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Let's say that it is early in 1917--the February Revolution has just succeeded in Russia, and Lenin is still in exile in Switzerland, Trotsky in New York. Your goal is to prevent February from being followed by a far-left insurrection in October--what the Bolsheviks would call the Great October Socialist Revolution (and their opponents would call the Bolshevik coup). To prevent this, you are able to kill one--and only one--person. Who do you kill--Lenin or Trotsky?

Most people would probably say that Lenin was the more important, and to some extent Trotsky's own writings (in his diary in exile) support this view:

"Had I not been present in 1917 in Petersburg, the October Revolution would still have taken place -- on the condition that Lenin was present and in command. If neither Lenin nor I had been present in Petersburg, there would have been no October Revolution : the leadership of the Bolshevik Party would have prevented it from occurring -- of this I have not the slightest doubt ! If Lenin had not been in Petersburg, I doubt whether I could have managed to overcome the resistance of the Bolshevik leaders. The struggle with "Trotskyism" (i.e. with the proletarian revolution) would have commenced in May 1917, and the outcome would have been in question. But I repeat, granted the presence of Lenin the October Revolution would have been victorious anyway." https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/frank/works/diary.htm

There is however IMO a case to be made that Trotsky is being unduly modest here (perhaps modesty is not the right word; after all, even in a private diary, Trotsky always wants to rebut Stalin's allegation that Trotsky was not a loyal Leninist); that he was *more* indispensable than Lenin for the success of October; and that he could have led a successful insurrection even without Lenin, whereas the converse was not necessarily true. Before arguing this position, I will summarize the traditional argument that Lenin was more important:

After the February Revolution, the Bolsheviks--or at least *Pravda* under the editorship of Kamenev and Stalin--were advocating conditional support of the Provisional Government, and even a merger of the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks, or at least with Martov's Menshevik "Internationalists." It took Lenin's return and his "April Theses" to reorient the party toward opposition to the PG and support for "all power to the soviets." (Yes, some "left" Bolsheviks like Molotov had already been criticizing the Stalin-Kamenev line, but they hardly had Lenin's authority.) Even later in the year, the Bolsheviks were still divided and confused on the question of insurrection; many of them thought that a peaceful transfer of power to the soviets, and a genuine multiparty socialist coalition government, were both possible and desirable. Zinoviev and Kamenev even leaked word of the planned Bolshevik coup and of their own opposition to it to the non-Bolshevik press. Only through Lenin could the party arrive at the decision for insurrection and a Bolshevik-dominated government (the few Left SRs were basically window dressing). Trotsky had for so long been a non-Bolshevik that the party would not listen to him had Lenin not decreed that their past differences should be forgotten.

Here is my counter-case for the greater importance of Trotsky:

First: Even without Lenin and the "April Theses" the Stalin-Kamenev line in favor of "conditional support" of the Provisional Government would not have lasted long. First of all, it was by no means unanimously approved by the Bolsheviks--Molotov in particular opposed it. Second, even the "moderate" Bolsheviks did not expect the Provisional Government to last for long. Stalin, for example, warned against a premature attempt to seize power, but added "we must bide our time" until the Provisional Government discredits itself, and when that time comes "The only organ capable of taking power is the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on an all-Russian scale." Quoted in Robert M. Slusser, *Stalin in October: The Man Who Missed the Revolution* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press 1987), p. 44. Moreover, after the Mensheviks had retracted their support for a Bolshevik-inspired motion on foreign policy, Kamenev warned that "Our task is to show that the only organ deserving our support is the Soviet of workers' deputies." Robert Service, *Lenin: A Political Life, Volume 2: Worlds in Collision* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1991) pp. 163-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=cti-DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA164 Third, the increasing unpopularity of the PG would greatly strengthen the hands of the Left Bolsheviks against any who would still counsel moderation. In particular, it would have to occur to the Bolsheviks that if they would continue to take a moderate line thwy would lose working-class and soldiers' support to the Anarchists and other far-left groups.

Second: One should not overrate the importance of the Bolshevik party *as such* in 1917. Its strength came from the fact that in the most important areas--above all Petrograd--there were increasingly radicalized soldiers who were sick of the war and the PG and would follow anyone who would promise land, bread, and especially peace. Party labels meant little to most of them, and any polemics Lenin had had with Trotsky would be irrelevant ancient history. If the Bolsheviks would continue to follow a conciliatory line, it is quite conceivable that the left wing of the party would break away and combine with Trotsky's followers among the Mezhraiontsy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mezhraiontsy to form a new party. Whatever the new party's name (perhaps "the Communist Party"--a name which the Bolsheviks had not yet adopted) there is no reason to think that such a party could not win an eventual majority in the Petrograd Soviet, and seize power. (Indeed, it might have an easier time carrying out an insurrection than the Bolshevik party of OTL, since it would not be hampered by Kamenev's and Zinoviev's opposition.)

Third: Trotsky had a better understanding than Lenin of the *tactics* of insurrection. Lenin indeed was sometimes inept in this respect and it is not an exaggeration to say that the Bolsheviks came to power largely by ignoring his tactical ideas. First of all, he wanted to start the insurrection in September, when it would probably have been premature. This is part of a pattern of impatience, of not understanding as much as Trotsky did the importance of portraying the insurrection as a *defensive* move--against the planned transfer of the Petrograd garrison, against the alleged Kerensky-Kornilovist plot against the Second Congress of Soviets, etc. Second, he wanted to start it not in Petrograd but in Moscow, claiming that in that event success would be assured and might even be bloodless. In fact of course, taking over Moscow (even *after* the insurrection had won in Petrograd) was *much* bloodier and more difficult than overthrowing the PG in Petrograd. Finally, Trotsky understood that the way to make an insurrection was not to send "the masses" into the streets as in the July Days but to use small groups of specialists to take control of the strategic points. I am not sure how well Lenin understood this.

Trotsky in *The Lessons of October* tries to excuse Lenin's tactical errors by saying that they were largely the product of his not being on the scene in Petrograd until very late: "Lenin's counsel to begin the insurrection in Moscow, where, on his assumptions, we could gain a bloodless victory, flowed precisely from the fact that in his underground refuge he had no opportunity to assess the radical turn that took place.." etc. https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lessons/ch7.htm Still, in
the *History of the Russian Revolution* Trotsky does not hesitate to call attention to Lenin's errors:

"The facts speak otherwise. Lenin insisted upon raising in insurrection in the days of the Democratic Conference. Not one member of the Central Committee supported him. A week later Lenin proposed to Smilga to organise an insurrectionary headquarters in Finland, and strike a blow at the government from that point with the sailors. Again ten days later he insisted that the Northern Congress become the starting point of an insurrection. Nobody at the Congress supported this proposal. At the end of September Lenin considered the postponement of the insurrection for three weeks, until the Congress of Soviets, fatal. Nevertheless the insurrection, deferred to the eve of the Congress, was accomplished while the Congress was in session. Lenin proposed that the struggle begin in Moscow, assuming that there it would be resolved without a fight. As a matter of fact, the insurrection in Moscow, notwithstanding the preceding victory in Petrograd, lasted eight days and cost many victims.

"Lenin was no automaton of infallible decisions. He was “only” a man of genius, and nothing human was alien to him, therein included the capacity to make mistakes..."

https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch49.htm

For all these reasons, I think there is at least a case to be made that the October Revolution/Coup is more likely to succeed in a "Trotsky without Lenin" world than in a "Lenin without Trotsky" world. I am not by any means certain of this; after all, as Trotsky notes, it was not just him but the Central Committee that rejected some of Lenin's crazier ideas. Furthermore, see http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/2894c486f4d981f7 where I argue that "Even if you accept Trotsky's later claim that he was trying to goad the government into a pre-Congress attack all along (and in that case, such things as the MRC's acceptance of the government's ultimatum seem curious), his strategy involved the *risk* that (should the government refuse to let itself be provoked) power might not be seized until after the Congress met." And of course there is the question of whether a far-left government led by Trotsky would be as likely to *survive* as one led by Lenin--but that is another matter.
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