TLC3: Brothers In Arms

This is my entry for the 3rd Timeline Contest. [see thread here]. The POD is a defeat for Simon Bolivar at the Battle of Boyaca. OTL this was the key victory in Bolivar's creation of the Republic of Colombia and in ejecting the Spanish from New Granada. As Maverick has noted in his TL, though, undoing that single victory will not resuscitate the Spanish Empire. It may, however, cause some distinct differences in the manner of its decay and in what will rise from its ashes.

I have to work out a lot of just what happens so the following is just as much me getting my bearings as it is introduction (especially so since this is my first formal TL). My ideas are at the moment quite fluid so I welcome any and all input -- including pointing out that something I propose is utterly ridiculous.

In the interest of time, the form of this TL may meander severely. I'll try to keep things intriguing, nonetheless. Without further ado, I give you...

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Part I: For Want of a Cold, a Charge, and a Comrade


From A Dictionary of Warfare in the New World
London: Macmillan-Spencer Ltd, 1935.

“Boyaca, Battle of” 7 August 1819. General Simon Bolivar with some 3,250 men against 2,995 from the forces of General (then Colonel) Berreiro.

One of a series of battles fought by Simon Bolivar during the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, this battle marked the beginning of the end of Simon Bolivar’s ill-fated crossing of the Andes during his attempt to liberate the Viceroyalty of New Granada from Spanish rule, even though it is often overlooked as a prelude to the later conflagration at the Battle of Trunja (SEE: TRUNJA, FIRST BATTLE OF).

After a desperate battle with the army of General Berreiro at the Vargas Swamp, Bolivar’s forces had successfully out-maneuvered the royalist army to arrive at the town of Trunja on 5 August, allowing them the advantage of re-supply and rest. That the Patriot forces were allowed such an advantage and yet still succumbed in the later battle is a testament both to the seasoned veterans of the royalists and to the disease that plagued Bolivar’s forces after his crossing of the Andes. [1] This disease robbed Bolivar of some of his choicest soldiers, the volunteers of the British Legion. [2] Nevertheless, Bolivar’s forces were still numerically superior and most assuredly possessed greater morale, given the zeal of their commander and the justice of their cause.

When Berreiro’s troops approached around midday, Bolivar sent out a certain Brigadier Francisco Santander to secure a vital bridge over the Teatinos River. A charge meant to dislodge the Spanish from the bridge and so allow Bolivar to surround the royalists resulted in utter disaster. Santander himself was killed and his men fled. Bolivar managed to fend off the Spanish attack but the casualties from the battle decimated the remainder of his troops. Though he managed to withdraw, avoid disaster, and prolong the campaign for some weeks, he could not reverse the results of this day nor could he undo the work of Spanish guns. Hence, when he finally met Berreiro at Trunja, Bolivar’s forces were decidedly the weaker.

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From A Pocket Guide to Kingston
Frommers. 1992 edition.

What to do on a rainy day:
If you’ve already been to the famous Pirates Hall of Fame, then a rainy day in Jamaica can look pretty gloomy. However, it’s important to remember the city’s history extends to more than buccaneers and sugar plantations. A journey to the Museo de los Hermanos can be just the thing to enlighten your excursion. The museum occupies the restored inn where famous Simon Bolivar made his home in Jamaica during his two periods of residence in the city. The first was in 1815 was the occasion for the composition of the Jamaica Letter, a copy of which the museum has on permanent loan from a private collector. More fascinating, though, is the permanent exhibition on Bolivar’s second stay in the city. Though brief, it was during those winter months of 1819-1820 that an extraordinary partnership formed—or so says the curator.

The Museum has an extraordinary collection of letters between Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin, letters which chronicle a tale of high-stakes intrigue more fit for the silver screen than for a history book. Though frequently discredited by historians who point to Bolivar’s decision to join San Martin in Peru as entirely self-motivated, the letters are an intriguing artifact of history. Thankfully, though, the Museum does not rely on parchment alone—they dramatize the entire affair and include guests in the experience. In an interactive theatrical display that runs throughout the museum, guests follow actors portraying Bolivar, Antonio Sucre, and San Martin’s envoys as they elude Spanish agents and avoid arousing the ire of the British governor. If you happen to catch the Museum on any Thursday in the off-season, you can sign up for the extended version of this “immersion experience” which is staged through Kingston and its environs. Cost: $20 (Jamaican) per person, $10 for students, free for children under age 12.


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From A History of the Peoples of Southern America: A Classroom Companion, Second Edition.
New York: McGraw-Houghton Publishing, 1968. [3]

Unlike the American Revolutionary War that inspired them, the Wars of Latin American Independence were chaotic, fraught with internal political disagreement and outright civil war, and interlaced with European politic. While America’s Founding Fathers were lawyers, bankers, and farmers driven to seek independence because of the offense given by the British Imperial government, the men who led these revolts were for the most part aristocrats and professional soldiers. Despite their background, their intentions, or their later actions, the Founding Fathers of the Latin American revolts were as important to the outcome of those revolutions as Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson were to ours.

Indeed, some scholars view the partnership between Simon Bolivar, Jose de San Martin, Bernardo O’Higgins and Antonio de Sucre as more instrumental, since it had to create a viable political tradition from scratch, overcome immense opposition from at home and abroad, and surmount immense sweeps of geography. Nevertheless, no amount of cooperation could simply wipe away the vast chorus of problems endemic to the Southern American continent: a culture of ease, rather than of work; an uneducated population; and, a legacy of absolute rule. Thus it is not to the detriment of these men that they appear to have made mistakes that our American Founders avoided, but rather to their credit that they nonetheless managed an accomplishment worthy of their predecessors’ example.

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Simon Bolivar’s Second Jamaica Letter

Translated by Ian McCormick, University of Texas at Houston. 1978.

Translator’s Introduction

While some historians have of late tried to superimpose a complicated narrative of international espionage around the publication of the Second Jamaica Letter, these notions are theories grounded in what is unfortunately wafer-thin evidence (to which we shall return later). The proper historical context for this letter is nonetheless dramatic. Bolivar had arrived in Kingston in mid November, 1819, after the dramatic events of the Andean Campaign.

Those efforts themselves marked the third time Bolivar had attempted to establish a republican stronghold in New Granada: the fall of the First Venezuelan Republic was intertwined with the treachery (according to Bolivar) of Francisco de Miranda; the second marked the beginning of savagery and atrocity as José Boves’ army of llanos pillaged their way across the countryside and as Bolivar himself responded with the Declaration of War to the Death. Now, Bolivar arrived with his hopes dashed yet again. While Spanish rule was little more than a veneer perpetuated by conflicting ambitions of the local elites (and that only in the urban centers and the coastal regions) it was a veneer protected by the dank odor of black powder and brave men’s blood. Now, yet again Bolivar had to prowl the international stage, looking for men, money, and another opportunity. After three failures, the prospects for more backing—particularly in the shadow of the Congress of Verona—looked grim. To add to Bolivar’s troubles, his aide and young friend Antonio de Sucre was deathly ill, still fighting the fever that erupted the previous summer and under the care of a British naval surgeon. [4]

Just as Bolivar’s previous failures elicited his written reflection on their causes, epitomized in the first Jamaica Letter and the Cartagena Manifesto, so too did his current debacle. As previously, his current endeavor was an attempt to solicit support for future efforts. His previous works had had specific audiences in mind: the Manifesto was directed at the interim government of New Granada (styled the United Provinces of New Granada) then struggling to unify along Republican principles; the first Letter was addressed to Henry Cullen and through him to the British political establishment. This letter was directed, however, at the population of then Spanish America at large. Its calls for unity and examination of the plight of Spanish Americans—though narrowly directed at the literate Creole classes—mark an important step in the evolution in his fight for his country’s freedom.

… It is striking that part and parcel of Bolivar’s clarion call is an examination not of his own revolution but of that fought by the former British colonies four decades prior. Previously, Bolivar had shrugged off much comparison between the two, eschewing the American example as out of context in Latin America. Nonetheless, a shrewd analysis of the cohesion of the US Patriots forms an important part of Bolivar’s text. More interesting still, to an American reader, is that Bolivar includes many tactics—appropriation of land, public and social pressure to conform along with religious condemnation—that escape the notice of most American students of the American Revolutionary War…


Author’s Note: Though some evidence (referred to above) indicates direct contact between Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin before and during the publication of the Second Letter, it is insubstantial. It does not explain the two men’s later denials of any such contact (though such denials would diminish the quasi-cult image of later events which make them suspect as well). The author has determined the best course to be one of cautious skepticism and deference to epistolary experts, whose debates on the subject have raged since at least the late 19th century. Nonetheless, the fact that within two months of the publication of the Second Letter Bolivar undertook a risky journey to rendezvous with San Martin in Chile should not go unnoticed. Perhaps despite all the pretense of unity amongst all Spanish Americans, the only unity that mattered was that between a few men at the center of unfolding events.


{Text of Bolivar’s Second Letter}
We are not Europeans; we are not Indians; we are but a mixed species of aborigines and Spaniards. Americans by birth and Europeans by law, we find ourselves engaged in a dual conflict: we are disputing with the natives for titles of ownership, and at the same time we are struggling to maintain ourselves in the country that gave us birth against the opposition of the invaders. Thus our position is most extraordinary and complicated. But there is more. As our role has always been strictly passive and political existence nil, we find that our quest for liberty is now even more difficult of accomplishment; for we, having been placed in a state lower than slavery, had been robbed not only of our freedom but also of the right to exercise an active domestic tyranny. . .We have been ruled more by deceit than by force, and we have been degraded more by vice than by superstition. Slavery is the daughter of darkness: an ignorant people is a blind instrument of its own destruction. Ambition and intrigue abuses the credulity and experience of men lacking all political, economic, and civic knowledge; they adopt pure illusion as reality; they take license for liberty, treachery for patriotism, and vengeance for justice. If a people, perverted by their training, succeed in achieving their liberty, they will soon lose it, for it would be of no avail to endeavor to explain to them that happiness consists in the practice of virtue; that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of tyrants, because, as the laws are more inflexible, every one should submit to their beneficent austerity; that proper morals, and not force, are the bases of law; and that to practice justice is to practice liberty.

Although those people [North Americans], so lacking in many respects, are unique in the history of mankind, it is a marvel, I repeat, that so weak and complicated a government as the federal system has managed to govern them in the difficult and trying circumstances of their past. But, regardless of the effectiveness of this form of government with respect to North America, I must say that it has never for a moment entered my mind to compare the position and character of two states as dissimilar as the English-American and the Spanish-American. Would it not be most difficult to apply to Spain the English system of political, civil, and religious liberty: Hence, it would be even more difficult to adapt to Venezuela the laws of North America. [5]

Nevertheless, the subject of laws must follow a successful revolution, not begin it. In the course of the present struggle, it is victory that must be achieved. To achieve victory, the unity of the people must bear testament to the righteousness of their cause. Our struggle—our dual conflict—must become one. We must become one.

…Indeed, perhaps the only way in which the experience of our struggle will mirror the experience of our Northern neighbors is in the necessity of unity and also in the path necessary to achieve such cohesion of force and of the body politic…

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Notes:
[1] This is how I explain the POD. One might quibble and say that I’ve introduced some prior points—poorer weather on the crossing of the Andes and an outbreak of disease in Bolivar’s army—to explain the results, rather than have exactly the same battle conclude with a different role of the dice. Nevertheless, the net result is the same as those prior differences explain how Bolivar manages to lose the Battle of Boyaca.
[2] OTL, Bolivar praised the British Legion who fought with him and their valor for helping him to win the battle. If they had succumbed to a tropical disease en route, surely things might have gone differently, but it is important to point out that this is a British source.
[3] This is supposed to be a middle school textbook. It is very simplistic and hence very biased.
[4] In the Aubrey - Maturin Series of TTL, this surgeon is undoubtedly Stephen Maturin. :)
[5] The text given to this point is the text of Bolivar’s OTL Message to the Congress of Angostura. That message dealt largely with the manner of governance in what became for a time the Republic of [Gran] Colombia. Bolivar spends some time contrasting his views with that of the American federal system. His views on this subject may be subject to some change in service to his overall goal.


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Comments, criticism and outright castigation are most welcome.
 
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Jasen777

Donor
Great start. Can't wait to see what happens.


This is how I explain the POD. One might quibble and say that I’ve introduced some prior points

A certain amount of that is expected.


Although you can of course, don't think you have to write that much for every update.
 
This has the Maverick seal of approval:cool:

Thankee. Having been fan of several of your TLs, I consider that quite an honor.

Great start. Can't wait to see what happens.

I hope to have the next update by next weekend, but as said, I'm open to suggestions.

Although you can of course, don't think you have to write that much for every update.

True. I started writing intending only to post the first 3 sections. But then I got into a grove with the "Second Jamaica Letter." Perhaps more updates without as many sections. :)

As always, comments breed enthusiasm. Enthusiasm begets updates.
 
Note: Due to Hurricane Ike, this TL might be temporarily delayed until I can get reliable power and a connection to the internet. My family is fine as is my house et al.

A slight teaser: Part VII will be titled "The Eagle and the Raven."
 

maverick

Banned
Damn you Ike! damn you to hell!:mad:

Wait a second, you've already got Chapter VII done? I should get back to work...:p
 
Damn you Ike! damn you to hell!:mad:

Wait a second, you've already got Chapter VII done? I should get back to work...:p

I'm back at work and so will have reliable internet. At home, on the other hand...that could be something else. I'm sure though there's a lot of people way worse off than me.

Anyway...

Also, worry not, Maverick: I've got Part VII vaguely planned; it's no where near written. Ironically, not having access to the internet could help, since I won't have access to information overload.

I'm surprised there were no guesses as to the meaning of "The Eagle and the Raven."
 
I wrote this part Friday, but didn't have time to post it before Ike interfered. The title reflects my own morbid sense of humor on that score. There are a few more sections to this Part. I will work on them post haste.

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Part IIa: The Gathering Storm

From Liberators, Protectors, and Pacifiers: South American Revolutions
by Prof. C. Hull, Vanderbilt University. 1938.

Antonio Jose de Sucre was the youngest of the original Libertadores…In 1819, before Boilvar’s so-called “Congress of Angostura” which sought to organize the abortive Third Republic of Venezuela, young Sucre had broken with his former commander Marino. A colonel, Sucre had been left with a command in Venezuela while Bolivar set off across the Andes in summer of that year. Bolivar had left the Congress still bickering: local strongmen such as Francisco Zea and Juan Bautista Arismendi controlled locally-recruited troops. The Republic was a legal fiction to suggest a pretense of unity over what was a patchwork of ambition, argument, and atrocity. As a part of the latent rivalry, Zea whom Bolivar had left as the putative President, appointed Sucre Brigadier General.

When most commanders heard of Bolivar’s defeat at Boyaca and later that at Trunja, they feared that isolated in the mountains of New Granada Bolivar would be captured and most likely killed. Accordingly, they and their troops began to seek refuge in rough terrain, preparing to hold out against an expected retaliatory mission from the Royalist army in Granada. Not so Sucre. On his own authority, Sucre marshaled a force of some 1,500 men—a number substantial enough to leave Venezuela defended only by the threat of guerrilla warfare. His rescue force gallantly christened "The Army of Redemption", he set off on his own crossing of the Andes, determined to save Bolivar…[1].

While Sucre could not have arrived in time to allow Bolivar to triumph at any of the decisive encounters, his additional force arrived in early September 1819 in time to prevent Berreiro from unleashing a fatal blow after Trunja. Sucre thus forever endeared himself to his friend for his daring rescue, confirmed by his offer to forego his general’s commission which he feared Bolivar might dispute on the grounds that Zea had lacked the authority to grant it. [2] However, because he had been reinforced, Bolivar attempted to maneuver for position against Berreiro and Morillo’s veteran forces; if he could achieve a single victory, all of New Granada would rise, or so thought El Libertador.

The months Bolivar spent attempting to raise an army but losing skirmishes effectively destroyed the tactical value of Granadan countryside to the Patriot cause. Bolivar’s original strategy had rested on taking advantage of the pristine nature of the Granadan people. Unlike Venezuela which had been riven by internecine warfare since 1814, Granada had been relatively peaceful--no Declaration of War to the Death, no llaneros rampaging through farms; correspondingly, the common people of Venezuela were by 1819 tired of war and easily “pacified” by Morillo. Granada on the other hand, having seen little strife, was more open to the influence of the revolutionary ideal. The campaign after Trunja sufficed to shed enough Granadan blood, spoil enough Granadan crops, and wreck enough Granadan property to create significant divides within the largely white population of the area. When Bolivar finally consented to withdraw to the coast in late September to be picked up by Luis Brion’s fleet and carried to safety in the Caribbean, the local populace in some areas echoed shouts Bolivar had heard before: “Down with the Dictator! Death to Bolivar!” [3]

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Notes:


[1] This is not precisely a retcon to the previous post, since I didn’t specify just how Sucre comes to be with Bolivar in Jamaica. However, on further research, I’ve discovered that Sucre wasn’t on the original expedition across the Andes in July/August of 1819; he was in Venezuela, though he had already switched his primary allegiance to Bolivar. Similarly, while the Congress of Angostura convened in February, it did not create the Republic of [Gran] Colombia until December.

[2] OTL Bolivar ran into Scure on his way back to the Orinoco valley just after re-crossing the Andes. There was a slight disagreement about Sucre’s commission from Zea at that point, which was solved by Sucre resigning the post. Bolivar was Commander in Chief of the Army while Zea was titular President. It’s a testament to the fragility of the structure though that Bolivar thought Zea lacked the authority to make such a promotion.

[3] When Bolivar attempted a descent on Guiria in 1816, he failed to unite the local commanders and lost the loyalty of the people at large. The townfolk there used these chants when Bolivar evacuated. Despite the overall dissatisfaction with the Spanish rule, the people of Spanish America were somewhat fickle in their regard to their supposed Liberators, particularly as they were being liberated
 
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No comments? Damn the silence! Full speed ahead!
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Part IIb: The Gathering Storm

Letter from San Martin to Bolivar
Translated by Ian McCormick, University of Texas at Houston

Translator’s Introduction

In November of 1819 (spring in the southern hemisphere), San Martin found himself with an army and complete preparations for an undertaking that appeared more daunting by the hour. Cautious and meticulous, San Martin had spent nearly two years in preparing for his successful expedition across the Andes in order to liberate Chile. His diligent work in preparing for that invasion no doubt went a long way to guaranteeing its success, unlike Bolivar’s extemporaneous crossing of the Andes (conceived of in May and executed in August). Without Bolivar exerting pressure on the Royalists from Venezuela and Colombia, San Martin faced the prospect of invading the oldest Spanish holdings in South America, liberating a populace whose unsteady hold on their slave populations and uncertainty stemming from the Tupac Amaru uprisings in the 1780s encouraged loyalist sympathies and a healthy fear of the potential social consequences of independence.


This letter presents a pointed parallel to Bolivar’s Second Jamaica Letter. Where Bolivar spends several pages on a panoramic survey of the Americas, delving into political philosophy, San Martin offers a laconic appraisal of the military situation confronting him. Nonetheless, many have suggested that San Martin wrote this missive in response to Bolivar’s call for unity. While San Martin does not specifically call for a meeting, Bolivar appears to have taken it as an invitation to the immortal Conference at Valpariso. Some scholars have speculated that San Martin included instructions for a renedez-vous to enable Bolivar to make the conference, but Bolivar preserved only the note presented here, in order to cast a dim light on San Martin's confidence in the sucess of the Cause…

Text of the Letter [4]

My Dear General,

I shall write to you not only with the frankness of my nature, but also with that which is demanded by the high interests of America and the peril of our present hopes for complete independence.

The results of your late campaign are not those which I foresaw for a quick end of the war. Unfortunately, I fear that the task that lies ahead will prove no less a test for my own mettle. Do not indulge any illusions, General. The Royalist forces presently gathered in Peru include no fewer than 23,000 veterans. The Patriot Army assembled here in Chile will not be able to send more than 10,000 on any invasion into the lower part of that province. The Royalists are even now assembling in Spain a host the like of which we have not yet seen.…

…The result of our present circumstances—your present peril and my precarious position—may indefinitely prolong the present struggle. I say indefinitely because I am deeply convinced that, be what may the difficulties of the present war, America’s independence is irrevocable; but I am also convinced that the prolongation of the war will be the ruin of its peoples, and it is a sacred duty for the men in whose hands lies her destiny to prevent a continuation of such evils.

Be it as it may, General, I fear my present course shall doom either our present hopes or the lives of too many to justly weigh. I am yet convinced that the fate of one part of America shall determine the fate of us all. While Spain holds Peru, Chile and Argentina cannot be free. While a foreign power holds the south, the North shall not be safe. Whatever be the future manner of the governance in America, once the war is won let the respective governments make their own decisions as to their constitutions, free of the trials we currently face.

If you feel as I do, perhaps our future efforts would benefit from mutual consideration and cooperation. If nothing else be gained, comradeship offers us some certain measure of consolation.

Your Affectionate Servant,
Jose de San Martin


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Notes:

[4] This letter is based on the OTL letter San Martin sent to Bolivar after the Guyaquil Conference of 1822. That letter is a rather somber account of the military situation in Peru and San Martin’s lament that he and Bolivar will not serve together in the final liberation of America. It provides some evidence of what occurred at the OTL Guyaquil Conference, the only meeting between Bolivar and San Martin OTL: Bolivar insisted on sole command of the expedition to Peru, refusing it seems even to allow San Martin to serve under him. Bolivar used several pretexts regarding his own permission from the Colombian Congress, but he may also have wanted to keep the glory for himself. Nonetheless, the circumstances of this letter are different though the tone still downcast. Somehow I get the feeling that San Martin was a dour kind of guy, unlike the romantic, excitable Bolivar.
 

maverick

Banned
Interesting update...

It's not that San Martin was all that dour, he just wasn't Bolivar...:p, which was probably better in some ways...
 
Part IIc: The Gathering Storm

From In Search of a Glorious Cause: Lord Cochrane and the Wars of Liberation
By J. Aubrey, K.B. Oxford University Press, 1958.

Having arrived in Valpariso in November of 1818, Cochrane found himself in an all-too familiar role. Despite his nominal Vice-Admiral’s flag in the Chilean navy, he found himself far from the poop deck of a 74 commanding a line into battle. On board the newly re-christened O’Higgins, he found himself rather once again pacing a frigate's quarterdeck. At 44 guns, she was a stouter ship than his prior commands in the Napoleonic Wars (the largest of which, the Imperieuse, had just 38 guns). In tried fashion he set to work training the crew in British naval custom, testing their mettle with raids on Spanish forces up and down the coasts of southern Chile and Peru…

…In the opening days of 1820, Cochrane’s preparations for a daring (and most likely foolhardy [5]) assault on the fortifications at Valdivia were interrupted by a sudden and secretive summons to Valpariso for a meeting with Director O’Higgins and General San Martin. His mission was simple and yet seemingly impossible: spirit Simon Bolivar and a battalion of his veterans to Chile to join in the invasion of Peru…

…Few navigators could have made the journey in so short a time, evading Spanish patrols from Peru and Ecuador. Fewer men still would have had the daring to risk the over-land journey across the jungles of the Isthmus of Panama to make contact with Bolivar and lead him across to the waiting ship. Without Cochrane, it is likely the later invasions in the close of 1820 would have been postponed and later actions in Spain and Europe would no doubt have forestalled them entirely. It is therefore understandable why Bolivar and San Martin chose to include the expatriate Liberator in their deliberations at the immortal Conference that was to follow Bolivar’s arrival in Chile.
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Notes:

[5] OTL Cochrane successfully assaulted the fort at Valdivia in February of 1820, with only 300 men and 2 ships against nearly 1,000 Spanish defenders.
 
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Interesting update...

It's not that San Martin was all that dour, he just wasn't Bolivar...:p, which was probably better in some ways...

Good point :). Bolivar was...well, quite unique to say the least. One part visionary, one part general, one part egomaniac, one part romantic.

On a more general note, I'm aware that the pace of the TL to date has been pretty slow. We're only about 6-9 months after the POD so far and have had much more foreshadowing than anything else. I'll admit that part of this is me "finding a voice" for the TL and getting comfortable with the history of South America.

Partly though it's making sure that the scene is set for when the big departures take place -- and that will happen in the next two updates. They will deal with 1) the Conference at Valpariso, analogous to the Guyaquil Conference of 1822 OTL (in that its a meeting between San Martin and Bolivar), but wholly different in content, substance, sources, and outcome and 2) the political situation in Spain in 1819-20 and the Cadiz Mutiny.

As a Confucian in New Orleans would say, Laissez les temps intéressant roulez.
 

maverick

Banned
Good...

Interesting update, even if I sometimes prefer faster timelines with quick developments...

I hope this picks up the pace later...
 
Good...

Interesting update, even if I sometimes prefer faster timelines with quick developments...

I hope this picks up the pace later...

Worry not. I just got my internet connection back at home. Hopefully, I'll be able to get off two action-packed updates before leaving on a business trip Wednesday.
 
The Conclusion of Part II: The Gathering Storm. Coming up next -- Part III: To Redress the Balance of the Old, including events in Mexico, Spain, the conference halls of Europe, and perhaps the United States. Comments, criticism, and outright castigation are most welcome.

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Part IId: The Gathering Storm

From A History of the Peoples of Southern America: A Classroom Companion, Second Edition.
New York: McGraw-Houghton Publishing, 1968.

Unlike the Continental Congress during the American Revolution to which it is sometimes compared, the Valpariso Conference was first and foremost a military council of war, rather than a deliberative assembly of representatives. Faced with the failure of the Northern Andean Campaign and with the aftermath of the Battle of Cepeda [6], Bolivar found himself defeated in need of a new avenue to attack the Spanish while San Martin found himself with fleeting political legitimacy. Hence, the Conference offered both the opportunity to change these circumstances.

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Valpariso, Republic of Chile
March 17, 1820

The late summer sun dawned early over what had been just a few years prior a sleepy fishing village that now served as the primary port of the Republic of Chile. Its first rays found José de San Martin, General of the Army of the Andes, longtime servant of the Spanish Empire, who had for the past decade dedicated himself to the simple cause of his country’s freedom, already dressed and wakefully. He sat at newly-polished wooden table in the dining room of the alcade, who had insisted that the great general use his own home as his temporary headquarters. The attempt at appointed elegance fell flat to San Martin’s eyes, who had grown up in the opulent Bourbon court in Spain. Nevertheless, it was better than a camp tent, he thought.

He toyed with a cup of coffee as he reviewed several sheets of correspondence in front of him. He had read them before, read them several times a day since they arrived in February. You do not serve a government, but the happiness of this nation—the phrase filled his thoughts. When the politicians had begun facing off, the so-called and now former Supreme Director had recalled San Martin and his army to “put down the rebels.” San Martin had refused and when the Directorate had fallen, he had resigned his commission in an army whose government he now believed defunct. The new junta had replied thusly—you do not serve a government, but the happiness of a nation. [7] It was their attempt to secure his loyalty. And thus attach themselves to his achievements and perhaps, he thought, recall him to put down more rebels.

San Martin was a solider and a patriot. Dressed in simple white breaches and a blue broadcloth coat, he did not look the part of the great hero. He had no desire to be a politician nor any particular attachment to one form of government or another. Let that be a question for the victors, he thought. And yet if Argentina was now launched on a course of civil war and if Grenada and Venezuela still clung to Morillo’s pacification, then his army stood alone. We fight for our country, but our countries do not yet fight for us, he mused.

A tap at the door interrupted his thoughts. It would be Diego, his aide, here to call him to the conference.

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From Liberators, Protectors, and Pacifiers: South American Revolutions
by Prof. C. Hull, Vanderbilt University. 1938.

While the conference included a wide variety of participants, the opinions and supporters of the two great men, Bolivar and San Martin, dominated the proceedings. The contest between the two was less one of strategy than of the nature of the choosing a strategy and later sharing power. From the point of view of the dispassionate analyst, San Martin had the undoubted advantage: the army under his auspices was far larger than Bolivar's (by a factor of some 20 to 1). Bolivar should have been the supplicant to San Martin, hoping to join forces in order to gain prestige and hopefully resources for a renewed attempt upon Venezuela and Granada. San Martin’s supporters were more varied and had more discrete interests than Bolivar’s. For example, Bernardo O’Higgins though a loyal friend of San Martin had to defend the interests of the Republic he now headed. In contrast, Antonio de Sucre had at the time no cause save Bolivar’s. Bolivar had left those who might have been his major internal rivals—Santander or Paez, to name a few—either dead in Granada or fighting in the backcountry of the Orinoco.

Personality no doubt played a role as well. Few tales are more colorful than those that contrast the quiet, somber, diligent San Martin with the energetic, conceited, and idealistic Bolivar. However, in the calculation of cause and effect, personality is but the lens by which interest and advantage become manifest…[8]

*******************************

Valpariso, Republic of Chile
March 17, 1820 [later the same day]

Resplendent in his new uniform—the blue broadcloth unfaded by hours of marching, the gold lace of the cuffs freshly polished, the epaulets’ fringes a full five inches long, the satin red sash from his most recent beloved punctuating the entire ensemble no less than the wearer’s own defiant stance—Simón José Antonio de la Santísima Trinidad Bolívar Palacios y Blancoleapt from his seat as General José de San Martin entered the meeting room chosen for the conference. From the glimmer of Bolivar’s accoutrement, one would never have suspected that he commanded only the shadow of an army and represented only a hoped-for republic.

“General San Martin! To meet you in the flesh is truly such an honor,” said Bolivar rushing to embrace his southern counterpart. “Imagine—to have in the same room the two men who have done so much to shape the present struggle. It is truly remarkable, no?”

“I suppose…”

“Indeed, I am glad you agree, amigo.” Bolivar began to conduct San Martin toward one of the chairs around a large conference table, thinking it entirely appropriate that he should act as host to the man who had arranged for his transport across half a continent. “In that same spirit, I have asked my companion, Colonel Daniel O’Leary to provide a record of our meeting, to preserve it for posterity. Now that we, two, are here, I am eager to begin!”

San Martin sat in the chair to which Bolivar had conducted him. His face was a mask. Bolivar seemed to assume that he should conduct the meeting. While San Martin was not one to easily submit, he was perfectly happy to let Bolivar make the first move. He looked around the table: there was Bernardo, now head of the Chilean Republic and Ramon Freire, San Martin’s trusted deputy. Bolivar had brought the young Antonio de Sucre, now famous for his campaign to save his commander, along with this Colonel with the Irish name. There too was Admiral Lord Cochrane, the dashing British commander whose fledgling navy was the object of so much present hope.

San Martin took some comfort that most of their eyes were fixed on him, waiting for his response.

Si, General Bolivar, please do.”

******************************

From Liberators, Protectors, and Pacifiers: South American Revolutions
by Prof. C. Hull, Vanderbilt University. 1938.

Bolivar’s plan presented at the Valpariso Conference was simple but completely changed the nature of the Wars of Liberation. Previously, local elites had banded together in juntas to lead their respective regions to independence. Both San Martin’s and Bolivar’s Andean Campaigns were prefaced, though, on the idea of using the independence of one region to guarantee that of another (to free Granada and thus Venezuela and to free Peru and thus Argentina). Bolivar’s plan was thus not unprecedented. Nevertheless, it was a marked change.

Bolivar proposed that his single lamentably under-strength battalion and San Martin’s forces from the so-called United Provinces of the River Platte, along with those of the Republic of Chile, unite under a single joint-commander (Generalissimo) and a council of war to form “a protective association for the liberty of America”--the precise phrase he used, according to the justification recorded by the Conference’s published records. [9] This “War Council” would initially comprise seven members—Bolivar’s classicism induced an homage to the Theban democracy created in the 4th century BC by Epaminondas: Bolivar, his deputy Antonio Jose de Sucre, San Martin, Bernardo O’Higgins, Admiral Cochrane, Ramon Freire, and Daniel O’Leary. The Council’s split heavily favored Bolivar, whose troops and contribution to the “joint war effort” was to this point lacking. Nevertheless, this framework was instrumental in crafting the plans for the invasion of Peru and in forming the precedents for the later Sociedad Thrasybulo. The appointment of Generalissimo proved telling for later political developments…

***********************

Valpariso, Republic of Chile
March 25, 1820


It had been a week, a week of long, tedious back and forth between Bolivar and San Martin, a week of bickering and intrigue, but a week in which the future of a continent, the world, and the Spanish speaking peoples would be indelibly changed.

“No!” shouted General Bolivar, interrupting San Martin’s reverie and Bernardo O’Higgins’ speech. “We cannot wait. We cannot send envoys. Whether the regime in Spain be constitutional or not, whether the army in Cadiz be on the march to Madrid or to Montevideo, we cannot negotiate with a foreign oppressor. We must attack and attack now. The Cause of Liberty awaits us!”

O’Higgins, bristling at the slight given by Bolivar’s interjection, raised his own voice. “The Republic of Chile did not raise an army so that one man could waste it.”

San Martin took in the “debate,” his chin perched on one hand while the other toyed with his notes. A small bottle of opium lay at his elbow, but he was determined to resist the pain in his chest today—however much the hot air leaching from his fellows might induce him otherwise. [10]

“It is not a question of if we invade, Señor Director,” said Sucre, “but surely when and whether it be sooner or later. And that question depends upon what our objective is to be: are we to attempt to negotiate with Viceroy de la Serna or are we to push forward no matter what?”

“No question, my boy! No question. Straight at ‘em, as Lord Nelson said. Strait at Lima and the let the whole edifice crumble. Should be a simple matter…” Admiral “Lord” Cochrane attempted to explain how the descent might be planned, most simply, in a manner which would ensure him a dashing entry in the Times of London.

Bolivar stopped him. “Gentleman, Gentleman, please! We cannot continue thusly—”

San Martin had had enough. “Indeed, we cannot. General Bolivar, would you mind if I shared my thoughts on the subject of our strategy?”

Bolivar had been standing, leaning over the table as if to rest the other men to his will. Bolivar looks abashed. He sat down, almost sheepishly, though a careful man would note the touch of resentment that underlay Bolivar’s demeanor.

Si, Generalissimo.”

“Thank you. General Sucre is indeed correct. We must chose whether to land boldly and strike at once or to advance more discretely. I myself favor caution, but let us put the matter to a vote.”

“A vote?” asked Bolivar.

Si, General Bolivar, a vote. As a proper council should.”

Secretary O’Leary stood and took the vote. As San Martin expected, it was a narrow victory for an audacious invasion. Cochrane had swung the vote in Bolivar’s favor.

“Very well. I propose General Bolivar, be sent with an initial force of some 6,000 with Admiral Cochrane’s fleet. The rest of us will follow when he has secured the road to Lima.”

The motion passed with little objection. Bolivar was delighted to have been given pride of place, and O’Higgins was mollified with the notion of a modest initial force. San Martin was pleased. If Bolivar was to have his way, at least let him take the risk of his folly. With all the trouble brewing across the Atlantic, the dice that would determine their ultimate victory had probably been already been cast by the hand of the army at Cadiz. South America would have its freedom, San Martin thought, but Europe would as ever have its preeminence. [11]

_______________________________________

Notes:

[6] Fought in February 1820, the Battle of Cepeda pitted the centralist forces of Supreme Director Rondeau against troops from the federalist provinces as part of the struggle to define the nature of government and power sharing in the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. It was an OTL event and I see little reason that the POD and events thus far should change it since the conflict between centralists and federalists in Argentina was long in coming.

[7] Per OTL.

[8] This is Professor Hull’s primary thesis, throughout his accounts of the revolutions in South America. He has a very good point and from an alllohistoriographical point of view, he is famous for provoking just such a shift in the [English] histories of South America due to the primary role of the Libertadores in prior histories of the region TTL.

[9] This is a big change from OTL in which we have no records for what San Martin and Bolivar said to each other at the Conference at Guayaquil.

[10] San Martin suffered from tuberculosis it seems during the invasion of Peru OTL, for which he took opium (probably in the form of laudanum) for the pain.

[11] OTL San Martin and Cochrane disagreed about just how aggressive to be in the conquest of Peru. San Martin was cautious and invaded Pisco and began negotiating with the Peruvian authorities, who were more open to such measures because of the beginning of the Liberal Trenio in Spain in early 1820. TTL’s lack of Bolivar providing pressure in the North probably pushes San Martin to be a bit more cautious, hence all of the dissent in the Council. Of course, I’ve not guaranteed that the events in Spain will proceed precisely as per OTL.
 
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^^^Bump^^^

No comments? I have the next installment planned, but am beginning to wonder if there's something about the shape of the TL I should alter in order to attract more readers.

Any suggestions?
 

maverick

Banned
No idea...

I was going to comment after the last update, but I'm too lazy and I'm waiting for the war to continue...
 

Jasen777

Donor
Well, personally I prefer a bigger picture look at things, and that might be more necessary since less people are familiar with this period and location.
 
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