for Apollo 23, Oct. 1976 Sat V"b" 11 day
*Apollo 23 AES 2 14 Day stay using LEM Shelter, Extended CSM, rover Nov. 1976 Sat V"b" 33 day/15 day
*Spacelab 1 Unmanned launch of long duration Spacelab (Skylab B) Dec. 1977 Sat V"b" -
Spacelab 2 Long duration International expedition in Spacelab Jan. 1978 Sat. 1b 100 day
Spacelab 3 Long duration international expedition in Spacelab April 1978 Sat. 1b 100 day
*Spacelab 4 Long duration international expedition in Spacelab July 1978 Sat. 1b 120 day
* Requires new hardware buys
One other addition: A dedicated Saturn 1b/Modified CSM for Skylab Rescue, kept available for both space station schedules.
The schedule for each fiscal year after FY 1972 is fairly modest: no more than two (2) Saturn V lunar launches or one (1) Saturn V lofted space station paired with three manned Saturn 1B LEO station crews. Of course the hardware required for the later AES missions would have entailed significant development costs, but not unreasonable ones, since much of the design work had already been done for the extended LM, the Block III CSM, and even the LEM Shelter. A special orbital module would be needed for the 30 day LOSM mission in 1974, but would be easier and cheaper to manage than the LM, since it did not have to land or takeoff. All of this would be quite achievable under NASA budgets as they existed in the 1970's - if you take the shuttle out of the equation. It leverages existing hardware and facilities to the greatest degree possible.
Partnering with ESA, as was considered at one point, also makes the second Skylab "b" station more attractive to the Nixon and Ford administration(s) and Congress, not least because ESA could kick in funding - and no one would be keen on disappointing the Europeans once development had proceeded. Which is precisely how Clinton was able to salvage the ISS in the 1990's.
Spacelab (Skylab B) would finish this initial schedule and take us into the Carter Administration. The requisition of a larger second Saturn V and Saturn 1B buy could help lock in a continued program along these lines - but as we have seen in our history OTL, there is no guarantee. Harder choices might have to be made - an upgraded Skylab for extended life would require regular crew visits and even expansion, building in a permanent flight schedule every year, while the next planned lunar exploration phase, LESA, required a two launch profile with much more ambitious hardware and much longer stays - 90 to 180 days. And that would also cost more money. And run the risk of having to run such missions at the same time as LEO Skylab missions. Perhaps NASA could not do both with existing funding levels.
My guess is that NASA at that point would find sticking to LEO for the time being an easier sell - less risky, less cost. And after all, if NASA maintains the Saturn and Apollo hardware lines, they will still be there once it is able to return to the Moon, if it so desires - perhaps later in the 1980's, when the technology expands mission possibilities and safety. Every moonshot heavily leveraged existing (primitive) technology, and most ran into at least one potential mission-ending incident that NASA managed to finesse, without any possibility of rescue. NASA got very lucky with Apollo 13 - imagine the reaction if the Apollo 19 LOSM is unable to fire its SPS engine, leaving the astronauts to die in lunar orbit...or any of a hundred other scenarios that results in dead astronauts in deep space. A stranded crew in LEO at least would have had a chance at rescue.
Of course, if any of the succeeding moon missions (Apollo 20-23) do find something worthwhile on the lunar surface - water for in situ uses, and Helium 3 for mining - that could change the calculus considerably.
* * *
The more I think about it, an aggressive focus on space station work in LEO might have been a safer bet than an extended lunar program. Lunar exploration with 1960's technology was tremendously risky, and the payoff - mainly exploration of lunar geology (selenology) could not really justify the risk, let alone the cost. A modular "American Mir" station using the last Saturn V (or two, if you drop Apollo 18 as in OTL), and a new series of Saturn II's or INT-20's (on the assumption that these will be easier to sell to Congress than resumed Saturn V production) beginning in the late 1970's, serviced by Block III CSM's, would still be advantageous over what STS gave us.
And resumed lunar exploration, if desired, could be resumed in the 80's or 90's once technology and resources made it a less risky proposition.
* * *
Budget Appendices: