To Carrier, or not To Carrier, that is the question!

Riain

Banned
In this document (starting page 184) the Chief of Defence Staff (1961-66) RAAF Air Chief Marshall Scherger is questioning why Australia needs a carrier (either refitted Essex class or new build CVA01) to replace HMAS Melbourne when so many other things needed to be done, like mine warfare vessels, submarines, surface ships etc. In the end the RAN didn't get an Essex or CVA01, they refitted the Melbourne for S2 and A4 and kept it until 1981.

A lot of countries had this debate n the 60s,, Canada and Netherlands for starters, without getting a new carrier or even retaining their existing carrier.

What I want to know is was Scherg right comparing a new carrier to other Navy capabilities? Or is a carrier a stand-alone capability, separate from the rest of the Navy?
 
In this document (starting page 184) the Chief of Defence Staff (1961-66) RAAF Air Chief Marshall Scherger is questioning why Australia needs a carrier (either refitted Essex class or new build CVA01) to replace HMAS Melbourne when so many other things needed to be done, like mine warfare vessels, submarines, surface ships etc. In the end the RAN didn't get an Essex or CVA01, they refitted the Melbourne for S2 and A4 and kept it until 1981.

A lot of countries had this debate n the 60s,, Canada and Netherlands for starters, without getting a new carrier or even retaining their existing carrier.

What I want to know is was Scherg right comparing a new carrier to other Navy capabilities? Or is a carrier a stand-alone capability, separate from the rest of the Navy?
It's ability to project air power well beyond one's or allied territories seems to fill a unique niche compared to other naval assets.

But from my understanding, Australia didn't really care about that politically by then.
 
Depends on the type of carrier. A full sized fleet carrier with jets is overkill.

OTOH, one or two ships along the lines of the British Invincible class would be more useful. Having the ability to embark a couple dozen helicopters would be better for Australian interests. Better for disaster relief missions, deployment of special operations forces, for hunting Soviet submarines during the Cold War.
 
It requires a few questions

Does your military have the requirement to project airpower beyond the ability of your airbases or allied airbases to support?

Does your national military budget have the ability to support this - potentially over other considerations?

For Britain for example in the 60s-90s the answer was 'yeah' (we have global aspirations) ..but...'nahhh' (RAF Germany and British Army of the Rhine was more important and quite rightly so)

This relegated fleet carriers to the nice to have but cannot afford list and the RN made do with the light carriers as per OTL once the Eagle and Ark Royal were decommissioned

The 1994 draw down of RAFG and BAOR and decade of peace dividend bumped fleet carriers back up to nice to have and we can afford list for the UK and 25 years on we have 2 nice new shiny fleet carriers

I think Oz went through a similar phase post Vietnam but today with the 'emerging threat' of an expansionist China they have ended up with the 2 LHD/Helicopter carriers (which could potentially operate F35B in the future?) and are looking to build the type 26s 'Hunter class' and are looking to build and operate nuke boats
 
About the only nation Australia would want to park a carrier off the coast of would be Indonesia, and that was why they were buying F111s.
Is an ASW a thing yet because that is about the only realistic role. The surface RAN is about keeping the sea lanes open and paying the occasional blood tax to the US. Anything else is a vanity project.
 

Riain

Banned
I think Scherg was wrong to compare the carrier to other naval capabilities for 2 reasons.
  1. The Navy was never going to 'turn off' the surface fleet, there were always going to be escorts in the RAN whereas the carriers is an on or off proposition and should be looked at differently as a a result.
  2. A carrier cannot be rapidly bought into service in a short period in a crisis, whereas the surface fleet can be by exapnded on reasonably short notice refitting a ship due for decommissioning, accelerating the commissioning of a ship under construction and/or buying a ship from another country.
He was probably right to compare the carrier to the creation of the sub fleet, although in reality the RAN was merely replacing the RN sub flotilla that was based in Australia until 1969 and not creating an offensive arm.

The role of the RAN carrier was changing at the time as well. In the late 40s the Melbourne and Sydney (and Vengeance) were acquired to be trade protection ships and escort the 3rd AIF to the Middle east to fight alongside the British in WW3 much like the prewar cruisers. By the late 50s the Melbourne was a wholly ASW carrier, its SEATO role was leading an ASW hunter-killer group in the Sulu Sea. She escorted the HMAS Sydney on her 1st, 3rd and 4th (Op Hardihood) trooping runs to Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 and was requested by the USN as an ASW asset on Yankee Station in 1966 and 1967.

However the RAN Essex proposal was to have a sqn of Phantoms and a sqn of Trackers and be a multi-role carrier. When the Essex and CVA01 were dropped in favour of keeping the Melbourne only 10 Skyhawks were ordered in 1965 to keep 4 at sea, but in 1969 another 10 were ordered to keep 8 at sea with the option for up to 14 making Melbourne a multi-role and even light attack carrier from 1971.

I think the Navy was right in pushing for a carrier despite all of the other priorities as it is a different procurement type. Its a 'once in a generation' buy whereas surface ships (or planes for the Air Force and kit for the Army) are an ongoing process.
 
About the only nation Australia would want to park a carrier off the coast of would be Indonesia, and that was why they were buying F111s.
Is an ASW a thing yet because that is about the only realistic role. The surface RAN is about keeping the sea lanes open and paying the occasional blood tax to the US. Anything else is a vanity project.
Why not get F4 for both strike and interception missions rather than f111
 
However the RAN Essex proposal was to have a sqn of Phantoms and a sqn of Trackers and be a multi-role carrier. When the Essex and CVA01 were dropped in favour of keeping the Melbourne only 10 Skyhawks were ordered in 1965 to keep 4 at sea, but in 1969 another 10 were ordered to keep 8 at sea with the option for up to 14 making Melbourne a multi-role and even light attack carrier from 1971.
I'd like to know what whoever thought the RAN could man an Essex (never mind paying for it) was smoking/injecting/drinking. The absolute most they could have managed was Centaur or Hermes, and that's a real stretch. Still that would allow the RAN FAA to operate Sea Vixens which as well as being fighters were capable strike aircraft.
 

Riain

Banned
I'd like to know what whoever thought the RAN could man an Essex (never mind paying for it) was smoking/injecting/drinking. The absolute most they could have managed was Centaur or Hermes, and that's a real stretch. Still that would allow the RAN FAA to operate Sea Vixens which as well as being fighters were capable strike aircraft.

Yeah, but in fairness at the time Indonesia had acquired Tu16s with AShMs so it was looking as if we needed Phantoms and would simply have to find the crew to make it work. That said, Scherg noted that it would require the Navy go from 12,500 to 17,600 men in 4 years and he said that would be 'impossible'.
 
What I want to know is was Scherg right comparing a new carrier to other Navy capabilities? Or is a carrier a stand-alone capability, separate from the rest of the Navy?
I think we must also recognise that the CDF at the time was also a very much a product of his own service. If there is one thing that those in the light blue want, it is to strangle anyone or anything that threatens their monopoly on air power. With the caveat that I still support the RAAF operating rotary winged assets in support of the Army, but that is another argument.

That aside, the decision to acquire or replace an aircraft carrier is very much a whole of government decision & the choice of platform should fit into the existing doctrine for the ADF & the service as a whole.

With that in mind, the question should be given the transformative nature of organic fixed wing air power to the fleet & IMHO it's an essential component for a Navy or a military that wants the ability to operate independently. So a fairer comparison is to look at the impact of acquiring nuclear weapons and the commensurate delivery system or something else that changes the way we do business.
 
The F-111s were intended, originally, to attack southern China from Penang, not Jakarta. It was why they were chosen instead of the A-5 or the BAC TSR-2. They had the range. They were to be armed with UK atomic bombs and to be used in a general nuclear war. The F-111 was pushing the envelope as far as performance and systems were concerned. Indeed there are doubts that the TSR-2 could have performed the mission it was intended to.

The RAN had a carrier (two actually) and were determined to keep them. The RAAF were intent that anything flew should belong to them. The USN offered an Essex to the RAN but they were knocked back on the basis of manning the ship was beyond the RAN. Same went for the remote possibility of the CV-01 proposal. Australia was at full employment and anything that diverted people from the civilian economy was going to face trouble, hence the re-introduction of conscription in 1965. Scherger was a product of the RAAF and fought to protect it as much as possible, bugger the RAN! His wishes/desires were came to fruition in 1985 with the Dibb Report and the idea that the RAAF could provide air support with their new fighters. Very foolish.
 
Yeah, but in fairness at the time Indonesia had acquired Tu16s with AShMs so it was looking as if we needed Phantoms and would simply have to find the crew to make it work. That said, Scherg noted that it would require the Navy go from 12,500 to 17,600 men in 4 years and he said that would be 'impossible'.
The only way the RAN could have had an extra 5000 trained men that quickly would be to recruit them from elsewhere and the Royal Navy would have objected to losing that many as £10 Poms.
 

Riain

Banned
The difference between the F111 and the Melbourne was that nobody was thinking of not buying a Canberra replacement because the RAAF had other priorities. The 'bomber' was a core capability and other capabilities were and should have been prioritised around it, and if these other capabilities fell short then they're easier to make up in a crisis.

This is how the Melbourne's replacement should have been thought about. Scherg did ask a question pretty much like this and the documents don't show that this question was answered, however Scherg did correct some incorrect Ministerial assumptions about which countries had carriers and why the PoW and Repulse were sunk. I don't think Scherg was particularly anti-carrier, I think if it was properly justified he would have been happy.

That said, an updated Essex or CVA01 were pipe dreams IMO, Hermes or Centaur with A4s were have been far better received.
 

Riain

Banned
They wouldn't be as suitable as the Melbourne, and were a decade older.

In 1964 the choice was an Essex class or a CVA01, before they finally came around to keeping the Melbourne with S2s and A4s. In 1972 the RN offered the RAN the Hermes but this was rejected as the manning requirements were too high.
 

Riain

Banned
It wasn't in the papers, however the CVA01 option looked doubtful because it was assumed Britain would be too busy building their own to build one for us, so my guess the same applied to a Clem. Also there was a lot of discussion about F4s and if they could operate from an Essex, I imagine it was already assumed that F4s couldn't operate from a Clem.
 
It wasn't in the papers, however the CVA01 option looked doubtful because it was assumed Britain would be too busy building their own to build one for us, so my guess the same applied to a Clem. Also there was a lot of discussion about F4s and if they could operate from an Essex, I imagine it was already assumed that F4s couldn't operate from a Clem.
Clems are a different problem from CVA-01 - far from being too busy to build more in 1964 the French had just a commissioned Foch a year prior. The space was there, but that far after construction of the two ships restarting production would likely have been very expensive and time-consuming.
 
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