Part XXI
Part XXI:


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"On the morning 20 October, 1987, David Steel reached out to Tom King in the capacity of Leader of the Alliance of the Social Democrats and Liberals to negotiate the formation of a coalition government with the Conservative Party on behalf of both Alliance parties. He stated the Alliance terms as follows:

1. A referendum on Proportional Representation (PR) for the Westminster elections;

2. Bill on PR for the European elections, backed by a three line Tory whip;

3. Bill on the creation of a Scottish Assembly, backed by another three line whip;

4. Bill on a Welsh Assembly, also backed by a three line whip;

5. The creation of a Ministry of Justice as a Cabinet position, headed by a Liberal;

6. The creation of a 'lifeline' social security agency for the elderly;

7. Freedom of Information Act;

8. Repeal of the poll tax in Scotland;

9. Free vote on a Bill to reform the House of Lords;

10. Cancellation of the Trident deal;

11. Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Industry;

12. Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Health and Social Security;

13. Alliance MP as Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food;

14. Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Scotland;

15. Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Wales;​

Tom King indicated he would have an answer for David Steel by noon. David Steel then informed David Owen of the call he had placed to Tom King."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"I was disappointed David (Steel) chose to conduct the second part of our sensitive negotiations with the Conservative Party without prior consultation of me, but on the whole I thought most of his demands had merit and closely matched what I intended to ask of the Conservative myself, with the exception of the veto of Trident, which I thought too sensitive an issue to discuss."


David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):

"David Owen flew into a rage when he found out David Steel negotiated as the Leader of the Alliance of the Social Democrats and Liberals. He threatened to go to the press there and then and denounce David Steel and all he had said to Tom King and sunder the Alliance, but Chris Patten and Mike Thomas happened to be with him in the room when the news broke and spent an hour soothing his ego. They saved the Dear Exalted Leader a great deal of embarrassment, at least on that day."


Chris Patten, Roamer, (HarperCollins, 1995):

"I did not think David Steel's unilateral (no pun intended) negotiation on behalf of the Alliance was of great benefit to the long term health of the Alliance. David Steel should have consulted David Owen on the more divisive terms of the proposal before sending it over in their name, rather than just his alone. David Owen was right to be offended by it and we had a tough conversation on the subject before agreeing, for the greater good of the Party and the Party's standing, to allow the negotiation to proceed, but we also insisted future negotiations include David Owen and representatives of SDP leadership."


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"David Steel sundered the Alliance that day. We knew from that moment on we had to break the Alliance as quickly as electorally possible and never put ourselves into a position of having a Liberal speak for us. As to the half-libelous and all-silly comments of the little Friend of Roy Jenkins Marquand regarding rage, Dr. David Owen is a man in full control of his emotions. He was naturally disappointed in David Steel's actions, but he was, sadly, not surprised by them and did not express much anger."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"David Owen smashed a chair against the wall of his office when he found out. Mike Thomas had to rush to block the door with his pint sized body to prevent the alarmed secretaries from coming inside. Chris Patten, no stranger to dealing with sociopaths from his days at the Conservative Research Department and also writing broadcast speeches for Margaret Thatcher in '79, deftly handled the wounded ego of his Dear Exalted Leader and Father of All Social Democratic Peoples by saying, 'We will deal with Steel's betrayal later. Now we must do the utmost to contain damage and advance the interests of the Party.' It was the absolute correct thing to say to David at the time. It cemented Chris as a member of the Owennite inner circle for displaying the knee-jerk 'us vs. them' mentality which David so highly prized in others and overindulged in himself and focused the Dear Exalted Leader's mind not on petty and immediate revenge, but on the need for public display of unity for the sake of the Party so he can exact his pathetic petty revenge much later. I doubt Chris meant what he said, but he must have known the tonic effect it would have on David."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"Steel's Points made the Cabinet degenerate into a not particularly well behaved grammar school debating society. Mr. King and Mr. Tebbit did their best to contain the tempers flaring, but it was as close to chaos as I have seen any professional Tory organization descend. Throughout all this Mr. Heath sat so quietly I rather feared he had fallen asleep, though in retrospect, given the amount of noise we were all making it was an unlikely proposition. But as Malcolm Rifkind repeated his objection over being asked to relinquish his Cabinet post and abandon Scotland to the Liberal wolves, Ted suddenly spoke out in a rather booming voice. 'They asked for Scotland and Wales in the hope of getting one, not both.' All at once, we - the bickering grammar school debate society children - turned to listen to our elder. 'And Trident is only on there so they can make us feel good turning them down as well. Nor can they truly expect us to force three line whips on devolution for Wales and Scotland, as well as PR for the European elections.' At this someone, though I am not sure who made an effort to interrupt, Ted sent him a glare that he must have used to silence an errant sailor on his yacht in the midst of a race and carried on. His reworking of the Steel Points were as follows:

1. A referendum on Alternate Voting System (NOT PR) for the Westminster elections;

2. A free vote on a Bill on AVS (NOT PR) for the European elections;

3. NO - Bill on the creation of a Scottish Assembly;

4. A free vote on a Bill on the creation of a Welsh Assembly;

5. YES - The creation of a Ministry of Justice as a Cabinet position, headed by a Liberal;

6. YES - The creation of a 'lifeline' social security agency for the elderly;

7. NO - Freedom of Information Act;

8. NO - Repeal of the poll tax in Scotland;

9. NO - a Bill to reform the House of Lords;

10. NO - Cancellation of the Trident deal;

11. NO - Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Industry;

12. Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Social Security (but separate from a Health ministry);

13. YES - Alliance MP as Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food;

14. NO - Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Scotland;

15. YES - Alliance MP as Secretary of State for Wales;

16. Alliance MP as Minister for the Arts;

17. Alliance MP as Minister of State for Europe;

18. Alliance MP as Minister of State for Housing;​

Ted then sank back down and indicated non-verbally for us to debate his counteroffer. Though there was a lively discussion, not the least from the poor Secretaries of ministries to be handed over, in the end we adopted the Heath Points as our formal response, without too much recrimination."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"David Owen and I reviewed the counterproposal together with our leadership team. Following a productive, if tough, debate, we reiterated our request for a free vote on the House of Lords and the Freedom of Information Act."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"Parliamentary traditionalists within the Cabinet were horrified by the prospect of any House of Lords reform, while the Freedom of Information Act alarmed the more 'law and order' Thatcherites in, and out of, the Cabinet. The negotiations dragged on, until someone leaked the reasons for the impasse."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"The bloody minded awful 'Sun' attacked us for fiddling while Rome burned over Lords and privacy. Thankfully the 'Daily News' was able to counteract their claims, though it had much smaller circulation."


Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, (Bantam Press, 1990):

"During only the opening gambit of his negotiation with the Alliance, Tom was giving the store away because he knew most of the Conservative Party MPs were too worried about their jobs to remove him come November, even if he had installed Paddy (Ashdown) as the Secretary of State for the Defence. Only one thing motivated Tom - survival."


Bernard Ingham, Kill the Messenger, (HarperCollins, 1994):

"It was disheartening to watch the Leader of the Conservative Party betray his principles for power."


Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"I didn't care for the deal Tom King and Ted Heath were prepared to make to stay in power, but for Bernie Ingham to accuse anyone of betraying principles to stay in power is akin to having a bank robber complain about an increase in burglaries in his neighborhood."


Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):

"Political power is a scary thing. Few who tasted it can leave it behind gracefully and will do all they can to cling to it. I myself felt its toxins when I was just a mere Member of Parliament. To be Leader of your Party is not something I can even imagine, never mind being Prime Minister. It is not surprising the speed with which Tom King was willing to chuck his Cabinet ministers aside to slake his thirst, just it was rather disappointing. Michael (Heseltine) and I had an almost comedic conversation on the topic, until he turned deadly earnest and said, 'November, 1988.' Nothing more had to be said. Michael was determined to remove Tom King for what he had done to the Party. We don't do coalitions in Britain."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"Due to the entry of Social Democrats into negotiations, the tough negotiating stance David Steel took early on had all but evaporated and we were left with a rather weak slush. We went from having a hardline on devolution to promises of free votes and from PR to AVS. It then became clear to me the issue was not just the Alliance and outsized influence the Social Democrats had upon it, but the nature of David Steel's leadership. He simply had to go. During the course of the negotiations I approached David Penhaligon and said, 'This can't go on, you know.' Catching my drift, David Penhaligon nodded and said, 'Let us finish this out and then in six months, who knows.' Nothing more had to be said."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"We had hoped to keep the shuffles to a minimum, but of course given all that had occurred, some changes were necessary. Others were not. Mr. Tebbit, I fear, did not take to the creation of a Ministry of Justice as a Cabinet level position and saw it as an affront to his position as Home Secretary. We were all very keen for him to stay on, but he would not be budged. Finally Mr. King prevailed upon him to be named Deputy Prime Minister and take charge of the passage of legislation in the House. It was at the time considered a wise choice, though it did not play to his natural strengths and was remarked as such at the time by more than a few people, though not me. Given the importance of the Home Office, it was felt someone of caliber was put into such a position and Douglas Hurd was moved from Foreign Office. Malcolm Rifkind's accomplishments in Scotland were to be applauded, nor was his time in the foreign ministries overlooked, so it was only natural for him to take on Foreign Office. We had great hopes for Michael Forsyth to take his place, but there were differences in style and Malcolm recommended we elevate Ian Lang instead. Michael Allison did not prove to be a good fit in Northern Ireland, I am sad to say, so it was natural there would be a change there. Given the febrile atmosphere of the time it was thought a level headed politician should be sent there and Jim Prior was reconciled into the government and agreed to take charge there yet again, though he warned us he would not last long and wanted Nicholas Scott as his minister. Neither demand was too onerous in my view, nor that of Mr. King. Given we were splintering Health and Social Security, we decided to consolidate Trade and Industry. I was stunned to learn I was to be put in charge of it and much humbled by the task set before me. We lost some good ministers, but I dare say jumpstarted more than a few careers by elevating new ones. All in all, I had thought our agreement and subsequent reshuffle went rather well."


List of the Tom King's ministers (October, 1987):

Tom King - Prime Minister

Norman Tebbit - Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister

Peter Brooke - Lord Privy Seal (and Chairman of the Conservative and Unionist Party)

Lord Young of Graffham - Chancellor of the Exchequer

Malcolm Rifkind - Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Paddy Ashdown - Minister of State for Europe​

Douglas Hurd - Secretary of State for the Home Department

David Steel - Minister of Justice

Chris Patten -Minister of State for Justice​

Paul Tyler - Under-Secretary of State for Justice​

David Penhaligon - Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

Charles Kennedy - Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food​

Elizabeth Shields - Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food​

George Younger - Secretary of State for Defence

Kenneth Baker - Secretary of State for Education and Science

Kenneth Clarke - Secretary of State for Employment

Alick Buchanan-Smith - Secretary of State for Energy

Patrick Jenkin - Secretary of State for the Environment

Simon Hughes - Minister of State for Housing​

Jim Prior - Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Ian Lang - Secretary of State for Scotland

David Mellor - Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Virginia Bottomley - Secretary of State for Health

Mike Thomas - Secretary of State for Social Security

Liz Lynne - Minister of State for Social Security​

Rosie Barnes - Under-Secretary of State for Social Security​

Nicholas Ridley - Secretary of State for Transport

John Pardoe - Secretary of State for Wales

Bob Maclennan - Minister of State for Wales​

Alex Carlile - Under-Secretary of State for Wales​

David Waddington - Chief Whip

John Cartwright - Minister for the Arts

Sir Ted Heath- Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster



Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"During the course of the sweat-soaked nerve-fraying campaign to retain my seat in '87, I had given up smoking cigars so I could function at least two-thirds of my former self. When news came of the long and sadly blood minded negotiations between the Alliance and the Conservatives over the House of Lords reform and Freedom of Information Act ended with a Solomon like decision of Tories to grant Freedom of Information but not Lords reform, I lit up a midsized Havana."


Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):

"One must always have hope, even if one is dive bombed by Stukas on the bloody beaches of Anzio, never mind something as ultimately silly as horse trading in politics. I had held out hope the Tories and Liberals would not come to an agreement, but they did. Thus the unlikely alliance was struck between the Alliance and the Conservatives. I was struck more by the fact in the immediate aftermath of the election I had talked myself into making a deal with a man such as Enoch Powell in the vain hope of promoting a government in which I might have a limited voice. It was time to go. One did not wish to be Roy Jenkins and cling to the bitter and not retire gracefully. Not that I have ever been accused of having much grace. I had broken more promises about holidays to my wife than I could count, so I made up to her for it by taking us to Switzerland on a whim, after telling my constituency agent to find a suitable replacement for me for a by-election or a general, depending on my mood. Upon my return, I was told with some trepidation that a good candidate was found, though they warned me I must not react to his name. I therefore eagerly anticipated meeting Fidel Mussolini and was much disappointed it was only Hillary Benn instead, son of That Benn. Upon meeting me, he almost offhandedly said, 'I'm a Benn, but not a Bennite.' We had a warm conversation after that and I once knew I met the man to whom I could entrust my constituency, and fling into the chaos of our Party."


Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"When the Con-All coalition was formalized, I rang up all the men and women on our wonderful campaign team and said, 'The battle begins.' I was gratified by their enthusiastic response."


Philip Gould, Confessions of an Adman, (HarperCollins, 1996):

"In retrospect, I was rather naïve and only realized Bryan Gould was preparing to make a run at being Leader of the Labour Party after that post-coalition announcement phone call, when one of my co-workers turned to me and stunned me with a simple question, 'Think he can manage to chuck out Neil?"


Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"I thought Neil Kinnock did a magnificent job in '87. He took us from 184 MPs in '83 under Foot to 221. But in politics there is no prize to be had for coming in second. It was clear to me there would be a need for a change, though no clear candidate presented himself in my view."


Roy Hattersley, Roy from Yorkshire, (Penguin Books, 1992):

"It was clear to me the Labour leadership team of '87 did not all do that it could have done and a change was necessary. I was not alone in my views."


Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"John Prescott and John Smith - the Welsh one - and John Smith - the one that matters - were sent by the rump of a dump of a corporal's guard remains of Tony Benn's brigade, Roy Hattersley and Neil, respectively, to learn whether I intended to run for Leader. In 1980 I ran for the leadership to forestall a candidate further to the left of me, and that resulted in Michael Foot entering the race, winning and leading us off several steep and rather tall cliffs for three long years, always striving to find the sharpest rocks to have us land upon. In 1983 I ran to prevent a unilateralist from gaining control of the Party yet again and that resulted in Neil Kinnock winning and losing to a quilted patchwork alliance of Alliance and Tories. I feared if I ran again, Joseph Stalin would come back from the dead, re-possess the body of his dear old granny Joan Maynard and capture the leadership of my Party. I therefore decided to go off to the backbenches to better indulge my habit of being a cranky not quite old man."


Cherie Booth, Speaking for Myself, (Little, Brown, 1998)

"If '83 brought about the depths of despair, '87 brought about pangs of a near miss. Though Tony (Blair) was much more clinical in his assessment. He said we were not as yet ready to win, but we could manage it in three to four years, if we brought about more necessary changes. I was of the great opinion all it would take is one more heave. As it turns out we were both wrong."


Joe Trippi, Sleepless Summers, (Faber, 1998):

"Anyone who tells you Dukakis ran a squeaky clean Democratic campaign in '88 to capture the White House only to be utterly destroyed by the unprincipled scoundrels on the Republican side is three-quarters right and one-quarter wrong. Dukakis did run a clean campaign, against Republicans. He has no such claims against his fellow Democratic primary candidates. Oh Gary Hart demolished himself, twice, but Dick Gephardt's destruction was all Duke. His team, flush with cash, while Dick's campaign was running on fumes, ran a series of slick ads after the New Hampshire primary in which a Gephardt gymnast lookalike did somersaults and flip-flops as an announcer discussed the flip-flops Dick was alleged to have made. It wiped us out. TV, my once friend and ally, turned on me because the other guys had more money and I realized then there I had to seek a new medium."


Peter Mandelson, The Revolution Will be Televised, (Faber, 1996):

"Nothing quite prepared me for securing the rights to the Alan Clark Diaries for TV serialization for ITV. In addition to the battery of lawyers and high strung literary agents there was a trip to South Africa, during the height of apartheid, to visit the great man himself. He was ensconced on what could only be described as a plantation and was attended to by if not a harem, then at the very least a dedicated attempt at one. Mr. Clark began by asking me who I had envisioned in portraying him. Apparently the question much occupied him. I barely resisted the urge to suggest Tony Robinson, who had just finished playing Baldrick in Blackadder II, and reversed the question. Who had he imagined portraying him? He assured me none would be up to the job, but perhaps Michael Caine could it, if only he - Michael - had been a tad younger, you see. Forcing myself not to laugh I pivoted rather artfully away from what I said were 'feature film' actors towards TV series actors. He then suggested Paul McGann, who was taller, younger and, then, even more handsome than Mr. Caine never mind Mr. Clark. I told him I would look into it. Mr. Clark then treated me to a rather impromptu monologue on the state of British politics, which surprised me by its incisive deductions, though they were sprinkled with statements designed to shock. I knew there and then he still had the bug and it was only a matter of time for him to return to British politics. Though I fear he and I stopped being on speaking terms when he learned I was the one who convinced Ian Holm to portray him in the Diaries. Also I might have something to do with getting Paul McGann to guest star as David Owen."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"All through the selection of the Cabinet I felt a strange sense of foreboding due to David Owen not joining it. I had expected him to ambush David Steel and demand a Cabinet position allocated to Liberals to be handed over to him, but he did nothing. He decide to hedge his bets by not joining the Cabinet to allow himself the freedom from collective responsibility to criticize the government whose formation he so lukewarmly endorsed. People often ask me if I was offended not being named to the frontbench of the second King ministry, to which I reply I did not regret it for even a moment because I knew I would be frozen out by David Owen. He had wrongly assumed I was the one who leaked the substance of our 15 October SDP leadership meeting to the Liberals and decided to punish me for it. Also, having been Secretary of State for the Defence, I did not relish heading Welsh Office. I say this without any prejudice or snobbery, for any Cabinet position is a privilege, but there are unwritten rules about such things. Furthermore, at the time I felt I needed an independence from a ministry to ensure I could assist Roy in deposing David Owen. But those feelings were quite far from my mind on the day of the State opening of the 50th Parliament. I will always cherish the moment I sat down in a row behind the government frontbench as a Social Democrat. In 1981 we had set out break the mold of British politics and break it we did. We did it. We really did."
 
As others have noted, this is both an entertaining and a well informed timeline, and the use of fake quotes from fake memoirs is both brilliant and I don't think has been done before on this site.

However I still have a criticism.

The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition in 2010 IOTL, with David Cameron being a somewhat stronger politician and in a stronger negotiating position than Tom King, so why not use those negotiations as a template for your 1987 negotiations? It actually seems that the Lib Dems got a better deal in 2010. Also, hard as it is to believe, Ted Heath offered Jeremy Thorpe the position of Home Secretary in order to prop up his government in 1974.
 
As others have noted, this is both an entertaining and a well informed timeline, and the use of fake quotes from fake memoirs is both brilliant and I don't think has been done before on this site.
Thanks.

However I still have a criticism.

The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition in 2010 IOTL, with David Cameron being a somewhat stronger politician and in a stronger negotiating position than Tom King, so why not use those negotiations as a template for your 1987 negotiations? It actually seems that the Lib Dems got a better deal in 2010. Also, hard as it is to believe, Ted Heath offered Jeremy Thorpe the position of Home Secretary in order to prop up his government in 1974.
I did take the 2010 deal(s) as a starting point, but in this timeline's '87 negotiations The Alliance is deeply divided and there is pressure on them to make a deal. In 2010, there were financial considerations regarding Greece and etc., here it seems they are on a verge of another Great Depression. In the '87 of our world, more than one wise economist predicted it would get even worse after October of '87 and as late as the Holiday season it was widely reported things are about to take a bad turn economically by more than a few grave economics professors and experts.

There are also three profound fears driving the Alliance.

The first, due to their aforementioned division, David Owen will race David Steel to cut a deal. The contents of his (David Owen's) meeting with his leadership team are imperfectly leaked to the Liberals and force their hand. The concern is that David Owen will agree to even less and leave them out of power, sunder the Alliance and lose everyone votes. Right now Alliance is the feel good Party of people of all sorts working together, a classless party where centre Tories and centre Labour men and women can work together without any rancor. Their intra-Alliance squabbles are not public knowledge. Should they split, the feel good factor will be lost and cost them untold votes in the next general.

The second fear is that the Conservatives will call a general election after saying they could not make a deal with the Alliance and need either a fresh mandate to run the country or ask the people to turn the nation over to Labour. In 2010, Conservatives were the Party with the largest number of seats trying to get into Downing Street, in this '87, they are the Party with the largest seats trying to stay in Downing Street. Their mentality is very different here. They are not hungering to seize power after 13 years in the wilderness, they are merely making deals to stay in, or leave and then come back soon, because they view the Liberal-SDP-Labour-Unionist coalition as fundamentally unworkable. Enoch Powell's prediction of a four month Labour government is, if not widely shared, then at least understood by senior Tory Cabinet ministers.

The third fear is that the Tories will call the Alliance bluff and ask them to go get a better deal with Labour. Tories only need SDP or Liberals to stay in power, Labour needs at the very least both Alliance parties to take power. Nobody among Liberal leadership thinks, for even a second, David Owen would allow Neil Kinnock to become Prime Minister.

Jeremy Thorpe is believed to have asked for a high office, such as Home Office, but I do not think Ted ever truly offered it. There might have been some element of letting Jeremy Thrope think it was on the table, but Ted had access to Thorpe's file. The Rinkagate might have been just beginning, but MI-5 had a file on Thorpe's dalliances since at least the '60s (biographers seem to think Wilson had the file as well and was very tempted to use it, but held off, for reasons people will debate). I do not think Ted would ever put such a man in charge of the Home Office. But, even supposing the rumors are true and Ted was going to do it, he was absolutely shattered by the '74 defeat and was not thinking rationally. He had let the lease lapse on his Albany home, if I recall correctly, some time prior to the election, and was absolutely sure he was going to be re-elected and stay on in Downing Street. The '74 defeat was soul crushing for Ted. In '87, Ted would have been in a better frame of mind. He had survived destruction, humiliation and self-imposed exile, to see off his most bitter intra-Party foe and return to advise the Leader of his Party and the Prime Minister of his nation. If anything it is Tom King scrambling here and letting David Steel effectively split the Home Office in two with the Ministry of Justice as a Cabinet worthy ministry. Ted was probably pressing for Tom to get the Liberals to settle for a new Ministry of State reporting to Home Office. In '74, Ted was staring down the barrel of the gun with exhausted Cabinet ministers wishing to be put out of their misery. In '87, he is a much steadier hand.
 
Great stuff!

Did the card suit symbols had some logic behind them?

I felt a lack of any idea of who Tom King was, or what policies he stood for, other than invisible, which I suppose might have been the point?

Hope you do choose to continue at some point.
 
Thank you for the compliments.


re: Tom King. He is struggling to overcome his non-entity status in this timeline. He is a middle of the road Thatcherite Cabinet minister, used in a variety of tough jobs, but not entirely ambitious. He is chosen for his loyalty and ability during the Strike, not for his philosophical underpinnings. He is trying to find his way, but the series of crises he faces force him to be more concerned with holding the Party and nation together than developing a true philosophy. If there is a follow-up I will try to explore Kingite positions to flesh out his stances on things.


re: suits and colors, there are a couple of reasons behind them.

Early on, I realized I would have a lot of talking heads in this story and all of them would have biases. Since it is hard for some of us non-Brits to keep these names and agendas straight, I marked their political allegiance using suits, colors and hollow vs. solid shapes.

Card suits:
Hearts - Labour Party
Diamonds - Liberals
Spades - Conservative Party
Clubs - Social Democrats​

Solid vs. hollow:
The closer the member of the Party is to the middle road of their Party, the more likely they are to be solid. The more radical they are within their Party philosophy, the more likely are to be hollow.

In Labour, if you are closer to Healey/Callaghan world view, you are likely to be a solid heart - If you are closer to the Foot or Benn axis, you are more likely to be hollow heart - .
If you are Peter Shore, you are closer to solid than hollow, but you don't meet the left/right axis in Labour well, so I turned you sideways -.

Among the Conservatives, if you are closer to Thatcher/Keith Joseph than Heath/Macmillan you are a hollow spade, otherwise you are a solid.

Liberals have a rich history of non-conformists and are harder to place on the left/right axis. Solids are those who follow David Steel and his cooperation model with Social Democrats. Hollows are more likely to oppose SDP (and Steel) and pursue their own agendas.

SDP solids are more likely to be Jenkinites, while hollows are Owennites. Due to the us vs. them mentality of Owennites, if you are not one of them, you go into the Jenkinites column.​

Colors:
Labour is red, the end.
Liberals, regardless of their view of Steel and SDP, are orange, but those who lean Labour, or are former Labour, are red.
Conservatives are blue, except those Thatcherites who rebelled against Thatcher. Their political views on the right/left axis puts them in the hollow wing of the Spades, but they oppose Thatcher so I gave them a shade of gray.
Everyone who joined SDP within a couple of months of the Party being formed are purple. Those who defected from Conservatives afterwards are still shaded Tory blue. In theory, post '81 former Labour types would be red, but we don't meet any of them in this story.
Green are neutrals, or at least not politically biased in their views.
Stars:
Non-politicians. Though unless shaded green, they have their biases, denoted in colors and solid vs. hollow.
some folk do not quality for star status even if they claim to be non-politicians. Thus Mr. Gove and Mrs. Thatcher's Press Secretary are politicians in my view. Others were once politicians, but by and large got out of the racket, like OTL Speaker of the House.​
 
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This has been a very enjoyable TL - the colour/symbol-coding was inspired. This does feel like a logical place to leave off, but I very much hope we get to see more from this world in the future!
 
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