As promised, an update--with lots of action. I hope the battles turn out well. If they seem a bit too fast, then I can just say they take longer. Hopefully, the next post will see the end of the campaign in Peru and the Act of Settlement, which ends among other things the Quasi-Revolution in Spain.
As always, comments, criticism, and outright castigation are all most welcome. DISCLAIMER: There are probably some typos in here, given the lateness of the hour when I finished writing.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Part IIIc: To Redress the Balance of the Old
From Oporto: A Visitor’s Guide
Frommer’s. 1996.
Museu Real da Constituição (Royal Museum of the Constitution)
Admission: Free
Hours: 10-6 Tuesdays – Friday, 10 – 10 Saturday and Sunday.
Closed on Mondays.
[FONT="]A great way to round off a busy day touring the sights of Oporto is to visit this gem of early 20th century Architecture. The oldest example of Baroque Modernism still extant after the Second Great War, the building itself is perhaps more well known than its contents. Inside is the Royal Museum of the Constitution, which details the path of constitutional development in Portugal, a journey starts in Oporto itself (indeed, so say the docents on their guided tours). In early 1820, a movement of the city’s merchants combined with several disaffected army officers to demand the return of João VI from Rio de Janeiro and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy…[1][/FONT]
Visitors should enjoy the courtyard, featuring a café and a large green space around a statue of King Miguel II, who created the Museum at the start of his reign in 1911.
*****************************
From Liberators, Protectors, and Pacifiers: South American Revolutions
by Prof. C. Hull, Vanderbilt University. 1938.
The arrival of San Martin changed the nature of the Patriot position in Peru. Whereas Bolivar’s forces had been outnumbered even by the 8,000 men the Viceroy had stationed in Lima and Callao, San Martin’s additional 6,000 and an additional “Freedman’s Battalion” gave the Patriots the advantage: approximately 14,500 men against 6,800. The Royalists were acutely aware of their position: many officers, lead by General José de la Serna, advocated withdrawing from the capital and defending Peru from the highlands. Viceroy de la Pezuela refused to back down. He sent for reinforcements from Cusco, detail an additional 8,000 men.
Before that force could materialize, however, two factors undercut de la Pezuela’s position. First, the Marques de Torre Tagle opened the city of Trujillo and with it much of Northwestern Peru to forces under Admiral Cochrane and Marine Colonel William Miller on January 6. [2] This signaled a significant blow, since Torre Tagle was a notable member of the Peruvian aristocracy. Second, one of Cochrane’s ships—the sloop of war Maipú which had been captured at Callao—arrived in Pisco bearing a captured prisoner: an envoy from Spain bearing sealed orders for the Viceroy. San Martin knew of the Liberal Government in Spain (though not of the growing countermovement led by Don Carlos) and calculated that any message sent so far in such times would help him to bring Pezuela to the negotiating table. Therefore, he sent the envoy through Patriot lines to Lima. He could not have foreseen the results of this decision, however. [3]
The envoy’s message instructed de la Pezuela to institute the Constitution of 1812 (by calling for elections) and to seek an armistice with the forces arrayed against him. It lacked however a genuine seal of the King or his true signature. Instantly, the divisions amongst the Royalist forces were magnified tenfold. De la Pezuela refused to credit the envoy, believing it to be a ruse on the part of San Martin and Bolivar. De la Serna insisted they obey, arguing that an armistice would afford them the perfect circumstances under which to evacuate to Cusco and organize a defense.
Faced with what he believed to be de la Pezuela’s flagrant disregard for legal orders (an opinion influenced by his own political sympathies), de la Serna on the night of January 15 forced de la Pezuela to resign. [4] As Acting Viceroy, he relayed the envoy’s offer to San Martin.
Had San Martin been alone, with only his subordinates, he most certainly would have accepted the offer. However, under the terms of the Valparaiso Conference, San Martin’s hands were tied: such a matter had to be referred to the Council. There Cochrane and Bolivar defeated it. Unlike his tacit acceptance of the decision to invade Peru, now San Martin vigorously objected. Indeed, he attempted to insist they delay for O’Higgins to attend in person, rather than rely on his proxy in the person of Juan Arenales. Fortunately, San Martin’s objections came to naught, for in refusing de la Serna’s offer, the Patriots stumbled into what would become a most resounding victory, though not before confronting a defeat which could have ended their cause entirely.
*******************************
From A Family Matter: Portugal and Brazil in the 19th Century
By Luisa da Silva. London: University of Oxford Press, 1957.
João VI had steadfastly refused a number of calls to return to Lisbon. After the defeat of Napoleon, the Regency in Lisbon left many of the conservative powers of Europe fearful that revolution could all too easily sweep through the kingless country. The issue was problematic enough that in 1814 the British placed a fleet at João’s command to expedite his return and appointed George Canning ambassador to Portugal with a remit to supervise the arrangements for the “Royal Return”. [5]…
In 1820, the advent of the Quasi-Revolution in Spain increased the intensity of these efforts. Indeed when the Oporto Movement began, General Lord Beresford, who had remained in Portugal after the conclusion of hostilities as Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Army, was in Brazil, attempting to persuade João to return. João simply assigned him the task of reviewing the army in Brazil and inspecting its hospitals and depots. Beresford’s absence along with that of any of the Royal family meant that there was little force for opposition when the Regency was swept aside and the Cortes was summoned to write a formal Constitution for Portugal. Even upon hearing of the Cortes’ convocation—an event that had not occurred for more than a century—João continued to refuse to return, offering to send Crown Prince Pedro to Lisbon to rule in his stead a constitutional monarch.
It finally took the threat of revolutionary fervor in Brazil itself to move João to action. In February 1821, a public demonstration in Rio de Janeiro called for a National Convention to write a constitution for Brazil. The affair was somewhat confused, since the same day an assembly convened in Bahia called for the adoption of the Constitution promulgated by the Cortes in Lisbon. João called for a Cortes to meet in Rio, to govern with limited powers. When the Cortes met, however, it immediately declared itself a National Convention, invoking the terminology of the French Revolution. The Convention demanded a yet more radical constitution than that proposed by Lisbon, one more similar to the Spanish document of 1812. João considered relenting to this latest demand, but was ultimately dissuaded to do so by his son, Pedro. João appeared in public and demanded the Convention “respect the fundamental laws of the Kingdom.” His meaning was unfortunately unclear and only served to undermine his own prestige. It took swift action by Pedro and a cadre of loyal army officers to drive the most liberal of the deputies from the convention and end the threat of violence. Nevertheless, the incident served notice to the royal family of the need to safeguard their prerogative. Leaving Pedro as his Regent, João and the rest of the court took ship for Lisbon in April 1821. [6]
Queen Carlotta is known to have rejoiced in private with her favorite son, Miguel: “Now let us cleanse Lisbon, my son. There is much to do for you and our future,” she wrote in a private note to him on the eve of their departure, words which today have a prophetic force that only hindsight can give.
*******************************
From A Dictionary of Warfare in the New World
London: Macmillan-Spencer Ltd, 1935.
“Chorrillos, Battles of” January 20-January 25, 1821. A series of engagements between Spanish Royalist forces in Peru under Viceroy Jose de la Serna and General Jose de Canterac with a combined strength of 14,800 men and the United Liberation Army with 14,500 men…
Throughout January 1821, the United Liberation Army was formed in three corps. One, of 5,000 under Simon Bolivar, including both of the “Freedman’s Battalions” he had created; another, also, of 5,000 under San Martin; and a detachment of 4,500 under Antonio Jose de Sucre. San Martin and Bolivar had taken up positions between Callao and Limo, with the former occupying the coastal village of Chorrillos as a headquarters. Sucre was stationed some distance from Lima, to guard against the approach of Royalist reinforcements expected from Cusco.
After the ULA rejected the armistice, Viceroy de la Serna was preparing to unilaterally abandon Lima. He could not actually depart because he could not risk an engagement which would jeopardize his march to Cusco. This changed on the morning of January 20, when General de Canterac and 8,000 troops originally requested by the former Viceroy, the Marques de la Pezuela, confronted Sucre’s force. Rather than be overwhelmed, Sucre fought a disciplined withdrawal, sending scouts to inform San Martin and Bolivar of the change in circumstances. San Martin’s force, the closer of the two, decamped to offer assistance.
De la Serna, however, had also learned of de Canterac’s approach. He took a desperate gamble. In the early morning of January 21, his army left the city. He sent word to the garrison at Callao, some 2,500 men under the command of Brigadier Jose de la Mar, to hold out “in hope of future assistance.” Awakened by his scouts, Bolivar rushed into action, howling at his men to goad them to action. The Royalists had to be prevented from uniting. Unfortunately, his actions were too slow and de la Serna’s forces arrived in short order. Bolivar’s forces arrayed themselves across the road, blocking de la Serna’s route. De la Serna, in ironic imitation of French Flying Columns, drove straight through, helped by the lack of coordination between Bolivar’s Spanish-speaking troops and the “Freedman’s Battalions.” Nevertheless, de la Serna chose not to capitalize on his victory. Had he tarried he could have destroyed Bolivar’s army, but he felt he could not take the risk of losing the chance to regroup with de Canterac. Once, he had broken Bolivar’s lines he continued a forced march.
In the aftermath of the defeat, Bolivar attempted to whip up his troops in order to seize Lima. However, it was at that moment that disaster struck. The second of the Freedman’s Battalions was nominally commanded by a prominent Indian leader Ignacio Quispe Ninavilca; he resented Bolivar’s tactics, which amounted to conscription, believing the “monster Bolivar [sought] to take [his countrymen] as slaves to his towns in Venezuela.” Ninavilca thus rallied the Freedman’s Battalions to his own command and set about raiding the countryside. Bolivar’s Patriot forces were thus outnumbered 2:1 by the very slaves they had freed. So the chaos of the battlefield dictated. [7]
As Bolivar attempted to contain a budding Indian rebellion, Sucre and San Martin had joined forces on the evening of January 24th. That same night, however, De Canterac managed to slip Sucre’s patrols and thus bypass the Patriots, making toward a rendezvous with de la Serna….
Meanwhile, Bolivar had met Ninavilca’s forces only to be forced to withdraw toward Callao, still held by the Royalists. Ninavilca seemed to be able to summon followers from the whole countryside, but the threat of such a rising also mobilized the Limeños. A hastily organized militia under a former Royalist colonel, Andres de Santa Cruz, though putatively commanded by Riva Agüero, an aristocrat from Lima, marched out and offered their services to Bolivar if he would promise to avert the destruction of their homes. The combined force quickly marched to meet Ninavilca’s forces, only to be met by yet another most unexpected party: the Royalist garrison of Callao under General de La Mar, who rode out under a white flag to make the very same offer. Bolivar found his forces restored and then doubled in the course of an afternoon. [8]…
*******************************
From The Sociedad Thrasybulo and the Origins of Modern South America
By Prof. Ian McCormick, University of Texas Press, 2001.
Revolt of the Freedman’s Battalions
When San Martin and Bolivar first invaded Peru, they did so as foreigners. The ‘Protective Association’ they had formed at Valparaiso was as of yet a simple mechanism to formalize their cooperation. However, with the defection of Torre Tagle, the Patriots found that the Association provided a very able forum by which to attach new adherents to their cause. Rather than take the trouble to set up an independent Peruvian state, which would invite discord and set native against foreigner, the Association provided a unified command structure which muted national boundaries.
Ignacio Ninavilca’s revolt during the Battles of Chorrillos proved the workability of this arrangement. When approached by Riva Aguëro and then by de la Mar, Bolivar simply offered them membership in the Association and promised to ensure they had a voice in the Council of War. However, it was in acting to put down Ninavilca’s revolt that the Association acquired the trappings not just of a military organization, but of an aristocratic club, a philanthropic society that protected the rights of property and the status quo. When Bolivar marched into Lima after defeating Ninavilca—a farce of a battle really, as the revolt had spent itself out—he was not just hailed as a Liberator, but as a pillar of the community. His new found comrades found their standing increased by their formal membership in the Association as well…
It was thus the inclusion of Peruvian aristocratic culture that began to transform the Protective Association into the Sociedad Thrasybulo.
********************************
From A Dictionary of Warfare in the New World
London: Macmillan-Spencer Ltd, 1935.
“Arahuay, Battle of” February 1, 1821. Conclusion of the Battles of Chorrillos…
Once De Canterac and de la Serna had joined forces, de la Serna had occasion to regret not finishing off Bolivar. Furthermore, rumors of the revolt of Ninavilca had reached him and he saw the chance to defeat the Patriots…
Suddenly confronted by the Royalist force they had previously been pursuing, San Martin did not have much time to array his forces. He would defend the right flank, Sucre the left, while the Argentinean grenadiers under Frere would take the center. As the battle unfolded, de la Serna attempted to break through against Sucre’s forces, thinking the marches of the past weeks had taken the hardest toil on them. However, this allowed San Martin to advance (though in the face of the Spanish artillery fire). Through the explosions, San Martin’s stolid expression, unchanged by the bullets seemingly tugging at his elbows, seemed like a rock as unmovable as the Andes themselves. Sucre remarked to his troops, “Let us see if victory can crack the Old Man’s face, for certainly the Spanish assault cannot do it alone!”...
In the end, the determination of the Patriots won out. De la Serna was forced to retreat after de Canterac was killed in a cavalry charge against the Argentinean lines. San Martin and Sucre lost 1,000 men, but the Royalists lost 3,000. As la Serna lead the march to Cusco, they would lose still more. San Martin did not smile in victory, Sucre’s remark notwithstanding: Ramon Frere had died holding the line against de Canterac’s charge.
*********************************
From The Sociedad Thrasybulo and the Origins of Modern South America
By Prof. Ian McCormick, University of Texas Press, 2001.
The Society Gains a Name
San Martin returned to Lima to thunderous acclaim. Bolivar had secured the countryside, San Martin had secured the country. San Martin welcomed Riva Aguëro and de la Mar into the ‘Association,’ though he reserved the right to nominate another Argentine to take the place of Frere. And on February 5, 1821, a town meeting of Lima met and declared the Viceroyalty of Peru independent of Spain. The Protective Association was declared the interim governing force, until a Congress could be convened. [9]
At the banquet to commemorate Peruvian Independence, Bolivar declared, “Only once before in history has liberty prevailed when Fortune so conspired against it, when the immortal Thrasybulus of Athens and a handful of his compatriots took to the hills against the Tyrants the Spartans had sent to govern the city. Whereas Cincinnatus of Rome freed his country from dangers from without, Thrasybulus freed his from dangers both without and within.” With a cheer from the crowd, no doubt inebriated at willing to recognize anything as an excuse to shout, the remark gained a certain popular assent. San Martin raised his glass as well—to the surprise of many, since the dour Generalissimo had kept to himself throughout the festivities—“Let us pray that our efforts may leave our own Republics so vibrant as hopes for the future of mankind that one day men may see clear to recall our words and our deeds in the same light.” [10]
With that exchange, the connection of Thrasybulus with the Protective Association passed into history.
***************************
From HIST 208: History of Modern Mexico, 1600-2000
Lectures by Prof. Ian McCormick, University of Texas at Houston
In February 1821, Augustin de Iturbide and Vincente Gurrero met at Chilpancingo, the same city where in 1813 the National Congress under Jose Maria Morelos had called for independence from Spain. That Congress declared respect for property but confiscated the goods of the Spaniards. It abolished slavery and all class and racial social distinctions in favor of the title "American" for all native-born individuals. Torture, monopolies and the system of tributes were also abolished. Morelos was offered the title Generalissimo with the style of address "Your Highness", but he refused these and asked to be called Siervo de la Nación ("Servant of the Nation").
The Plan of Chilpancingo was quite a contrast. A carefully crafted compromise document, it combined the long-discussed autonomous regency with a Constitution; however, it provided explicit protection for the clergy, the army, and Europeans. It established the Roman Catholic faith “without toleration for any other.” It nonetheless declared “the absolute independence of this kingdom” but invited Ferdinand VII, a member of his family, or someone from another ruling dynasty to govern. [11]…
As the Army of the Three Guarantees—“Religion, Independence, and Unity”—began to consolidate its hold on the country, precipitated by the overthrow of Ruiz de Apodaca in Mexico city, it became increasingly clear that Iturbide’s plan would decide the future of New Spain. What was not clear, however, was the reaction from Spain herself, due to the intensification of the Quasi-Revolution at this time. By delaying any reaction to Iturbide’s relatively bloodless conquest of Mexico, Spain actually would find her later bargaining position much improved: the Plan had installed a provisional junta, with Iturbide at its head, but without a Spanish authority with which to negotiate the Plan could not be finalized and the delicate compromise threatened to collapse under its own weight. [12]
_____________________________
Notes:
[1] This is OTL. The difference between TTL’s Quasi-Revolution and OTL’s Liberal Trenio are not pronounced enough at this point that they prevent or materially change the nature of this revolt. Yet.
[2] Torre Tagle did so in OTL. This is an opportune moment for him to do so TTL.
[3] IOTL the Liberal Government in Spain very quickly sent envoys to Venezuela, to Peru and to New Spain. In the case of both Venezuela and Peru, the envoys instructed Morrilo and de la Pezuela to seek an armistice with Bolivar and San Martin (respectively); the Liberals hoped that instituting the Constitution of 1812 would serve to end the Independentist revolt in both cases. In both cases, Bolivar and San Martin accepted. Bolivar used the opportunity to strengthen his forces and broke the truce when it suited him. San Martin chose this moment to attempt to propose a compromise with de la Pezuela, to set up an independent constitutional monarch in Lima. This soured his reputation with the Patriots, but is probably a better reflection of San Martin’s deteriorating health and morale than of his true politics. TTL this envoy has been delayed by the increased confusion in Spain and by Cochrane’s greater control of the Pacific; indeed, OTL the envoy seems to have arrived without incident, perhaps due to the increasing discord between San Martin and Cochrane.
[4] OTL de la Serna forced de la Pezuela to do just this in February 1821. Then the issue solely concerned evacuating Lima.
[5] This was his first significant post after the duel with Castlereagh.
[6] This is pretty much OTL. The difference is that the movement in Brazil in early 1821 is not so revolutionary: without Bolivar’s success independence is not so high on the agenda and so the liberals in Brazil are somewhat more demure. While João position is still diminished by his actions, he does not prevaricate so much as he did OTL, when he allowed the National Convention to proceed and went along with them for several weeks, before Pedro finally took action. Hence TTL João does not seem to have vacillated, but to have been firm. This is of course entirely by accident.
[7] This a variation on an OTL quote from Ninavilca, who believed Bolivar had come as nothing more than a conqueror. TTL his resentment is concentrated by Bolivar’s “liberations”.
[8] Riva Aguëro was a Peruvian independentist OTL. Andres de Santa Cruz was a Royalist major who when captured by one of San Martin’s early patrols in September 1820 joined the Patriot cause; that doesn’t happen TTL, until Ninavilca raises the specter of Tupac Amaru. Jose de La Mar was yet another Royalist General who switched sides OTL. I’ve just concocted the circumstances which induce these defections simultaneously.
[9] OTL San Martin alone was declared Protector, while Bolivar was later declared Dictator. TTL the members of the Association are essentially declared joint-protectors. Rather than suspect either San Martin or Bolivar of thus attempting to dominate the country, the Association becomes not simply a nexus of military cooperation, but a political force.
[10] Thrasybulus was an Athenian general who led a movement against the Thirty Tyrants in 402-400 BC after Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War. With a single fort and about 200 men, he led a movement that restored democracy in the face of Spartan intervention in support of the Tyrants. San Martin’s comment is not a wholehearted endorsement of the concept, since there’s probably a dose of sarcasm in his statement. Nonetheless, the classically educated aristocrats of Lima and particularly Bolivar like the idea.
[11] Identical to the Plan of Iguala, only in a more ironic ATL location.
[12] OTL Juan O’Donojú was sent with vice-regal power (though technically not with that office) to New Spain in July 1821. He negotiated the Treaty of Cordoba which approved the Plan of Iguala as the basis for Mexican Independence; unlike the Plan of Iguala, which only allowed Ferdinand VII, a member of his family, or another European royal to take the throne, the Treaty of Cordoba allowed the Mexican Cortes to select anyone in the event no royal would take the job. It thus was essential to Iturbide’s getting himself declared Emperor in 1822. TTL not only is Juan O’Donojú part of the government in Madrid at this point, but Spain is convulsed by the Quasi-Revolution, which is far more chaotic in its early phase than the Liberal Trenio was.
