Part XV
Part XV:


Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"The increasing rumours of the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland having to call an early general election in Spring of 1987 to forestall the publication of a diary of a mistress of a disgraced Cabinet minister made sure there would be no Spring 1987 general election. The fear of being mocked for cowardice overrode the fear of the embarrassing revelations. Though I am sure it did wonders for the sales of Ms. Ozols's book. I myself have not read it, not out of prudishness or disapproval of low brow literature, but merely because I did not have to read it for the most sensational claims within it were splashed across the dailies in the week preceding the publication of the book, including the implication of an affair of a Cabinet minister with a fellow Conservative MP."


Azucena Ozols, My Alan Clark Diary, (Bantam Press, 1987):

"29 July, 1985. I found Al (Alan Clark) gloomy. I thought it was because he had been manhandled by Norman Tebbit during his gallant but silly defence of Margaret Thatcher over Europe and began to reassure him I still found him manly. He rather liked that word. But he shook his head and told me it was a different matter. 'The Lady asked me to find a spot for John Major at Treasury, but rumour has it the old boy is shagging Edwina Currie. Ghastly, isn't it? Most women age horribly when they get to the House and Edwina Currie was no great looker before she got into Parliament.'"


Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"Ms. Ozols could have easily excised the passage regarding Mr. Major from her book, but chose to leave it in and thereby wrecked a man's career. Given the perverse milieu in which she operated, she was not content to indulge in the baser instincts of the public with a tale about Jeffrey Archer or her own beau and instead went after a much more innocent man. Having worked with John Major I can tell you he is a man of great intellect and had, and still has, vast political potential. What went on between him and a woman other than his wife is a matter for him, his wife and the other woman. Instead it became tabloid fodder, for less than a day. A man's life was turned upside down and his political career stalled because a failed actress in search of someone to pay her rent attached herself to a lecherous self-indulgent over-promoted village idiot who said too much and thought too little, and the failed actress then parroted his words in the hopes of buying a much more sparkly outfit for her next societal outing and hoping to prolong her rapidly dwindling career of pseudo-fame."


Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):

"More than a few hopeful voices in the SDP thought John Major's resignation would have an impact on the local elections by reminding the voters of the The Sleaze of Tom King's ministry during its first year, but the results were muddled. We did better than expected, but not as well as we would have liked. Conservatives lost 100 councilors, which was in no way remarkable and Labour lost only 300. It did not surprise me that Mr. King elected not to have a general election in the Summer of '87 after such a result. It was very inconclusive and, it must be remembered, he had until June of '88 to hold an election."


Joe Trippi, Sleepless Summers, (Faber, 1998):

"May 1987 found me Deputy Political Director of the prohibitive presidential nominee of the Democratic Party of the United States of America Senator Gary Hart. Gary had charm, intellect and a deft touch for politics. He then proceeded to shoot himself in the testicles by daring the press to follow him around to disprove rumors of his infidelity. The press duly followed and found pictures of a gorgeous twenty-nine year old actress sitting on his married lap in front of a boat named, and I wish I was making this up, 'Monkey Business.' Following that implosion, I found myself without a candidate or a job. Oh and my marriage finally fell apart due to me being a terrible husband and even worse father. As I lay in bed and contemplated whether I should get up to use the bathroom or just go there and then I got a phone call from Philip Gould asking me to help look into the recent Tory successes and how to identify and combat the overall Tory strategy. Poor Philip did not realize he could have gotten me to work for free and actually agreed to pay me a decent rate to come in as a consultant, with first class accommodation. I agreed and then got up to go to the bathroom.

I found England to be a less gloomy place for Labour than during my last visit, but one in a state of high anxiety. The recent Parliamentary by-elections and local elections (think counties and districts) made them all twitchy and Philip asked me to review the recent Tory campaigns. Since he was paying me top dollar, uh, pound, I agreed and fortified with terribly weak Coke (British Coca Cola uses vegetable extract instead of good old fashioned American chemicals) I perused the Tory TV spots, radio commercials, posters and pamphlets and compared them to their earlier works in a nice office Philip Gould was renting. I was struck by how much weaker and less effective the new Conservative spots, radio commercials and posters were. The bulk of the work was done by the same company, Saatchi and Saatchi, but their '87 products lacked style. I later found out the man behind the earlier campaign had quit their company and started his own firm, which did not do him much good with King's Tories as he was seen as Mrs. Thatcher's man. Then I turned to pamphlets and leaflets. Here, the results were even more in Labour favor. The '83 batch were cruel and effective, the new batch felt dated and restrained. All in all, I found the Tory campaign material to be noticeably worse in '87 than in '83, based on the evidence before me. Bored, and getting paid by the hour, I then reviewed the Labour material. It had improved greatly.

I told Philip his campaign materials were fine and that of the opposition were not as good. He thanked me, hesitated and left the room. Bryan Gould called me in the next day into his terrible office at the Not Transport House and asked me to look into the rumors of the Tory Party hiring Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly. I almost did a spit take. Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly is an American political consulting firm. They had many clients and many employees, but there was only one name on their roster all Democratic political junkies and professional campaigners feared, The Dark Lord of Political Arts: Lee Atwater. The shilling dropped. I was flown in at great expense to be the Labour's pet Yankee defender against the attacks of the alleged new Yankee pet of Tories - Lee Atwater. I laughed. First of all, asking me to stop Lee Atwater is like asking a man with a spoon to stop a man with a bazooka. I pride myself on being a smart and an effective campaigner, but Lee was the most ruthless campaigner in the history of American politics. He'd eat me alive and then spit out my bones into the faces of my loved ones while taunting them and drinking their tears. Second, Lee breathed and lived American politics, he had no interest in England. Third, the Tories had nothing to offer him. Money was nothing to Lee. He wanted power, and by 1987 he was sitting on the right hand of the Vice President of the United States of America and the presumptive presidential nominee of the Republican Party. All this I said with my usual lack of grace, was thanked for my 'tough and frank views' (code for, 'you did not tell us what we wanted to hear, jerk') and was once again paid on time. I returned to America to run the underfunded losing Democratic primary campaign of Dick Gephardt. It ended badly and to this day I am owed $89,000 for it. Also I discovered I had an onset of diabetes."


Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"Philip (Gould) and I met with Neil (Kinnock), his wife, Giles (Radice), Charles Clarke and Denis (Healey) to discuss the results of the May '87 local elections. Though disappointed, Neil understood we were making progress for the upcoming general election. There was a robust discussion over the extent of our success. Neil remained upbeat throughout the postmortem and contributed to our discourse."


Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):

"As we were discussing the theme for the various posters we had earmarked to be distributed to the Labour Party headquarters of the constituencies at the next general election (which we felt was just around the corner), the conversation suddenly and quite unexpectedly veered into the effectiveness of having any posters at all. I do not recall who espoused which argument. The conversation was rather academic and more than a little silly, but reached the heights of passion due to it being an election matter. It is hard to explain to those of you who have not experienced the madness of a national campaign, but it has an unfortunate tendency to make the most mundane seem feverish. It was in the midst of this discussion that we experienced some heated outbursts, most of which I could not recall."


Philip Gould, Confessions of an Adman, (HarperCollins, 1996):

"Denis kept banging on how much we needed posters to keep up morale in the Party, ignoring all attempts by Giles to get him to calm himself, when suddenly Neil cried out, 'None of this is of any use! It's not the posters! It's me! They're never going to elect someone like me!' Giles jumped to his feet and motioned for all to leave. We scuttled out of the room, leaving Neil alone with his wife and Giles. Denis cracked jokes about the Tories and talked football with us for fifteen minutes, pretending nothing had happened. Bryan got in on the act and did his best to joke through it. Charles Clarke mutely studied me during the whole of the ordeal, trying to discern how I would react to the outburst. I was shocked, but did not show it. I did not realize how much Neil's nerves were frayed. The door opened, and Neil strolled out, all smiles, followed by his wife and the near always placid Giles. Charles walked up to me and hissed with all the considerable menace he could exude, 'This never happened. Understood?' I nodded. But I did not forget. The strain of a near-election had caused a near collapse in my Party's Leader. What would a sustained election bring out?"


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"In the anticipation of the Spring '87 election which never came, three constituency Labour parties deselected their MPs. John Forrester of Stoke-on-Trent North was deselected due to age in favor of a London based radical (Joan Walley). Michael McGuire of Makerfield fell due to his support for the miners who elected to work during the Scargill Strike. The other casualty of the National Union of Mineworkers was Alec Woodall of Hemsworth who supported the police during their clashes with the Scargill strikers. All three promptly defected to the SDP."


Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"In '72, when Dick Taverne ran into trouble with his local Labour Party, no one paid attention for no one thought it would go far. When he was deselected, much head shaking resulted, but no one thought it would go far. When he ran as independent and lost, people sighed, but did not think it would go far. When Reg Prentice, largely as a result of what he saw happen with Dick Taverne, crossed the aisle and joined the Tories, he was barracked as a traitor, but no one thought it would go further than that. In '81, when 10% of the Parliamentary Labour Party deserted to form the SDP, people thought it went too far and fiery speeches were made by men and women on the moderate and every left wing of the Labour Party regarding it. How and why did we then allow three MPs, scant six years later, to be deselected by the 'activists' into the waiting arms of the SDP? How did Arthur Scargill, discredited and disowned for taking the men put into his care off a cliff, could manipulate our Party into bringing down two sitting Members of Parliament? I did not understand it then and I do not understand it now."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"I failed to see then, and still fail to see now, how gaining three MPs is a bad thing."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"Two of the three seats were to be contested by Liberal candidates in the next general election. The local Liberal candidates had made great inroads in their communities and were confident they had a chance to exploit the rift between the local radicalized Labour Party selection committee and the ordinary prospective Labour voters. They were now to be cruelly ordered to stand aside for two men who had only joined our cause because they were about to lose their seats. It was not well received by the members of my Party."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"David Steel should be rightly regarded as among the best, if not the best, Liberal party leaders of the second half of the 20th century. He inherited a Party in disarray, with its just deposed Leader under suspicion of a murder for hire, and led it to its best Parliamentary showing since 1923. But in his eagerness to expand the frontiers of possibilities of the Liberal Party he may have at times neglected the core message of certain elements of the Party in favour of inter-Party unity within the Alliance. Social Democrats were given too much leeway in their intra-Alliance dealings and were treated very much as our equals, despite us outnumbering SDP two to one in the House of Commons. There were concerns he deferred to David Owen as much as he deferred to Roy Jenkins, and would defer further in particular to the rapidly approaching sticky area of Alliance Leadership in the event of a general election. One of the many, many reasons for our not as good as it should have been electoral showing in '83 was the blind assumption on the parts of senior leadership of the Alliance that Roy Jenkins was the natural leader, or in the bizarre parlance of the day: Prime Minister Designate. Time and time again in '83, David Steel proved to be the more dynamic leader and a better orator and persuader than Roy, yet when he dared to speak up about the possibility of taking Alliance Leadership, he was viciously verbally assaulted by Bill Rodgers and other Friends of Roy Jenkins for even broaching the subject. But if some case could be made that Roy Jenkins the Elder Statesman was the natural choice for Premiership when standing next to David Steel, no such case could be made with much objective conviction for Dr. David Owen. True, he had been a Foreign Secretary of some skill and he could be seen as a man partly responsible for the downfall of the Thatcher regime, but beyond that, what exactly were his qualifications to be Leader?"


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"David Steel could not be counted to control 60 Liberal MPs. What on Earth made him and his fan club think he could be hold a divided country such as Britain in the turbulent '80s? I am reminded of a very clever ad someone once brought over from America. It simply flashed the name 'Spiro Agnew - Vice President' on a title card and had a man laugh at it off camera for some 15 seconds, followed by more subdued and sad chuckling. The same would have occurred had 'David Steel - Prime Minister' been splashed across the TV screens of Midlands and South of England. If we were to remain as an Alliance, there could only be one choice for Prime Ministerial candidate of it: Dr. David Owen."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"David Owen projected an image of being a man of ruthless determination while David Steel was credited with and derided for being a happy go lucky bearded pacifist who just had a shave. The truth is more complicated. David Owen was not as ruthless as he wanted to portray himself. He was driven far more by radical emotions than his admirers and reluctant allies would have liked. While David Steel was as capable of sticking a knife into any man, woman or child as anyone I ever met in Labour or SDP, Harold Wilson included. In '87 the rapidly approaching issue of who would be the Prime Minister of the Alliance, should we be so lucky in the polls come the hypothetical general election, was threatening to riven for personal reasons rather than political ones. The difference between an average SDP and Liberal voter was not large. The differences in activists were largely artificial. None of normal voters wanted to see a fistfight between two men who agreed on 85% of the issues at hand, (sadly, both men would dispute my percentage). I therefore proposed a Solomon like comprise, though it cost me the friendship of a man I regarded as my older brother in politics."
 
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Part XV:
<much snipping>
Joe Trippi, Sleepless Summers, (Faber, 1998):

"May 1987 found me Deputy Political Director of the prohibitive presidential nominee of the Democratic Party of the United States of America Senator Gary Hart.
<snip>
Do you mean 'putative'?
 
Part XVI
Part XVI:


Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"To my utter dismay, it was my one time closest colleague Bill Rodgers who first seriously floated the spurious notion of having the Prime Ministerial candidate for the Alliance be the man whose party had the most MPs in Parliament at the end of the election. The office of Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is much too important to be treated as a Lottery prize for the Alliance Party which had the most luck in picking their constituencies ahead of the election. It was essential for the voters to know who would be Prime Minister if we were to win the necessary seats, and to know it before heading to the polls."


Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):

"I have the utmost respect for Roy Jenkins and think him to be the finest Home Secretary of our nation since Sir Robert Peel. He nobly chose to sacrifice his future with the Labour Party to vote for European integration in the face of hostility from the senior leadership of the Party in '72 and '75 while rank opportunists such as Jim Callaghan and Denis Healey alternated between reluctantly toeing the Party line in opposition to their own personal beliefs to grub for votes from their leftist comrades. He is in every meaning of the word a statesman, but statesmen rarely make good politicians. Roy chose not to understand we could not win the majority of House seats in a hypothetical Spring '87 election, barring a thermonuclear war or discovery of glossy photos of Kinnock and King frolicking together in a garden. We could, however, have everything come apart ahead of the general election by having David Owen and David Steel confront one another in a public spat, sharpening divisions between Liberals and Social Democrats. The Rodgers Leadership Proposal was sound and all of us breathed a sigh of relief when both Davids accepted it."


Chris Patten, Roamer, (HarperCollins, 1995):

"At the time, the '87 Bill Rodgers Leadership Proposal was well received by many in the SDP anxious to avoid a fight with the Liberals. The Liberals response was more muted, but a sense of relief could be felt from those I met in the House as well. More than a few more civically minded progressive souls, however, wanted very much for Shirley Williams to be the unifying all-healing mother figure to lead the Alliance to the polls and into Downing Street. Given Baroness Williams is no longer an active politician I feel I can reveal an untidy open secret known to virtually all of her hand-in-glove working colleagues, Shirley was incapable of handling the day to day pressures of being a Leader of a Party, much less the Alliance, much less of the nation. She could be quite brilliant on the stump and in the committees, but each experience left her feeling drained and she would disappear for random periods of time to restore herself before returning once more upon the field. The first time I encountered this tendency to seek a 'water break' in the middle of a tough football match I was dismayed, but then grew to accept it. I doubt the electorate would have been as understanding, never mind the House."


David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):

"The '87 Bill Rodgers Leadership Proposal did not forestall divisions between Liberals and Social Democrats in the House and nation, it only heightened the sense of false differences between us. Instead of a unifying figure such as Roy Jenkins or Shirley Williams leading us into the fray against the Tories and Labour, we instead dithered and told the electorate, 'Vote for us and either David Steel or David Owen will become Leader.' It was a sign of weakness of the Alliance and was perceived as such by the voters."


Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"In Spring of '87, Bill Rodgers had to keep in line an utter shit such as David Owen and a half-clever half-sneak such as David Steel, while also holding together a quilted patchwork of MPs divided on nuclear deterrent and the extent of their feelings towards the Thatcherite economic measures. I had much sympathy for him and wished our Party had as clear an ability to compromise effectively."


Cherie Booth, Speaking for Myself, (Little, Brown, 1998):

"In '83, I was a unilateralist and was much amused by the verbal gymnastics performed by Denis Healey, who as a committed anti-unilateralist was deeply compromised by Michael Foot's unabashed pacifism. I was no longer amused in '87. My experience in Europe and with the electorate lead to my greater understanding of the issue and I adopted a line not entirely out of tune from that of the wings of the Liberal and Labour parties favoring a so-called 'Euro-bomb,' which would see us unite with France to free ourselves from an American nuclear deterrent. It was not an easy line to articulate, made even harder by seemingly near universal voter knowledge of Neil Kinnock's unilateralism in the Spring of '87. I regarded a carefully articulated nuclear stance as a much more vital than our stance on privatization."


Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"There were more than a few creaky policy declarations in various Labour manifestos which called for the re-nationalization of all that which the Thatcher and now King government had privatized. The view was wholly ridiculous by 1987 in light of even Communist Bulgaria having a rent-to-buy scheme for the flats to encourage home ownership. East Germany, not a regime noted for its progressive views or capitalist practices, expanded its private agricultural effort and even syndicalist socialist Mexico had privatized 67 industrial concerns. One did not want to be call backward when compared to the privatization efforts in such places as Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania. Yet, there were powerful calls for clinging to the bitter end to the outdated and outmoded shibboleths. Giles Radice did what he could, and where he could, to ensure we were not beholden to the ultra-left, Bennites, or the far-left."


Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"Giles (Radice) authored a smart policy paper outlining our weakness in banging on about having the need for more council homes for the disposed and re-nationalization of the industries. By constantly reminding the voters we were for the 'have-nots' we were alienating the 'haves' and the 'have-not-got-enoughs.' By '87, the Thatcherite and King governments have identified 'succeeders' - men and women who benefited from the Conservative policies. The 'succeeders' were opposed to any policy by a Party talking as if they were from the depths of the '70s. But what was really damaging is those who were not succeeding but were trying to succeed also viewed us with suspicion. The aspirational working class and lower middle class voters tarred us with the brush of Bennite siege economy notions. A few pivots could bring home the message we were not all loons and make the voters believe we were not trying to take away their success. But to get those pivots through the National Executive Committee (NEC) and make them official planks in our manifesto required time and patience. Both were rapidly running out."


Philip Gould, Confessions of an Adman, (HarperCollins, 1996):

"Four years of hard work yielded some positive results when it came to the Labour brand among the electorate, but there were still plenty of roadblocks. Less roadblocks were encountered with the Neil Kinnock brand. Neil, for all his potential negatives, had a much better personal rating than the Party. The natural course of action would therefore to make Neil the centerpiece of the campaign, but this could not quite be said out loud. We (campaign and ad team) were already being derided for our Americanisms and the use of Neil as a 'Presidential' figure would not have more detractors than fans within the NEC. They just had accepted the necessity of a notion of a sustained ad campaign. Now we would be asking them, in effect, to make the Party secondary to the focus put on Neil. As I struggled to formulate the most polite and oblique way of making my case, I could not get the image of Neil with his hands in his hands in the pits of despair declaiming he could never be elected. I would be putting even more burden on Neil with this campaign. I was overcome with a case of foreboding, of Neil cracking in public with the unmerciful eye of the TV lens upon him and millions watching and then re-watching on the news. I therefore made the decision to not make Neil the focus of our campaign. I would have to fight a battle without our best weapon out of fear it would blow up in our face. It was not a decision I made lightly. As more and more time passed from when the election should have been called, in my highly uninformed opinion, the more I began to second guess myself."


Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, (Bantam Press, 1990):

"It was clear to me the government had missed its best chance to call for an election in the Spring of '87 and it was becoming increasingly clear to the government as well."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"After the May local council elections, internal Party pressure to call for an early election before Fall of '87 became immense. MPs in the marginal seats felt we were dithering and giving SDP and Labour time to organize and squandering the fruits of our Greenwich gambit. Ted (Heath) ignored the calls, for being unpopular among the MPs was nothing new to him, while Norman (Tebbit) claimed we would win regardless of when we would run a campaign against the Alliance and Labour, but Mr. King felt quite besieged and the whispering campaign begun by the papers more loyal to Mrs. Thatcher than the Conservative Party were beginning to take its toll on him and his government as well."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"The downward spiral of Enoch Powell's tortured career taught any Tory MP what would happen if they should attempt to formally break off from the Conservative Party to try to get to the right of it. There was never a question of an SDP-style split from the more extreme-minded Conservative MPs, nor would Mrs. Thatcher even at her most obstinate consider such an official course, but there was definitely a 'no enemy of Tories, no friend to King and Heath' element to the backbench rebellion her surrogates were fomenting in the House and in the tabloids, with her implicit consent. Michael Portillo was in the thick of it, organizing propaganda tours for the Class of '83 MPs to see their Lady Scorned. The Thatcherite position in '87 was blood chillingly simple: have Mr. King lose the next general election, blame him and his Heathite overtures for the loss, step in and purge the Party of the King's men. Their ultimate nightmare was a Tory win. I regarded it as disloyal to the government, the Party and the nation. They were rooting for the pilot of their plane to fail because they did not like his football pin. I resolved to do all I could to ensure Mr. King would remain Prime Minister after the election and threw myself into the alchemy of when and how to best call the next general election."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"Having settled the uneasy question of the leadership of the Alliance, both David Steel and David Owen reiterated their stance on dealing with either the Conservative or the Labour minority government in the event of a hung Parliament collectively. Neither SDP nor the Liberal Party were to play kingmaker by themselves alone, only the Alliance could crown a winner if called upon to decide the fate of the nation. Those seemingly hard questions settled we returned to the topic of such sensitivity we dared not address it for over a year: nuclear policy. Watching Neil Kinnock struggle with his soft left unilateralist views, we wanted to avoid any 'slush and mush' to borrow a phrase from David Owen. We had to have a clear policy. In this all of SDP was united, we could not be tarred with the brush of unilateralism. The Liberals, however, were all over the place."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"I have levied much criticism against David Steel, and with good reason. But one thing of which he could not be accused is wavering on his views on the defense of the British Isles. David was not, nor has he ever been a unilateralist. His great weakness was in his inability to impose his view upon his MPs."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"The Liberal Party has always been a broad Church and it was no use to enforce a three line whip on us. Most of us got into politics because of our passionate beliefs and we could not, as Social Democrats did, suborn them in the name of Party unity. We were the descendants of Whigs and practiced whiggery. My views on nuclear deterrent were my own and I had no wish to impose them on fellow MPs or voters outside my constituency, nor could anyone else impose their views upon me."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"The best we could do for a common Defence statement was to abhor nuclear proliferation, negotiate with the Soviet Union on nuclear arsenal reduction and build closer ties with Europe with a goal of common protection. We dared not even whisper the word 'Polaris' for fear it would cause, much less mention the forbidden topic of Trident missiles."


Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"There is something perversely British in the leading lights of a given party feeling utterly compelled to discuss the most divisive issue facing their party. Thus at Labour, having waged a long and bloody war over the bomb, Nye Bevan felt the need to expound upon it at length all sanity to contrary. Immigration was a great taboo subject for the Tories in the '60s and thus Enoch Powell kept banging on about it and forced Ted Heath to state his case much more forcefully than he should. When Europe became the great forbidden word among Labour in the early '70s, Barbara Castle and I both decided to speak out about it at every opportunity instead of quietly trying to repair the rift in our Party. The self-destructive impulse to discuss Polaris in the '80s dragged two different political causes, that of Labour in '83, when Jim Callaghan delighted in contradicting his erstwhile ally Denis Healey and his black sheep successor Michael Foot, and in the run up to the election that was not yet even called in '87, when David Owen exhibited nuclear fetishism, discussing at length and breadth the precise mechanics of a nuclear missile leaving a submarine or silo and overwhelming his audience with facts and figures of the kiloton yields of various weapons. Enoch Powell tore open the scabs of Tories on immigration to highlight an issue he felt important and thereby force Heath's hand and destabilize his government to advance his own career. Nye Bevan wanted to ensure his complex views on nuclear deterrent were understood, with little to no evil intent behind it as regards to the stability of his Party. David Owen's motivations remain opaque to me, but seem to fall somewhere in between. He felt passionately about the bomb, but he could not have been unaware of the degree his passion was making an impact on the stability of the Alliance and the position of David Steel within his Party. There were far too many jibes thrown about David Steel being a Social Democrat leading a Liberal party when I was Leader of the SDP, but at least those were largely good natured and were mostly contrasted with me being a Liberal in charge of a Social Democratic Party. When those jibes were flung against David Steel in '87, there was no gentle counterpart in David Owen being ever considered a Liberal. David Owen's actions regarding nuclear policy were heavily damaging to David Steel's intra-Party prestige."


Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):

"Michael Heseltine's prestige in the Party demanded we Heseltaniacs (as 'The Daily Mail' so lovingly labelled us) formulate an official stance on a variety of issues facing the electorate and the Party. The trouble was given the latitude shown by the King ministries, we simply had no idea what the manifesto would contain. Tom King started his reign as an arch Thatcherite then tacked moderate at the first sign of bad weather. We had no idea how much Heath and how much Thatcher would be in the document. There was a degree of uncertainty about the whole thing, which added to the anxiety."


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"In the run up to the eagerly anticipated and equally dreaded general election, Michael Portillo took it upon himself to create a ginger group of Thatcherite MPs from the Class of '83 who were elected in the traditionally Labour seats and therefore faced the most immediate danger. Disappointed in the quality of the Saatchi and Saatchi campaign material for the '86 and '87 local and by-elections, Mr. Portillo reached out to Tim Bell, formerly of Saatchi and Saatchi, and the man largely credited with the '83 Saatchi materials. The decision was not cleared with the designated head of the Conservative Party campaign - Norman Tebbit. The move was seen by some as having the backing of Mrs. Thatcher and was accused by certain members of the Cabinet as running a campaign within a campaign and mixing messages with the electorate. It was then revealed Mr. Heseltine's grouping engaged in the services of their own firm to help run their campaign, and was quickly followed by a revelation of Norman Lamont leading a still another group of the dry non-Thatcher backed MPs in contributing to their own re-election campaign with a wholly separate ad company being solicited."


Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"I did not trust Norman Tebbit to do what is right by those of us who were not in the good graces of the Cabinet. I certainly did not trust Portillo's Thatcherites and the less said about Michael Heseltine the better. I was not alone in this predicament and likeminded MPs and I chose to run our own re-election campaign in the looming general election of '87."


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"By June of '87 almost everyone in the Westminster bubble agreed the general election would have to take place sometime in October. The only question was when."
 
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Part XVII
Part XVII:


Philip Gould, Confessions of an Adman, (HarperCollins, 1996):

"In the run-up to as yet undeclared general election of '87 much wiser men than I began to look harder than ever at the electoral maps to identify the mystical firewall of Labour seats which would ensure we would not face a third crushing defeat in a row. Some hopeful soul staked out the Midlands as the road to total victory. More sober men saw Wales turning red. Some clearly not sober men and women said we would do better than expected in South of England. Realists pointed to the North of England turning crimson. But those with the biggest slide rules kept saying we would much better in '87 than the last two tries in Scotland. I saw eye watering reports claiming we could win 50 out of 72 Scottish seats."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"While Heseltine, Lamont and Portillo were busy splintering the Party, I and fellow loyal members of the Party strove to unite it and find the best approach to the rapidly looming but not yet announce October '87 election. My brief at Energy by the sensitive nature of the industries involved put me in close contact with quite a lot of my fellow ministers as matters impacting Energy had a way of quickly overlapping their briefs as well. After two years in office, I am glad to say more than a few ministers had begun to confide in me in conversations they simply could not have in full Cabinet. The most astute observer of the dangers facing us was Malcolm Rifkind, the then Secretary of State for Scotland."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"Even in the cabinet of curiosities that was the King's ministry of '87, Malcolm Rifkind managed to stand out for his rapid fire style of talking, his Scots-Jewish heritage and his university experiences in Rhodesia. It was Malcolm, during his spell in the Foreign Office as a minister under the loathsome Leon Brittan, who first set the precedent for Western diplomats to meet with members of the banned Solidarity movement in Poland during the course of each official state visit to the chagrin and horror of the military regime. It was Malcolm, while still in the Foreign Office, who took the lead in the drive to re-engage the Soviet Union in diplomatic talks, arguing isolation never helps. And it was Malcolm who in his then position as Secretary of State for Scotland warned select members of the Cabinet in the Spring of '87 of the trouble the Tories would face North of the Border in the looming general election. Ted (Heath) was much impressed with Malcolm's analysis and shared his fears with me."


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"Mr. Rifkind's 5 May 1987 memorandum on the Scottish Problem explained how the Conservative Party could be down to just scant half dozen seats in Scotland in '87, down from the sixteen elected in '83. The loss would then be further compounded by a predicted return of 45 Labour MPs from the 72 Scottish seats. Mr. Rifkind attributed the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland to a number of issues and asked for formal permission to act upon them. Mr. King consulted his inner Cabinet war council on the Rifkind Memorandum. Norman Tebbit (Home Office), Kenneth Clarke (Employment) and Sir George Young (Trade) were against any major changes by the Scottish Office on the eve of the not as yet declared October general election. George Younger (Defence), Lord Young (Treasury), David Mellor (Energy) and Sir Edward Heath (Lancaster) were in favor. Mr. King went with the majority view."


Brian Monteith, The Rise and Fall of Thatcherite Tory Edinburgh, (Constable, 2009):

"In the days before devolution and Assembly, the Secretary of State for Scotland ran our lands with more leeway than a Viceroy or a satrap. Therefore, when I was summoned to see Mr. Rifkind, I felt more than a small twinge of fear. He began to talk in that high Morning side accent of his, which when deployed with speed, clarity and emphasis has a way of making you feel small indeed. He poured scorn on my Conservative student activism and the Blue Saltire's efforts at Party disunity and factionalism and was on the verge of making me cringe and mutter apologies when he set aside the stick and offered the carrot: rates reform. My heart leaped to my throat."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"Local government finance was the chief preoccupation of Mrs. Thatcher since her election. Yet the controversial nature of the measures proposed and the sheer effort to implement them was such it invariably was shunted aside. But the issue remained. 40% of all local council spending was financed by householders or local businesses. A large proportion of people were not classified as householders, however, and did not have to pay any rates at all. Disproportionately the non-rate payers were Labour voters. By contrast the rate payers and local businesses tended to lean Tory, especially in Scotland. And it was in Scotland that the high-profile left-wing councils, led by such darlings of the left as Alistair Darling, increased the council spending and put an even greater burden on local businesses and rate payers to support their projects. The issue was further made much worse in Scotland because, unlike England or Wales, it had a statutory obligation on revaluation of all property. Therefore at times of inflation, with the property values going up, the rates went up along with it at a phenomenal clip. The rates were fundamentally broken and unfair, but their reform and indeed replacement was a political minefield. The only alternatives to rates were a local income tax or a community charge - a poll tax. Neither option was a glittering prize, especially when bandied about this close to a general election, but the demand for any alternative to the current system in Scotland was such it would energize our base and increase activism in an area of the nation hardest hit by Party disunity."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"Ted was supportive of an income tax in Scotland but vehemently opposed to a poll tax. Lord Young, on the other hand, favored the poll tax, as did David Mellor and George Younger. Malcolm Rifkind argued for poll tax as well but mollified Ted by agreeing to raise the Rate Support Grant from 60% to 80% to keep the poll tax at a very low level. Lord Young further agreed to have a detailed breakdown on the extent of a poll tax per each town and county in Scotland. We were dealing with dynamite and knew it. When the announcement was made, its complexity was largely misunderstood. Labour denounced it on general grounds of it being a Conservative initiative. Liberals denounced it for levying taxation on those who had as yet to pay taxes before. Social Democrats called it a political ploy, and it was. While the Scottish National Party accused us of using Scotland as a 'guinea pig' to test mad economic theorems. By and large though, most voters did not care one way or another, for the community charge was couched in accounting language and no one as yet had to pay a single bills, until the measure was passed after the general election. The main effect of the announcement on the Scottish Tories, however, could not be underestimated. Blue rosettes blossomed among a sea of red and Malcolm Rifkind was feted as the saviour of Scotland, with even Mrs. Thatcher praising his decisions as Michael Portillo grimaced with feigned delight. Scottish businesses increased donations and civic organizations pledged support. The situation in Scotland was turned much in our favour, though by how much was an open question given the widespread loss of manufacturing jobs North of the Border."


Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"Internal polling revealed the Social Democrat position in Scotland was quite precarious and none more so than in my own constituency. The trouble started from the very start. I was a Welshman without an ounce of Scottish blood in my veins or burr in my speech in a very Scottish seat, and while the late 19th and early 20th centuries is littered with examples of Liberal and Conservative Englishmen and Welshmen holding Scottish constituencies by the middle of the 20th century they had all but disappeared due to growing nationalism. The other issue was the nature of the seat. Glasgow Hillhead encompassed the great Scottish city's West End, which in addition to its middle classes entrenched upon its namesake hill also included a river-land populated with a rather militant band of manual workers among whom the fifes of 'Bennery' found eager dancers. I did not campaign along the river as well as I should have in the by-election and my obligations as Leader of the SDP in '83 made me neglect it further. I then compounded the troubles issue by vetoing the redrawing of the boundaries of my constituency. The proposed boundary change would have given me more hillside voters, but would have necessitated a change in the name of the constituency to 'Kelvin.' I regarded the change as rather offensive. In this I was supported by the Labour Party, which should have been a sign for me to reconsider, but I did not. I was thus faced with the only other alternative boundary change, one which let my constituency keep the name of Glasgow Hillhead but which took in more of the river-lands. I thus made my continued political existence in Parliament much harder because I cared more about the label on the bottle than its contents. By '87 it was clear to me I would most likely be swept out of my seat along with more than a few of my fellow Social Democrats and Liberals, barring a ghastly mistake by Labour. The revelation did not trouble me as much as I thought it would have. If anything I felt rather relieved. From the 1950s through '72, I entertained the great hope of becoming Leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister. Choices I had made in my life regarding Europe prevented me from achieving those twin goals. My mind was quite settled by '76 when I had to bear witness to the elevation of Jim Callaghan and went off to become President of the European Commission. From my eyerie in Brussels I regarded the subsequent self-destruction of the Labour Party with a curious detachment. It was as if I was reading a novel whose characters I felt deeply about but whose lives were nonetheless the stuff of fiction. Though all that changed upon my return. My plunging into the task of a creation of a viable fourth party in the UK in '81 quite exhausted me but did whet my appetite. For a brief moment in '82 I had a fluttering of hope of becoming Prime Minister. The loss in '83 quite thoroughly destroyed my dream. I had resolved in the unlikely event the Alliance would form government in '87 to take on whatever brief was offered but stand down at earliest opportunity. I had been in the Home Office twice and was Chancellor. At one point in my life I rather imagine I would have liked to have been Foreign Secretary, but my age and health prevented me from seeking such an active and demanding position. Realizing I was nearly finished in the House in the run up to the general election of '87 allowed me a degree of freedom I had not felt since I resigned from the frontbench of Labour Party. I saw my tasks in the coming election to help those Social Democrats and Liberals in the marginal seats in need of aid of the reflect light the dimming wattage of my political celebrity still offered and to ensure there would be no recriminations between the Social Democrats and Liberals. In retrospect, I should have picked a far less lofty goal, such as bringing democracy to North Korea."


Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, (Bantam Press, 1990):

"It would be easier to bring democracy to Iran than order to Northern Ireland, but Margaret (Thatcher) did attempt to make a stab at it despite the fumbling of (the then Foreign Secretary) Leon (Brittan), I regret the Westland squabble distracted us all from finalizing the Anglo-Irish agreement, denounced as it was among the Unionist parties of that troubled place. There was talk of mass resigning from the House to force the by-elections for all Unionist MPs in Northern Ireland, a pathetic protest which would have amounted to nothing, but the threat did scare of Tom (King) and the Anglo-Irish agreement never did take place. I do not know what peace it could have brought to that troubled land, but whatever it was, it was stopped dead by Tom's weakness."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"In November of '86, David Owen called me and Shirley (Williams) into his lair in the House of Commons in our formal capacity as the Vice-President and President of the Party, respectively. Flanked by his Political-Commissar Mike Thomas and sidekick John Cartwright, he announced he had single-handedly solved the Alliance seat-allocation issue. The seat distribution of '83 would simply carry over into '87, with two additional SDP allocated seats surrendered to Liberals in return for the two recent Labour to SDP defections in Makerfield and Hemsworth. I was stunned. Six months of painful and inconclusive committee meetings initiated by him were to be wiped clean and a deal even a child would see as patently obvious was to be adopted. He looked rather pleased with himself, but I gave him nothing. Shirley, much better at this than I, quickly thanked him for his speedy resolution and made polite small talk while I sat there like a great big stone. When we walked out, Shirley turned to me and spoke at her best charming bossy headmistress, 'Wasn't that just wonderful?' The ridiculous thing was that it was wonderful. We had abandoned an illogical approach in favour of sanity and saw reason to celebrate it, which tells you how much we had all expected insanity from our Dear Party Leader."


Chris Patten, Roamer, (HarperCollins, 1995):

"I deliver no Columbus like discovery when I observe the great tragedy of the former-Labour SDP leadership is that they had broken off from Labour to avoid the personality based factionalism and its ugly side-effects only to find even sharper factionalism within their new Party. I increasingly found myself offering solace to increasingly disillusioned SDP MPs from the former-Labour wing of the Party. Peter Walker was the first to notify me I could be seen as a unifying figure for SDP, due to my split from the Tories being seen as a matter of principle not personality. At the time I dismissed his predictions."


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"Defying predictions, Alan Clark let his name go forward to the selection committee of his constituency of Plymouth Sutton. Since fleeing England in the middle of the night, Mr. Clark has been hiding out in South Africa, periodically emerging to embarrass his Party by a variety of headline grabbing acts, including being named as plaintiff in a divorce accusing him of seducing the wife of a judge and her three daughters. Yet despite not setting foot in the House since his 'incapable' antics played a key role in the downfall of Mrs. Thatcher's government, Mr. Clark thought he would be named candidate to his old constituency and to the utter dismay of senior Tory leadership was almost named as such. Mr. Tebbit personally visited the constituency and had an almost polite conversation with the committee. Mr. Clark was quietly de-selected and William Hague was selected to run in his place. Ian Gow, once called by 'The Telegraph' as 'Mr. Clark's only friend in the Conservative Party,' was sent down to South Africa to personally entreat with Mr. Clark to keep quiet. Upon his return, Mr. Gow indicated his mission went well. More than a few Tories hoped it would be the last they heard of Mr. Clark."


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"After the disastrous by-election in Greenwich the last thing I wanted to hear was the very name of the constituency, but Alec McGivan, our national campaign organizer, rang me up and said, 'There is someone I need you to meet, she can win back Greenwich and more.' I immediately thought poor Alec had gone crackers from the pressure of dealing with Liberals. I muttered something polite and hung up. Alec rang me up a day later and reiterated I had to meet the candidate. I muttered something not nearly as polite and hung up on him again. He then showed up at campaign headquarters with some strange woman, who looked overwhelmed. I was as charmless as possible. Alec begged the woman's pardon, asked her to please step outside, grabbed me by the lapels of my sweat soaked stained shirt, walled me, and snarled into my bleary face, 'You bloody idiot, she's the key to London, the Midlands and more!' He then released me. Before I could blink, he stepped back out and escorted the young woman back inside. That is how I met Mrs. Rosie Barnes. The more she spoke about herself and her goals in life, the more I stopped feeling like a cornered animal. I at once knew I had met the perfect candidate. I immediately called Dr. Owen."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"Mike Thomas discovered Mrs. Rosie Barnes during his re-vetting of all of our candidates. He called me, swallowing half of his words and not making entirely too much sense. The upshot as I understood it on the call is that I had to meet with some candidate he found immediately. After making polite inquiries as to the state of Mike's mental health I acquiesced. Fifteen minutes into my conversation with Mrs. Rosie Barnes I realized I was talking to the new face of our national campaign. She was the perfect candidate."


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"The daughter of working-class parents, Mrs. Rosie Barnes was a grammar school girl with a degree from Birmingham University. At the time of the proposed general election she was 40 years old, mother of three, married to a Greenwich councilor and having a job in market research. Mrs. Barnes was the poster girl for the so-called 'service-class' of aspirational former working class people yearning to find a new political identity for themselves. But much more importantly than the phrenological considerations was her personality. Upon meeting her, the clearly smitten Shirley Williams delivered a verdict which has since then stood the test of time, 'She seems nice because she is nice.' And while certain Tory tabloids derided her as a mascot, she was the centerpiece of the Social Democratic charm offensive. For the first time, the SDP slogan 'tough and tender' found the appropriate 'tender' counterpoint to the toughness of Dr. David Owen."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"After surviving a tough summer in a state of near anxiety, Mr. King finally rang me on 21 September 1987 and gave the long awaited date for the general election 14 October, 1987. I was relieved. The great undertaking would finally start its course. At the time I paid no special attention to the date, though Mr. King explained he chose the date because Parliament could begin its scheduled opening on 21 October, 1987 without any interruption. It was a phrase with which to tempt fate."


September, 1987. House of Commons: Before the General Election:

Conservative Party (Leader Tom King, Deputy Leader Lord Atkins): 352 seats

Labour Party (Leader Neil Kinnock, Deputy Leader Giles Radice): 179 seats

Liberal Party (Leader David Steel, Deputy Leader Alan Beith): 60 seats

Social Democratic Party (Leader David Owen, Deputy Leader John Cartwright): 37 seats

Other Parties: 22 seats.
 
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Really enjoying the timeline, great format and fun reading. Electoral calculus (I know) is telling me you'd need rough percentages of Tory 39%, Labour 23% and Alliance 36% to get the above result. Does that sound about right?
 
Really enjoying the timeline, great format and fun reading. Electoral calculus (I know) is telling me you'd need rough percentages of Tory 39%, Labour 23% and Alliance 36% to get the above result. Does that sound about right?
That is correct. But the pre-election situation in '87 above has a lot to do with the by-elections since the '83 general election though. The '83 election:

Conservative Party (Leader Margaret Thatcher): 361 seats

Labour Party (Leader Michael Foot): 184 seats

Liberal Party (Leader David Steel): 54 seats

SDP (Leader Roy Jenkins): 30 seats

I tried to mess about with the normal percentages of OTL '83 as much as I could and most of them no matter how twisted turned against the Alliance. The first past the post system is so brutal that swinging 5% from Labour voters to Alliance would have resulted in maybe five extra seats than what they won in OTL in '83. But without Falklands and with a win in Darlington, my theory is that the Alliance vote would have come from new voters, not people switching from Labour to Alliance. So in this timeline, I had Alliance gain 8% to 10% from what they achieved in OTL '83 on the back of these 'political virgins.' Labour lost 5% from OTL '83 and the Tories lost the balance. I do not think Conservatives would have qualified a full 5% loss due to the economy rebounding in '83 and the Labour campaign being an utter shambles, made worse in this timeline with them losing face at Darlingon. Your percentages above are correct, with a small tweak here and there.

Thanks for reading and commenting.
 
Part XVIII
Part XVIII:


Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"Internal polling indicated we were running at 35% on the eve of the announcement of the general election of '87. The next morning the Brent East Constituency Labour Party announced they were deselecting Reg Freeson in favour of Ken Livingstone, of the arch loony Greater London Council. That afternoon my poor secretary had to drive me to the hospital. I broke my hand punching my desk."


Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"Reg Freeson supported Irish nationalism, opposed the Korean and the Vietnam Wars, was a founding member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in '57, marched with Michael Foot against the bomb in Aldermaston in '58, wrote for the Tribune (back when it was hardest of hard left), edited the anti-fascist 'Searchlight' rag in '64, and voted 'No' on Europe and almost assaulted Roy Jenkins in the House of Commons for voting 'Yes.' There was not a left wing cause in England to which Reg would not lend his name, but he was not left enough for Brent East and so they subbed him out for the clown prince of the London left, and did it on the day after the announcement of the '87 general election. I do sometimes wonder if my Party actually wants to lose."


David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):

"I was in the House of Commons in '72, when Reg Freeson ran up to Roy Jenkins after Roy exited the 'Yes' on Europe lobby and screamed 'rat-fucker' into his face repeatedly. Roy took it with remarkable sangfroid. I wanted to commit grievous bodily harm to the weasel. Roy Hattersley had to hustle Roy Jenkins out of the House and Bill Rodgers had to be restrained from exacting physical retribution. Roy Jenkins is a gentleman and can never say what I say now, I celebrated Reg Freeson being chucked out on his ear. I drank champagne, not claret, that day and it was rather expensive champagne at that."


Roy Jenkins, Centre Ground, (Harper Collins, 1991):

"I did not celebrate the de-selection of Reg Freeson, but did much welcome the selection of Ken Livingstone. Since Tony Benn disappeared into the desert to commune with the great spirits of Marx, Levelers and the latest book he managed to finish reading, the patently false cures of 'Bennery' were extolled by a motley band of charlatans. The most well-known mountebank was Mr. Livingstone. His selection inspired more than a few of my fellow Social Democrats and seemed to have revived my fortunes in my seat, where the resident extoller of 'Bennery' was young George Galloway. When I first ran in Glasgow Hillhead in '82, it had an air of Gladstonian crusade, in '87 it was college entrance exam mathematics. The phrase 'tactical voting' was not as well known then as it is now and I dare say my seat may have contributed to its popularization, as Conservative voters stealthily approached me all through September, always alone or in pairs, and after looking leftwards and rightwards would lean and confess they were voting for me to keep Mr. Galloway out of Parliament. I was at first amused by this, then cheered by it."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"Contrary to popular opinion there was no 'tactical voting' or anti-Labour machinations in Brent East. The Social Democrats ran a good campaign, but we simply did not have the necessary level of support to do well there, through no fault of our excellent young candidate."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"Daniel Finkelstein was the Social Democratic Party candidate for Brent East in '87. Prior to that he was Chairman of the Young Social Democrats, which were as loyal to David Owen as the Mamelukes of the Guard were to Napoleon. During the month-long general election campaign, David Finkelstein appeared in Brent East thrice and spoke once. In '83, our candidate in Brent East got almost 7,000 votes and captured 17% of the vote, with the Conservative candidate coming in second with 13,529 votes (35%). In '87, we captured 1,035 votes for a deposit losing 2.6% and coincidentally the Conservative candidate saw her total rise to 19,794 and won the seat. But if David Owen says there was no 'tactical voting' done per his orders in Brent East, then I have no wish to openly call him a liar."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"David Owen and his campaign team gave me assurances in word and letter there were no formal deals being struck between Social Democrats and Conservatives during the general election and I have no court worthy evidence to the contrary."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"I very much resent the conspiratorial theories of a quid pro quo conducted between Conservative and Social Democrat candidates during the October '87 election."


Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"There was no quid pro quo. Most involved were silks, or at the very least had QCs on their staffs, and knew better than to commit themselves to actions from which there was no plausible deniability. But there were moves and countermoves. An SDP candidates suddenly forgot how to campaign in Brent East. A Tory candidate in Stoke-on-Trent North was not seen in the constituency during the whole of the election. In Aberdeen South and Edinburgh South, the SDP candidates were suddenly bereft of posters, had their radio buys yanked for 'budgetary reasons' and appearances by David Owen were cancelled and those of Bill Rodgers and Shirley Williams redirected elsewhere. Tory candidates in Glasgow Hillhead and Stockton South quite suddenly found the Central Office of the Conservative Party unable to support their campaigns with an appearance by a single Cabinet minister. It wasn't 'tactical voting' it was voter manipulation, and it worked."


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"Norman Lamont once called General Pinochet 'a good, brave and honourable soldier,' and that made more sense than the conspiracy theory he doodled on the back of a napkin in green ink and inserted into his book. I have had to live for four years with random radio hosts asking me about the missing posters in Aberdeen South with the same fervour a JFK conspiracy theorist talks about the Book Depository. I do not wish to spend much time on Lamont's ravings. Actually, I do not want to spend any time on his ravings. But since the publication of that book caused me to repeat myself more times than I can count, I do want to make some statements to bring an ounce of reality to the funhouse mirror world Norman constructed. I can't speak for the behaviour of the Tory candidates as I had nothing to do with them. Neither can I speak for the Tory electoral efforts in three constituencies Norman named in his ramblings. But I can speak regarding Social Democratic efforts in '87 in Brent East, Aberdeen South and Edinburgh South. No one told Daniel Finkelstein to forget how to run an election. He just read the political weather and realized he could not get elected in Brent East in '87 but he can siphon off Tory voters and help install Ken Livingstone into Parliament. He therefore took it upon himself, solely, to sacrifice any chances he had of winning to prevent Pink Ken from getting into the House of Commons. It was brave and entirely self-directed. I defy anyone to produce one letter where anyone from SDP Leadership or National Committee told Daniel Finkelstein to blot his copybook. I defy anyone to find a single witness of a single conversation between Daniel Finkelstein and the Committee or Leaders where anyone told David to stay home. I congratulated him on his choice after the election, but did not have a single word with him during the course of it. As to the candidates in Edinburgh South and Aberdeen South, as the names suggest, these were Scottish constituencies. Everyone in the SDP who was going to run in '87 and was not an incumbent was told to prepare for the worst. Actually, anyone in SDP who was running Scotland, incumbent or otherwise was told to prepare for the worst. Scotland was not going to go well for us and everyone knew it. Unlike Labour, flush with money from trade unions, or the Tories and their millionaire friends, the SDP campaign fund was not swimming about in Scrooge McDuck's money bin. We had to make decisions, hard decisions, on where to allocate resources. Our non-incumbent candidates in Scotland were not as supported as they should have been. There was no conspiracy there, just the financial perils of trying to elect 300 plus candidates. But if there was, consider the sheer number of people who would have to be involved to tell three people with healthy egos running for Parliament to do their best to lose. Consider what would have to be done to redirect resources and alter schedules. Consider the overwhelming odds of some kind of paper trail to carry out some of what Norman suggests was done: posters sent to a different warehouse or constituency, alteration of campaign diaries, transferring funds. How did no journalist manage to find any proof of the supposed conspiracy? Did we bribe the press as well?"


Philip Gould, Confessions of an Adman, (HarperCollins, 1996):

"We lost two and a half days of campaigning to responding to the Ken Livingstone nomination in the press. Neil (Kinnock), Giles (Radice) and all of the Shadow Cabinet pledged to never allow Pink Ken into the Cabinet in the event of a Labour victory. For two and a half days I had to watch the 'Sun', 'Daily Mail,' 'Daily Express' and 'Daily Telegraph' slowly roast us on a spitfire. We had some counterattacks in the 'Daily Mirror' and 'Guardian,' but those were counterattacks instead of spreading our message. We had pipped Mail, Express and Tory-graph by the end of day three, but the 'Sun' was quite another matter. It was relentless."


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"With a circulation of 3,993,000 and a readership of 11,316,000, the 'Sun' was the most widely read daily in the Fall of '87. At the time, 35% of its readership was C2 (National Readership Survey classification 'skilled working class') and it therefore struck at the heart of what many assumed to be a traditional Labour voter. The 'Sun' savaged Labour throughout the campaign in a brilliant and bigoted fashion. By and large the television coverage strived to be less factional and did its best to ignore the more sensational claims of the dailies. However, should some politician be goaded into responding to a newspaper story it was then covered on the TV under the guise of covering the politician's response rather than the prurient nature of the claim to which the politician was compelled to respond. Such was the case with Mr. Healey whose attack on an article disclosing Mrs. Healey had used private health care led to the issue being seen as fair game during his television interview. But the symbiotic relationship of TV and the newspapers cut both ways, as Neil Kinnock found out when he made an ill-advised attempt to explain his (by then) complex views on nuclear weapons in an interview with David Frost."


Roy Hattersley, Roy from Yorkshire, (Penguin Books, 1992):

"I find it bewildering that Neil (Kinnock) did not anticipate being asked what he would do in the event of Soviet attack upon British soil. His response was muddled and defeatist. The Tories rags tore him to pieces over it, while the 'Guardian' said Neil was 'half way round Spaghetti Junction in a thick fog.'"


Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"We were all in a fog. Each attempt to direct the conversation to education or healthcare was somehow pivoted back to defence. 19% of the lead stories on the front page of the dailies during the election campaign were on the issue of defence, as compared to 14% in '83. We found ourselves quizzed on Polaris as if it was a great novel we all should have read before daring to apply to college."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"The press coverage was unhelpful. It excluded us for the most part and treated the proceeding as a horse race between Labour and the Conservatives. Every day the politically aligned dailies argued the merits of this poll or another and neglected to address the core issues represented by the Parties. We were quite prepared to explain the difference in our manifesto with that of the muddled efforts of the King ministry and the Labour's attempt to break with its more doctrinaire socialist aspects. Instead we watched percentages of voters weighed in the balance on the front pages. The only issue the press seemed to wish to discuss was defence and there our intra-Alliance monk like silence regarding Polaris did not hold. David Owen felt compelled to speak at great length on the subject, causing much trouble for the unilateralist members of our coalition."


Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):

"There were no unilateralist SDP MPs in '87. It was not an article of faith we required incoming members to subscribe, but we happened to have uniform views regarding it. Asking Social Democrats to declare for the bomb but against it at the same would have as ludicrous as Denis Healey's awful compromises in '83. The Liberals could speak out against the bomb if they chose. We chose to speak out in favour of it. I saw no negative consequence to it."


Chris Patten, Roamer, (HarperCollins, 1995):

"On the first day of the campaign the Alliance Shadow Cabinet was re-introduced with as much fanfare as we could muster. Prime Minister was to be either David Steel or David Owen and the loser would then be Home Secretary, certainly a first in the history of any campaign in Britain. The rest were evenly divided. In an effort to get a flint-eyed anti-unilateralist out of Defence, Liberals agreed to make Bill Rodgers the Foreign Secretary once Roy Jenkins announced he would not take on the position. Defence Secretary was then conferred upon Bob Maclennan, who was as puzzled as the rest when the two Davids called upon him to the job. He took it, but without any enthusiasm. He did swot up on it and gave cogent responses to questions and it raised his profile, due to Defence being a big issue in the '87 campaign. But no one among the SDP truly believed in the event of an election Bob would stay on as Defence Secretary. Nor could anyone really picture Bill as Foreign Secretary. The compromise Shadow Cabinet fooled no one, especially when both David Owen and Bill Rodgers were able and quite willing to to articulate the Alliance defence policy far better than its erstwhile Shadow Defence Secretary. It was a farce, but a dangerous one, for Bill could not pull his punches when discussing the necessity of Polaris, while David would not do it."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"Time and time again, David Owen drew attention to his nuclear policy, ignoring the rules put in place to create peace and waging open war on the unilateralist members of the Liberal Party, without consulting either David Steel nor anyone else within the Alliance regarding his statements, nor clearing them in advance with any of the bodies setup to address defence issues."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"Norman Tebbit ran a good, if not particularly inspired, campaign. Or I should rather say the official campaign. Norman Lamont and Nigel Lawson had setup their own sideshow, as did Michael Heseltine and his band, as did Michael Portillo and his Thatcherites. Although none were in the Cabinet, some of the schismatics were former members of it and could issue grand pronouncements for the benefit of the press and the detriment of the official Conservative campaign. Our message became quite muddled and Norman Tebbit could not impose order, despite his best efforts."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"I was highly disturbed in watching Lawson, Portillo and Heseltine efforts. Each was rooting for the King government to fail, but not too fail so badly as to not allow a recovery of the Conservative Party at the subsequent election with one of the three men taking a hand at the tiller. It was a less principled stand than that of Enoch Powell in '74. At least Mr. Powell had the fortitude to call upon the electorate to vote Labour as a way to punish Ted. The Lawson, Portillo and Heseltine camps pretend to be for King, while very much undermining him. Their actions might have splintered segments of the electorate but unified the Cabinet. The feeling of being besieged by former friends turned foes led to a remarkable spirit of loyalty among the ministers and all of them did their best to help the Party secure a victory."


Cherie Booth, Speaking for Myself, (Little, Brown, 1998):

"The polls were going crazy. There was talk of a comfortable Conservative majority followed by a stringent belief Labour would have a razor thin majority. There was also talk of the Alliance overtaking Labour in the popular vote and the implication of an Opposition Party not speaking for the most people opposed to the Government. We all became half-experts at electoral mathematics during the course of the month long campaign. The problem wasn't lack of information, but its overabundance. There were too many polls and too many newspapers covering them from every angle. In '83, the question was how low could Labour sink and how large of a majority could Conservatives establish on the bones of Labour. In '87, the question was who would win?"


14 October, 1987. General election. 650 Parliamentary seats contested. Results:

Conservative Party (Leader Tom King, Deputy Leader Lord Atkins): 314 seats

Labour Party (Leader Neil Kinnock, Deputy Leader Giles Radice): 221 seats

Liberal Party (Leader David Steel, Deputy Leader Alan Beith): 55 seats

Social Democratic Party (Leader David Owen, Deputy Leader John Cartwright): 39 seats

Ulster Unionist Party (Leader James Molyneaux, Deputy Leader Enoch Powell): 12 seats

Democratic Unionist Party (Leader Ian Paisley): 3

Plaid Cymru (Leader Dafydd Elis-Thomas): 3

Páirtí Sóisialta Daonlathach an Lucht Oibre (Leader John Hume): 2

Scottish National Party (Leader Gordon Wilson): 1

No Party achieves a majority (326 seats). Hung Parliament.
 
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Looks like the Tories will be calling on the Ulster Unionists or trying to work out a supply and confidence with the Alliance (or sections of the alliance).
 
Looks like the Tories will be calling on the Ulster Unionists or trying to work out a supply and confidence with the Alliance (or sections of the alliance).
"You might think that, I couldn't possibly comment."
;)

Superb stuff, as always. One minor point though; it's Daniel Finkelstein, not David.
D'oh. Thank you for catching that, will correct it. The perils of inputting a name once and then copy and pasting it from your working document further on and not bothering to compare it to the original source afterwards. The sad part, I read his bio in three different places and still got it wrong.
 
Superb stuff, as always. One minor point though; it's Daniel Finkelstein, not David.

D'oh. Thank you for catching that, will correct it. The perils of inputting a name once and then copy and pasting it from your working document further on and not bothering to compare it to the original source afterwards. The sad part, I read his bio in three different places and still got it wrong.

And there was me giving Greg the benefit of the doubt and assuming that Daniel had a bother, David, who I hadn't heard of ;)

Overall I'm really enjoying this, and impressed that it was written by a Yank. Perhaps you're not all insane after all. Particularly like the way that any Owen quote is almost always immediately followed by a Steel quote saying the complete opposite (or vice-versa).
 
Part XIX
Part XIX:


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, after snatching a few hours of sleep, I woke to a hung Parliament. It was a profound shock to me. The voters were confused by the quad-partied Conservative electoral message during the general election (official, Lamont, Heseltine and Portillo), reeling from the shock of expulsion of a sitting Prime Minister by avaricious members of her own Party, assaulted by 'The Sleaze' of the subsequent rookie ministry and bewildered by the return of a Tory faction once repudiated by the very people who now relied upon it to form a Cabinet. The people of Britain had great trouble voting us in, but an even greater trouble voting us out and putting Labour in charge. The Conservative Party was still the largest party in Parliament but could not reliably be counted upon to go on alone, with Liberals, Labour and Social Democrats collectively outweighing us. The simplest math, much debated by the morning TV hosts and bulldog newspaper editorials, was for us to join with the Ulster Unionists and thereby form a razor thin majority of one (326 MPs), but there were more than a few complications."


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"For much of the troubled history of Northern Ireland, virtually all Conservative Party politicians took the loyalty and the vote of its Unionist MPs for granted. The attitudes of Tory leaders regarding their allies in Northern Ireland ranged from patronizing to being slightly embarrassed by them. Although a small faction of English Conservative MPs could be found to occasionally speak for the Ulster Unionist cause, no Tory (nor Labour, nor Liberal) MP of Privy Council rank (or higher) spoke passionately for them since Andrew Bonar Law in 1914, until 1969. Following his expulsion from the Heath Shadow Cabinet in '68 for the 'Rivers of Blood' speech, Enoch Powell turned his not inconsiderable intellect towards finding a solution for the Irish Troubles. Eschewing anything resembling conventional wisdom regarding Northern Ireland being a complicated subject few people could understand, Mr. Powell saw the matter in starkly simple terms of the principle of nationhood. To Mr. Powell, Unionists represented loyal British subjects defending the rights of the British nation set against a foreign nationalism originating from Ireland. It was theme upon which expounded in and out of Parliament between 1969 and 1974. In '74, when he felt compelled to leave the Conservative Party over Mr. Heath's pro-European stance and urged the voters to support Labour in the coming election due to Harold Wilson's promise to hold a Referendum on Europe, Mr. Powell was courted by various Unionist leaders to formally join them. The issue was, however, made more complex by the Heath government decision on 30 March 1972 to remove power from the devolved non-power-sharing Unionist dominated Stormront Parliament in Northern Ireland due to the troubles in the region and impose direct rule from Westminster. Most of the senior Unionist members now courting Mr. Powell endorsed direct rule as a scheme for a temporary measure of peace. Mr. Powell turned down their offers to join them in February of '74, for reasons that have been variously interpreted as not yet ready to leave the Conservative Party (despite calling upon people to vote for Labour) or shrewdly realizing direct rule would be deeply unpopular and the Unionist leaders would be punished by their voters for going along with it, as most were. When the inconclusive nature of the February general election required Mr. Wilson to call another in October of the same year, and a new batch of Unionist leaders came to Mr. Powell, he accepted their offer to stand for a seat in Northern Ireland as a representative of the Ulster Unionist Party. Upon his election for South Down in October of '74, Mr. Powell became the de-facto Leader of the Ulster Unionist MPs, though he was quite assiduous in attempting to treat Mr. Molyneaux as the official leader of the faction, going so far as to call him 'Sir' in the presence of others. Mr. Powell then broke with a hundred years of tradition."


Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):

"The minority government Jim Callaghan inherited from Harold Wilson in '76 was held together with cracked aged drying plaster, cracked, aged and dying MPs and few good wishes. We were quite at the mercy of small parties voting with us or against us. Most were quite dreadful, basking in their moment in the sun and asking for the moon while at it. Yet there were surprises to be found, none more so than when Jim and I discovered Ulster Unionist MPs ready to vote with us on key measures, and crucially abstain on others, in return for not unreasonable demands. Enoch Powell, no blood brother of mine, treated us fairly. He once said to me he assumed if he can get the Ulster Unionists to overcome their instinctual century old support for the Conservative Party, then perhaps we reds could get over our 'silly' views on Northern Ireland. It was a shrewd assessment from a very shrewd man. On more than one occasion I heard Jim say he preferred dealing with the Unionists over Liberals or other small parties because he found the Unionists to be serious men: tough and straight talking. He regarded David Steel as a capricious adolescent. Enoch Powell, for all his faults and there are far too many to list here, was paradoxically a man with whom Labour could, and would, make deals."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"Ted (Heath) could not, and would not, make a deal with Enoch Powell. When Ted lost the election in February of '74 to Harold Wilson, some of the analysts assumed it was caused in no small part by Enoch Powell urging the voters to support Labour. I know not whether it is true, but I know Ted believed it to be true. Ted may have disliked Margaret, but he loathed Enoch. When Ted's poor biographer was attempting to piece together his long awaited official biography, the topic of the 1965 leadership election for the Conservative Party came up. Ted had nothing terrible to say about his opponent Reggie Maudling, settling on an epithet of 'amiably lazy,' but qualifying it with some praise. When the topic turned to his other opponent in '65 - Enoch Powell, Ted's eyes flashed lightning and he could only bring himself to utter one word to describe him - 'evil.' I was therefore not surprised when on the morning of 15 October, 1987 Ted rang me up to say he just advised Mr. King to not negotiate with the Ulster Unionist MPs and instead reach out to the Social Democrats."


Roy Hattersley, Roy from Yorkshire, (Penguin Books, 1992):

"On the morning of 15 October, 1987 I was filled with a horrible sense of foreboding. I foresaw members of my own Party arguing for cutting a deal with the SDP and the Liberals to attempt to form a government. It was in my view wholly unacceptable. Firstly, the combination of Liberals, SDP and Labour could muster 315 MPs, barely topping the Conservative 314 MPs. We could not form a majority government with the SDP and the Liberals alone, but we could alienate many members of our own Party by trying to form a minority government of the sort practiced by poor Jim Callaghan, an utterly demoralizing experience, with little to no hope of sustained electoral success. While many would have thought the biggest opposition to such a deal would come from the left of the Party, I can assure you the deal would have been roundly criticized by us moderates as well. When the right wing of the Labour Party detached itself to form the core of the SDP, it isolated men such as I within the Party. The remaining moderates were regarded, for much longer than we should have been, with deep suspicion. The guilt by association destroyed virtually all moderate political Labour groups in which the SDP members once operated. As someone who was a proud member of most of those Labour groups, I found myself constructing new groups from their ashes which had to be watered down with at least one visible left-winger within its committees to forestall any accusations of building a plank towards SDP. The agenda of moderates within the Labour Party was wholly compromised by the creation of the SDP. How were we now to be expected to welcome back such people into our midst?"


Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"Between 1983 and 1987, Roy Hattersley's nightmares revolved around seeing Neil Kinnock become Prime Minister. Such a scenario would mean a repudiation of Roy's criticisms and all of his carefully planted whispering campaigns, and would end with him marooned on a desert island of his own making. But Kinnock in Downing Street was a nightmare shared by others, chief among them - David Owen."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"On the morning of 15 October, 1987, Shirley (Williams), John Cartwright, Mike Thomas, Chris Patten, David Owen and I met with David Steel, David Penhaligon and Paddy Ashdown. Poor Roy (Jenkins) had to endure a slow count and a recount of his votes on the night before that bled over into the morning before being declared winner and could not join us due to being exhausted. Not that any of us present were in much better shape. We were all bleary eyed, sleep deprived and bone tired. Our nerves were frayed and I dare say I had hoped Paddy Ashdown would say something awful so I could pounce on him. Of all of us, only David Owen looked remarkably fresh and eager to play the role of kingmaker. He congratulated the Liberals on running a wonderful campaign, waited for David Steel to belatedly offer the same congratulations to the SDP and then reiterated that the Alliance was now in a position it most sought - it alone could decide who would form the next government. It was a puzzling remark, either born of cold blood calculation or a sudden inability to perform arithmetic. SDP and Liberals combined with Labour could not constitute a majority necessary to form a stable government. But either the Alliances, or the Liberals or the SDP by themselves, could very much decide the formation of the next Tory government by giving it a cast iron majority. Either David Owen was more exhausted then he let on and did not realize what he was saying, or he had single-handedly concluded we could make a deal with segment of the Tory government but not Labour. Judging by the looks our Liberal allies gave us, I was not alone in following the thread. Yet none of the three men sitting opposite us asked for clarification. Perhaps they felt outnumbered in that meeting. Or perhaps they were too tired to cause a row. Regardless, David Steel agreed we should now see what each side could offer us and negotiate collectively. He put undue stress on the last word, causing a frisson of tension among the Owenites, but not their namesake Leader. David Owen smiled and agreed. He then suggested that as the biggest Party in Parliament, Conservatives should be heard first. David Penhaligon then surprised us all by agreeing quickly. David Steel's view at this point was unknown to me, but consensus was reached. David Owen suggested David Steel, as the Leader of an Alliance Party with the most MPs, should be the one to make the call. David Steel asked for David Owen to join him. It was remarkably civil still as they began to discuss the details of when to place the call or how, but it occurred me we had not discussed how a possibility of such a deal would be received by our activists and members. In the run to the election, the question of hung Parliament was much talked about. Indeed, David Owen made certain it was a possibility in the mind of the British public. We had a document in place of what we would ask both the Conservatives and Labour in event of hung Parliament: Proportional Representation for Westminster and European elections and certain bullets points of our manifesto - true local government for the people of England, Scotland and Wales, reforming the House of Lords, creating a Ministry of Justice to better meet the complex needs of our legal system, improving healthcare and creating a 'lifeline' social security for the elderly. But we made no serious no groundwork to truly sound out how our members and activists felt about the Alliance keeping the Conservatives in power or conversely installing Labour. There were opinion polls bandied about to capture the mood of some sampling of people, but I distrusted them."


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"Opinion polls conducted on the eve of the election indicated in the event of a hung Parliament, likely Alliance voters favored the formation of a government with the Conservatives over that of Labour by 38% to 35%, with the 15% Undecideds and Neither averaging 12%. Among Liberals, the preference was reversed with 37% favouring a deal with Labour to just 34% favouring a deal with the Conservatives. SDP voters on the other hand preferred Conservative government to a Labour one by 45% to 30%. However, most of those polls merely asked with which of the two 'major' parties likely Alliance voters preferred to form a coalition government. More open ended phrased polls asked of the overall British electorate (and not just Alliance voters) had different results. When asked 'If neither the Conservatives nor Labour win an overall majority in the House of Commons at the General Election, which of these options would you prefer?' 38% of the overall electorate did not favour a Conservative/Alliance pact nor a Labour/Alliance once and state they would prefer 'A quick election to decide who should form a government.' Alliance and SDP might have been conflicted with whom to form a pact or coalition, but the average voter preferred no coalitions or pacts at all."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"On 15 October, we had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament because we did not anticipate it. But by some minor miracle we managed to articulate our talking points for a negotiation with the Alliance prior to their phone call and present it to Mr. King."


Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):

"Only liars and fools would tell you a hung Parliament was not anticipated by the Tories and Labour in '87. I do not know the extent of the King government's preparation for it, but I can tell you Michael Heseltine worked out nearly all of the strategems for the benefit of someone as thick as me and was able to have me grasp it. The key lay with Labour's willingness to compromise. The King government had four options, propose a deal to the Alliance as a whole, SDP alone, or Liberals by themselves, or offer no deal to either. The optimal solution, on 15 October, as Michael drew it out for me using game theory matrices on a whiteboard, was for the Tories to offer no deal. As the largest Party in Parliament, there was a possibility of the Conservatives carrying on as they did prior to the election, as a minority government. That option was only viable, however, if Labour did not conclude a satisfactory deal with the Alliance. More on that below. Making a deal with the Alliance was the least preferable choice in a rational scenario. Proportional Representation (PR) was a recipe for disaster. For a Tory government to contemplate its implementation in such a way as to impact the makeup of the House of Commons at the next general election would have been inviting a backbench revolt. Somewhere between no-deal and Alliance deal hovered the notion of trying to make a deal with the Social Democrats. David Owen, in his feline way, made it known PR would not be a deal breaker. It opened possibilities. Somewhere between Alliance deal and making a deal with the SDP hover the option of making a deal with Liberals by themselves. Prior to the election, the consensus was David Steel instinctually tacked leftwards and would ask for more concessions than David Owen."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"David (Owen) and I had a not entirely productive call with Mr. King in the afternoon of 15 October, 1987. He could not commit to PR for the Westminster elections and he was unwilling to negotiate on devolving power to the locales, even though his own Scottish Office minister, Malcolm Rifkind, was in favour of a Scottish Assembly."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"I felt the afternoon call to Tom King went rather well, we made progress on 'lifeline', the need for a Ministry of Justice, some form of change in the House of Lords and considerations regarding PR for the European Parliament elections. Mr. King had room to negotiate and I wanted him to explore his options, but David (Steel) was quite anxious to see what he could wring out of Labour."


Michael Mates, Where There’s a Will, (Hamish Hamilton, 1995):

"If the King government had four options, Labour had a myriad, but the branches of its decision tree very much depended on which Kinnock would appear at the negotiating table with the Alliance: the freckled darling of the soft-left or the half-serious almost-sober politician he tried to play for the telly. For the darling, the best outcome would be no deal with the Alliance for Labour or the Tories. It would mean a weak Conservative government of 314 MPs and give his lot a chance to roleplay us in our harassment of the Callaghan government in the late '70s. It would also strengthen their ideological purity. They stood tall and made no offers, you see, and the only way they can effect change was to have the good people of Britain vote them into office. The worst possible outcome for the darling would have been to offer Alliance a deal, only for Alliance to turn around and get the Tories to give them a better one. It would have left him humiliated and looking weak. Their argument about standing tall would evaporate and the voters would know them as the lot that tried to grab power, but couldn't get the job done. The third best option would have been a Labour-Alliance deal. Yes, yes, third best. Here's why. For the Benns of the world no loaf is better than half-loaf. The notion of having to temper their precious manifesto with the ideas of the SDP 'defectors' would stick in their craw and more importantly stick in the craw of their loon activists. It would also leave Kinnock open to charges of cavorting with the enemy. Prudence is not a virtue in the land of extremists. This leaves us with the seemingly ludicrous notion of the darling's second best option: watching Alliance and the Tories make a deal. Labour left could then trumpet how neither the Liberals nor the SDP are true opposition to the Tories but merely crypto-Conservatives. It would lay the Alliance open to the charge of not being an effective opposition and raise the profile of Labour as the only legitimate form of grievance against the government and its allies of the day."


Bryan Gould, Hard Labour, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"We had no plan to form a government in event of a hung Parliament before the general election. In the mad scramble, we managed to hastily create a document cobbled together at the last second. Neil's view was we could not in any meaningful way offer PR, but had much in common with the social agenda of the Alliance. But the less said about Polaris, the better."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"I thought we were making decent progress in our talks with Labour on 15 October, when David Owen, without warning, asked them about Polaris. I cringed. Everyone fell silent. Giles (Radice) tried to pivot the conversation towards Labour's commitment to NATO, and how the '83 manifesto discussing the possibility of withdrawal from NATO was a ghastly mistake. David Owen let him finish his point and then asked, 'Do you advocate cancelling the Trident and then scrapping Polaris, leaving us without any nuclear deterrent?' It was a nasty way to pose a question, for it introduced the divisive topic of Trident and refocused the conversation back on the subject of unilateralism within the Labour Party leadership."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"One is either pro-Europe or against. One is either pro-NATO or against. One is either pro-nuclear deterrent or a unilateralist. Given the serried sentinels of anti-unilateralism within my Party, I would be guilty of committing an utter betrayal of their interests by installing a government committed to the utter destruction of British nuclear arsenal in the name of one-side peace offers to our many foes."


Dick Taverne, Vagabond, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1988):

"Unilateralism is too important a subject to be left to chance or to be deferred until a later date. If we were to be allied with Labour we needed assurances regarding it. David Owen was right to raise the question during the 15 October meeting."


David Ian Marquand, Nomad, (HarperCollins, 1990):

"David Owen does not speak for me. David Owen has never spoken for me. And David Owen will never speak for me. Roy Jenkins has a coherent, well thought out philosophy. David has a demonic energy to seize the latest political ideas and explore them in service of his all-consuming ego. He regarded the Social Democratic Party as his mere instrument. I did not join a cult. I joined a Social Democrat Party."


Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"It is worth remembering David Owen is an utter shit, but it is also worth remembering the unilateralist policy of Labour cost us untold votes in three general elections. It allowed Michael Foot to lead us off the cliff and nearly made us come in third in the popular vote in '83. It then led Neil Kinnock to muddle his way through an interview that cost us a score of seats in Midlands in '87. I hold David Owen in little regard, but he was right to fight Neil on nuclear policy, even if he was not right about anything else."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"In my highly uninformed view, by midafternoon of 15 October, Proportional Representation (PR) was the only real stumbling block between a deal between us and the Alliance, but it was central to the Alliance plank as we then understood it. Various options were discussed and much debate was had during that busy afternoon and evening. Some very bright sparks from business colleges were drafted to come up with 'game theories' on which optimal options would be pursued by Labour and Alliance to give us an edge in negotiations and be able to forestall their wants, then even brighter sparks had to be drafted to decipher for us poor non-economists what it all meant. It was in this state of confusion that the gurus came to us with the notion we should wait for Labour to formally offer a deal to the Alliance. Should they offer one, we were advised to not offer a deal and carry on a minority government, but should Labour not offer a deal to the Alliance then we should offer one. It would take seven matrices for me to explain to you the underpinnings of such a strange conclusion, but it was quite convincing at the time. This 'tit for tat,' but 'not tit for tit' theorem moved Mr. King to go along with the gurus. And there we left it at the end of that long Thursday, waiting on Labour. There followed an apocalypse."
 
Perfectly captures the mood all the time, with every voice seeming as chillingly accurate as always. I'm in suspense, keep up the good work!
 
Part XX
Part XX:


John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"The Sunday before the general election, there were sporadic forecasts of inclement weather on Thursday 15 October or Friday 16. But by midweek those forecasts became somewhat more equivocal. Severe weather was forecast for the Chunnel, while only a light touch would come unto the extreme coastal parts of Southern England. The first gale warnings in the sea were largely dismissed and during the evening of 15 October, radio and TV forecasts mentioned only strong winds. BBC meteorologist Michael Fish at the BBC in particular earned infamy for his falsely prophetic reassurance:

'Earlier on today, apparently, a woman rang the BBC and said she heard there was a hurricane on the way; well, if you're watching, don't worry, there isn't, but having said that, actually, the weather will become very windy, but most of the strong winds, incidentally, will be down over Spain and across into France.'​

The Great Storm made landfall in Cornwall on the evening of 15 October, then tracked north-east to Devon and then over the Midlands and then going out to Sea. Gusts of up to 100 knots (120 mph), were recorded along the south-eastern edge of the storm, hitting Hampshire, Sussex, Essex and Kent."


Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"The storm caused substantial damage over much of England, felling an estimated 15 million trees. Fallen trees blocked roads and railways and left widespread damage. Over a hundred thousand people were left without power, not fully restored until more than two weeks later. The National Grid sustained damage, as crashing cables short-circuited and in some cases overheated the main system. The headquarters faced the choice of keeping the Grid online to help London as the storm approached but then risk a gradual system breakdown, or to shut down most of South East England, including London to avert the risk. The headquarters made the decision, the first since before World War II, to shut down the South East power systems. In London, many of the trees lining streets were blown down overnight, particularly plane trees, blocking roads and crushing parked cars. Building construction scaffolding and billboards had collapsed in many places, and many buildings were damaged. Much of the public transport in the capital was not functioning, and people were advised against going to work."


Rebekah Mary Wade, Hezza, (Politico's, 2000):

"In total, the Great Storm caused £2 billion damage by itself, but much worse was to follow."


Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"Reeling as we were from the Great Storm itself, more than a few men in the City were unable to reach the trading floors. Stock market trading was suspended twice and the market closed early at 12:30 PM. The City therefore could not immediately react to news of a Wall Street market correction on the 16th, when Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell a single-day-record of 108.36 points. By the time the Market reopened on Monday 19 October, the free world had experienced a Black Monday. The last time such an appellation was trotted out for a Monday was on 28 October, 1929 - widely considered the start of the Great Depression."


David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"Over the weekend, all Party leaders visited the hard hit areas, but avoided contact with one another, lest they be accused of political opportunism in a time of crisis. I was vaguely aware of the financial situation on Saturday as Lord Young (Chancellor of the Exchequer) kept referencing troubles overseas and impact on the market, but I did not quite grasp the extent of the 'troubles.' There were some continued inconclusive negotiations over the formation of a government throughout the weekend, but once the extent of Black Monday was understood even by such non-experts as I, Mr. King called an emergency session of the Cabinet."


Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"In the 19 October, 1987 Cabinet meeting, Tom King let it be known he did not believe a minority government would have the power or the mandate to deal with the problems facing the country. He rejected the 'game theory' expert-suggested course of waiting on Labour to offer a deal to the Alliance. He was willing to offer concessions to the Alliance to form a stable government to deal with the crisis: a Referendum on the Alternate Voting System for Westminster elections, a free vote in the Commons on Proportional Representation in the European elections and devolution to Scotland and possibly Wales. There followed a lively debate. Ted (Heath) waited until everyone had vented their spleen and then gave his advice: do nothing. Ted believed the pressure on the current government was nothing compared to the pressure now put on the Alliance to help form a government to deal with the crisis. The electorate would not forgive the Alliance for dithering in their negotiating in the midst of a crisis. Nor could they (the Alliance) afford a minority Conservative government collapsing in the near future and a new general election to be called. In such an election, both the Liberals and the Social Democrats would be targeted by the Conservatives and Labour as standing idly by in the hopes of getting a better deal while the nation suffered. They would appear childish and selfish and would be punished by the voters for it. The longer the Alliance waited to cut a deal, the quicker the press and the voters would turn on them. By the time Ted finished speaking the Cabinet was in stunned silence. No one expected such a speech and no one had expected it from Ted of all people."


Peter Walker, A United Kingdom, (Hamish Hamilton, 1987):

"In April of '69, during the then height of Irish Troubles, republican socialist Bernadette Devlin managed to defeat the widow of a dead Ulster Unionist MP in the Mid-Ulster by-election. Flouting conventions about maiden speeches, the twenty-one year old firebrand deliver a big, brilliant and bigoted speech. It was spellbinding. As she sat down exhausted, Jim Prior leaned over from the bench directly behind Ted Heath's and whispered to him, 'Brilliant speech.' 'Yes, but it's the only speech she's got in her, she can't make another one,' Ted replied without a thought of contemplation. He was right. Bernadette could only make a variation of her maiden speech in the House and did so repeatedly, but people soon grew tired of her one-note act and she was finished. During his first spell as Leader of the Opposition, Ted had an intrinsic grasp of politicians. Sadly, his sure touch deserted him when he was Prime Minister and would not manifest itself when he became Leader of the Opposition. Perhaps his deftness will return to him in the twilight of his years now that he is advising Mr. King, but one has doubts."


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"While Liberals had their doubts as always, before Black Monday, I knew my preference to be for a Conservative minority government to twist slowly in the wind, occupying Downing Street despite not having a mandate from the electorate. Such a government could not last and we could reload for another general election, with a clearer message to the electorate: give us the mandate to form a real government. But after Black Monday, a Conservative minority government could expound at length how while they were too busy saving the country, the rest of us played at politics. A quick election called after such appeal would crush us and give the Tories a clear majority. There was no alternative. We had to make a deal, the only question was the terms and whether Liberals should come with us."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"David Owen called an emergency meeting with the senior leadership of the Social Democrats. Roy (Jenkins), Shirley (Williams), David Owen, John Cartwright, Mike Thomas and yours truly qualified. David wanted to know what should be the minimum requirement for the SDP to support the Conservatives. Roy, Shirley and I exchanged a look. David Owen could not have been so careless as to not to use the word 'SDP' when he meant 'Alliance.' Just to be sure, Shirley sought clarification, 'Don't you mean the Alliance, David?' she said almost lightly. 'The Alliance negotiations are a different matter,' the Exalted Leader replied. 'We need to decide what is acceptable for us, as a Party.' Shirley was too alarmed to engage in a meaningful way, but Roy recovered his wits wonderfully and outlined the case for Ministry of Justice, House of Lords reform, economic changes to enable greater employment opportunities and Proportional Representation (PR). David Owen went down the list, striking down Ministry of Justice as a Liberal plank in the Alliance manifesto, considered House of Lords reform to be a hopeless cause, said employment changes would come about by a more robust private enterprise and concluded we could not ask for PR as it would not be a 'serious' demand. Shirley, Roy and I were astonished. John and Mike, clearly told of the talking points forehand, quickly agreed with the Dear Leader. In one meeting, David Owen rubbished the manifesto he authorized and used as the basis of our campaign. As a veteran of the Harold Wilson Cabinet I was not naïve and would describe myself as cynical, but this was taking it too far and I said as such. David Owen glared at me. Shirley, the natural peacemaker, asked David what he thought should be our demands. David quickly ticked off his wish list: Alternate Voting System for the European Parliament, 'lifeline' for the elderly and prison reform. 'The rest is Liberal nonsense' he derided. Shirley, Roy and I were once again left astonished. Roy was on the verge of saying something rather rash, as a man of no small ego he could not be expected to sit silent with another man taking charge of a table with such ferocity. For that matter, neither could I. But Shirley once again attempted to heal divisions by asking the Great Leader to reconsider the Ministry of Justice, outlining the social case for it and tying it into prison reform. Had I suggested it or Roy, it would have been turned down flat, but the price to pay for going through life playing alpha male, as David so enjoyed, is that you attempt to woo any woman at the negotiating table in the hopes of turning her to your view just to reassure yourself you're still an alpha. David allowed himself to be swayed on the Ministry of Justice to buy Shirley's approval on his overall plan. Shirley played his game and agreed, to stall for time. But by this point Roy's hands were on the verge of shaking. John Cartwright of all people spotted it and said it would be best if all of us would take time to consider our position, 'our' in this case meaning Social Democratic, to the exclusion of the Alliance. We left the room. In the lift, Shirley, Roy and I rode down in silence until Roy turned to me and said rather softly, 'He has to go.' I was not sure whether Roy was blowing off steam, but Shirley realized he was deadly earnest. 'Roy, not now, surely,' she implored. 'Not now. In three months, or six, or a year, but go he must. He is a danger to the Party. As we are ready and the time is right, we must move quickly. Bill, you could be the candidate. Be ready.' Roy said all this softly still, staring directly ahead and not making eye contact. The lift stopped and Roy walked on, leaving stunned Shirley and I behind. Not even at the lowest point in Roy's relationship with Harold Wilson did he ever advocate regicide. But David Owen had pushed him too far."


David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"Mike, John and I had a robust meeting with Roy, Shirley and Bill on Black Monday on the negotiating stance we should take with the Conservatives. We agreed on an overall plan, but some of the details caused disagreements among us, as well they should, for when one talks about forming a government with another Party there should be a debate."


David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"I had a meeting with my senior leadership on the state of negotiations with the Conservatives and Labour. It was a full and frank discussion and I came out of with a better understanding of the varied needs the Parliamentary Liberal Party felt had to be addressed before any further negotiation were to take place with either of the two Parties vying for a deal with us."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"The always entertaining David Pehaglion told David Steel, 'Big Jim (Callaghan) buggered us the last time we got in bed with the government and that was when we actually agreed with half of the government's policies. If we get in bed with Tommy (King), we'll all be buggered as Thatcherites, with the eyes of the nation upon us.' There followed a good debate. I do not wish to generalize, but very, very broadly speaking there were two sorts of Liberal MPs in '87: dreamers and realists. The dreamers prefer all or nothing, while realists would settle for half, or less, to be able to achieve change within government. The senior leadership at the time reflected such a split. Had the 50th Parliament included 314 Labour MPs or even 300, and we were discussing the formation of a Labour government it would have been a much different discussion. But Labour looked to be dead in the water."


Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):

"Through intersession of men who shall remain nameless I arranged a furtive face to face meeting with Enoch Powell on Monday at St. Ermin's Hotel, a site of many Labour battles. He was polite and forced me to sit through five minute exchange of pleasantries about our families before letting me proceed with the business at hand. I outlined my case for a electoral pact of Labour, Liberal, SPD and Unionist parties to form a government backed by 327 MPs in the House, then asked him what would his Party want in return for being part of it. His metallic tinged reply was precise and brutal though courteous, 'Given such an unwieldy government would be fated to fall apart in less than four months, what can your offer me that could be fulfilled in such short interval?' I was not quite prepared for a fatal diagnosis of a government as yet not born and cycling through my offers I realized nearly all of them would need more than four months to implement. When I had admitted as such to Enoch, he astonished me. He was of the opinion (rightly as it turned out) that the European Economic Community (EEC) was going to identify Northern Ireland as one of Europe's poorest region in January of '88 and thereby make it eligible for regional structural funds. Enoch believed a Conservative government would dispute such a finding and thereby reduce the funds available to Northern Ireland. He wanted a Labour led government to not dispute the findings. Enoch despised the EEC and famously broke with Heath over it, and furthermore he was the driest of all dries when it came to monetary aid from his own government, never mind that of a body whose existence he opposed. My face, which I had willed to be blank in more than a few high profile negotiations conducted in the course of my long life, did not stay blank for Enoch's precondition. He spotted it and said, 'It is not about my needs, but the needs of my province, my constituency and my Party.' It was not unreasonable demand and one I could easily communicate back to my leadership. I waited for more. Roy Hattersley once confided in me, back when he confided in me, that Ulster Unionist MPs were prepared to vote to support poor Jim Callaghan in the vote of no-confidence of '79 had he promised them a gas pipeline to Northern Ireland to keep heating costs down. When I broached the subject, Enoch said, 'It will all end in tears, for you will never be able to deliver it, but I suppose it would be good to announce it.' I sat there like a great stone waiting for more demands. None came. I cracked. 'What about devolution for Northern Ireland and an end to direct rule?' He spared a single glance. 'I oppose it, but half of my Party supports it. Full integration is the only path to solving the troubles in Northern Ireland, but you lot lack the will to see it through one way or another and it would be savaged by your left wing until it would be rendered toothless.' I should have been offended, but I was not, for it was true. Thus ended my 'negotiation' with Enoch Powell, securing the possibility of 12 MPs helping to form a hypothetical Labour government.


Michael Gallagher, Wanderer, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"My attempt to capture Milton Keynes in the '87 general election ended in tears. It was a seat we could have won in a by-election, but in a general election we were easily beaten by the Conservatives. I had decided I had quite enough of skating uphill and went off to skulk in my tent. And by tent I mean a pub in London, to where I returned for reasons not entirely clear to me at the time, nor made better by the passage of time. The Great Storm marooned me there, and it was in such inauspicious circumstances, drinking terrible beer by the light of a great fat smelly candle and being utterly miserable, that John Smith managed to find me and initiate back channel talks between Labour and SDP, though both of us were at great pains to pretend it was just two politicos talking. Our talks were not unproductive."


Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"John Smith via Michael Gallagher brought news of a remarkable Labour volte-face on Polaris. Multilateralist Labour MPs were prepared to use the cover of an electoral pact with the Alliance to force the Labour Party to abandon the unilateralist commitments of their '87 manifesto. Far from being a deal breaker, the Social Democratic stance on Polaris could act as a bridge between likeminded Labour MPs and SDP and thereby help stitch together a new government. I was overjoyed and sought out David Owen. He was disdainful. In view of the Great Leader, we could not trust Labour. Given we would, in such a deal, hold the balance of a no-confidence vote and given abolition of nuclear deterrent could not be done covertly nor quickly, I failed to see any semblance of logic in his increasingly peevish arguments. At first hint of Labour attempt to scrap Polaris, Alliance could finish off the Labour government. But David Owen could not, or would not, follow my arguments. It was worse than unproductive."


Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"Much stock has been put to the alleged drunken ramblings of Michael Gallagher regarding Labour's unilateralism and how it could have been set aside for the sake of quilt patchwork Le Grand Alliance of racialist loon Enoch Powell and his merry band of Ulstermen, soft serve ice cream left Neil Kinnock, rising hope cum elder statesman David Steel and our Social Democrats to form a two-seat majority of 327 MPs and thereby create a government. How could anyone expect such an unwieldy unnatural union to last longer than four months barring an outbreak of World War 3 or Conservatives electing Alan Clark as their Leader? It was not just grasping at straws, it was willful denial of reality and sanity."


Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"There were far too many small minded idiots on both sides of the fence for a Social Democratic and Labour pact to ever work in October '87. Not that Liberals were any better though."


Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"It came to my attention that David Owen was prepared to negotiate with the Conservative Party separate from the Alliance and that his demands would be limited to a free vote on an Alternate Voting System for the European Parliament, 'lifeline' for the elderly and prison reform. There would be no reform of the House of Lords, no Ministry of Justice, no devolution for Scotland and Wales and no economic measures. I relayed the substance of David Owen's upcoming betrayal to David Steel. David at first did not want to believe it, but then got confirmation from sources I am not at liberty to disclose. What followed next must be laid entirely at the feet of David Owen."
 
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