TL: The War of Dogger Bank, or the Anglo-Russian War- Version 1 DISCONTINUED

Having because of this story read up on the Dogger Bank Incident, I am amazed at how the Russians managed to convince themselves that the Japanese were operating, let alone capable of operating, a significant naval force in the North Sea, even when factoring in the paranoia that came with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; it is one of those moments of stupidity that would, had it not happened, be decried as an Alien Space Bat intervention on this board.
There were Japanese torpedo boats and crews in the UK, being built at Yarrow IIRR and with crews training there.
 
There were Japanese torpedo boats and crews in the UK, being built at Yarrow IIRR and with crews training there.
I was initially surprised reading this, but then I realized that I never took into account that like that would make perfect sense. Still, did the Russians really think that the British would allow the Japanese to operate militarily from the Home Islands? There was an alliance of course, but I can't imagine there was much evidence of the British clamoring for a war with Russia at the time.
 
Having because of this story read up on the Dogger Bank Incident, I am amazed at how the Russians managed to convince themselves that the Japanese were operating, let alone capable of operating, a significant naval force in the North Sea, even when factoring in the paranoia that came with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; it is one of those moments of stupidity that would, had it not happened, be decried as an Alien Space Bat intervention on this board.

As BlondieBC once put it, fiction has to make a modicum of sense. Reality is not similarly hindered.

I was initially surprised reading this, but then I realized that I never took into account that like that would make perfect sense. Still, did the Russians really think that the British would allow the Japanese to operate militarily from the Home Islands? There was an alliance of course, but I can't imagine there was much evidence of the British clamoring for a war with Russia at the time.

Concurrent with this conflict, the British were invading Tibet because they thought the Russians would use it as a conduit to invade India, so that isn't as unfounded as it sounds, either.
 
I was initially surprised reading this, but then I realized that I never took into account that like that would make perfect sense. Still, did the Russians really think that the British would allow the Japanese to operate militarily from the Home Islands? There was an alliance of course, but I can't imagine there was much evidence of the British clamoring for a war with Russia at the time.
It's difficult to comprehend the level of paranoia demonstrated by the Russians. They (well mostly the Kamchatka) regularly mistook passing ships for Japanese warships, anything floating was a sign of a submersible or a clandestine minefield and they seriously believed Japanese spies were everywhere (including within the fleet). You really need to read Politovsky's "From Libau to Tsushima" (available here) Pleshakov's The Tsar's Last Armada or Hough's The Fleet That Had to Die to understand.

As BlondieBC once put it, fiction has to make a modicum of sense. Reality is not similarly hindered.
Exactly.
 
It was my reading that while the new Russian Government was far left it was not actually communist, as in proletarian dictatorship(or rule of the masses by a small party elite). It was in fact elected, and is a coalition government of SR's and Mensheviks party, both who are democratic socialist parties. Yes the new coalition government is being a bit of a dick to the opposition but at the moment we are not talking suppression or arrests.

As for the German workers they are already in the process of electing the socialist (SPD) into a majority. OTL it would have taken them about a decade to get it done all "peaceful and democratic".

For the Europe of 1905, though, this new Russian regime is going to be the closest thing to a communist regime any of them have ever seen (even beyond the Paris Commune of 35 years previous). It will be plenty enough, I think, to trip the paranoia circuit breakers at every royal court.

I also think you cannot rule out the possibility of the regime becoming more radicalized (and murderous) over time. And Trotsky will be eager to export the revolution, as he always was...
 
Question about the new states, what size are Finland, the Baltics, Poland and the Ukraine.
i would imagine what otl would be Belarusis probably divided up between them
 
For the Europe of 1905, though, this new Russian regime is going to be the closest thing to a communist regime any of them have ever seen (even beyond the Paris Commune of 35 years previous). It will be plenty enough, I think, to trip the paranoia circuit breakers at every royal court.

I also think you cannot rule out the possibility of the regime becoming more radicalized (and murderous) over time. And Trotsky will be eager to export the revolution, as he always was...
However from the German perspective there is a layer of buffer states between them and the new Russia.
There may be a rapprochement between Germany and France, in a few years, faces by a possibly expansionist Russia. Also improved relations between Germany and Britain; Russia was a traditional British enemy and I wonder what the new regime feels about British India...
Then there are the Ottomans, probably eager to strengthen the alliance with Germany in the face of their new neighbour.
 
However from the German perspective there is a layer of buffer states between them and the new Russia.
There may be a rapprochement between Germany and France, in a few years, faces by a possibly expansionist Russia. Also improved relations between Germany and Britain; Russia was a traditional British enemy and I wonder what the new regime feels about British India...
Then there are the Ottomans, probably eager to strengthen the alliance with Germany in the face of their new neighbour.

Buffer states who's sovereignty is very soon going to be under at least rhetorical threat if Trotsky officially adopts the policy of World Revolution. Considering places like Finland and Ukraine are just being established, and likely have domestic Reds just like IRL that might rise in favor of the Russians, Germany is certainly going to have at least a healthy suspicion of Russian intentions, even if they prefer the current, unstable situation in the east to being stared down by the ever-growing Czarist bear, and would need to be prepared to make an effort to keep those states "white"

Rapprochement between Germany and the UK right in the middle of the Anglo-German naval race would probably be something of a slow process. After all, Russia's situation doesn't cause the threat German's industrial rise poses to British economic hegemony, nor solve the security scare on the Home Isles the ability for the Germans to bridge her traditional natural moat would present. The culture is just a little too jittery right now. The Ottomans, however, DO probably gain quite a bit of stock in both German and British eyes; with Russia no longer a friendly factor to contain Germany, Britain has no need to deviate from her long-time policy of securing Ottoman integrity for the sake of stability in eastern Europe (And as a possible chip to play in a region where her immediate alliances are sorely lacking), while Germany sees a replacement market where she's already fairly well invested.
 
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Concurrent with this conflict, the British were invading Tibet because they thought the Russians would use it as a conduit to invade India, so that isn't as unfounded as it sounds, either.
I was aware of the intervention in Tibet but forgot it took place in this same time-frame. Still, I don't see that as the same evidence of jingoism that, say, an intervention into Afghanistan might bring, but that may well be because I am looking at it will a logical mind and knowing the intentions of both parties.
It's difficult to comprehend the level of paranoia demonstrated by the Russians. They (well mostly the Kamchatka) regularly mistook passing ships for Japanese warships, anything floating was a sign of a submersible or a clandestine minefield and they seriously believed Japanese spies were everywhere (including within the fleet). You really need to read Politovsky's "From Libau to Tsushima" (available here) Pleshakov's The Tsar's Last Armada or Hough's The Fleet That Had to Die to understand.
I'll grab and read those if I have the time, thanks.
 
I was aware of the intervention in Tibet but forgot it took place in this same time-frame. Still, I don't see that as the same evidence of jingoism that, say, an intervention into Afghanistan might bring, but that may well be because I am looking at it will a logical mind and knowing the intentions of both parties.

Afghanistan surrendered its foreign policy to London after the Second Anglo-Afghan War, so they're already basically a British protectorate. Also worth noting that the Viceroy in India until the end of 1905 is the extremely Russophobic Lord Curzon. His successor the Earl of Minto I'm not as familiar with, but he served with the Turkish army in 1878, so also probably not too friendly. The point here being that Russophobia was still definitely a thing in Britain at this time. Enough that it'd seem reasonable for the Russians to think that they'd let the Japanese operate out of their ports? Probably not, but as Catsmate has pointed out, the Russian Baltic Fleet was apparently staffed with asylum inmates.
 
Actually, looking at the latest entry, I have my doubts that the Russian Civil War would end so easily. The Germans certainly would have looked upon the Revolution as a great opportunity to expand their influence East, but they would have been incredibly wary about allowing the existence of any Socialistic State that could propagate subterfuge against it, it's allies, or any nation it determined was within it's sphere. Now the following is coming from the mindset that Germany had during the First World War with regards to Eastern Europe, but I doubt that it would have changed much in its overall outlook in a decade when given a somewhat similar situation where they have more freedom of action.

Despite their hand in the historical Bolshevik Revolution, the German government was initially convinced that Lenin and the Soviet was going to fall to the White Forces, not helped by the fact that Germany was providing the Whites areas to operate from as well as what few supplies they could afford to part with that couldn't be shipped West. They weren't going to stand for the permanent establishment of the Soviet Union, and in the long-run you may well have White Russians operating out of the Ukraine and Baltics in partisan guerrilla campaigns which would keep the Russian Soviet from ever effectively stabilizing. That is from an OTL perspective however.

From an ATL perspective, Germany would almost immediately occupy Poland and the Baltic States once those areas rose in revolt and attempted to declare independence. Given its own previous troubles, as well as its long term plans for the region, Germany was never going to willingly allow the establishment of a Polish State that was not a de facto province of the German Empire, as it's very existence would rile Poles within Germany and Austria. The Russian nobility of Latvia and Estonia, in conjunction with the Baltic German population, would also likely have petitioned for Germany to "protect" those regions from the Russian Soviet with the White Forces only starting to form, and given German designs when it came to colonizing that region as an extension of the Empire, I doubt that they would have passed up the chance. Lithuania in turn would probably end up much the same way as Poland, though not subject to the same kind of intensive colonization as either Poland or what would be the Baltic Duchy.

Finland and the Ukraine would be the two countries that make it out with a strong measure of independence (relatively speaking), the latter because it would not be strategically important, the two together because of strained relations with France and the United Kingdom requiring that any "gains" be relatively moderate, nor would they have the manpower to truly occupy such an expansive amount of land, even with Austrian aid. The Ukrainian People's Republic claimed quite a bit of territory, as outlined in the map below, and often those claims extended to including the Kuban Republic, the Don Republic, and the Crimea. Not all of territory is guaranteed to be incorporated, but I know for a fact there were ongoing efforts to incorporate the Kuban and the Crimea, and the more the Ukrainians control, the more that can be potentially exploited by Germany and Austro-Hungary. At the same time however because of those extensive claims you are bound to see some sort of proxy war between the Russian Soviet and the German Empire before the former buckles and let's the Ukraine go, with the Don and Kuban Republics being a bit of a toss-up in terms of whether it gets awarded to the Ukrainians or not.

The Caucus would not be the hotbed of activity as it was in 1917 with the Mensheviks having won out here, but the Ottomans are liable to make a move and at the very least occupy and annex what was the Kars and Batum oblasts, territories it had lost to Russia in 1878, and there is strong potential that they could outright occupy the entire region below the Caucasus Mountains; the only caveat to that is that that would deal considerable damage to relations with Germany, who would probably prefer that the region be controlled by a White Russian government, or an independent Transcaucasia. However, given how the Ottomans were willing to ignore such ramifications in the middle of a war where they were becoming if not already dependent on German aid, I can't imagine they'd care in this case. They would be involved in a fairly heavy guerrilla war though when it came to putting down the Georgians and Armenians.

LffPr8u.jpg
 
Actually, looking at the latest entry, I have my doubts that the Russian Civil War would end so easily. The Germans certainly would have looked upon the Revolution as a great opportunity to expand their influence East, but they would have been incredibly wary about allowing the existence of any Socialistic State that could propagate subterfuge against it, it's allies, or any nation it determined was within it's sphere. Now the following is coming from the mindset that Germany had during the First World War with regards to Eastern Europe, but I doubt that it would have changed much in its overall outlook in a decade when given a somewhat similar situation where they have more freedom of action.

Despite their hand in the historical Bolshevik Revolution, the German government was initially convinced that Lenin and the Soviet was going to fall to the White Forces, not helped by the fact that Germany was providing the Whites areas to operate from as well as what few supplies they could afford to part with that couldn't be shipped West. They weren't going to stand for the permanent establishment of the Soviet Union, and in the long-run you may well have White Russians operating out of the Ukraine and Baltics in partisan guerrilla campaigns which would keep the Russian Soviet from ever effectively stabilizing. That is from an OTL perspective however.

From an ATL perspective, Germany would almost immediately occupy Poland and the Baltic States once those areas rose in revolt and attempted to declare independence. Given its own previous troubles, as well as its long term plans for the region, Germany was never going to willingly allow the establishment of a Polish State that was not a de facto province of the German Empire, as it's very existence would rile Poles within Germany and Austria. The Russian nobility of Latvia and Estonia, in conjunction with the Baltic German population, would also likely have petitioned for Germany to "protect" those regions from the Russian Soviet with the White Forces only starting to form, and given German designs when it came to colonizing that region as an extension of the Empire, I doubt that they would have passed up the chance. Lithuania in turn would probably end up much the same way as Poland, though not subject to the same kind of intensive colonization as either Poland or what would be the Baltic Duchy.

Finland and the Ukraine would be the two countries that make it out with a strong measure of independence (relatively speaking), the latter because it would not be strategically important, the two together because of strained relations with France and the United Kingdom requiring that any "gains" be relatively moderate, nor would they have the manpower to truly occupy such an expansive amount of land, even with Austrian aid. The Ukrainian People's Republic claimed quite a bit of territory, as outlined in the map below, and often those claims extended to including the Kuban Republic, the Don Republic, and the Crimea. Not all of territory is guaranteed to be incorporated, but I know for a fact there were ongoing efforts to incorporate the Kuban and the Crimea, and the more the Ukrainians control, the more that can be potentially exploited by Germany and Austro-Hungary. At the same time however because of those extensive claims you are bound to see some sort of proxy war between the Russian Soviet and the German Empire before the former buckles and let's the Ukraine go, with the Don and Kuban Republics being a bit of a toss-up in terms of whether it gets awarded to the Ukrainians or not.

The Caucus would not be the hotbed of activity as it was in 1917 with the Mensheviks having won out here, but the Ottomans are liable to make a move and at the very least occupy and annex what was the Kars and Batum oblasts, territories it had lost to Russia in 1878, and there is strong potential that they could outright occupy the entire region below the Caucasus Mountains; the only caveat to that is that that would deal considerable damage to relations with Germany, who would probably prefer that the region be controlled by a White Russian government, or an independent Transcaucasia. However, given how the Ottomans were willing to ignore such ramifications in the middle of a war where they were becoming if not already dependent on German aid, I can't imagine they'd care in this case. They would be involved in a fairly heavy guerrilla war though when it came to putting down the Georgians and Armenians.


Keep in mind that Russia is not a communist state, but a social democratic state and so Germany does not feel as wary about the new regime. The Ottomans retook Kars and Batum in the chaos of the revolution.
 
The Crisis of 1905 and the Franco-German War
Its update time!

Unfortunately, I will not have access to the internet for the weekend so the next update will come on Monday.


The Crisis of 1905 and the Franco-German War


During the second half of 1905, tensions between France and Germany had reached a boiling point. Germany’s alliance with Poland, the Baltic States, and Ukraine had been met with substantial protest with France, who had only backed down from war due to Russia’s instability. However, although war had appeared to have been averted, another crisis arose. France had been pressuring Morocco to establish a French protectorate over the country. However, the Kaiser flatly declared that there would be war with France if France established a protectorate on Morocco. War appeared to be on the horizon, and both Germany and France mobilized. Then came the spark.

On the border of France and Germany, near the town of Belfort, a German patrol and a French patrol happened to chance upon each other at the same time. In the Belfort incident (14 August 1905) it was unsure of who fired first, but by the time night fell, five French and two Germans were dead and several more wounded.

Everything spiralled out of control. Germany blamed France for war mongering. France struck back, shouting at how the Germans were barbaric imperialists and wanted to conquer the globe. Despite calmer heads on both sides attempting to prevent a war, the wheels were turning, and upon the outbreak of civil war in Russia, the Germany declared war on the French republic on October 6, followed by Austria-Hungary declaring war on France the day later.

When it was clear that the Russo-French alliance was breaking, chief of staff Alfred Von Schlieffen devised two plans regarding a war solely against France. The first plan, Ausmarsch IV, detailed a massive swing through Belgium, which would outflank the French in Lorraine and destroy them, thus winning the war quickly. However, Schlieffen acknowledged that in 1905, Germany did not have the troops nor the light artillery necessary for an invasion of Belgium at that time, and so Ausmarsch IV was put aside for a later date. The second plan, Ausmarsch V, was more suited for 1905. Due to the overwhelming German superiority in numbers and heavy artillery, Ausmarsch V outlined a massive attack all along the border with France, with numbers concentrated around Metz, forcing a breakthrough at Longwy, where the fortifications were old and in need of upgrading, and pour towards Paris while the rest of the French army was pinned in place.

In contrast, the French had formulated “Plan XV”, in which upon a German attack, the French would thrust with the bulk of its army from Nancy into Alsace to pin the Germans in place while other army’s would flank the Germans. However, this plan had several flaws. In order to have enough men to pin the Germans down in the Nancy army, the armies on the flanks were made of reserves and thus poorly trained and not as well equipped. Further, the French hadn’t counted for a general German offensive all along the line.

At dawn of the 6, the same hour Germany declared war against France, the Germans unleashed a heavy artillery barrage concentrated west at Metz. The barrage ceased after three hours and the Germans surged forward all along the front. Over 200,000 men, having marched into Luxembourg the day earlier, were attacking Longwy alone.

The Battle of the Frontiers lasted eleven days, but by the 18, huge holes had been created in the French line, and the famed French fortifications had been largely blown to pieces by German Heavy Artillery. The simple fact was that the French did not have enough men or machine guns, to prevent a German breakthrough and halt the German advance in 1905. Further, aerial reconnaissance was not a thing in 1905 and did not have the effect it would have on war like it would in the future. By the 23, the Germans had taken Verdun and Montmedy, while Nancy was taken on the 25. With the Germans swarming west, the French had to retreat, or face being annihilated.

And retreat they did. The French attempted to establish a defensive line at the Moselle, but the Germans had taken St Menehould on the 30 and this line had already been flanked, and so the French retreat continued. It quickly became apparent that the French could not retreat fast enough, and the reserves that had been called up to stop the German advance did not have the training or machine guns to stem the German advance and could only slow the Germans before being overrun.

By this time, the Germans had suffered heavy casualties, and although the German advance began to slow due to a lack of supplies, they nevertheless continued to advance. With the bulk of the French army disorganized and panicking far to the south of Verdun, the Germans took Reims on the 15 of November, and German troops entered Paris on the 30. The French government capitulated shortly after and an armistice was requested.

It is widely agreed by historians and members of the popular alternatehistory.com that if the French had regrouped and attacked the south of the salient, the German advance would have been stopped and, if the French were lucky, quite possibly destroyed. Great Britain was already sending supplies to the French and could have possibly joined the war if the Germans hadn’t advanced so swiftly as well. However, the French were in disarray and were completely pinned down, and so could not counterattack at all, and it is widely up to speculation on what could have happened if the French had halted the German advance.


franco-germanwarwikibox.PNG


Next: The Treaty of Brussels
 
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Well that was a stupid idea. Basically France should have realised it's position and been really quiet for a couple of decades.
Also I'm surprised the Italians didn't jump in.
 
Well that was a stupid idea. Basically France should have realised it's position and been really quiet for a couple of decades.

Also I'm surprised the Italians didn't jump in.

Hey. It's still better than the nightmare of OTL World War 1.

Argee. Italy could have join the Germans and Austrians.
 
I'd like to see how Ukraine and Poland are currently ITTL. Ukraine would probably be ruled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky and a socialist leaning rada. Ukraine's borders would be interesting too, historically the Kuban and much of the Don was claimed by Nationalists during the Russian civil war. The Kuban also IOTL in early 1918 petitioned Ukraine for annexation.
 
I suspect Britain is going to start getting very twitchy about German strength on the continent. With Russia weak, France beaten, Austria allied with Germany, it's fairly clear who the big beast on the continent is. Given that the British-German naval race has been going about a decade, I rather suspect that British-German relations are going to be interesting.
 
Hey. It's still better than the nightmare of OTL World War 1.
Hell yes. I wonder what'll happen long term. The UK has Irish Home Rule, Germany has it's own internal rumblings. Russia is a mess and will be for a decade at least. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires are, well, themselves.

Argee. Italy could have join the Germans and Austrians.
It makes sense (well a certain kind of sense) there are bits of France the Italians coveted.

I believe Pratchett said it best (as usual):
"Uberwald is like this big suet pudding that everyone’s suddenly noticed, and now with this coronation as an excuse we’ve all got to rush there with knife, fork and spoon to shovel as much on our plates as possible?"

"Your grasp of political reality is masterly, Vimes. You lack only the appropriate vocabulary"

Change 'Uberwald' to 'France' and 'coronation' to 'war' and let the carving begin...
I assume the Germans will grab Morocco (to "restore order"), Britain will take French Sudan (restoring more order), Italy will want some border territory and maybe Corsica (well at least the Mont Blanc question will be answered), Japan will take Indo-China and anything else in grabbing range.
The Germans, Italians, British, Austrians, Dutch, Portuguese et cetera will all want some former French colonies.
Maybe Mexico gets Clipperton Island.

If the Germans are smart they'll spread the spoils wide, to reduced the chance of French relations improving with anyone. Of course Wilhelm II...
 
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