TLIAW: You Can't Always Get What You Want

[RyanF]

"I would rather people wondered why I was not Prime Minister than why I was."
-Denis Healey, February 2011
​

As a rule, Prime Ministers don’t resign in the first quarter of a year unless they have fouled up badly. Though there are those, including myself, who could not be happier with the events that have transpired in the past week none of us were expecting it to happen (see last week’s article). Because of this momentous event in the history of our country we have found ourselves with a Prime Minister handing in three months’ notice, resigning as leader of his party with the intention to resign as premier as soon as they have elected a new leader. This was not done without much grumbling from some in the opposition parties and from his coalition partners that the honourable thing to do would be to go to the country given the present situation, but given the uniqueness of the current government and the circumstances of his resignation we’re in unknown territory as to what is the correct process constitutionally. The Home Secretary has even suggested that using the continental example that the leader of the junior coalition partner, as Deputy Prime Minister, should take over the premiership on an interim basis while the leadership election is completed – an amusing position for the leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party to take.

With several candidates already thrown their hats into the ring it seems that the leadership election will go the full distance as opposed to the panicked appointment the last time a Prime Minister had been replaced by someone from their own party. Everywhere speculation is abundant in which MPs will vote for which candidate, and as always there is the accompanying wistfulness that the pundits own personal favourites are out of contention “to bring the change the country needs”. Since the boom in alternate history science fiction that has hit television and cinema in recent years we have seen a similar boom in the sort of naval gazing political wish-fulfilment fantasy masquerading as commentary from the old media. It may serve as some surprise then that throughout the leadership election to determine our country’s next Prime Minister I shall be doing a series of articles on the best prime ministers we have never had from the end of the Second World War to the present day. With eleven articles between now and when the leadership results are determined we will look at eleven politicians who perhaps could have assumed the premiership had events transpired differently. Hoping to avoid the usual biases that accompanies these sort of articles I have put aside my own political views in choosing the figures for these articles.

As someone who was literally a car ride to the Palace away from becoming Prime Minister, Clement Attlee was perhaps closer than any other politician to becoming Prime Minister without ever actually achieving the position. By the time of the 1945 general election Clement Attlee had been leader of the Labour Party for a decade and had served throughout the Wartime coalition as Deputy Prime Minister, where he had been given great powers over British domestic life. Refusing Winston Churchill’s request to continue the coalition until after Japan was defeated, Attlee went on the deliver the Labour Party it’s largest ever majority in the largest swing seen in any general election before or since. The surprise landslide was delivered by public fear of a return to the high unemployment of the 1930s (the Conservatives largely bearing the blame for this in the public’s eye); Labour’s influence in domestic affairs during the War under Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister, Ernest Bevin as Minister for Labour, and Herbert Morrison as Home Secretary; and a lacklustre campaign from the Conservatives including the first of several of Churchill’s infamous statements comparing the Labour government to the Gestapo.

The public clearly believed Labour were the party best placed to deliver the change they wanted after more than a decade of economic depression and then total war, but there were those in the Labour Party who did not believe Clement Attlee was the man best placed to lead them in government. A group of MPs led by Attlee’s long-time rival Herbert Morrison (who had previously challenged and failed to unseat Attlee in leader in 1935, again immediately after a general election) believed that any leader could not agree to form a government without consulting the Party, a consequence of Ramsay MacDonald doing that very thing in 1931. Morrison had also privately let Attlee know that whatever the results of the election he intended to challenge him for the leadership. Attlee’s closest ally, Ernest Bevin, aware of the intentions of Morrison urged the leader to immediately head to the palace once the results were confirmed for a Labour majority. However, the ever-cautious Attlee, aware of how damaging any party division or leadership challenges would be to a sitting government, agreed to the leadership election – hoping to have his position confirmed by the party and to not fear any backroom intrigue for their term of government.

The leadership election was not destined to go in Attlee’s favour in the same way the general had. Morrison’s record in government in London, his public relations mastery as Home Secretary during the War, along with the strong alliances he had built up with other senior figures in the Party all helped Morrison win the hastily assembled ballot of Labour MPs in London, many them still in military uniform. Morrison’s closest allies in the leadership competition were Sir Stafford Cripps and Ellen Wilkinson, the latter delivering most of the north east’s newly elected MPs to vote against Attlee. Once the leadership contest began it became apparent just how few figures in the party were prepared to back the current leader, Bevin being the exception. Anuerin Bevan and Hugh Dalton both were quick to declare their support for Morrison, much as Dalton had done in 1935. After being confirmed as leader of the Labour Party by the assembled MPs Herbert Morrison quickly made his way to the Palace to kiss hands. It is from the machinations of Morrison in unseating Attlee that the Labour Party’s famed ruthlessness in removing poor leadership was born. It also led to the downfall of the great Winston Churchill as leader of the Conservative Party; the notion of the Leader of the Opposition accusing a sitting Prime Minister of using “Gestapo tactics” was too much even for a lot of Conservatives to bear, and soon the Magic Circle were sounding out their own members on a potential replacement.


What if the Attlee had refused to take part in the leadership election, the constitutional basis for it was woolly at best and without his agreement Morrison may have found it more difficult to get the support necessary to launch the challenge? How would the Labour government of 1945 have developed with Attlee at the helm instead of Morrison? Given how close Attlee came to achieving the position, and that he had already made several notes on his cabinet choices, we have a better picture as to how the Attlee ministry would have looked compared with some of the other figures we might examine for Prime Ministers that might have been.

In the first instance, Morrison’s staunch ally Stafford Cripps would not have become Chancellor of the Exchequer. Instead that role would have gone to Attlee’s staunch ally, Ernest Bevin. A much more fitting position for such a prominent figure in the Party than the exile to the backbenches he received after Morrison’s ascension. It would be Bevin and not Cripps that would be the figure associated with Britain’s austerity in the immediate post-War period and the mad drive in boosting manufacturing and trade. Britain would still be desperately in need of the Anglo-American loan after the end of Lend-Lease, but it is unlikely that Bevan would have been able to get any better terms than the 3% interest rate and convertibility of the pound within three years of the loan that Cripps got. The terms may have in fact been worse if the Americans played hard-ball on the convertibility as they did initially when negotiating with Cripps and John Maynard Keynes, only extending their initial one year limit once Cripps said that Britain might have to pull out of its military commitments East of Suez in order to offset any damaging effects from it. Bevin would still have had to face the 1947 ‘Winter of Discontent’, where the effects of severe cold temperatures on energy and food led to strong dissatisfaction with the government, it is thought this contributed greatly to Cripps’ early death in 1949, and given Bevin only lived until 1954 without the stress of the Treasury taking its toll he may have faced the same early grave.

Amongst Attlee’s other choices were Hugh Dalton to the Foreign Office, the same role Dalton eventually took under Morrison. India would still have gained their independence, most likely still partitioned, the state of Israel would still have come into existence, and the King still would have had disagreements with the Prime Minister on all government foreign policy – motivated more by personal dislike of Dalton than anything else. The real difference between the Morrison government and an Attlee one would come with domestic policies. The principles of the Beveridge Report would still have been accepted, but the exact make-up of the bodies created to cure the five Giant Evils may have been different to the creations of the Morrison government. Attlee was never as keen on local government as former London County Council Leader Morrison, it was Morrison’s experience in that position that coloured much of what his government introduced domestically. The responsibilities for the National Health Service, National Insurance and Housing all fell to municipalities to administer overseen by the Ministers of those respective departments; Ellen Wilkinson, Jim Griffiths, and Lewis Silkin, respectively. Under Attlee’s leadership, not being as enamoured with local government as Morrison would have led to much more centralised management of the welfare state. This would have helped avoid the postcode lottery system of benefits, education, healthcare and house building that we currently have in this country. Similarly, the model of the London Transport Board would not have been used as the model for nationalisation of the coal mines, electricity, gas and rail transport. However, the problems of the 1940s to 1970s with the failure of industrial democracy involving the workforce in the administration of the nationalised industries would still have been present under the more centralised Attlee government.


An Attlee led Labour government in the post-War period would have solved a few of the problems that arose from the municipal mode of welfare and industry that Morrison pursued, but they would have created their own. An army of bureaucrats would have been needed to manage the administration of centralised national welfare services and nationalised industries in London, perhaps Churchill’s jibes about Gestapo did have a kernel of truth to them. The famously frugal Bevin may have had more than a few reservations about the government footing the bill for the necessary bureaucracy to run these titanic entities.

It also must be considered that Attlee may not have even lasted a full term as Prime Minister, had he disagreed to the leadership contest Morrison and Cripps may have just bided their time and launched a challenge at a more opportune moment, an Attlee government would still have to face the harsh winter that led to the Winter of Discontent that soured the government in the public eyes. Had Attlee faced the challenges of the winter of 1946-47 and shown any hesitation in acting (such as scapegoating Manny Shinwell as Morrison did) then Morrison or Cripps may have seized the opportunity and launched a leadership challenge. Indeed, during the Winter of Discontent Bevin urged Attlee to launch just such a challenge against Morrison. It is rumoured that both men enjoyed seeing Morrison face the worst months of his premiership from the comfort of the backbenches, and as such neither would ever return to Cabinet (although Attlee was briefly rumoured as a potential candidate for Chancellor of the Exchequer after Cripps illness and then death, something he was quick to deny and Morrison was quick to install Nye Bevan into the role) and both would stand down at the 1950 general election. Clement Attlee would be elevated to the peerage as Viscount Prestwood in the county of Essex. From the Lords he would make contributions to the decriminisation of homosexuality in the 1950s and 1960s, speak out against United Kingdom entry into the European Economic Community, and in one of his last public appearances speaking at the state funeral of his wartime coalition partner Winston Churchill in 1965, before passing away himself the next year.

Clement Attlee might have shaped the post-War consensus instead of Herbert Morrison, but by the end of the 1945-50 parliamentary term the short-term problems of the Labour government would still have been there. Lingering discontent from the winter of 1947, refusing to abolish rationing to control consumption for economic reasons, and a reformed Conservative Party under a leader who many considered more Prime Ministerial opposite Morrison and may have roused the same feelings opposite Attlee. Clement Attlee was just as likely as Herbert Morrison to lose the election of 1950 to the Conservatives and see Labour back in opposition after only five years.

 

[Comisario]

Whilst I like the idea, I have to take issue with the idea that Stafford Cripps was somehow Morrison's 'staunch ally'. He was pragmatically supportive of a leadership ballot in 1945 and had no love for Morrison and his pro-business tendencies. Indeed, the point of supporting Morrison and Laski in forcing a ballot was to force a wider contest that would be fought by multiple candidates (including those of the left, of which Cripps could be called a 'leader'). Indeed, Cripps was so opposed to Morrison that one of his reasons for bankrolling Attlee in the 1930s was to stop Morrison becoming leader. There would likely have been a split field and, given Morrison would look like an opportunistic backstabber in a 1945 coup scenario, Morrison is not likely to have become PM like this.

It is a good read, honestly, even though the setup needs work. There are ways to get him in 1945, but the personalities and party politics here don't exactly ring true.

 

[RyanF]

Whilst I like the idea, I have to take issue with the idea that Stafford Cripps was somehow Morrison's 'staunch ally'. He was pragmatically supportive of a leadership ballot in 1945 and had no love for Morrison and his pro-business tendencies. Indeed, the point of supporting Morrison and Laski in forcing a ballot was to force a wider contest that would be fought by multiple candidates (including those of the left, of which Cripps could be called a 'leader'). Indeed, Cripps was so opposed to Morrison that one of his reasons for bankrolling Attlee in the 1930s was to stop Morrison becoming leader. There would likely have been a split field and, given Morrison would look like an opportunistic backstabber in a 1945 coup scenario, Morrison is not likely to have become PM like this.

It is a good read, honestly, even though the setup needs work. There are ways to get him in 1945, but the personalities and party politics here don't exactly ring true.

Thanks for the feedback on that, I'll look to go back and redo the setup and add some beef to the relationship between Morrison and Cripps after I've finished.

Even purely from a narrative point of view it seemed far too easy I felt but I had to just get started on it or it would never get done.

 

[Skinny87]

Really digging this and look forward to seeing how it works out.

Though not sure about Churchill being unseated. OTL he made the Gestapo comments and, though embarrassing, did little to prevent taking Leader of the Opposition. There's a great quote I can dig out from a Conservative MP about how, although Churchill obviously needed to go, he was far too strong and popular, and his rivals far too weak.

 

[Milo]

Really digging this and look forward to seeing how it works out.

Though not sure about Churchill being unseated. OTL he made the Gestapo comments and, though embarrassing, did little to prevent taking Leader of the Opposition. There's a great quote I can dig out from a Conservative MP about how, although Churchill obviously needed to go, he was far too strong and popular, and his rivals far too weak.

Considering Churchill got 72% of the vote, he needs to really go off it

 

[RyanF]

Really digging this and look forward to seeing how it works out.

Though not sure about Churchill being unseated. OTL he made the Gestapo comments and, though embarrassing, did little to prevent taking Leader of the Opposition. There's a great quote I can dig out from a Conservative MP about how, although Churchill obviously needed to go, he was far too strong and popular, and his rivals far too weak.

Thanks.

The exact circumstances of Churchill's departure will be covered in the next update. I realise that it was nigh on impossible to shift him until he decided to go, but I've also come to the opinion that in a few universes next door to our own he probably won the 1945 election and people there believe it's impossible for him to lose that.

 

[Skinny87]

Thanks.

The exact circumstances of Churchill's departure will be covered in the next update. I realise that it was nigh on impossible to shift him until he decided to go, but I've also come to the opinion that in a few universes next door to our own he probably won the 1945 election and people there believe it's impossible for him to lose that.

There's one or two ways I can think of, but not without some butterfly wings.

I have the latest Morrison biography by Donaghue if you need details, and an extensive Churchill library as well.

Good luck!

 

[RyanF]

In some ways, the leadership election that will determine the next Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is proving much more exciting than the general election two years ago; it at least seems to have won back some segments of the population that were more concerned with the conclusion of the third series of The New Sun than with the election to determine the next government. Never a group to try to keep out of the spotlight for too long, the Leader of the Opposition has briefed that considering the new circumstances the nation finds itself in that a general election should be held as soon as possible after the senior coalition partner has concluded their leadership election. Both coalition parties were very quick to ridicule this suggestion as pure political posturing, with a new election due in just over a year under any circumstances and a majority for early dissolution looking unlikely even if the maximum number of rebels in the government benches should vote for it. However, with some of the jibes that have come from some members of HM Government over the leadership contenders and other colleagues in the past week we must wonder if the coalitions majority will be as secure after the leadership election as it was before.

The epost responses that my decision for the first edition of this series of had generated was most welcome, ranging from the Tory faithful decrying that anyone writing for a publication such as this could write so gushingly about any socialist as a potentially great Prime Minister to what I can only assume was a mixed-up subscription with the Daily Worker complaining that any Labour government would not go far enough and that Harry Pollitt would be a much better choice. I can only assume both these schools of thought have missed our editorial decisions at the last few general elections. I will mention however that the decision to focus on Clement Attlee instead of Stafford Cripps or anyone else who might have stood in that Labour leadership election was motivated by just how close Attlee came to becoming Prime Minister before the leadership election took place. I think today’s choice might placate those who thought my first was too much on the left, although I did hesitate to make cover this well-known “lost Prime Minister” after so many people could guess at his inclusion in these articles.

Anthony Eden was in many respects the most qualified politician that could ever become Prime Minister. Born on the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria to a family of the landed gentry, educated at Eton and then Oxford, in between those two establishments serving as an officer in the trenches of the First World War, Conservative Foreign Secretary at the age of 38, critic of appeasement and Churchill’s loyal lieutenant during the wartime coalition. To many Britons in 1945, even after the surprise of the Labour landslide, it was not a question of if Anthony Eden would become Prime Minister but when. It did come as a surprise to many with the Conservative Party and the population in general when after the Conservative defeat in the 1945 General Election Winston Churchill did not resign to make way for a younger man, with Eden’s name often mentioned in the next sentence as being that man.

Churchill’s decision struck many as odd, most of all Eden whom had been told by Churchill as they left the Cabinet Room after the final meeting of the caretaker government that “I shall never sit in it again. You will, but I shall not.” There was the undeniable fact that Churchill was still very popular with the electorate, and that many of those voting incorrectly believing that Churchill would continue as Prime Minister no matter what the election result. Eden was reluctant to issue any challenge to Churchill, but for extended periods was de facto Leader of the Opposition while Churchill was working on literary projects or on one of his numerous trips abroad. Eden did use his new found free time in Opposition to focus on development of the Conservatives domestic policy, Churchill leaving much of the day to day running of the Party to Eden even when he was present in the country. It was Eden, along with Rab Butler and Harold Macmillan, that first proposed that the Conservatives would accept the need for reforms following the end of the Second World War and would make a commitment to full employment – seeking to shake off the label of the party of the Great Depression that may have lost them numerous seats in the previous general election.

Less than a year after the general election relations between Churchill and Eden were starting to strain. All the progress Eden would make in pushing the new consensus and the Conservative commitment to it could be undone in a matter of hours if the leader made comments describing the Labour Party as using “Gestapo tactics”, refer to the defeat of Clement Attlee as a “purge”, and warning that the municipal division of Labour’s welfare programs would result in an “iron curtain” between the central government funding the services and the local authorities providing them. Some of these made others within the Conservative Party rather uneasy, to hear the men they had worked with during the dark days of the War described as “Gestapo” went a bit beyond the pale, although Churchill had made such statements during the general election campaign after the replacement of Attlee with Morrison as leader they took on a new bitter edge. At the same time, there were those who thought Churchill had a point, but these gaffes coupled with his treating the job of Leader of the Opposition as a part-time hobby along with his writing and speaking more and more MPs reluctantly came to the belief that new blood was needed in the leadership.

In May 1946 Eden asked Churchill directly to stand down from leadership in his favour. Churchill again declined to stand down in favour of his trusted lieutenant, who demanded to know his reasons. Although reticent at first Churchill would eventually tell Eden that considering the personal tragedies that had befallen the Deputy Leader in the past year (the death of his son during in Burma during the general election campaign and the breakdown of his marriage that followed this) Churchill felt it was better that he remained as Leader until Eden was suffering from less personal stress that might affect his judgment. Eden, taken aback at the personal concern Churchill had shown him, but unable to deny that he had been suffering from depression caused by these losses – the “black dog” to which Churchill was no stranger.

A new understanding between the two men personally they came to a schedule for Eden to take over the reins of the Conservative Party in name from the man who had led Britain through the Second World War. Within three months Churchill would stand down from the leadership and recommend Eden as his successor, he would then step into Eden’s former role of Shadow Foreign Secretary (no stranger to the role, largely serving jointly in the role with Eden during the War) and within the Shadow Cabinet would serve in an advisory capacity on all other policies. In many ways, he would function as Eden’s principle lieutenant over the Deputy Leader or the Deputy Prime Minister should they form the next government. This arrangement was not destined to last more than a few months.


The Winter of Discontent would see the Labour government fall quickly out of favour with the electorate, it would also result in the death of the Leader of the Opposition. Whilst being driven to his home in his constituency the icy roads would cause the car to spin out of control and leave the road crashing into the River Leam; knocked out from the impact Anthony Eden would drown at a time when he was making great leads for his Party against the government. The tragedy of such a popular figure dying would serve as an emblem of the creeping crisis the winter of 1947 was bringing. It would also serve to temper some of the intrigue going on within the Labour government, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer abandoning a planned challenge to the Prime Minister, less it be seen in poor taste coming so soon after Eden’s death.

The Conservative Party was thrown into a numb turmoil following the accidental death of its leader. There was also the question of just who would take over, everyone knew Churchill was the man to take over but some felt it would be best to be done on an interim basis. The death of his former lieutenant and the man Churchill considered to be his political heir, a man twenty-three years his junior, forced Churchill to consider his own mortality. Not wishing to saddle the Conservative Party with another leader who might die before the next election he sounded out one of Eden’s allies in reforming the domestic agenda of the Party, and came to the same arrangement he had made with Eden – although Churchill would later realise he could be much more of a backseat driver to the man he would recommend as the new leader of the Conservative Party than he ever could with Eden. In the Conservative Party of the late 1940s Churchill’s recommendation for the leadership was as good as being coronated, but there were some grumblings about appointing a “man of Munich”.


How would Eden have fared as Leader of the Opposition had he not taken that fatal car journey on that freezing night? Would he have led the Conservatives to a general election victory in 1950 as his successor would do? Almost certainly, it is likely Eden would have returned the Conservatives even more seats than they got – they may even have won the popular vote. What would Eden’s government have looked like and how would it have differed from the Conservative government Britain had 1950-1955?

The double bill of Eden as Prime Minister and Churchill as Foreign Secretary would have given us one of the most effective governments in foreign policy in British history. Much of the policy would have been retained, so much of it coming from Churchill during that government in any case, the UK would still have joined the Korean War and pursued their own independent nuclear deterrent. Where it may have differed is that Churchill’s hopes of European cooperation and integration may have gone forward with Britain as an original partner. The decision that would colour that Conservative government and every one since may never have come about had the foreign policy minded Eden been at Number 10, even Churchill would give his approval to the policy that would change Britain’s economy as rapidly as the Labour victory in 1945 had but Eden may have forced the Cabinet to think twice about a policy that was likely to antagonise the Commonwealth and Europe. Domestically Eden would have committed to upholding the welfare state and sought to mark the Conservatives out from Labour by focusing on large targets for house building, without the economic upheavals that the economic policy of the mid-1950s brought they may even have met it, and the government would definitely have lasted longer than 1955 instead of crashing against the rocks of Nye Bevan’s reinvigorated Labour Party.

 

[RyanF]

And then there were four. With one of the candidates withdrawing from the leadership competition mere hours before the deadline passed we may have lost one of the better possibilities for our countries next Prime Minister. Had I known in advance that this would happen I would have devoted one of the articles in my series on Prime Ministers who never were to the (perhaps soon to be former) Finance Minister, but Mr. Osborne at The Times seems to have written it for me – although perhaps more wistfully than I would have done. No matter who goes on the lead the country the mutterings that they would not have achieved the position had Sir Vincent Cable not withdrew will be difficult to shake. Sir Vincent may have been the man best placed to take the country through the trying times ahead, despite his advanced years, but at least we may see more of him on Come Dancing now.

As I anticipated last week my description of Anthony Eden loss as Prime Minister drew more than a few adulations from those longing for some Tory nostalgia. I also received plenty of connections to online short stories and articles examining how an Eden premiership would have succeeded where others failed, it appears to be a popular subject amongst historical speculators online. Some described him as having a premiership lasting into the 1970s, but all of them went on the put Britain into a much better position nationally and internationally in the decades following his premiership than we were in our own history. A more critical response came to my speculation that Eden could have prevented the decision to float the rate of the pound in the Lyttleton shock, arguing that as convertibility was a requirement of the Anglo-American loan to only way to maintain this without a massive balance of payments problem. Taking us to the subject of this article, a man who is perhaps more obscure to most of my readers than either Clement Attlee or Anthony Eden.

To most observers, Harold Macmillan was a man who could never become Prime Minister. A man whose political affiliation seemed to change with each passing decade. Starting out as a Liberal at Oxford before finally being elected as a Conservative for the northern industrial seat of Stockton-on-Tees; early in his parliamentary career his hero former Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George would describe him as a “born rebel”. In between losing his seat in 1929 and regaining it in 1931 he was an early supporter of future British Union of Fascists leader Oswald Mosley in introducing radical measures to tackle the unemployment of the Great Depression. Back in Parliament he remained on the backbenches as a critic of appeasement, eventually being raised to the Cabinet during Churchill’s wartime coalition. Losing his seat again in the 1945 Labour landslide he was soon selected for a safe seat in a by-election, with a colleague noting that Macmillan was needed in parliament for those that felt “Winston is too old and Anthony to weak”. With his baggy clothes, unruly hair, thick glasses and toothy grin Macmillan would have seemed an odd choice to most people for Conservative leader, one historian going so far as to say he cultivated the appearance of “an early Bolshevik”. It may not be surprising then that after the tragic death of Anthony Eden Winston Churchill would recommend Rab Butler for the leadership without considering Macmillan.

Macmillan was incensed by the choice of a man eight years his junior as leader over him, especially one who was linked closely with the Appeasement policy of the 1930s. He would not even have served in Cabinet after the Conservatives won a majority in 1950 (but lost the popular vote) had Churchill not made a personal request of him to serve as Housing Minister, aiming to fulfil to Conservatives pledge to build 200,000 houses per year. Despite a lack of expertise in that area Macmillan threw himself wholeheartedly into his work, although Cabinet colleagues noted that he “always seemed to treat Winston as though he was PM in meetings, then again so did Rab”. This would change with the decision to float the rate of the pound to alleviate the balance of payments problems caused by the American assistance on convertibility, which reserves were inadequate to cope with. It was the brainchild of the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer Oliver Lyttleton, Lord Cobbold and Sir George Bolton, Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, and numerous civil servants at the Treasury.

The decision was recognised in Cabinet for the enormous risk that it was; it may antagonise the Americans being a betrayal of the Bretton Woods agreements, it would undermine the European Payments Union with the continent, it would reduce the role of sterling as a global currency and might collapse the sterling zone, a floating pound may create its own crises and make even essential imports too expensive. It was also seen that the devaluation that would accompany the initial float of the rate would rise the cost of imports and invite deflationary measures, which would then result in an increase of unemployment to one million. Macmillan, memories of Stockton during the Great Depression and realising that housing targets would not be possible to meet with the rising cost of imports this would bring, announced that he would resign should these measures make it into the budget. He would be one of several Conservative abstentions on the 1952 budget that included the measures. Although through Britain’s participation in the Korean War Butler had managed to drop some of the Munich stigma that still clung to him the effects that floating the pound brought on the country would carry with it a new kind of stigma, especially for a population that remembered the Great Depression under the last Conservative government. What was most embarrassing for a government elected on the pledge to end rationing was forced to abandon that as the cost of imports, food, and raw materials rose in the immediate aftermath of the introduction of a floating rate. Coupled with the ebb in house building and the doubling of unemployed these would be the circumstances in 1955 under which the Labour Party would return to government on a comfortable majority under Aneurin Bevan.


Butler soon made it known that he intended to resign as leader of the Conservative Party. When the Magic Circle that would determine who would replace him it was out of the shadow of Winston Churchill, the man who lead Britain through their finest hour having stood down in the lead up to the 1955 General Election. There were those in the Party who deemed this to be a blessing as Churchill had focused more on building Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent and meeting with the new Queen (it was said Churchill had more frequent meetings with Her Majesty than Butler did), as well as pursuing his literary and speaking engagements while the country’s falling economy was blamed on the Conservatives. Macmillan eagerly awaited the call that would make him leader, but the first he heard on the results of the leadership deliberations was when someone let slip that David Eccles would not be inviting him into the Shadow Cabinet. There were too many in the party that remembered his agitating in the dying throes of the Butler government for a new party of the centre, while many pressed him to ask Butler to step down in his favour, and the rumoured meetings he held with Hugh Gaitskell and Clement Davies on the matter (which have never been proven to have taken place).

Macmillan would spend the nine years of Labour government under Bevan and, following Bevan’s death in 1963, George Brown, on the backbenches. Even after Eccles stepped down following the 1959 election defeat he was still not invited into Reginald Maudling’s Shadow Cabinet, apparently, there was no room in the vibrant new Tories under their flashy leader in the new decade for Harold Macmillan. Maudling would, however, put Macmillan’s name forward as the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1964. Leaving Parliament for the last time, this time of his own accord, Macmillan would throw himself into the role; arguably making the Commonwealth what it is today with the “winds of change” that his leadership ushered in, to quote from his own speech in Kingston, Jamaica on his first tour of the Commonwealth. He did much to heal the lingering resentment from Australia and New Zealand over the floating of the pound form the decade prior, ensured newly independent members were granted full participation in the organisation, helped build up regional alliances of former colonies, and committed the Commonwealth against Apartheid and the white minority government in Rhodesia.


What if Maudling had never put forward Macmillan as Secretary-General in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference? There were plenty of grumblings at the time that it should be someone with diplomatic experience not from Britain, as opposed to a former Colonial Secretary. It may have seemed that by 1964 Macmillan’s political career at home was as dead as a dodo, but with the inevitable collapse of Maudling’s government into the corruption of the Poulson scandal of 1967 Macmillan would have been ideally suited as a backbencher with Cabinet experience to take over. More so than Profumo or Macleod or the eventual winner, after the style and no substance of the Maudling premiership the Conservative Party was ready for a return to an old-fashioned sort of Conservative leader. The evolution of Macmillan’s appearance since 1951 into the quintessential straight-laced English gentleman may have allowed him to emerge as the consensus choice over the man who critics would soon grow to call “more of a satrirical take on a Conservative Prime Minister than one we should expect in the 1960s”.

Macmillan’s tenure in office had he taken over the car wreck of the Conservative Party following the Poulson scandal would certainly have been short, but like another potential candidate who could have saved the Conservatives from being out of government for twelve years he could have given them a better chance at the next election than the man they chose to replace Maudling could. As Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations he would have many disagreements with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and leader of his former Party in the late 1960s before retiring in 1974, but then again as Prime Minister Enoch Powell could count the people he did not have disagreements with on one hand.

 

[KingCrawa]

This is fascinating. The world you are designing behind the scenes here is brilliant

So far we have PMs Morrison, Butler, Bevan, Brown, Maudling and Powell?

 

[RyanF]

This is fascinating. The world you are designing behind the scenes here is brilliant

So far we have PMs Morrison, Butler, Bevan, Brown, Maudling and Powell?

Thanks, and yes those are the PMs in the ATL so far. Given the conceit of who is being used as the subjects of the articles it seemed appropriate to go for some of the most obvious choices for who the ATL PMs are.

 

[Skinny87]

Really very good! Can't wait to see where this is going

 

[ShortsBelfast]

Like the timeline and you are doing a good job at highlighting the subtle changes that would ensue politically and economically from having different men at the top. But one or two niggles:-
The Lyttleton shock? R A Butler and Oliver Lyttleton were actually rather good at economics for politicians (Lyttleton a generation too far ahead of his contemporaries) and, if going to let sterling float, would have chosen the most propitious moment and (given the amount of institutional resistance that they would have experienced from the Bank of England and Treasury) the policy would have been very finely crafted to counter opposing argument. The Commonwealth might not have been entirely happy either but probably not as seriously miffed in an environment where there is a voracious British demand for their exports. As I have said before, any deregulatory Tory government in fifties Britain is going to release immense pent-up economic demand and the economy is in a "sweet spot" -new industries rising but old ones not yet displaced. No more likely than an "Erhard shock" on the Deutschmark OTL. Essentially a "Roaring Fifties".
And very hard to see why (even if sterling plummeted) they would have to reinstate rationing as most sugar, butter and eggs, meat and poultry came from within the sterling zone as did bananas and 60% of apples (and we could have brought in more Canadian and fewer French apples). Nor did we import bricks, cement or concrete 60 years ago in any appreciable quantities. Beef would possibly have got dearer (we bought in quite a bit from Argentina and Uruguay) as would oranges (mainly from outside the sterling zone) but there would have been some counter-reactions. The British and Irish bacon industries would have contracted less with dearer Danish and Dutch bacon and ham and the South African and Australian citrus fruit industries would have got an early boost. And the English soft fruit growers contracted less. And the poultry industry expanded even more.
American criticism would have necessarily been muted. No matter how angry they were privately they couldn't allow the information that Bretton Woods was largely orchestrated by a Soviet spy, Harry Dexter White (which British intelligence was well aware of) to become public knowledge. So they would have toned down the rhetoric and no overt reprisals.
Now a Suez crisis in 1956 could have generated a run on a freely floating sterling, granted. But, if sterling had been unpegged, the American ability to exert pressure would not have been as great and militarily Suez was a success for the British, French and Israelis -it was damn lucky for Nasser that the American referee blue his whistle when he did. After a short victorious war, sterling would undoubtedly have bounced back.
If you want to bring Butler down for the purposes of narrative, best you use some other device like publication of his correspondence with the Swedish intermediary with the Nazis. But even then, it is likely to be an Eden situation, replaced by an other senior Tory (probably his brilliant Chancellor). There was a reason why the Conservatives dominated politics 1952-63 OTL even with the disaster of Suez. Britain was booming and people had "never had it so good";

A Nye Bevan premiership also strikes me as unlikely. He was too much of one faction to successfully lead the whole party and was the original "Champagne Socialist" or "Bollinger Bolshevik" (presumably Fascists drink Taitinger?). This was well known to the general public (among other things he appears thinly disguised as "Mr. Vitamian Evans" in a night-club scene in Agatha Christie's "the Labours of Hercules" This meant that he was not that popular with Scottish Labour (still quite heavily Presbyterian or Catholic 70 odd years ago and both lots rather puritanical) or with the (still a potent force back then) nonconformist protestant tradition within English Labour. Now in our more secular society these groups are politically insignificant in the Labour party and wider electorate (the "Crystal Methodist" being an example of them not going out with a bang but a giggle) but it was not so in the 1940s and 1950s. Butler's great triumph in the 1944 Education Act was to arrive at an arrangement all the major religious groups could sign up to.
Nor did the Gaitskellites like him and "Lower than Vermin" did him more damage than you would expect in his own party. In what was still a polite society it was seen as rude and intemperate and if you are a sad individual like me who likes to read the memoirs/ autobiographies of politicians, industrialists and generals a familiar trope following that speech is the Minister to Shadow Minister/MP to paired MP/TU Secretary to industrialist apologetically remarking along the lines of "Although I disagree with you politically, I want you to know that I disassociate myself from the views expressed..."
In 1955, I would have thought Gaitskell or (butterflies permitting his daughter not to get out of her depth) Durbin.

 

[ShortsBelfast]

"blew his whistle" Bloody prescriptive text!

 

[Bolt451]

1. I'm loving this so far, a fantastic idea

 

[RyanF]

Sorry I haven't had time to update over the past few days, a few things on and the accompanying hang overs have slowed down progress. Perhaps should have clarified the W stands for 'While' and not 'Week'.

Like the timeline and you are doing a good job at highlighting the subtle changes that would ensue politically and economically from having different men at the top. But one or two niggles:-

Thanks for the thought put into this, will try to answer each point as best I can.

The Lyttleton shock? R A Butler and Oliver Lyttleton were actually rather good at economics for politicians (Lyttleton a generation too far ahead of his contemporaries) and, if going to let sterling float, would have chosen the most propitious moment and (given the amount of institutional resistance that they would have experienced from the Bank of England and Treasury) the policy would have been very finely crafted to counter opposing argument. The Commonwealth might not have been entirely happy either but probably not as seriously miffed in an environment where there is a voracious British demand for their exports. As I have said before, any deregulatory Tory government in fifties Britain is going to release immense pent-up economic demand and the economy is in a "sweet spot" -new industries rising but old ones not yet displaced. No more likely than an "Erhard shock" on the Deutschmark OTL. Essentially a "Roaring Fifties".

The phrase Lyttleton shock says more about the historiography of TTL with regards to the sterling float than it does about the actual effects. The situation faced here by the time of the 1951 budget, with convertibility of the pound since 1949 (as demanded by the terms of the Anglo-American loan negotiated here by Cripps and Keynes) the weakness of sterling was revealed with the quick loss of dollar reserves and the potential for devaluation. The need for cuts in expenditure both at home and abroad to meet this obligation were marred by participation in the Korean War and Churchill's insistence on an independent British nuclear deterrent. These all contribute to forcing the hand of the PM and the Chancellor.

As to the Commonwealth, much like there were countries in the sterling zone that in 1967 OTL refused to devalue in line with the devaluation in the UK and that later the decision to float the pound in 1972 (the latter working in conjunction with the exchange controls put in place to prevent a flight from sterling to USD) here we see some of the sterling zone, principally Australia and NZ, reject the exchange controls needed to prevent a flight of sterling to USD as a result of the float and convertibility which speeds up the conversion to dollar economies (although still pegged to GBP rather than USD). Canada of course was already a dollar economy, and most of the remaining parts of the Empire and the smaller parts of the sterling zone don't have much choice.

Going back to the historiography on display here, the adverse effects of the float in 1951 had largely passed within a few years. However, unemployment was still close to one million, over double what it was when the Conservatives took power and charges had been introduced for dentistry, optometry and prescriptions on the NHS. For many voters, the former serves as a stark reminder of the days of the Great Depression still fresh in many people's memory and for which the Conservatives bore the brunt of the blame; and the latter, being a top down edict given by the central government to local health boards smacking of a lack of commitment to the welfare state (there would have been a few attempts by local health authorities to circumvent this). Things would definitely be improving by the time of the 1955 election, but much like the 2010 election the people believed they knew who was to blame for the tough times and they would be punished accordingly.

And very hard to see why (even if sterling plummeted) they would have to reinstate rationing as most sugar, butter and eggs, meat and poultry came from within the sterling zone as did bananas and 60% of apples (and we could have brought in more Canadian and fewer French apples). Nor did we import bricks, cement or concrete 60 years ago in any appreciable quantities. Beef would possibly have got dearer (we bought in quite a bit from Argentina and Uruguay) as would oranges (mainly from outside the sterling zone) but there would have been some counter-reactions. The British and Irish bacon industries would have contracted less with dearer Danish and Dutch bacon and ham and the South African and Australian citrus fruit industries would have got an early boost. And the English soft fruit growers contracted less. And the poultry industry expanded even more.

The government has not had to reinstate any rationing, but nor have they removed much of the rationing still in place from the 1940s (such as confectionery and meat). As to housing, timber and cement imports were needed to meet the governments huge targets for house building, IOTL Macmillan was able to meet his target but with the changes following the float of the pound he realises they cannot be met. Any timer, or apples, that might have been imported from Canada would be imported from outside the sterling zone as Canada's dollar economy was pegged to the US dollar. As you correctly say the price of beef would rise but the poultry industry would grow, it is likely we might see a healthier nation by TTLs 2017 than OTL, but for many Britons in the mid-50s not being able to get a joint for Sunday at a decent price (and still on ration) wouldn't be thanking the government for more roast chicken.

American criticism would have necessarily been muted. No matter how angry they were privately they couldn't allow the information that Bretton Woods was largely orchestrated by a Soviet spy, Harry Dexter White (which British intelligence was well aware of) to become public knowledge. So they would have toned down the rhetoric and no overt reprisals.

American criticism was only ever mentioned as a potential risk that the government feared, I meant to include a sentence as the US's muted reactions so thanks for mentioning this will include it.

Now a Suez crisis in 1956 could have generated a run on a freely floating sterling, granted. But, if sterling had been unpegged, the American ability to exert pressure would not have been as great and militarily Suez was a success for the British, French and Israelis -it was damn lucky for Nasser that the American referee blue his whistle when he did. After a short victorious war, sterling would undoubtedly have bounced back.

We'll cover a bit more of foreign affairs in the next update so won't say anything except get out of my head.

If you want to bring Butler down for the purposes of narrative, best you use some other device like publication of his correspondence with the Swedish intermediary with the Nazis. But even then, it is likely to be an Eden situation, replaced by an other senior Tory (probably his brilliant Chancellor). There was a reason why the Conservatives dominated politics 1952-63 OTL even with the disaster of Suez. Britain was booming and people had "never had it so good"

Butler lasts as Prime Minister until the 1955 election, but the boom that you have accurately predicted is still just in it's initial stage. With a Man from Munich in Number 10 and the party of the Great Depression up to their old tricks the electorate turn their back on him and his party, which brings us to...

A Nye Bevan premiership also strikes me as unlikely. He was too much of one faction to successfully lead the whole party and was the original "Champagne Socialist" or "Bollinger Bolshevik" (presumably Fascists drink Taitinger?). This was well known to the general public (among other things he appears thinly disguised as "Mr. Vitamian Evans" in a night-club scene in Agatha Christie's "the Labours of Hercules" This meant that he was not that popular with Scottish Labour (still quite heavily Presbyterian or Catholic 70 odd years ago and both lots rather puritanical) or with the (still a potent force back then) nonconformist protestant tradition within English Labour. Now in our more secular society these groups are politically insignificant in the Labour party and wider electorate (the "Crystal Methodist" being an example of them not going out with a bang but a giggle) but it was not so in the 1940s and 1950s. Butler's great triumph in the 1944 Education Act was to arrive at an arrangement all the major religious groups could sign up to.

We've not heard that much of the travails of Labour since their loss at the 1950 GE, but with regards to a few points you raise with this examination of Bevan some of these will have a lasting effect on the Labour Party's success or lack thereof in certain areas or groups within the UK and as the only successful 'left' party in the UK.

Nor did the Gaitskellites like him and "Lower than Vermin" did him more damage than you would expect in his own party. In what was still a polite society it was seen as rude and intemperate and if you are a sad individual like me who likes to read the memoirs/ autobiographies of politicians, industrialists and generals a familiar trope following that speech is the Minister to Shadow Minister/MP to paired MP/TU Secretary to industrialist apologetically remarking along the lines of "Although I disagree with you politically, I want you to know that I disassociate myself from the views expressed..."
In 1955, I would have thought Gaitskell or (butterflies permitting his daughter not to get out of her depth) Durbin.

Who said Bevan made that particular comment at a party rally three years after the POD? Especially with most of the papers still gushing over the martyred Eden.

The exact details of how Bevan vs. Gaitskell turned out ITTL will be covered once we switch back to looking at the Labour Party with the update after next.

Really very good! Can't wait to see where this is going

1. I'm loving this so far, a fantastic idea

Thanks folks, hopefully have a new update tomorrow.

 

[RyanF]

A slow week in the leadership contest. Now that all the candidates know who their opponents are they have most likely retreated to their own lines to prepare for the next big push. It is possible that one candidate in particular will have to rethink his strategy after Sir Vincent Cable pulled out in the final hours before nominations closed. Instead we have seen most of the coverage and commentary devoted to what the results of the referendum in the past month mean to our, hopefully still, United Kingdom. If the first polls since then are anything to go by we might be looking at the largest shifts in popular opinion about the mainstream (and some not so mainstream) political parties in specific areas of the country. If these prove true this will be a much more rapid realignment than the long, slow rise of the current governing party (in a coalition of course).

Those of you who follow international commentaries will have seen the bamboozlement expressed by pundits in the Commonwealth, Europe and the United States; many of whom simply cannot understand the controversy in this country over what they see as being the natural order of good government. Unsurprisingly the subject does not seem to have been covered much in the Authoritarian Bloc, given how the subject matter might inspire ideas in some areas of their own countries. International relations were the field in which our next Prime Minister who never was devoted most of his career. Taking into account the number of responses I have received complaining as to the obvious choices I have made so far, I expect the change in tact will be to describe how impossible my next choice is.

Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home, the 14th Earl Home, better known to as Alec to many Britons of the late 1950s and 1960s, might seem a curious choice for Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. In many ways, he was born a few generations too late for a Scottish Lord to be tasked with forming a government, to paraphrase Lord Home’s own words during the fraught 1967 leadership contest. Before acceding to the Earldom Home had served as a Unionist MP in the House of Commons in the as Neville Chamberlain’s parliamentary aide, before spending several years in a fully body cast due to spinal tuberculosis and then losing his seat in the 1945 general election to Labour. He would retake the seat in 1950 with a very small majority, but would only last a year further in the Commons before taking up the title of Earl Home and with it a seat in the House of Lords after the death of his father.

In the Commons and in the Lords Douglas-Home would work in the Scottish office, where he would help devise a specific cypher for post-boxes in Scotland that would not feature reference to the new Queen as Elizabeth II. The complaint brought by Scottish nationalists (as ever more concerned with fringe matters than with actual politics) was quickly seen off by Lord Home at the same time the Foreign Secretary managed to offend a portion of the Scottish population by referring to the complainants as the country’s ‘silliest people’. Both the Foreign and the Commonwealth Offices made overtures to Lord Home to join their respective teams he would remain at the Scottish Office for the length of the 1950-55 Conservative government.

Following the Conservative move into opposition, after David Eccles had been chosen as the next leader of the Party, Douglas-Home was made Shadow Commonwealth Relations Officer. He served in this capacity during the Suez Intervention of 1957. The start of the Bagdad Pact in the final days of the Butler government had spelled the final straw for many Egyptian nationalists, who felt their predominance in the Arab World was now under threat, and by the end of that year had seen King Farouk overthrown by a cabal of military officers. Farouk had only clung to power over the previous few years by pegging the Egyptian pound to the US dollar at the suggestion of his advisors following the floating of the sterling rate; this was a bold move by a ruler whose critics often accused him of being too Anglophilic, and helped keep him in power a few years longer. Within eighteen months Colonel Gamal Abder Nasser, the first Egyptian President, had forcibly nationalised the assets of the Suez Canal. Immediately the Daily Mirror and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, both made comparisons of Nasser to Italian dictator Benito Mussoloni. Former Prime Minister Herbert Morrison indicated that the government may have to pursue unilateral action, seemingly confirmed by Prime Minister Aneurin Bevan when he stated in Parliament that Nasser’s claims that he was nationalising the Canal to strengthen Arab cooperation was the equivalent of a burglar claiming “he was entering the house in order to help train the police.”

Shadow Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s to call for a peaceful settlement soon looked embarrassing to the Opposition after the joint Anglo-French operation to retake the canal zone was a successful, and he would soon find himself replaced in the role by Lord Home. Despite a run on the pound and petrol shortages, the latter of which necessitated a brief resumption of petrol rationing, the patriotic fervour generated by the short successful action. This would pay more dividends for the Labour government of the United Kingdom than the SFIO government of France – the problems of the French Republic too numerous for even successful action in Suez to save the government. Maintaining use of the Canal proved essential for the UK in coming years to increase Commonwealth cooperation in Asia and Oceania; but it did nothing to slow the demise of the French Union, France’s attempt to reform its former imperial possessions. The last gasp of Anglo-French cooperation would also do nothing to slow France’s increasing cooperation with West Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries.

As Shadow Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home would adopt a different line of tact to criticising the government over the animosity this drew from the world press. Particularly from the Americans, who were unable to exert much economic pressure on the UK since the pound was floated. Douglas-Home also noted the irony of two socialist led governments invading a country after it had embarked on a program of nationalisation, and that even the Soviets had backed down from intervening in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 after international pressure. He always stopped short however of criticising the use of military intervention directly, but it would not do the Conservative Party any good by the time of the 1959 general election where Labour were returned under a decreased majority – even then the government had lost more votes to the resurgent Liberals and the avowedly pacifist Common Wealth than to the Tories.


Following the resignation of David Eccles, becoming only the second Conservative leader of the twentieth century to not have been Prime Minister, Lord Home was one of several considered by the Magic Circle as the new Conservative leader. In the end, it was decided that after two successive electoral defeats that a more modernising leader would be needed. Even when Douglas-Home was named Shadow Foreign Secretary it was named by as “constitutionally unacceptable” for a peer to be named Foreign Secretary should the Conservatives form a government again, so it was decided that then may not have been the best time to appoint a Lord to the position of Leader of the Opposition. Between the two modernising possible leaders, Reginald Maudling would win out over Peter Thorneycroft – the latter being too in line with the sort of economic liberalism that led to the 1955 election defeat, but was becoming vogue with some of the younger party members in both the Conservative and Liberal parties.

Maudling would keep Douglas-Home on as Shadow Foreign Secretary under his leadership, foreign policy of the early 1960s was mainly concerned with the ongoing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union – with the controversy surrounding the building of the Berlin Wall and US military intervention in Cuba not providing much opportunity for the Conservatives foreign policy to distinguish itself from government policy under Foreign Secretary Denis Healey. Except on the issue of Britain’s participation in the EEC, of which large numbers of Conservatives were in favour but many in the Labour Party were against.

After the death of Bevan and the ascension of George Brown, followed by the public relations train wreck that the latter’s premiership resulted in, the Conservatives were re-elected with a small working majority in 1964. There had been those in the new Opposition who opposed the appointment of Douglas-Home to the position of Foreign Secretary, demanding that if he were to take the role he would have to disclaim his peerage much as the Minister of Supply Anthony Wedgwood Benn had done on the death of his father, the Viscount Stansgate, in 1960. Douglas-Home had no intention to do so, instead delegating to the pro-European Commonwealth and Colonies Secretary Duncan Sandys; who acted as Deputy Foreign Secretary in preparation for the two ministries to merge under the cost-conscious Tories.

The main issue of Douglas-Home’s time as Foreign Secretary under Maudling was that of Rhodesia, after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in the early 1960s the Labour government were prepared to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia but not before majority rule could be enacted. In government, the Conservatives explained their policy on this through the five points devised by the Foreign Secretary; progress to majority rule, assurance against any future legislation detrimental to native African interests, improving the political status of the same, moves towards ending racial discrimination and a settlement acceptable to the whole population. Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia rejected the five points, and claimed the colony was already entitled to its own sovereignty and a declaration of independence was issued following a referendum backed by the white minority population. Calls for sanctions from the Opposition proved difficult for the Government, given how many of their own MPs and supporters were more sympathetic to the settlers than they were to the black majority population.

Following Maudling’s resignation in disgrace after his close connections with the corrupt architect John Poulson were revealed, the Conservatives were again in search of a new leader. Part of the modernisation of the Party in the early 1960s this would now be determined by a ballot of MPs rather than from the consultation of the Magic Circle. The Earl Home ruled himself out of the contention, despite many his colleagues in both Houses pressing him to stand for the leadership. Another candidate from the House of Lords, the Viscount Hailsham, would eventually stand after making it clear that he would disclaim his peerage should he be elected. The number of candidates were few, with many senior figures ruling themselves out for fear of increased scrutiny on their business interests or personal lives that might follow in the wake of the Paulson Scandal. After John Profumo had ruled himself out as a candidate there emerged only one leader from the Commons – Enoch Powell. Rumours have long been heard that said Powell and Iain Macleod agreed not to stand against each other for fear of splitting the vote and sending the leadership to someone form the Lords or Profumo; with the decision for who would stand supposedly being decided by a game of draughts in a Westminster pub.

Many Conservative MPs agreed with the Powell-Macleod school of thought that having a Prime Minister from the Lords, even one who would disclaim his peerage if elected, was too big a risk to take in the 1960s. The sight of the Conservatives being led by a former Viscount being opposed by a Labour leader who had made history in their own election would drive was too much of a liability. Even taking that into consideration however, there were still plenty of Conservative MPs who could not stomach a Powell leadership for personal reasons. Shadow Education Secretary Tony Crosland would dub the leadership contest “a choice between an antiquity (Hailsham) and an antiquarian (Powell)”, but in the end no alternatives would present themselves and Enoch Powell was selected by the Conservative Party as their new leader and as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Any potential sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia were quickly reduced with the Powell leadership. Close cooperation that had begun in earnest with the appointment of Harold Macmillan as Commonwealth Secretary-General on Douglas-Home’s suggestion also went on the back foot under the Powell leadership. Very soon Powell had made it clear his intentions were to replace the Earl Home as Foreign Secretary with someone from the Commons, Douglas-Home’s resignation would come as soon as Powell had found a suitable replacement. Domestically the perceived racialist tone of the Prime Minister’s rhetoric would draw lots of criticism from the Opposition, but would also prove popular with many members of the public concerned with large scale immigration from the Commonwealth that came in the late 1950s and 1960s. This would eventually see the remaining members of the National Liberal Party leave the Conservative whip in 1968 and join with Emlyn Hooson’s Liberals. The knee-jerk reaction of the Powell leadership to this was to attempt to integrate the Scottish and Ulster Unionists in the Conservative and Unionist Party structures; this would only serve to give the Scottish Nationalist Party a by-election victory in a formerly safe Unionist seat and cause the Ulster Unionists to rally round Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill after he resisted these changes.

By the time 1969 dawned the past eighteen months of Powell’s premiership proved too much for several members of Cabinet, but it was Iain Macleod’s resignation as Chancellor of the Exchequer that was the final nail in any hope of salvaging anything for the 1969 General Election. Macleod had refused calls to challenge Powell, despite how much he grew to disagree with many of his policies, citing that only a united Conservative Party could hope to challenge the Labour Party in any election that was due to come within two years of the Poulson Scandal. After the defection of the National Liberals and the antagonization of the Unionist Parties in Scotland and Ulster, the Government going into the 1969 General Election was essentially a minority one. It would be replaced with one of the largest majorities ever achieved in the post-War period, but not a Conservative one.


Powell refused to stand down even after the election defeat, moves were quickly made to trigger a motion of no confidence which swiftly passed. The Fourteenth Earl Home finally responded to calls to accept the leadership of the Conservative Party, but he did so only on an interim basis until a new leader could be elected. Could Alec Douglas-Home have served the Conservatives any better in the 1967-1969 period than Enoch Powell? Almost certainly. Could he have secured the Conservatives a majority in any election held after the revelations of the Poulson Scandal? Probably not. They would certainly have been under a better position by the end of that parliament than they were after the premiership of Enoch Powell.

Alec Douglas-Home would almost certainly have had to disclaim his peerage to accept the Conservative leadership, the fact he was a former peer would almost certainly have made him an easy target for the egalitarian Labour Party. In the depressing times of the 1960s, with one Prime Minister having proven himself a drunk and the next a crook, the British public may have been more willing to buy into a touch of nostalgia by having an aristocratic Prime Minister. On the international front a Douglas-Home premiership would have sped up Commonwealth cooperation and introduced sanctions to the Rhodesia government (though not without some trouble from his own MPs). It is also likely that British entry into the EEC, abandoned as an ambition under both Enoch Powell and his successor, would have been properly attempted – the changes this would bring to both Britain and the Commonwealth are too much to try to list in this already long article.

After serving as interim leader until William Whitelaw was elected as Conservative leader, Douglas-Home would serve as Conservative leader in the Lords until 1975 – when he retired from front line politics. He would spend more of his time in Scotland after retirement, serving as an elder statesman to younger Unionist Party politicians in his home nation. He would perform one final service to his Party at the grand age of 80 when in 1983 he made several appearances in favour of the Scottish Parliament proposed by the new Conservative government, though never overly pro-devolution himself he accepted the party line. He would finally draw entirely from public life in 1990 after the death of his wife, and would himself die only two years later in 1992.