To Slip The Surly Bonds of Earth - Alternate Apollo Program

The Space Task Group – 'Paine's Folly'

Months before the first historic landing on the Moon, NASA commissioned a 'Space Task Group' to prepare plans for the post-Apollo future of the agency, and provide options for the recently elected President Nixon. This project was the brainchild of NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine; he was hoping to provide for a glorious future for the agency, and certainly encouraged boldness and vision among the picked members of the group. The amazing success of Apollo 11 – which held the world spellbound – only led to greater enthusiasm among Agency staffers.

In September, the group prepared three proposals for the President. The first was the boldest – a major expansion into space, with the construction of a space shuttle, large orbiting space station, lunar base, and an expedition to Mars by 1981. The second and third options had essentially the same goals, but assumed reduced funding levels, with the Mars mission delayed until later in the century. This plan was submitted to the White House for consideration...and met with a stony response.

The President – looking at the increasing costs of the war in Vietnam and other budgetary crises – was not about to commit to an eternally ongoing increased spend; his scientific advisers questioned the likelihood of these goals being attained on the timescale indicated, and as importantly, none of the key results would bear fruit until long after the conclusion of his second term.

Not that the President disliked space; Apollo was the child of Kennedy, and he found that hard to forgive, but the President did like heroes, and astronauts fitted that bill perfectly. Additionally, the space program had become key to the Cold War, and there were rumours that a space station was being considered by the Soviets for early in the next decade, and this was something the United States had to keep pace with. It was also noted that NASA had accumulated a substantial inventory of hardware, already paid for – and it would be a great shame to waste it.

The President's directive to NASA became simple: he would not authorise any new programmes, but would continue to fund existing ones. An emphasis on lunar exploration was ordered for the manned programme, but the 'Skylab' project should continue – with an eye to potential military applications – so the USAF would have an increased role.

Administrator Paine, seeing his dreams torn asunder, threatened to resign unless at least the Space Shuttle programme was continued; Nixon, laughing at the idea of, “a bus to nowhere”, accepted his resignation, and George Low – an Apollo expert – was named as NASA Administrator on November 10, 1969. He immediately commissioned an Apollo Applications Working Group to determine how best NASA hardware could be used to meet the President's demands, under General Sam Philips, Dr. Charles Townes, and astronaut James McDivitt. Apollo 12, 13 and 14 would continue as planned for the present, and preparations for the second flight to the moon continued apace. In addition, the new administrator quietly called upon the FBI to launch discrete investigations of the astronauts. If the President wanted heroes, he was going to need to make sure that there were no unpleasant surprises coming up...
 
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The Space Task Group – 'Paine's Folly'

Months before the first historic landing on the Moon, NASA commissioned a 'Space Task Group' to prepare plans for the post-Apollo future of the agency, and provide options for the recently elected President Nixon. This project was the brainchild of NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine; he was hoping to provide for a glorious future for the agency, and certainly encouraged boldness and vision among the picked members of the group. The amazing success of Apollo 11 – which held the world spellbound – only led to greater enthusiasm among Agency staffers.

In September, the group prepared three proposals for the President. The first was the boldest – a major expansion into space, with the construction of a space shuttle, large orbiting space station, lunar base, and an expedition to Mars by 1981. The second and third options had essentially the same goals, but assumed reduced funding levels, with the Mars mission delayed until later in the century. This plan was submitted to the White House for consideration...and met with a stony response.

The President – looking at the increasing costs of the war in Vietnam and other budgetary crises – was not about to commit to an eternally ongoing increased spend; his scientific advisers questioned the likelihood of these goals being attained on the timescale indicated, and as importantly, none of the key results would bear fruit until long after the conclusion of his second term.

Not that the President disliked space; Apollo was the child of Kennedy, and he found that hard to forgive, but the President did like heroes, and astronauts fitted that bill perfectly. Additionally, the space program had become key to the Cold War, and there were rumours that a space station was being considered by the Soviets for early in the next decade, and this was something the United States had to keep pace with. It was also noted that NASA had accumulated a substantial inventory of hardware, already paid for – and it would be a great shame to waste it.

The President's directive to NASA became simple: he would not authorise any new programmes, but would continue to fund existing ones. An emphasis on lunar exploration was ordered for the manned programme, but the 'Skylab' project should continue – with an eye to potential military applications – so the USAF would have an increased role.

Administrator Paine, seeing his dreams torn asunder, threatened to resign unless at least the Space Shuttle programme was continued; Nixon, laughing at the idea of, “a bus to nowhere”, accepted his resignation, and George Low – an Apollo expert – was named as NASA Administrator on November 10, 1969. He immediately commissioned an Apollo Applications Working Group to determine how best NASA hardware could be used to meet the President's demands, under General Sam Philips and astronaut James McDivitt. Apollo 12, 13 and 14 would continue as planned for the present, and preparations for the second flight to the moon continued apace. In addition, the new administrator quietly called upon the FBI to launch discrete investigations of the astronauts. If the President wanted heroes, he was going to need to make sure that there were no unpleasant surprises coming up...

???Nixon supporting continued Apollo/lunar? Sounds next door to ASB to me, actually.

Now, a revamped Skylab system with a renamed Apollo capsule (maybe the 6-7 astronaut version various people looked at), might work.
 
IOTL, Nixon had ample opportunities to close down the lunar program – after 11, 13 or 14; he didn't. ITTL, he's cancelled all the future projects and out and out rejected the space shuttle – Paine has presented a blue-sky plan that would simply cost far too much. IOTL the shuttle was a tough sell, and the POD is that this failed.

But there remains the Apollo hardware – thirteen CSM, nine LM (two almost finished), nine Saturn V and seven Saturn IB. No point in not using it, especially as it promises a reducing budget; besides, the President did like heroes – I'm quoting Chaikin on that one.

As for modifications to Apollo – why do it at all? All of this would cost money, and revamping Skylab to support more astronauts productively is going to cost, as well. Nixon's gone for the cheapest possible option short of cancelling the program altogether.
 
The Longest Lightning Rod in History (Apollo 12)

The Astronaut Corps' reactions to the news coming out of Washington was mixed, to say the least; there was elation on behalf of the Group V astronauts, as far more of the missions they had been recruited to fly were likely to be on the schedule; for at least most of them, a ride into space had become a near-certainty, either to the Moon or at least to Skylab. The later astronauts, including the scientist-astronauts, were of a rather different opinion – may had joined knowing that they had little chance on main-line Apollo, but gambling that a follow-up program would provide them with seats into space. Group VII – the second batch of scientist-astronauts – appeared to have little chance of a flight into space. Group VIII – the MOL astronauts – appeared to have even less of a chance, but there were whispers from the Pentagon of a possible military involvement in Skylab, which might provide them with an opportunity. During the turmoil of the change of administrators, Deke Slayton managed to slide past Al Shepard's appointment as commander of Apollo 13.

Apollo 12 launched on the original schedule, on November 14th. Commanding was veteran astronaut Pete Conrad; along for the ride as Command Module Pilot (CMP) was Dick Gordon, and Al Bean as Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) – this was the closest thing NASA had to a 'buddy' crew. The launch immediately ran into difficulties, as all the electrical systems failed on the flight into orbit; it was later determined that lightning had hit the rocket on its flight out of the atmosphere. Some quick-thinking on the part of Mission Control managed to bring the systems back to life, but there were some serious question marks over the viability of the spacecraft for re-entry.

Nevertheless, the flight to the moon took place, and Pete Conrad landed the Lunar Module within a few hundred meters of his objective, Surveyor 3. This was one of the major objectives of the mission, not only a precision landing on the moon, but to retrieve the delicate electronics from the probe for examination back on Earth. The big glitch of the landing occurred when Al Bean inadvertently pointed the camera at the Sun, ruining the image; the coverage became a radio show.

Lunar Module Intrepid launched successfully from the Moon and docked with the command module, the return to Earth took place on November 24th. There was a general agreement that Apollo had completed its 'test' flights, and could now become a true vehicle for lunar exploration; the scientific community hoped for much from the forthcoming flights.
 
As for modifications to Apollo – why do it at all? All of this would cost money, and revamping Skylab to support more astronauts productively is going to cost, as well. Nixon's gone for the cheapest possible option short of cancelling the program altogether.

There's room for minor improvements at little cost. When the current run of CSMs expires (The Block II series), North American can incorporate new features into a Block III. Like making systems of the interior removable, so that, even if the hull is not usable after reentry (something else to work on...), some reusability can be incorporated. As well, the main SM engine can be removed if a flight is bound for Skylab rather than the Moon. And the CM, with almost no modification (just add two seats), can carry 5 to LEO (though it would be best for lunar flights to remain at 3 crew).

For later Lunar Surface missions, when surface stay was expected to reach 14-28 days or longer, it may make sense to take the CMP down as well. The suggestions going around Grumman mainly suggested having the CMP sit on the Ascent Engine cover as the Commander and LMP flew down, and then having the 3 of them transfer to a CM- or LM-derived shelter on the surface.

And, for further cost saving, a Saturn V-derived LEO launcher makes more sense than reopening the Saturn 1B production line. The S-IC alone, in stage-and-a-half configuration (dropping 4 of the F-1s for reuse halfway through the flight), would have been able to deploy 20 tonnes to LEO, about as much as a Saturn 1B. The Saturn INT-20 design, with an S-IC and S-IVB, but no S-II, could have put from 40 to 60 tonnes in LEO, depending on number of engines. While the Saturn V series (and modified successors, possibly with stretched stages or Titan IV SRBs, definitely with F-1A and J-2S engines) carries on Lunar exploration, Skylab and Skylab 2 (well, they had it built, so why not fly it?) can be serviced by these dwarf Saturns.
 
Definitely a Block III CSM was on the cards had development work continued – and I actually agree that it would have been an excellent way to proceed – but that would require reopening the CSM production line. (Though I will grant that the modifications made to CSM-115 to make it the 'Skylab Rescue' CSM could have been carried out to simply make it a five-man Apollo for the purposes of transit...and that in itself is an interesting point...)

A Saturn-II successor also makes a lot of sense – a lot of the planning already done, but again, that would require a test program and a new production line.

The idea here is that NASA is to use all the hardware currently in inventory up. (That and complete the last two LM, and finish CSM-115a). No new development is to take place other than modifications of the hardware currently in the inventory. Which still leaves enough for a lot of missions as of 1969...though it will look pretty bleak by 1975 with no Shuttle in the pipeline, or no Apollo successor in the works.
 
Methuslah; The idea here is that NASA is to use all the hardware currently in inventory up. (That and complete the last two LM said:
Actually this could lead to a BETTER Space Shuttle, since the original - current - was a mass of first-of-a-kind ideas that would have been better tested on a cheap, experimental system like the cancelled X-20 Dyna-Soar.

No winged vehicle had ever travelled as fast as the shuttle.
No winged vehicle had ever launched vertically.
No winged vehicle had undergone re-entry.
No vehicle had ever undergone successive space missions.
No practical way of testing the effect of shock waves from the wings of a hypersonic vehicle's interaction with a rocket booster attached had ever been found. Turbulence would be bad, but how bad:confused:
No real toilet had ever been flown on a space craft. The Shuttle toilet BROKE DOWN ON EVERY MISSION for the first ten years:eek:
Tiles for the re-entry shield had never been tried, and it was taken for granted that some would fall off during launch. The original plan had been to send the first crew up with spare tiles and a tile cutter so they could replace lost ones during an EVA.

I am NOT suggesting that the early 60's design X-20 would be a replacement for the shuttle or even the perfect experimental flight test of the shuttle idea. But being already designed and actually on the production line at one point it would be cheap, use existing boosters, and gain the information otherwise gained at such high cost by the Shuttle.

So yes, a full sized shuttle would be delayed. On the other hand it would certainly be radically superior for having the major potential bugs discovered and designed out through proper experiments.
 
I'd only really planned this through until 1976 at the moment, but you are right in that possibly a better spaceplane can result from the delay. Hypersonic research is certainly going to continue, either under NASA or the USAF. (Indeed – you might see the USAF eventually develop an X-20 successor here...)

Two possibilities for the 1980s (well, three, but letting manned space die altogether is a bit bleak). Either a low-cost capsule replacement, either a Block III Apollo, a modified 'Big Gemini', or a fourth type altogether, or possibly a smaller spaceplane, something the size of the European Hermes (hmmm... ESA/NASA co-operation here...interesting...)
 
Apollo All the Way (The Working Group Report)

The Apollo Applications Working Group completed its report by late January 1970, following which General Philips – somewhat later than he had planned – left NASA to return to USAF duty. The report would be accepted as the working plan for the next six years, effectively for the period of the Nixon administration; many at NASA hoped that the next President – whether in 1972 or 1976 – would be more generous to the agency, but Administrator Low did his best to keep future projects buried, not wanting to risk Presidential ire.

Apollo missions 13 through 20 would proceed as planned; a small increase in the planned '70 budget would be required to complete the last two CSM and LM. (Privately, Nixon had already agreed to a small increase for the year, as long as his requirements were met and on the understanding that budgets would then substantially drop.) Three of these missions would use the remaining 'H' type landers, with the final five using the upgraded 'J' type; the report made no recommendations for landing sites beyond those already decided for the next four missions, and a new Landing Site Working Group would begin work immediately.

The biggest effect would be on Apollo Applications. In August 1969, the decision was taken to build a 'dry' laboratory to be launched on a Saturn V rocket – now there was no rocket left in the inventory to launch it. The alternative – a 'wet' laboratory that would need to be completed in orbit, with reduced capability, launched by a Saturn IB. The report noted that there would be seven boosters available for Skylab launches, but only four Apollo CSM set-ups; the suggestion – which would be taken up – was for two separate Skylab stations, to each be visited twice, and for a backup station to be prepared in the event of a failure.

The plan was approved by all parties concerned, and promised launches well into the decade; there was some suggestion that the second Skylab station could be launched for America's Bicentennial – something that Nixon wholeheartedly approved of; tentative names for the two stations were under consideration, with 'Abraham Lincoln' and 'George Washington' receiving the most support. The stage was set for Apollo 13.
 
Forgett the Saturn IB it was to expensive in build and launch.
that reasion why NASA stop Saturn IB production in 1967

NASA and USAF look on use of Titan IIIM for Apollo CSM launch
M like Man-rated version of IIIC for USAF MOL cancelled by Nixon in 1969.
by the way Douglas proposed NASA a civilian version of MOL in same time


Titan IIIM had much cheaper as Saturn IB
Saturn IB launch cost 107 million in 1967 US dollars.
Titan IIIM launch cost 22 million in 1967 US dollars.

sadly the Space Shuttle becam a big, a very big program
they believe to keep launch cost at 50 million in 1967 US dollars.
so they dropt new Apollo CSM&Titan IIIM and use up remaining Apollo hardware
later the Space Shuttle launch cost became more costly as of a Saturn V...
 
One of the things I'm hoping to explore here is 'what if NASA hadn't been tied to the Shuttle'. Without that straining the budget, a lot more becomes possible...and a whole generation of engineers are not tied to the 'Large Spaceplane' concept.

Titan III-C could lead to a 'Big Gemini' concept - which would actually be fine for space station operations. (If the Russians can still be flying Soyuz, why couldn't Gemini be revived?) Either that, or a modified Apollo - or even something completely new, but that would take longer to develop.
 
Have you looked at any of the threads similar to this posted by Truth is Life?

While this thread is good, you may find some interesting ideas in those earlier ones.
 
With no STS, do some of the pressure fed designs get a look in - Sea Dragon is the biggest and most well known of them but there were others from the various rocket manufacturers.

http://www.dunnspace.com/leo_on_the_cheap.htm

Page 180 -191

Quite a few of which seem to make use of stages from existing vehicles added to new pressure fed stages.
 
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One of the things I'm hoping to explore here is 'what if NASA hadn't been tied to the Shuttle'. Without that straining the budget, a lot more becomes possible...and a whole generation of engineers are not tied to the 'Large Spaceplane' concept.

Titan III-C could lead to a 'Big Gemini' concept - which would actually be fine for space station operations. (If the Russians can still be flying Soyuz, why couldn't Gemini be revived?) Either that, or a modified Apollo - or even something completely new, but that would take longer to develop.

Big Gemini had to use other Launch rocket
NASA it hat to be Saturn INT-16 (First stage 5 Titan UA1205, second stage S-IVB)
alternative NASA look for Saturn INT-21 or INT-20
USAF it was the Titan IIIL2 (15 foot Large Diameter Core, 7 segment solid booster from Titan IIIM.)
 
About the "no shuttle freeing up lots of budget for other things" idea, I'm pretty sure that with a less expensive manned space program in the 70's, NASA's budget would be cut to a "just making it" level. In people's perception, it's too expensive no matter how little it actually costs.

Some sort of limited space station program mirroring Salyut is the best alternative to the Shuttle we could hope for (and could prove useful should ITTL US become more interested later). If not for the continuing Soviet program, I'm sure the US manned program would have ended with Apollo.
 
In many ways, a US version of Salyut could have been better than developing the Shuttle; the USAF would have kept more of its launch capacity, and there would have been no commitment to the spaceplane concept.

I agree with you on the NASA budget, as well - it's going to start to plummet through the 70s, but there will be a lot more 'bang for the buck' for a while.
 
The Successful Failure (Apollo 13)

Following the publication of the Working Group report, several 'Group VII' astronauts individually approached Deke Slayton, head of Flight Crew Operations, and asked what realistic chance any of them had for a flight; he had to inform them that they might have a couple of seats open on the Skylab flights, and possibly a back-up seat on a late lunar mission, but that this was all that was in the pipeline. Astronauts Chapman, Henize and Holmquest would resign quietly over the next three months, though Don Holmquest at least remained with NASA – with an unofficial nod from Deke Slayton that should the situation change in the next year or so, he could return to the Corps.

The crew assignments for Apollo 15 were made early in 1970; Dave Scott would command the last 'H' mission, with CMP Al Worden and LMP James Irwin. This was expected – this was the crew that had backed up Apollo 12. The back-ups for this mission could be expected to take Apollo 18 to the moon; Dick Gordon would serve as commander, with Vance Brand as his command module pilot, and Harrison Schmitt – a scientist-astronaut – serving as his lunar module pilot. There was growing excitement in the scientific community that at last, a scientist – a geologist – would go to the moon. (Quietly, Deke Slayton assigned Anthony England, a geochemist, to the Apollo 15 support team, with the unofficial nod that he would serve as Schmitt's backup on Apollo 18. He had received significant pressure to get at least one geoscientist to the Moon.)

Amidst this, Apollo 13 prepared for its launch to the moon. The appointment of Al Shepard has CMD had caused some resentment in the Astronaut Corps; his only flight had been fifteen minutes in the Mercury series, and he had jumped straight into the rotation as soon as he returned to flight status. Deke Slayton had gone to bat for him, and his appointment was confirmed in the turmoil of November 1969. His crew were both rookies as well – Stu Roosa and Edgar Mitchell. Further, the geologists had only limited success to report in their lunar surface training, and considered that he and his crew were not taking the science seriously. Taking the hint, the Apollo managers stressed the engineering elements of the flight, opting to consider the mission more another test of the Apollo system. The Apollo 14 crew, under Jim Lovell, would be a better choice as scientific pioneers, based on the attitude of the mission commander.

Apollo 13 launched on April 11th, 1970, and faced almost immediate problems with a centre-engine failure on the first stage of the Saturn V. This was forgotten two days later, when Stu Roosa – sitting left seat – stirred the tanks and began a chain of events that led to an electrical fire, and explosion in the Service Module.

What followed would be called the 'Successful Failure', and ramp up America's hero-worship of Al Shepard, who with his crew – and the aid of Mission Control – nursed their wounded spacecraft home, circling the Moon once while huddling in the lunar module, and re-entering on April 17th, cold, tired, but alive. Al Shepard would receive the Presidential Medal of Freedom a month later on the steps of the White House.
 
Apollo 13 launched on April 11th, 1970, and faced almost immediate problems with a centre-engine failure on the first stage of the Saturn V. This was forgotten two days later, when Stu Roosa – sitting left seat – stirred the tanks and began a chain of events that led to an electrical fire, and explosion in the Service Module.

Actually, the centre engine on the S-IC was supposed to shut down early to prevent over-stressing of the structure during its burn, and to limit the accelerative forces to tolerable levels. You are probably refering to the S-II centre engine that suffered oscillating thrust levels before shutting down - late enough to allow the remaining engines to push the CSM/LM into a safe parking orbit and then TLI.
 
If the shuttle is cancelled outright, maybe they end up pursuing a clustered common booster concept, sort of like today's EELVs or Falcon 9? Size the single-core vehicle to be able to put a 20 ton crew transfer vehicle (Apollo Block III?) into LEO, or interplanetary probes, or large DoD satellites. The three-core vehicle with a modified upper stage (maybe just a stretch?) should be able to put up something like 75 tons or more, so station modules the size of Skylab, or a fueled lunar lander.

If you fly one or two crew flights to a station, and launch three satellites a year (really a bit of a slow rate, but...low budget), you're able to divide the fixed portions of operational costs over more launches, and there might start to be some economy of scale benefits on the cores themselves, so you might be able to accomplish some of the benefits intended to be gained with Shuttle, but without the expense of developing a fully reusable space plane.
 
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