Part XIX:
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, after snatching a few hours of sleep, I woke to a hung Parliament. It was a profound shock to me. The voters were confused by the quad-partied Conservative electoral message during the general election (official, Lamont, Heseltine and Portillo), reeling from the shock of expulsion of a sitting Prime Minister by avaricious members of her own Party, assaulted by 'The Sleaze' of the subsequent rookie ministry and bewildered by the return of a Tory faction once repudiated by the very people who now relied upon it to form a Cabinet. The people of Britain had great trouble voting us in, but an even greater trouble voting us out and putting Labour in charge. The Conservative Party was still the largest party in Parliament but could not reliably be counted upon to go on alone, with Liberals, Labour and Social Democrats collectively outweighing us. The simplest math, much debated by the morning TV hosts and bulldog newspaper editorials, was for us to join with the Ulster Unionists and thereby form a razor thin majority of one (326 MPs), but there were more than a few complications."
☆ John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):
"For much of the troubled history of Northern Ireland, virtually all Conservative Party politicians took the loyalty and the vote of its Unionist MPs for granted. The attitudes of Tory leaders regarding their allies in Northern Ireland ranged from patronizing to being slightly embarrassed by them. Although a small faction of English Conservative MPs could be found to occasionally speak for the Ulster Unionist cause, no Tory (nor Labour, nor Liberal) MP of Privy Council rank (or higher) spoke passionately for them since Andrew Bonar Law in 1914, until 1969. Following his expulsion from the Heath Shadow Cabinet in '68 for the 'Rivers of Blood' speech, Enoch Powell turned his not inconsiderable intellect towards finding a solution for the Irish Troubles. Eschewing anything resembling conventional wisdom regarding Northern Ireland being a complicated subject few people could understand, Mr. Powell saw the matter in starkly simple terms of the principle of nationhood. To Mr. Powell, Unionists represented loyal British subjects defending the rights of the British nation set against a foreign nationalism originating from Ireland. It was theme upon which expounded in and out of Parliament between 1969 and 1974. In '74, when he felt compelled to leave the Conservative Party over Mr. Heath's pro-European stance and urged the voters to support Labour in the coming election due to Harold Wilson's promise to hold a Referendum on Europe, Mr. Powell was courted by various Unionist leaders to formally join them. The issue was, however, made more complex by the Heath government decision on 30 March 1972 to remove power from the devolved non-power-sharing Unionist dominated Stormront Parliament in Northern Ireland due to the troubles in the region and impose direct rule from Westminster. Most of the senior Unionist members now courting Mr. Powell endorsed direct rule as a scheme for a temporary measure of peace. Mr. Powell turned down their offers to join them in February of '74, for reasons that have been variously interpreted as not yet ready to leave the Conservative Party (despite calling upon people to vote for Labour) or shrewdly realizing direct rule would be deeply unpopular and the Unionist leaders would be punished by their voters for going along with it, as most were. When the inconclusive nature of the February general election required Mr. Wilson to call another in October of the same year, and a new batch of Unionist leaders came to Mr. Powell, he accepted their offer to stand for a seat in Northern Ireland as a representative of the Ulster Unionist Party. Upon his election for South Down in October of '74, Mr. Powell became the de-facto Leader of the Ulster Unionist MPs, though he was quite assiduous in attempting to treat Mr. Molyneaux as the official leader of the faction, going so far as to call him 'Sir' in the presence of others. Mr. Powell then broke with a hundred years of tradition."
♥ Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):
"The minority government Jim Callaghan inherited from Harold Wilson in '76 was held together with cracked aged drying plaster, cracked, aged and dying MPs and few good wishes. We were quite at the mercy of small parties voting with us or against us. Most were quite dreadful, basking in their moment in the sun and asking for the moon while at it. Yet there were surprises to be found, none more so than when Jim and I discovered Ulster Unionist MPs ready to vote with us on key measures, and crucially abstain on others, in return for not unreasonable demands. Enoch Powell, no blood brother of mine, treated us fairly. He once said to me he assumed if he can get the Ulster Unionists to overcome their instinctual century old support for the Conservative Party, then perhaps we reds could get over our 'silly' views on Northern Ireland. It was a shrewd assessment from a very shrewd man. On more than one occasion I heard Jim say he preferred dealing with the Unionists over Liberals or other small parties because he found the Unionists to be serious men: tough and straight talking. He regarded David Steel as a capricious adolescent. Enoch Powell, for all his faults and there are far too many to list here, was paradoxically a man with whom Labour could, and would, make deals."
♠ Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):
"Ted (Heath) could not, and would not, make a deal with Enoch Powell. When Ted lost the election in February of '74 to Harold Wilson, some of the analysts assumed it was caused in no small part by Enoch Powell urging the voters to support Labour. I know not whether it is true, but I know Ted believed it to be true. Ted may have disliked Margaret, but he loathed Enoch. When Ted's poor biographer was attempting to piece together his long awaited official biography, the topic of the 1965 leadership election for the Conservative Party came up. Ted had nothing terrible to say about his opponent Reggie Maudling, settling on an epithet of 'amiably lazy,' but qualifying it with some praise. When the topic turned to his other opponent in '65 - Enoch Powell, Ted's eyes flashed lightning and he could only bring himself to utter one word to describe him - 'evil.' I was therefore not surprised when on the morning of 15 October, 1987 Ted rang me up to say he just advised Mr. King to not negotiate with the Ulster Unionist MPs and instead reach out to the Social Democrats."
♥ Roy Hattersley, Roy from Yorkshire, (Penguin Books, 1992):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987 I was filled with a horrible sense of foreboding. I foresaw members of my own Party arguing for cutting a deal with the SDP and the Liberals to attempt to form a government. It was in my view wholly unacceptable. Firstly, the combination of Liberals, SDP and Labour could muster 315 MPs, barely topping the Conservative 314 MPs. We could not form a majority government with the SDP and the Liberals alone, but we could alienate many members of our own Party by trying to form a minority government of the sort practiced by poor Jim Callaghan, an utterly demoralizing experience, with little to no hope of sustained electoral success. While many would have thought the biggest opposition to such a deal would come from the left of the Party, I can assure you the deal would have been roundly criticized by us moderates as well. When the right wing of the Labour Party detached itself to form the core of the SDP, it isolated men such as I within the Party. The remaining moderates were regarded, for much longer than we should have been, with deep suspicion. The guilt by association destroyed virtually all moderate political Labour groups in which the SDP members once operated. As someone who was a proud member of most of those Labour groups, I found myself constructing new groups from their ashes which had to be watered down with at least one visible left-winger within its committees to forestall any accusations of building a plank towards SDP. The agenda of moderates within the Labour Party was wholly compromised by the creation of the SDP. How were we now to be expected to welcome back such people into our midst?"
❥ Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"Between 1983 and 1987, Roy Hattersley's nightmares revolved around seeing Neil Kinnock become Prime Minister. Such a scenario would mean a repudiation of Roy's criticisms and all of his carefully planted whispering campaigns, and would end with him marooned on a desert island of his own making. But Kinnock in Downing Street was a nightmare shared by others, chief among them - David Owen."
♣ Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, Shirley (Williams), John Cartwright, Mike Thomas, Chris Patten, David Owen and I met with David Steel, David Penhaligon and Paddy Ashdown. Poor Roy (Jenkins) had to endure a slow count and a recount of his votes on the night before that bled over into the morning before being declared winner and could not join us due to being exhausted. Not that any of us present were in much better shape. We were all bleary eyed, sleep deprived and bone tired. Our nerves were frayed and I dare say I had hoped Paddy Ashdown would say something awful so I could pounce on him. Of all of us, only David Owen looked remarkably fresh and eager to play the role of kingmaker. He congratulated the Liberals on running a wonderful campaign, waited for David Steel to belatedly offer the same congratulations to the SDP and then reiterated that the Alliance was now in a position it most sought - it alone could decide who would form the next government. It was a puzzling remark, either born of cold blood calculation or a sudden inability to perform arithmetic. SDP and Liberals combined with Labour could not constitute a majority necessary to form a stable government. But either the Alliances, or the Liberals or the SDP by themselves, could very much decide the formation of the next Tory government by giving it a cast iron majority. Either David Owen was more exhausted then he let on and did not realize what he was saying, or he had single-handedly concluded we could make a deal with segment of the Tory government but not Labour. Judging by the looks our Liberal allies gave us, I was not alone in following the thread. Yet none of the three men sitting opposite us asked for clarification. Perhaps they felt outnumbered in that meeting. Or perhaps they were too tired to cause a row. Regardless, David Steel agreed we should now see what each side could offer us and negotiate collectively. He put undue stress on the last word, causing a frisson of tension among the Owenites, but not their namesake Leader. David Owen smiled and agreed. He then suggested that as the biggest Party in Parliament, Conservatives should be heard first. David Penhaligon then surprised us all by agreeing quickly. David Steel's view at this point was unknown to me, but consensus was reached. David Owen suggested David Steel, as the Leader of an Alliance Party with the most MPs, should be the one to make the call. David Steel asked for David Owen to join him. It was remarkably civil still as they began to discuss the details of when to place the call or how, but it occurred me we had not discussed how a possibility of such a deal would be received by our activists and members. In the run to the election, the question of hung Parliament was much talked about. Indeed, David Owen made certain it was a possibility in the mind of the British public. We had a document in place of what we would ask both the Conservatives and Labour in event of hung Parliament: Proportional Representation for Westminster and European elections and certain bullets points of our manifesto - true local government for the people of England, Scotland and Wales, reforming the House of Lords, creating a Ministry of Justice to better meet the complex needs of our legal system, improving healthcare and creating a 'lifeline' social security for the elderly. But we made no serious no groundwork to truly sound out how our members and activists felt about the Alliance keeping the Conservatives in power or conversely installing Labour. There were opinion polls bandied about to capture the mood of some sampling of people, but I distrusted them."
★ Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"Opinion polls conducted on the eve of the election indicated in the event of a hung Parliament, likely Alliance voters favored the formation of a government with the Conservatives over that of Labour by 38% to 35%, with the 15% Undecideds and Neither averaging 12%. Among Liberals, the preference was reversed with 37% favouring a deal with Labour to just 34% favouring a deal with the Conservatives. SDP voters on the other hand preferred Conservative government to a Labour one by 45% to 30%. However, most of those polls merely asked with which of the two 'major' parties likely Alliance voters preferred to form a coalition government. More open ended phrased polls asked of the overall British electorate (and not just Alliance voters) had different results. When asked 'If neither the Conservatives nor Labour win an overall majority in the House of Commons at the General Election, which of these options would you prefer?' 38% of the overall electorate did not favour a Conservative/Alliance pact nor a Labour/Alliance once and state they would prefer 'A quick election to decide who should form a government.' Alliance and SDP might have been conflicted with whom to form a pact or coalition, but the average voter preferred no coalitions or pacts at all."
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"On 15 October, we had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament because we did not anticipate it. But by some minor miracle we managed to articulate our talking points for a negotiation with the Alliance prior to their phone call and present it to Mr. King."
♠ Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):
"Only liars and fools would tell you a hung Parliament was not anticipated by the Tories and Labour in '87. I do not know the extent of the King government's preparation for it, but I can tell you Michael Heseltine worked out nearly all of the strategems for the benefit of someone as thick as me and was able to have me grasp it. The key lay with Labour's willingness to compromise. The King government had four options, propose a deal to the Alliance as a whole, SDP alone, or Liberals by themselves, or offer no deal to either. The optimal solution, on 15 October, as Michael drew it out for me using game theory matrices on a whiteboard, was for the Tories to offer no deal. As the largest Party in Parliament, there was a possibility of the Conservatives carrying on as they did prior to the election, as a minority government. That option was only viable, however, if Labour did not conclude a satisfactory deal with the Alliance. More on that below. Making a deal with the Alliance was the least preferable choice in a rational scenario. Proportional Representation (PR) was a recipe for disaster. For a Tory government to contemplate its implementation in such a way as to impact the makeup of the House of Commons at the next general election would have been inviting a backbench revolt. Somewhere between no-deal and Alliance deal hovered the notion of trying to make a deal with the Social Democrats. David Owen, in his feline way, made it known PR would not be a deal breaker. It opened possibilities. Somewhere between Alliance deal and making a deal with the SDP hover the option of making a deal with Liberals by themselves. Prior to the election, the consensus was David Steel instinctually tacked leftwards and would ask for more concessions than David Owen."
♦ David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"David (Owen) and I had a not entirely productive call with Mr. King in the afternoon of 15 October, 1987. He could not commit to PR for the Westminster elections and he was unwilling to negotiate on devolving power to the locales, even though his own Scottish Office minister, Malcolm Rifkind, was in favour of a Scottish Assembly."
♧ David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):
"I felt the afternoon call to Tom King went rather well, we made progress on 'lifeline', the need for a Ministry of Justice, some form of change in the House of Lords and considerations regarding PR for the European Parliament elections. Mr. King had room to negotiate and I wanted him to explore his options, but David (Steel) was quite anxious to see what he could wring out of Labour."
♠ Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):
"If the King government had four options, Labour had a myriad, but the branches of its decision tree very much depended on which Kinnock would appear at the negotiating table with the Alliance: the freckled darling of the soft-left or the half-serious almost-sober politician he tried to play for the telly. For the darling, the best outcome would be no deal with the Alliance for Labour or the Tories. It would mean a weak Conservative government of 314 MPs and give his lot a chance to roleplay us in our harassment of the Callaghan government in the late '70s. It would also strengthen their ideological purity. They stood tall and made no offers, you see, and the only way they can effect change was to have the good people of Britain vote them into office. The worst possible outcome for the darling would have been to offer Alliance a deal, only for Alliance to turn around and get the Tories to give them a better one. It would have left him humiliated and looking weak. Their argument about standing tall would evaporate and the voters would know them as the lot that tried to grab power, but couldn't get the job done. The third best option would have been a Labour-Alliance deal. Yes, yes, third best. Here's why. For the Benns of the world no loaf is better than half-loaf. The notion of having to temper their precious manifesto with the ideas of the SDP 'defectors' would stick in their craw and more importantly stick in the craw of their loon activists. It would also leave Kinnock open to charges of cavorting with the enemy. Prudence is not a virtue in the land of extremists. This leaves us with the seemingly ludicrous notion of the darling's second best option: watching Alliance and the Tories make a deal. Labour left could then trumpet how neither the Liberals nor the SDP are true opposition to the Tories but merely crypto-Conservatives. It would lay the Alliance open to the charge of not being an effective opposition and raise the profile of Labour as the only legitimate form of grievance against the government and its allies of the day."
♥ Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"We had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament before the general election. In the mad scramble, we managed to hastily create a document cobbled together at the last second. Neil's view was we could not in any meaningful way offer PR, but had much in common with the social agenda of the Alliance. But the less said about Polaris, the better."
♦ David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"I thought we were making decent progress in our talks with Labour on 15 October, when David Owen, without warning, asked them about Polaris. I cringed. Everyone fell silent. Giles (Radice) tried to pivot the conversation towards Labour's commitment to NATO, and how the '83 manifesto discussing the possibility of withdrawal from NATO was a ghastly mistake. David Owen let him finish his point and then asked, 'Do you advocate cancelling the Trident and then scrapping Polaris, leaving us without any nuclear deterrent?' It was a nasty way to pose a question, for it introduced the divisive topic of Trident and refocused the conversation back on the subject of unilateralism within the Labour Party leadership."
♧ David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):
"One is either pro-Europe or against. One is either pro-NATO or against. One is either pro-nuclear deterrent or a unilateralist. Given the serried sentinels of anti-unilateralism within my Party, I would be guilty of committing an utter betrayal of their interests by installing a government committed to the utter destruction of British nuclear arsenal in the name of one-side peace offers to our many foes."
♣ Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):
"Unilateralism is too important a subject to be left to chance or to be deferred until a later date. If we were to be allied with Labour we needed assurances regarding it. David Owen was right to raise the question during the 15 October meeting."
♣ David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):
"David Owen does not speak for me. David Owen has never spoken for me. And David Owen will never speak for me. Roy Jenkins has a coherent, well thought out philosophy. David has a demonic energy to seize the latest political ideas and explore them in service of his all-consuming ego. He regarded the Social Democratic Party as his mere instrument. I did not join a cult. I joined a Social Democrat Party."
❥ Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"It is worth remembering David Owen is an utter shit, but it is also worth remembering the unilateralist policy of Labour cost us untold votes in three general elections. It allowed Michael Foot to lead us off the cliff and nearly made us come in third in the popular vote in '83. It then led Neil Kinnock to muddle his way through an interview that cost us a score of seats in Midlands in '87. I hold David Owen in little regard, but he was right to fight Neil on nuclear policy, even if he was not right about anything else."
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"In my highly uninformed view, by midafternoon of 15 October, Proportional Representation (PR) was the only real stumbling block between a deal between us and the Alliance, but it was central to the Alliance plank as we then understood it. Various options were discussed and much debate was had during that busy afternoon and evening. Some very bright sparks from business colleges were drafted to come up with 'game theories' on which optimal options would be pursued by Labour and Alliance to give us an edge in negotiations and be able to forestall their wants, then even brighter sparks had to be drafted to decipher for us poor non-economists what it all meant. It was in this state of confusion that the gurus came to us with the notion we should wait for Labour to formally offer a deal to the Alliance. Should they offer one, we were advised to not offer a deal and carry on a minority government, but should Labour not offer a deal to the Alliance then we should offer one. It would take seven matrices for me to explain to you the underpinnings of such a strange conclusion, but it was quite convincing at the time. This 'tit for tat,' but 'not tit for tit' theorem moved Mr. King to go along with the gurus. And there we left it at the end of that long Thursday, waiting on Labour. There followed an apocalypse."
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, after snatching a few hours of sleep, I woke to a hung Parliament. It was a profound shock to me. The voters were confused by the quad-partied Conservative electoral message during the general election (official, Lamont, Heseltine and Portillo), reeling from the shock of expulsion of a sitting Prime Minister by avaricious members of her own Party, assaulted by 'The Sleaze' of the subsequent rookie ministry and bewildered by the return of a Tory faction once repudiated by the very people who now relied upon it to form a Cabinet. The people of Britain had great trouble voting us in, but an even greater trouble voting us out and putting Labour in charge. The Conservative Party was still the largest party in Parliament but could not reliably be counted upon to go on alone, with Liberals, Labour and Social Democrats collectively outweighing us. The simplest math, much debated by the morning TV hosts and bulldog newspaper editorials, was for us to join with the Ulster Unionists and thereby form a razor thin majority of one (326 MPs), but there were more than a few complications."
☆ John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):
"For much of the troubled history of Northern Ireland, virtually all Conservative Party politicians took the loyalty and the vote of its Unionist MPs for granted. The attitudes of Tory leaders regarding their allies in Northern Ireland ranged from patronizing to being slightly embarrassed by them. Although a small faction of English Conservative MPs could be found to occasionally speak for the Ulster Unionist cause, no Tory (nor Labour, nor Liberal) MP of Privy Council rank (or higher) spoke passionately for them since Andrew Bonar Law in 1914, until 1969. Following his expulsion from the Heath Shadow Cabinet in '68 for the 'Rivers of Blood' speech, Enoch Powell turned his not inconsiderable intellect towards finding a solution for the Irish Troubles. Eschewing anything resembling conventional wisdom regarding Northern Ireland being a complicated subject few people could understand, Mr. Powell saw the matter in starkly simple terms of the principle of nationhood. To Mr. Powell, Unionists represented loyal British subjects defending the rights of the British nation set against a foreign nationalism originating from Ireland. It was theme upon which expounded in and out of Parliament between 1969 and 1974. In '74, when he felt compelled to leave the Conservative Party over Mr. Heath's pro-European stance and urged the voters to support Labour in the coming election due to Harold Wilson's promise to hold a Referendum on Europe, Mr. Powell was courted by various Unionist leaders to formally join them. The issue was, however, made more complex by the Heath government decision on 30 March 1972 to remove power from the devolved non-power-sharing Unionist dominated Stormront Parliament in Northern Ireland due to the troubles in the region and impose direct rule from Westminster. Most of the senior Unionist members now courting Mr. Powell endorsed direct rule as a scheme for a temporary measure of peace. Mr. Powell turned down their offers to join them in February of '74, for reasons that have been variously interpreted as not yet ready to leave the Conservative Party (despite calling upon people to vote for Labour) or shrewdly realizing direct rule would be deeply unpopular and the Unionist leaders would be punished by their voters for going along with it, as most were. When the inconclusive nature of the February general election required Mr. Wilson to call another in October of the same year, and a new batch of Unionist leaders came to Mr. Powell, he accepted their offer to stand for a seat in Northern Ireland as a representative of the Ulster Unionist Party. Upon his election for South Down in October of '74, Mr. Powell became the de-facto Leader of the Ulster Unionist MPs, though he was quite assiduous in attempting to treat Mr. Molyneaux as the official leader of the faction, going so far as to call him 'Sir' in the presence of others. Mr. Powell then broke with a hundred years of tradition."
♥ Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):
"The minority government Jim Callaghan inherited from Harold Wilson in '76 was held together with cracked aged drying plaster, cracked, aged and dying MPs and few good wishes. We were quite at the mercy of small parties voting with us or against us. Most were quite dreadful, basking in their moment in the sun and asking for the moon while at it. Yet there were surprises to be found, none more so than when Jim and I discovered Ulster Unionist MPs ready to vote with us on key measures, and crucially abstain on others, in return for not unreasonable demands. Enoch Powell, no blood brother of mine, treated us fairly. He once said to me he assumed if he can get the Ulster Unionists to overcome their instinctual century old support for the Conservative Party, then perhaps we reds could get over our 'silly' views on Northern Ireland. It was a shrewd assessment from a very shrewd man. On more than one occasion I heard Jim say he preferred dealing with the Unionists over Liberals or other small parties because he found the Unionists to be serious men: tough and straight talking. He regarded David Steel as a capricious adolescent. Enoch Powell, for all his faults and there are far too many to list here, was paradoxically a man with whom Labour could, and would, make deals."
♠ Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):
"Ted (Heath) could not, and would not, make a deal with Enoch Powell. When Ted lost the election in February of '74 to Harold Wilson, some of the analysts assumed it was caused in no small part by Enoch Powell urging the voters to support Labour. I know not whether it is true, but I know Ted believed it to be true. Ted may have disliked Margaret, but he loathed Enoch. When Ted's poor biographer was attempting to piece together his long awaited official biography, the topic of the 1965 leadership election for the Conservative Party came up. Ted had nothing terrible to say about his opponent Reggie Maudling, settling on an epithet of 'amiably lazy,' but qualifying it with some praise. When the topic turned to his other opponent in '65 - Enoch Powell, Ted's eyes flashed lightning and he could only bring himself to utter one word to describe him - 'evil.' I was therefore not surprised when on the morning of 15 October, 1987 Ted rang me up to say he just advised Mr. King to not negotiate with the Ulster Unionist MPs and instead reach out to the Social Democrats."
♥ Roy Hattersley, Roy from Yorkshire, (Penguin Books, 1992):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987 I was filled with a horrible sense of foreboding. I foresaw members of my own Party arguing for cutting a deal with the SDP and the Liberals to attempt to form a government. It was in my view wholly unacceptable. Firstly, the combination of Liberals, SDP and Labour could muster 315 MPs, barely topping the Conservative 314 MPs. We could not form a majority government with the SDP and the Liberals alone, but we could alienate many members of our own Party by trying to form a minority government of the sort practiced by poor Jim Callaghan, an utterly demoralizing experience, with little to no hope of sustained electoral success. While many would have thought the biggest opposition to such a deal would come from the left of the Party, I can assure you the deal would have been roundly criticized by us moderates as well. When the right wing of the Labour Party detached itself to form the core of the SDP, it isolated men such as I within the Party. The remaining moderates were regarded, for much longer than we should have been, with deep suspicion. The guilt by association destroyed virtually all moderate political Labour groups in which the SDP members once operated. As someone who was a proud member of most of those Labour groups, I found myself constructing new groups from their ashes which had to be watered down with at least one visible left-winger within its committees to forestall any accusations of building a plank towards SDP. The agenda of moderates within the Labour Party was wholly compromised by the creation of the SDP. How were we now to be expected to welcome back such people into our midst?"
❥ Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"Between 1983 and 1987, Roy Hattersley's nightmares revolved around seeing Neil Kinnock become Prime Minister. Such a scenario would mean a repudiation of Roy's criticisms and all of his carefully planted whispering campaigns, and would end with him marooned on a desert island of his own making. But Kinnock in Downing Street was a nightmare shared by others, chief among them - David Owen."
♣ Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):
"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, Shirley (Williams), John Cartwright, Mike Thomas, Chris Patten, David Owen and I met with David Steel, David Penhaligon and Paddy Ashdown. Poor Roy (Jenkins) had to endure a slow count and a recount of his votes on the night before that bled over into the morning before being declared winner and could not join us due to being exhausted. Not that any of us present were in much better shape. We were all bleary eyed, sleep deprived and bone tired. Our nerves were frayed and I dare say I had hoped Paddy Ashdown would say something awful so I could pounce on him. Of all of us, only David Owen looked remarkably fresh and eager to play the role of kingmaker. He congratulated the Liberals on running a wonderful campaign, waited for David Steel to belatedly offer the same congratulations to the SDP and then reiterated that the Alliance was now in a position it most sought - it alone could decide who would form the next government. It was a puzzling remark, either born of cold blood calculation or a sudden inability to perform arithmetic. SDP and Liberals combined with Labour could not constitute a majority necessary to form a stable government. But either the Alliances, or the Liberals or the SDP by themselves, could very much decide the formation of the next Tory government by giving it a cast iron majority. Either David Owen was more exhausted then he let on and did not realize what he was saying, or he had single-handedly concluded we could make a deal with segment of the Tory government but not Labour. Judging by the looks our Liberal allies gave us, I was not alone in following the thread. Yet none of the three men sitting opposite us asked for clarification. Perhaps they felt outnumbered in that meeting. Or perhaps they were too tired to cause a row. Regardless, David Steel agreed we should now see what each side could offer us and negotiate collectively. He put undue stress on the last word, causing a frisson of tension among the Owenites, but not their namesake Leader. David Owen smiled and agreed. He then suggested that as the biggest Party in Parliament, Conservatives should be heard first. David Penhaligon then surprised us all by agreeing quickly. David Steel's view at this point was unknown to me, but consensus was reached. David Owen suggested David Steel, as the Leader of an Alliance Party with the most MPs, should be the one to make the call. David Steel asked for David Owen to join him. It was remarkably civil still as they began to discuss the details of when to place the call or how, but it occurred me we had not discussed how a possibility of such a deal would be received by our activists and members. In the run to the election, the question of hung Parliament was much talked about. Indeed, David Owen made certain it was a possibility in the mind of the British public. We had a document in place of what we would ask both the Conservatives and Labour in event of hung Parliament: Proportional Representation for Westminster and European elections and certain bullets points of our manifesto - true local government for the people of England, Scotland and Wales, reforming the House of Lords, creating a Ministry of Justice to better meet the complex needs of our legal system, improving healthcare and creating a 'lifeline' social security for the elderly. But we made no serious no groundwork to truly sound out how our members and activists felt about the Alliance keeping the Conservatives in power or conversely installing Labour. There were opinion polls bandied about to capture the mood of some sampling of people, but I distrusted them."
★ Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"Opinion polls conducted on the eve of the election indicated in the event of a hung Parliament, likely Alliance voters favored the formation of a government with the Conservatives over that of Labour by 38% to 35%, with the 15% Undecideds and Neither averaging 12%. Among Liberals, the preference was reversed with 37% favouring a deal with Labour to just 34% favouring a deal with the Conservatives. SDP voters on the other hand preferred Conservative government to a Labour one by 45% to 30%. However, most of those polls merely asked with which of the two 'major' parties likely Alliance voters preferred to form a coalition government. More open ended phrased polls asked of the overall British electorate (and not just Alliance voters) had different results. When asked 'If neither the Conservatives nor Labour win an overall majority in the House of Commons at the General Election, which of these options would you prefer?' 38% of the overall electorate did not favour a Conservative/Alliance pact nor a Labour/Alliance once and state they would prefer 'A quick election to decide who should form a government.' Alliance and SDP might have been conflicted with whom to form a pact or coalition, but the average voter preferred no coalitions or pacts at all."
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"On 15 October, we had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament because we did not anticipate it. But by some minor miracle we managed to articulate our talking points for a negotiation with the Alliance prior to their phone call and present it to Mr. King."
♠ Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):
"Only liars and fools would tell you a hung Parliament was not anticipated by the Tories and Labour in '87. I do not know the extent of the King government's preparation for it, but I can tell you Michael Heseltine worked out nearly all of the strategems for the benefit of someone as thick as me and was able to have me grasp it. The key lay with Labour's willingness to compromise. The King government had four options, propose a deal to the Alliance as a whole, SDP alone, or Liberals by themselves, or offer no deal to either. The optimal solution, on 15 October, as Michael drew it out for me using game theory matrices on a whiteboard, was for the Tories to offer no deal. As the largest Party in Parliament, there was a possibility of the Conservatives carrying on as they did prior to the election, as a minority government. That option was only viable, however, if Labour did not conclude a satisfactory deal with the Alliance. More on that below. Making a deal with the Alliance was the least preferable choice in a rational scenario. Proportional Representation (PR) was a recipe for disaster. For a Tory government to contemplate its implementation in such a way as to impact the makeup of the House of Commons at the next general election would have been inviting a backbench revolt. Somewhere between no-deal and Alliance deal hovered the notion of trying to make a deal with the Social Democrats. David Owen, in his feline way, made it known PR would not be a deal breaker. It opened possibilities. Somewhere between Alliance deal and making a deal with the SDP hover the option of making a deal with Liberals by themselves. Prior to the election, the consensus was David Steel instinctually tacked leftwards and would ask for more concessions than David Owen."
♦ David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"David (Owen) and I had a not entirely productive call with Mr. King in the afternoon of 15 October, 1987. He could not commit to PR for the Westminster elections and he was unwilling to negotiate on devolving power to the locales, even though his own Scottish Office minister, Malcolm Rifkind, was in favour of a Scottish Assembly."
♧ David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):
"I felt the afternoon call to Tom King went rather well, we made progress on 'lifeline', the need for a Ministry of Justice, some form of change in the House of Lords and considerations regarding PR for the European Parliament elections. Mr. King had room to negotiate and I wanted him to explore his options, but David (Steel) was quite anxious to see what he could wring out of Labour."
♠ Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):
"If the King government had four options, Labour had a myriad, but the branches of its decision tree very much depended on which Kinnock would appear at the negotiating table with the Alliance: the freckled darling of the soft-left or the half-serious almost-sober politician he tried to play for the telly. For the darling, the best outcome would be no deal with the Alliance for Labour or the Tories. It would mean a weak Conservative government of 314 MPs and give his lot a chance to roleplay us in our harassment of the Callaghan government in the late '70s. It would also strengthen their ideological purity. They stood tall and made no offers, you see, and the only way they can effect change was to have the good people of Britain vote them into office. The worst possible outcome for the darling would have been to offer Alliance a deal, only for Alliance to turn around and get the Tories to give them a better one. It would have left him humiliated and looking weak. Their argument about standing tall would evaporate and the voters would know them as the lot that tried to grab power, but couldn't get the job done. The third best option would have been a Labour-Alliance deal. Yes, yes, third best. Here's why. For the Benns of the world no loaf is better than half-loaf. The notion of having to temper their precious manifesto with the ideas of the SDP 'defectors' would stick in their craw and more importantly stick in the craw of their loon activists. It would also leave Kinnock open to charges of cavorting with the enemy. Prudence is not a virtue in the land of extremists. This leaves us with the seemingly ludicrous notion of the darling's second best option: watching Alliance and the Tories make a deal. Labour left could then trumpet how neither the Liberals nor the SDP are true opposition to the Tories but merely crypto-Conservatives. It would lay the Alliance open to the charge of not being an effective opposition and raise the profile of Labour as the only legitimate form of grievance against the government and its allies of the day."
♥ Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"We had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament before the general election. In the mad scramble, we managed to hastily create a document cobbled together at the last second. Neil's view was we could not in any meaningful way offer PR, but had much in common with the social agenda of the Alliance. But the less said about Polaris, the better."
♦ David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):
"I thought we were making decent progress in our talks with Labour on 15 October, when David Owen, without warning, asked them about Polaris. I cringed. Everyone fell silent. Giles (Radice) tried to pivot the conversation towards Labour's commitment to NATO, and how the '83 manifesto discussing the possibility of withdrawal from NATO was a ghastly mistake. David Owen let him finish his point and then asked, 'Do you advocate cancelling the Trident and then scrapping Polaris, leaving us without any nuclear deterrent?' It was a nasty way to pose a question, for it introduced the divisive topic of Trident and refocused the conversation back on the subject of unilateralism within the Labour Party leadership."
♧ David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):
"One is either pro-Europe or against. One is either pro-NATO or against. One is either pro-nuclear deterrent or a unilateralist. Given the serried sentinels of anti-unilateralism within my Party, I would be guilty of committing an utter betrayal of their interests by installing a government committed to the utter destruction of British nuclear arsenal in the name of one-side peace offers to our many foes."
♣ Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):
"Unilateralism is too important a subject to be left to chance or to be deferred until a later date. If we were to be allied with Labour we needed assurances regarding it. David Owen was right to raise the question during the 15 October meeting."
♣ David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):
"David Owen does not speak for me. David Owen has never spoken for me. And David Owen will never speak for me. Roy Jenkins has a coherent, well thought out philosophy. David has a demonic energy to seize the latest political ideas and explore them in service of his all-consuming ego. He regarded the Social Democratic Party as his mere instrument. I did not join a cult. I joined a Social Democrat Party."
❥ Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):
"It is worth remembering David Owen is an utter shit, but it is also worth remembering the unilateralist policy of Labour cost us untold votes in three general elections. It allowed Michael Foot to lead us off the cliff and nearly made us come in third in the popular vote in '83. It then led Neil Kinnock to muddle his way through an interview that cost us a score of seats in Midlands in '87. I hold David Owen in little regard, but he was right to fight Neil on nuclear policy, even if he was not right about anything else."
♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):
"In my highly uninformed view, by midafternoon of 15 October, Proportional Representation (PR) was the only real stumbling block between a deal between us and the Alliance, but it was central to the Alliance plank as we then understood it. Various options were discussed and much debate was had during that busy afternoon and evening. Some very bright sparks from business colleges were drafted to come up with 'game theories' on which optimal options would be pursued by Labour and Alliance to give us an edge in negotiations and be able to forestall their wants, then even brighter sparks had to be drafted to decipher for us poor non-economists what it all meant. It was in this state of confusion that the gurus came to us with the notion we should wait for Labour to formally offer a deal to the Alliance. Should they offer one, we were advised to not offer a deal and carry on a minority government, but should Labour not offer a deal to the Alliance then we should offer one. It would take seven matrices for me to explain to you the underpinnings of such a strange conclusion, but it was quite convincing at the time. This 'tit for tat,' but 'not tit for tit' theorem moved Mr. King to go along with the gurus. And there we left it at the end of that long Thursday, waiting on Labour. There followed an apocalypse."