TL: The Milwaukee Road

[Devvy]

Chapter 1: The 1970s

A Milwaukee Road freight operates in the west.

By 1970, the Milwaukee Road was struggling to make ends meet with the railroad teetering on the brink of bankruptcy and financial insolvency. High up on the agenda was a drive to increase revenue, improve productivity and efficiency on the railroad, across the entire network - but especially noting the rise of traffic across it's Pacific Extension. A re-evaluation of assets and operations revealed the profit generation of the Pacific Extension, and hence a new "rail rehabilitation programme" to replace the ties and repair the tracks began to take place. At the same time, an inspection of the overhead electrification took place, noting how well it is holding up in general apart from the support trolley poles, for which many needed replacement after several years of deferred maintenance. An accompanying project to make a final decision over the future of the Milwaukee electrification took place in collaboration with General Electric, producing a final report advocating modernisation of the route. This scheme would push not just for retention, but that the "missing gap" between Avery and Othello should be filled in, with construction costs minimised due to the more friendly terrain in this area - a position later ratified by the board of the Milwaukee Road. The scheme, underwritten by General Electric Credit was seemingly a baffling decision for a supplier to make, but the act of doing this, and the low amount of electric locomotive manufacturers in North America meant that they were in effect securing a long term customer and would also serve as a test case for widespread electrification in the United States.

The modernisation would allow electric operation over a longer distance from Seattle & Tacoma all the way to Harlowton, reducing shipment costs, reducing operational costs and speeding up transit time, whilst providing significantly better operational efficiency with the entire route west of Harlowton electrified and thus requiring only a single change en route. Meanwhile, this would also allow diesel locomotives to be reallocated eastwards and providing a net saving there. Contracts were signed with General Electric to extend and modernise the system, despite continuing to use the 3kV DC system instead of the newer 25kV AC. It would also allow new rectifier substations and transformers (and fewer of them), with less manual maintenance and operation required, with some existing substations on the present electrified areas receiving newer rectifier equipment to increase available power, with existing motor-generator sets moved to other existing substations in mountainous areas where additional power was also required whilst the motor-generator sets also allowed easy regenerative power to be fed back in to the grid. New long term contracts with the local power companies (principally Montana Power and Washington Water Power) were also signed for the power - the existing contracts expiring around 1976, although part of the contract involved selling the Milwaukee's 115kV distribution line to the energy companies to offset costs. The line, which supplied power to all the Milwaukee substations, was also heavily used by the utilities to distribute power; but as long as power came to the Milwaukee substations, then the Milwaukee Road was not in the business of power distribution anyway, and the sale helped provide funds for the overall electrification project.

The speed of the hotshot freight expresses from Seattle/Tacoma to the Twin Cities or Chicago began to gently improve, as worn out rail was slowly replaced as finances allowed. A large upswing in traffic now began on the Milwaukee Road, largely due to the interchange points on the newly merged Burlington Northern as well as access to Portland. In previous years, these services - primarily the "XL Special" and "Thunderhawk" services - were operated by diesel all the way, even under the electric wires as the time to change from diesel to electric, back to diesel, and then back to electric again was not worthwhile. However, with the electric gap removed, and price of oil rocketing due to global events, the trains would briefly halt at Harlowton for a snap locomotive change. The time spent at Harlowton was reduced over time, as crews got used to the quick change, and the two hotstop expresses continued to be extremely popular with customers, and were marketed with the slogan "Two and a half day timetable!" due to their speed, which was almost a day quicker than the competition.

The Burlington Northern railroad merged in 1970, creating a new "mega railroad" in the north, and this spurred other mergers. With the Milwaukee Road / Chicago & North Western merger planned during the 1960s falling through, the only other option was the Rock Island - but this railroad was firmly falling apart at the seams financially. It lasted until 1975, before folding in bankruptcy court and being wound up, with the Southern Pacific taking up several of the former Rock Island's southern routes; the Milwaukee Road also made serious efforts to close some of the numerous small branch lines in an effort to save money and reduce expenditure to avoid the same fate, whilst spending funds on rehabilitating other routes. One in particular was the "Southeastern" route towards Louisville, Kentucky, where an interchange existed with the Southern Railway who willingly interchanged with the Milwaukee and proved to be a successful partner, whilst the bankruptcy of the Rock Island reduced competition in several Midwestern areas where the countryside was well over saturated by rail. Southern Pacific also continued to be a critical partner, exchanging traffic not only in the Pacific Northwest, but also for Chicago.

Fluctuating oil prices through the decades.

Mergers continued through the 1970s; the Union Pacific eventually took over the Chicago & North Western railroad, in order to obtain it's own access to Chicago, but the most important was the continued failure of the Erie Lackawanna to be rescued. Firstly Norfolk & Western declined to take it over, and then the failure to complete the take over by the Chessie, led to problems in what to do with the route. Conrail, the result of the bankrupt Penn Central railroad, was looking to be a dominant entity in the north-east United States, and regulators were loathe to hand over more routes to Conrail when there was little competition as it was. This led to a speculative offer by the Milwaukee to take it over and thus create a true transcontinental railroad. The idea was loathed by Conrail - but they were a government-owned company who would otherwise have no real competition, whilst several other railroads lodged objections. However, the ICC didn't want to add to market domination by any of the large western railroads, Conrail would be monopolistic, whilst Norfolk & Western and Chessie had both failed to take it over. Lack of options, therefore, meant the ICC approved it given the significantly smaller size of the Milwaukee Road compared to the larger western railroads such as Burlington North or Union Pacific, whilst the Santa Fe were promised continued trackage rights along the express route between the Midwest and New Jersey/New York area. Despite teething issues on some washed out areas - with federal loans helping rehabilitate the route to operational status, the merger would eventually be a significant shot in the arm for the Milwaukee Road, allowing freight to seamlessly travel between the Pacific ports at Seattle & Tacoma, the Midwest (chiefly Chicago and the Twin Cities), and the Atlantic ports at New Jersey and the wider New York area. It also turned out to guarantee the independence of the Milwaukee Road for better or worse, as the ICC would not contemplate a truly transcontinental route for any of the larger railroads.

By 1976, the electrification between Avery and Othello and thus the wider Seattle/Tacoma to Harlowton was complete - and just in time, for the price of oil by 1976 was just shy of triple what it was at the start of the decade (Jan 1970: approx $23 per barrel, vs Dec 1976: $63). The cost saving of electric operations between Seattle/Tacoma and Harlowton was now approximately $1 million annually - and increasing if & when the price of oil increased further, rapidly paying off the investment in the electrification given the uninterrupted circa 870 miles of electric route. The 30 newer General Electric locomotives, named E65, was a C-C design, with a significant tractive effort of 86,000lbf and 6,000hp (4.5MW) power based on 6 x 750kW motors, whilst to save on costs, the same chassis/super structure was used as the new GE E60 locomotives. The locomotives were single-cabbed (ie. a driving cab at only one end of the locomotive), but were full width and more comfortable for train crew then previous locomotives, and would usually be operated in pairs back-to-back to simplify operations with no need to turn them. The remaining 12 "Little Joe" locomotives could now be seen along the full stretch too, often as an extra helper locomotive on the more challenging and steep subdivisions of the main line.

Electric operation advertising over the years.

Passenger train wise, the Milwaukee Road had been an early adopter of strategies to reduce train operation. The Olympian Hiawatha was cut back early, and the many of the Milwaukee Road's historic passenger services were cut before Amtrak was even created. Nevertheless, the remaining service remnants (principally around Chicago and Milwaukee) were merged in to Amtrak quickly, with the Milwaukee Road eager to rid their hands of any remaining obligations. Commuter services proved slower however, with the Regional Transportation Authority in Illinois coming in to existence in 1974 (3 years later then Amtrak), designed to lift the burden of commuter rail from the beleaguered railroads. Milwaukee Rock handed over all commuter service / intra-state service to the new agency, later named as "Metra", with Metra & Amtrak merely paying the Milwaukee Road for track access for their services - principally the "Hiawatha" service between Chicago and Milwaukee. This completely freed the Milwaukee Road from any lingering responsibility for passenger rail operations, helping their balance sheet with the reduction in expense and financial risk, although Amtrak especially found themselves happy to continue running trains along the Milwaukee Road's routes, particularly in the Midwestern area with the "Hiawatha" service between Milwaukee and Chicago in particular a heavy user of Milwaukee Road tracks.

Much needed additional funding for the Milwaukee Rock became available in federal loans under the "Rail Reorganisation Act of 1973", and was critical in the further rehabilitation of the Pacific Extension and the recovery of the new E-L route to New Jersey. The 1972 Hurricane (Agnes) had washed away miles of track in the east, with dozens of locomotives and wagons ruined or washed away too. Some of this could be handled through more efficient use of diesel locomotives under the combined Milwaukee Road, but equally new locomotives would be required as well, and federal loans under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 were welcome in continuing the replacement of worn rails on the Pacific Extension.. The State of Iowa, a long time agricultural state, also chipped in with subsidies to repair and rehabilitate damaged branch lines to locations dependant on rail service - especially those who were losing rail connections via the bankrupt Rock Island railroad, whilst many shippers themselves followed suit themselves, eager to preserve and not lose rail access. Closing smaller loss-making branch lines continued, although was hard going in the 1970s having to justify in public hearing each one, but closure was critical for the Milwaukee Road, where studies had highlighted the low ratio of freight carried against the size of the network.

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Notes:
Well it's been a year since I wrote anything rail related. Being a timeline in the US, I've tried to stick to US terminology and spelling, so forgive me for the occassional slip up. It's only maybe 6-7 chapters, not long, but something once again....
The PoD here originally was Quinn not coming back to the Milwaukee Road; I place responsibility with him for a lot of the baffling business decisions (ripping out the electrification for a more expensive diesel solution, bad accounting which made the Pacific route look economically far worse than it actually was, refusing custom, doing everything to shoehorn the Milwaukee Road in to the Burlington Northern system). But regardless; here the Milwaukee Road has a more independent minded boss, who back the railroad to operate.
OTL, General Electric Credit offered to underwrite the entire cost of modernising the electric system out west (the small amount that was needed), as well as closing the gap which would substantially improve operational efficiency. Here, that's been taken up on - and a good thing too, considering the enormous spike in oil prices which occurred just after OTL Milwaukee Road finished ripping out all it's electrification.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 2: The 1980s

America's Resourceful Railroad

The Milwaukee Road spent a significant amount of time transforming itself in the 1980s, as the railroad consolidated operations between "Lines West" (the Pacific Extension), "Lines Central" (around the Midwest), and "Lines East" (the former Erie Lackawanna routes). Although the rapid rise of the Seattle & Tacoma ports had chiefly benefited the Burlington Northern, congestion had led a not insignificant amount of freight to end up on the Milwaukee Road, aided by the faster and cheaper electric traction over the mountains given the rapid rise in fuel prices. The rise at the port was driven by booming imports from Japan and the Far-East, whilst Portland struggled to deal with the consequences of the Mt St Helens eruptions, and Los Angeles/Long Beach struggled with road/rail congestion through the city. All this was aided by a swift market conversion to intermodal containers instead of open goods, which allowed rapid transhipment via the Milwaukee Road. With a railroad less intensively used then Burlington Northern, the Milwaukee Road could operate trains faster from end-to-end which aided in the desirability of shipping via the Milwaukee Road, and as traffic increased on the Pacific Extension with it's electrification, the more they could match (if not occasionally undercut) the pricing of Burlington Northern when commercially desirable due to the huge rise in fuel costs.

A boxcar boom-and-bust by shortline railroads in the early 1980s also provided a large amount of near-new boxcars at low prices in to the market and subsequently to the Milwaukee Road, aiding in the transformation and replacement of lost rolling stock on the eastern half. The former Erie Lackawanna railroad had lost a large amount of rolling stock during Hurricane Agnes in the early 1970s, which had helped push it in to complete bankruptcy. The new end-to-end route from the Northwest and Midwest to the greater New York area was also popular with shippers, for the ease, reliability and speed - like the Milwaukee Road's Pacific Extension, the former Erie Lackawanna route from Chicago to New York ran through few urban areas en route, and therefore had less congestion and less slower local traffic to get in the way of longer distance trains.

Deregulation also played a large part in this boom for freight traffic during the 1980s. The Rail Reorganisation Act of 1973 and so-called "Staggers Act" of 1980 had removed much of the oversight of railroads, given the viable alternatives for transport in the market - a nationwide (indeed, a continent-wide) modern road system, as well as increasing air-transit. Both forms had annihilated passenger transit by rail, forcing the early 1970s reforms, creating state-led commuter rail networks, and a federal-led nationwide rail operator named Amtrak - although it was not envisaged that Amtrak would be around for very long, given the widespread switch to road and air transit by passengers. Freight too had often switched to road transit, with trucks now plying every highway in the country, and short-haul transit seemed unlikely to return. It was longer distance freight transit which would be the saviour of the US railroads, particularly as they merged and coalesced in to fewer larger railroads to save costs. The introduction of double stack container transport provided pivotal in further reducing expenses, with the double stack loading gauge in general fitting well within the Milwaukee Road limitations. The existing electrification infrastructure contained the copper trolley wires 24 feet (7.31 meters) above the rail - comfortably enough to accommodate double stack rail freight in a well car with safety clearances, which would have a maximum loading gauge height of 20ft 3in (6.17m). Some work was required to ensure the top corners of the containers would not catch on lineside structures or the top of the tunnels, but work required was thankfully found to be minimal. By accommodating double stack containers, it also allowed for the Milwaukee Road to keep few trains operating on the Pacific Extension whilst accommodating growth, for the route over the Rockies was still largely single track and given the market niche the railroad had found with operating faster freight, could ill afford for congestion to slow down transit times.

Eliminating steam traction in favour of diesels was completed in the 1980s.

The ability to set their own prices unless acting as a monopoly, with little oversight, truly revolutionised the railroads like few other pieces of legislation. The railroad business services would now be restrained by market forces, rather than by regulation, which had stifled the industry - one notable example being the introduction of shipping containers in the early 1970s due to regulations on introducing new freight types and how to charge for it. This upswing in traffic provided much needed revenue for the railroad, and much of it was immediately reinvested in upgrading and rehabilitating tracks, rolling stock and general investment after years - and in some cases decades - of deferred maintenance. Continuous welded rail, able to withstand heavier wagon loads at faster speeds, began to make real inroads across much of the Milwaukee's network during the early 1980s, whilst an expanded network of centralised train control and block signals also provided far more reliability and punctuality.

As railroad regulations slacked, further mergers within the industry seemed likely. Newer railroad companies were being formed, with larger networks then ever before, but conversely many of those same railroads were rapidly chopping at their network - and the Milwaukee Road was no different. Numerous smaller branch lines, some wildly unprofitable, were cut from the Milwaukee network or sold to minor shorthaul operators in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the ICC's powers faded in light of new government policies. This proved unpopular in some areas, but in small towns with a low market demand for rail access, the economic justification for the Milwaukee Road to maintain the tracks was just simply impossible to achieve; as such large swathes of track which contributed a fraction of a percent of the Milwaukee Road freight but required significant funds in maintenance costs were closed down unless subsidised in other means. This was critical in continuing to rehabilitate the Milwaukee Road's financial position given it's 1970s knife-edge survival. The ability to charge different rates at the Milwaukee Road to customers dependent on a number of different factors such as transit time, train load factors, route congestion, brought in increased revenue to the Milwaukee, which further allowed the Milwaukee to think long-term and modernize it's network, with double track restored to much of the "Lines East" - the former Erie Lackawanna route to New York & New Jersey. It also fully acquired the other half of ownership of the Indiana Harbour Belt Railroad, subject to trackage rights for pretty much every other railroad over the tracks, in order to be in control of the connection between the former Milwaukee Road tracks west of Chicago, and the former Erie & Lackawanna tracks east of Chicago, guaranteeing the connection. The very late 1980s saw the cheap acquisition of the bankrupt Chicago, Missouri & Western Railroad - itself a spinoff from the Illinois Central Gulf railroad as it tried to streamline it's network. Although the CMWR had seen a lack of success on the route, it would introduce the Milwaukee Road to new markets in St Louis and southern Illinois (as well as a second route to Kansas City) - both major rail hubs.

Southern Pacific was a reliable interchange partner with the Milwaukee Road in the 1980s.

The improving financial position of the Milwaukee Road, paying off significant debt which had historically been debilitating and who had once teetered on the brink of bankruptcy in the 1970s, led a new set of merger rumours within railroad circles. Although rapidly modernising, the railroad needed to avoid being squeezed again by nearby rival railroads who were larger; Burlington Northern kept significant pressure on the central and western routes, Conrail pressed hard in the east, whilst Union Pacific was present across much of the Midwest through their acquisition of C&NW. Being the only truly transcontinental and coast-to-coast railroad also made the merger position difficult however; they were unlikely to be able to consolidate their position in the east even if Conrail hadn't consumed much of the north-east rail network, whilst most western networks were potentially thinking about further consolidation in to several western behemoths which would force a domino effect of other large mergers. The Southern Pacific railroad, who had a working relationship with the Milwaukee Road, interchanging especially at Portland, made enquiries in to merging with the Milwaukee Road in the very early 1980s, given that a merger would be largely end to end and give a unified railroad coverage across almost all of the western United States with routes to New York. However, the ICC promptly poured cold water on the idea of the merger on competition grounds. The ICC was fearful of the monopolistic effect of having a titan sized railroad with transcontinental spread, covering most major populated areas and ports, and the ICC strategy was labelled by analysts as having switched to "regional heavyweight, or nationwide lightweight" - of which all railroads bar the Milwaukee Road were moving towards being regional heavyweights. The move put to rest most merger rumours and de facto secured, for better or worse, the Milwaukee Road's independence and freedom from being swallowed up by a larger railroad. Other mergers continued in the industry however, creating some true railroad behemoths, dwarfing the Milwaukee Road, although none managed to replicate the Milwaukee's fortunate and opportunistic feat of stretching coast to coast.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 3: The 1990s

Amtrak's Olympian service

With oil prices continuing to remain stubbornly around $35-$40 per barrel, the economics of diesel operation were different to their early days. The 1990s saw a much greater focus on economical operation, and fuel reductions (and correspondingly fuel costs) rather than flat out power; things like anti-wheelslip mechanics and driver aids to support the "two-man crews" which were the new industry norm, although the introduction of the Canada - United States free trade agreement did spur further cross border operations, with Canadian National interchanging heavily with the Milwaukee Road. Electrification was again the talk of the industry, given the stability of higher oil prices, compared to the pre-1970s Oil Crisis prices. However, for most railroads, that was all it would be - talk. The vast majority had no electrification in place, and as such would have to spend a huge amount of money to install it from the ground up across a wide enough area or route to be useful, as well as purchase the locomotives to use it. Meanwhile, the widespread use of the Northeast Corridor for a booming passenger market - Amtrak's only really successful and growing market, meant that freight trains were second priority and struggled to gain access to the route. This resulted in the 1980s Conrail strategy to shift freight traffic off the Northeast Corridor on to alternative routes, suiting both Conrail and Amtrak, the latter who was hardly delighted to host slow freight trains on their express passenger route. Ironically, this was the exact same opinion in reverse that most freight railroads had towards Amtrak using their tracks.

The Milwaukee Road was the exception to this, and already had 868 miles of electrified trackwork from Harlowton to Seattle & Tacoma using the 3kV DC standard, as well as the powerful GE E65 locomotives to take advantage of it. Extensions to this were an order of magnitude better value then any new sections in 1991, but would also have knock-on effects. Due to the higher efficiencies of electric traction, as well as lower maintenance requirements (due to far fewer moving parts), 1 electric locomotive could do roughly the same amount of work as 1.75 diesel locomotives - or 4 electric locomotives for every 7 diesel locomotives. Coupled to this was the fact that any electric additions would allow modern diesel locomotives to be utilised elsewhere on the Milwaukee Road network, reducing the need to purchase new diesel locomotives. The situation in Mexico, where Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México decided to de-electrify their new rail route from Mexico City to Queretaro, and swapping some barely used E60 locomotives for newer AC440CW diesel locomotives to use provided further impetus. Despite the modifications needed, the presence of so many barely used electric locomotives proved too tempting to pass on, especially after the Milwaukee Road had lost out on several Little Joe locomotives in the 1950s for too much internal deliberation. 30 E60 locomotives would have their electrical systems refurbished, and equipped for 3kV DC operation and re-engineered to E66 units (*1), and then sold to the Milwaukee Road, who would extend electrification from it's current terminus of Harlowton several hundred miles to the east as far as Aberdeen where lines diverged and offered a suitable depot for which to exchange traction power. This was approximately 620 miles, and would increase the total route to approximately 1,500 miles of electrified railroad from Puget Sound to Aberdeen, allowing the transfer of many modern diesel locomotives to Lines East, hauling freight between Chicago and New York & New Jersey. Significant debate occurred internally as to whether to adopt the burgeoning international standard of 25kV AC, but elected not to, in order to maintain operational simplicity with the existing 3kV DC system (technically closer to 3.3kV DC nowadays) already in operation so as to avoid ending up with small electrified zones which were not compatible with each other. With substations required every roughly 25-30 miles, even on the 3kV DC system, there were few advantages to the 25kV AC system bar "greater power", and more drawbacks in terms of operational issues, and as such 3kV DC won the debate.

Works began in 1997 to extend the electric wires eastwards from Harlowton. Another refurbishment of a few Little Joe locomotives - now well past their prime for heavy freight use bought them further years of work though, and they were soon to be used in a different way. Amtrak, the national passenger operator, proposed to re-introduce a new version of the Milwaukee's "Olympian Hiawatha". As the name "Hiawatha Service" was in use for the regular Milwaukee-Chicago rail service, this new long distance rail service would be called "Olympian" and would operate from Chicago to Seattle via the Milwaukee's route, using the long stretches of electric traction to keep costs low. This would offer a combined twice daily service between the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St Paul) and Chicago between the existing "Empire Builder" and the new "Olympian" service, before the Olympian would continue on westwards to reinstate rail service to South Dakota townships, Miles City, Harlowton, Butte, Missoula, Ellensburg and a host of other small communities along the way before terminating at Seattle. Leasing the locomotives from the Milwaukee (with the Milwaukee doing servicing), the Little Joe locomotives would now feature provision for head-end power and would haul the Olympian service from Aberdeen to Seattle, saving Amtrak a not insignificant amount of cash in fuel costs, although sacrificing a stop in Spokane itself, with the financial losses by skipping Spokane considered to be less than the savings in fuel costs by skipping it given that Spokane would continue to be served by the Empire Builder service. Where most railroads found Amtrak to be a hindrance to their business, the Milwaukee Road was only too happy to accommodate more business on their tracks in many areas, and the general faster speeds of Milwaukee Road freight (particularly on the electrified Pacific Route) meant that passenger services fitted in more easily with timetables.

Double-stack container transport by rail became popular in the 1990s.

Gauge clearance work would also continue across much of the main line network in order for the routes to fully accommodate double stack intermodal containers, but also a growing usage of tri-level autoracks on the Milwaukee Road, being able to easily haul such large wagons across much of it's network, even including the mountainous route to the ports at Puget Sound. Sidings became longer and more frequent on the Pacific Extension - double track was finally fully completed on the stretch between Minneapolis and Aberdeen, as the railroad attempted to increase capacity on one of the most profitable sections of it's network as intermodal freight via the Pacific ports continued to increase. As this continued, the parent company, the Chicago Milwaukee Corporation continued to attempt to diversify and innovate from it's solely freight railroad position flanked by the railroad giants. The rising "dot-com" industry led to the Milwaukee Road laying hundreds of miles of new fibre-optic cables along it's rights of way, in order to capitalise on predictions of exponentially increasing internet traffic. Such cables were intended to compete for the burgeoning industry of competitive local exchange carriers in the United States, and allow the interconnection of networks across the country, but have since also been widely used by the incumbent telecoms operators themselves especially between smaller communities along the railroads. The installation of fibre optic cables, particularly along the former Pacific Extension was welcomed by small communities along the way, for whom telecommunications were much improved, but also allowed a more reliable communications network for the signalling of the largely single track Pacific Extension route, increasing reliability and capacity.

By the mid 1990s, the railroad market started shifting for another round of mergers once again, and the Milwaukee Road would be flanked by giant railroads as corporations merged. All other railroads were however regionally dominant in the east or the west, not across the entire United States - whilst the Milwaukee Road stood smaller, stretched out across the entire country. The Milwaukee Road's main selling points were it's coast-to-coast coverage with fast speeds - in part because of it's lack of regional dominance and routes which connected large urban centres together whilst avoiding many smaller cities en route. This meant freight trains were often not stopping as regularly to pick up / drop off freight, and this meant the railroad could focus on faster and longer freight which was more profitable to them. In recognition of the pressures of being surrounded by giants, the Milwaukee was focussed on being as innovative it could, ready to accept new revenue streams, and often willing to make short term sacrifices for longer term gain, and had been an early adopter of the trailer-on-flat-car approach with raised access on either side, allowing for easier craneless loading/unloading, whilst the introduction of double stack containers allowed less flexible but cheaper transport of the intermodal containers over long distances. The days of having too many railroads and not enough industry to sustain it were well gone; the remaining railroads all had their niches, but were all, to some extent, large railroad companies.

As the industry consolidated around western and eastern giants, options rapidly reduced for the Milwaukee Road; despite their unique position, they were once again being squeezed by the competition. Previous failures to merge were case aside, as both the western and eastern United States saw mergers restart to bring forth fewer, larger railroads in both areas (*2). It was thus little surprise to analysts when talks began between the Milwaukee Road and the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad in 1993. The ICG, itself a result of an early 1970s merger between the Illinois Central and the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio railroads, was also struggling to deal with the post-merger world, given it was the child of two overlapping networks joining and attempting to cut out duplicate resources. The addition of the ICG would introduce access to a series of large southern markets, as well as access to the major ports at New Orleans, Mobile and to a lesser extent Gulfport, using a swathe of Milwaukee Road access to the Midwest as a source of produce travelling south to the Gulf ports, whilst also providing access to a wide swathe of the southern United States for intermodal transport from Milwaukee Road ports. Merger terms were agreed in 1995; the with the Milwaukee holding company purchasing the ICG and then eventually merging it into the Milwaukee Road several years later with ICG shareholders given shares in the unified parent company Chicago Milwaukee Corporation. The delay in fully merging the two railroad subsidiaries in to one was intentional, and would allow for a more gradual harmonisation and integration of the two railroads, avoiding the pitfalls which had struck several other railroads attempting to merge.

The older Illinois Central railroad livery was reminiscent of the Milwaukee Road.

The merger would, to customers, look like a takeover - but then the Milwaukee Road continued to be a large railroad (albeit stretched thinly nationwide), and the Illinois Central Gulf was now a significantly smaller railroad of approximately 3,000 miles. The combined railroad would continue with the "Milwaukee Road" name given the significant nationwide brand recognition, and much of the design would continue; the Hiawatha logo as a corporate logo, and the livery would continue to be largely Milwaukee orange-and-black (although this was similar to the ICG livery anyway). Other railroads were granted access on the former ICG east-west tracks to facilitate interchange between western and eastern railroads, alleviating competition concerns and removing industry issues. An expanding communication system, owned by the "Milwaukee Communication" subsidiary would be able to expand to the south as well now; the company used the railroad rights of way to install and operate an internal communications system for centralised signalling & traffic control, telephony, but was also increasingly selling excess capacity to other operators to connect settlements across the sparsely populated northern United States. Left with seemingly few options other then likely seeing a future Illinois Central eventually taken over by one of the large players or allowing full east-west mergers, the Surface Transport Board accepted the merger, and by the end of the decade the new Milwaukee Road was still a smaller railroad player, but large enough to financially compete with the big players, playing a unique role in cross-country transport.

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(*1) "E66" name chosen, after I used "E65" in the 1970s for General Electric locomotives bought by the Milwaukee Road which were based on the E60 locomotives but modified for 3kV DC operation.
(*2) I've left this deliberately vague as I a) don't want to get bogged down in other railroads and b) I don't want to fix myself for something later!

 

[e of pi]

Really interesting stuff so far! The big little electric that could is an attractive thought, and I'm looking forward to seeing how this develops. I'm interested to see they're not (yet) thinking about electrifying the double track portion from Aberdeen to Minneapolis and eventually Chicago, once they've eaten the elephant of the 600+ miles on the West side, the 600+ miles on the East side that were busy enough to double-track would seem to be a natural next step to electrify.

 

[Devvy]

Really interesting stuff so far! The big little electric that could is an attractive thought, and I'm looking forward to seeing how this develops. I'm interested to see they're not (yet) thinking about electrifying the double track portion from Aberdeen to Minneapolis and eventually Chicago, once they've eaten the elephant of the 600+ miles on the West side, the 600+ miles on the East side that were busy enough to double-track would seem to be a natural next step to electrify.

Hey, thanks for the comments!

Agreed on pretty much all your points, with the sole caveat that electrification is expensive. You need a bloody good reason to invest in it, as you can see from OTL where pretty much no electrification has occured, bar Amtrak's New York - Boston stretch. And even that wasn't exactly uncontentious. The benefits of electric over diesel are much finer and harder to justify (unless you have high levels of usage, or you're extending an existing system), as opposed to electric over steam when the Milwaukee first started rolling their system out.

I think it's fairly obvious to any reader, that the Milwaukee will be extremely interested in filling in the new "gap" from Aberdeen to Chicago; it eliminates any need for locomotive changes, reduces operating costs whilst allowing heavier and longer trains to operate at similar speeds. Likewise, on the east side, the former E-L main line as you say would be a prime candidate for electrifying at the eastern end, where it crosses the Poconos given the undulating terrain.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 4: The 2000s

The legacy of 9/11 was profound in the United States.

The September 11 Attacks occurred in 2001, and the events were seared in to the public consciousness. The immediate aftermath saw the complete shutdown of US airspace, the grounding of planes - often in completely the wrong locations for their passengers. Amtrak was called in action, both in an official capacity to move stranded air passengers around, but also unofficially as people bought train tickets in order to bypass the air industry. An immense backlog of passengers had quickly formed following 2 days of closed airspace, whilst new security procedures forced far more time consuming checks before boarding planes, for both domestic and international flights.

Much of this was, thankfully for the essential freight business of the Milwaukee Road, temporary as passengers moved around as the air industry got everything moving again and solved backlogs, but the crisis left a new lingering acceptance of rail travel in mid-to-long range trips - or short trips to major city centres, such as Chicago. Amtrak did a stellar job in transporting people around the United States during the period, and the spike in passenger usage also clearly illustrated to Amtrak where new passenger routes were viable, but also where railroads where happy to work with Amtrak. It was clear that the Milwaukee Road was one of those railroads, given the good on-time performance for the Olympian long distance service as well as Hiawatha shorter service, and so Amtrak decided to do more; this being the start of a very fruitful partnership between the Milwaukee Road and Amtrak.

Over the decades, the price of electricity and thus traction, in adjusted terms, it had stayed roughly the same price for years, since the 1960s - the main push for Milwaukee Road to switch to electric traction had initially been the difficulty of operating trains over the mountains, but equally now the constant low price of electricity was in contrast to fluctuating and generally increasing price of oil, and thus fuel costs for diesel locomotives. South Dakota and Montana were both windy areas of the United States, and the Milwaukee Road took the dive to install a wind farm in each state to generate environmentally friendly - but more importantly cheap - electricity, which could be funnelled in to rail operations, with excess supplying the electrical grid. After 2 years trial from 2007, in 2009 capital was invested in building a dozen more wind turbine farms in order to produce significantly more electricity which could be offset against non-windy days when railroad operations would pull most of it's energy from the grid. In collaboration with the new wind farms, were three experimental geothermal energy plants, using the earth's core to heat water and then generate electricity, which would be de facto available permanently - one in Washington, one in South Dakota and one in Illinois; all where areas where geothermal heat were higher and thus electricity production would be more efficient. These geothermal plants managed to output far higher levels of electricity, providing cheaper traction power for the railroad, and exporting the surplus for profit. The wind power generated was low in comparison to the plentiful hydroelectric & geothermal power available, but cheap to install and electricity generated covered a good portion of the base power requirements, with the grid filling in the peaks.The combined fuel savings were substantial, and allowed the Milwaukee Road to better isolate their advertised prices to customers from the price of fuel on routes to Seattle/Tacoma - which allowed them to remain competitive with the larger railroad neighbours. Power generation was pooled in to a new Chicago Milwaukee Corporation subsidiary; the Chicago & Milwaukee Power Generation Corporation, creating another string in the bow of the diversified - yet mutually supportive - mother corporation.

During this time, other railroads, backed by the Federal Railroad Administration continued to investigate their infrastructure requirements. However, they were at a perceived disadvantage with modern diesels available which were far better then steam power when the Milwaukee Road started electrifying. They were determined though, to continue innovation in to diesel-powered locomotives, and they all would see new designs of diesel locomotives during this time, ever more powerful and able to pull longer and heavier trains. One prototype locomotive used by a western railroad would see a 2-unit locomotive, with new extremely efficient and powerful gas turbine engine generating power for 12 motors (both units have C-C wheelsets with all three axles powered), and a diesel engine for use at lower speeds when a gas turbine would run at very low efficiency. It outputted an almost whopping 9MW of power (13,000hp), and just shy of 1kN (225,000lbf) of pulling power - a remarkably powerful locomotive, and would see usage on heavy coal/ore trains or other heavy drags (*1).

The Russian Railways gas turbine experimental locomotives provided some inspiration in the United States.

All this further illustrated the story to date of the Milwaukee Road - long-term strategic thinking instead of short term decisions in order to be able to compete with the railroad titans it was surrounded by; fast freight, Amtrak track-access charges, and increasing operational efficiencies by methods such as electrification. The 1970s had seen the infill of "the gap" between the two older electric districts, whilst the 1990s & early 2000s had seen the extension from Harlowton to Aberdeen. The much heavier traffic now in play to and from the ports of Seattle and Tacoma had allowed for such an investment, and with that new infrastructure in place it had allowed faster and more profitable services to be offered along the route, whilst Ford were an increasingly important customer of the Milwaukee, shipping vehicles across the breadth of the rail network from their factories.

With oil prices beginning to rise once again from the early 2000s, the Milwaukee Road assembled a management team to report on it's future, and in 2006 it released it's report, pushing for an eventual widespread electrification project on the major trunk routes. Another part of the plan was the adoption of some traits of the modern "precision railroading" philosophy. A rebranding and scope-widening of their fast freight expresses - historically the "XL Special" and "Thunderhawk" principally from Chicago and the Twin Cities to Seattle & Tacoma - would see the brand name "Thunderhawk" applied to most Milwaukee Road fast freight intermodal services instead of the specific train service, operating on a generally fixed timetable across the trunk main line in accordance with precision railroad philosophy. Other brand names applied to sets of freight services for different consists, such as boxcars or agricultural produce, allowing customers to better . The move, an initial "toe-in-water" test of the philosophy, brought several advantages with more easily planned crew shift patterns, locomotive allocations, and timetabling - which also helped to reduce conflicting train movements across single track sections particularly on the Lines West to Puget Sound.

The 1990s had seen a rapid increase in containerisation, especially as globalisation continued at pace, and the Thunderhawk rapid freight services were extremely popular; regular frequent services now operated to Seattle/Tacoma, and some services on to Portland, despite the trains operating with longer and heavier loads then previous decades. The Milwaukee freight market had been well diversified over the decades, and now spanned paper/manufacturing in Illinois & Wisconsin, Wisconsin & Minnesota auto facilities (Ford in particular was a prolific customer of the Milwaukee) and forestry products from the Pacific Northwest states. Agriculture from the Midwest states were destined for many markets, but the Gulf ports in particular, whilst intermodal traffic was an extremely common load on the Milwaukee from the ports on Puget Sound and ports of New York & New Jersey.

These improvements were also coupled with a new branch for the Milwaukee Road, from Rapid City around the Black Hills to connect to the Powder River Basin. The existing railroads, principally the Union Pacific, in the basin area encountered several track and locomotive failures, causing a downturn in coal shipments out from the area to power plants across the nation and causing electricity rates to rise during the period. The plans, approved by the Surface Transportation Board, would connect the Milwaukee Road from Rapid City to the Powder River Basin line south of Gillette, with trackage rights across the UP core route. In return, the Milwaukee would invest in the core route to help further modernise it and avoid further track failures. As such, the Milwaukee Road took advantage of the opportunity and managed to connect in to the jointly held line, allowing coal traffic to be shipped via the Milwaukee Road, especially out to the Puget Sound ports for export shipping, or to power plants especially in upstate New York and the Midwest. This injected a new source of traffic in to much of the Iowa routes of the Milwaukee Road via Sioux City, and an opportunity to invest in the line to bring it up to modern standards given the freight tonnage which would now be passing over the tracks.

Oil prices, despite starting the decade reasonably low, were to rise swiftly to an all time - and eye-wateringly - high price, approximately four times the pre-1973 price ($80 per barrel), with certain years seeing five times the price ($100 per barrel). This instantly transformed the Milwaukee's report as well as the economies and timescales for electrification, and despite only just having finished the Harlowton to Aberdeen electric extension, the Milwaukee was considering further extensions. It would also reduce the need to purchase newer diesel locomotives if existing units used were simply moved over to cover end of life losses.

The Aberdeen to Chicago section was just over 700 miles long - but this time it was double track, which meant just over 1,400 miles of track to be electrified, not including sidings; far more then any previous effort - but the rewards were far greater in fuel savings and operational efficiencies. Help came from unexpected sources however; the CREATE programme for Chicago & Illinois provided funds for improving rail transit in the Chicago suburbs, which would allow an overhaul of several junctions and crossings on the Milwaukee Road subsidiary, the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad which played a crucial role for the Milwaukee Road in connecting their 3 sections of network (west, south and east). Some funding was offered here for electrification of this road, which would improve acceleration and thus speeds through the suburbs, reducing congestion - not least road traffic at grade crossings, whilst also reducing noise in the many residential suburbs the IHB railroad operated through - as well as substantially improving the fuel efficiency due to the slow speeds at stop/start nature of suburban operations. Amtrak also offered to contribute funding to ensure the Chicago - Milwaukee stretch was electrified, as well as in to Chicago Union station to allow the Amtrak Hiawatha Service to be converted to electric operation with a more regular schedule, whilst taking the opportunity to build a new station serving Minneapolis, directly connected to the Metro system (*2). Despite Amtrak's insistence on a 25kV AC system, in common with it's North East Corridor systems, the Milwaukee would mandate 3kV DC standards, in common with it's own existing electrification, and allowing easy run through. Some federal loan funding was also made available in light of the 2007 financial crisis too, to try and stimulate the economy and retain employment.

Amtrak's new fleet of 3kV DC electric locomotives were based on NJTransit's Bombardier ALP-46 units.

Finally, after approximately 60 years of usage, the Little Joe electric locomotives were returned from Amtrak, and retired from the Milwaukee - their contribution to the story of the railroad being assured, and some attributing the very enduring success of the Milwaukee Road down to these locomotives. The Milwaukee contributed many of these locomotives to various heritage centres; one sits in Harlowton at the end of the original Little Joe operated rail subsection, another at the Illinois Railway Museum, and one (after being given a brand new lick of paint), now sits outside the new Milwaukee Road headquarters in Chicago. One unit remains operational in the Milwaukee's depots, painted in the original orange-and-black Milwaukee Road livery, and is usually seen operating trains of importance for both the Milwaukee Road and Amtrak - and notably hauling a "100 years of the Pacific Extension" company promotional train from Chicago to Seattle (duly assisted by a similarly preserved EMD GP9 diesel from Chicago to Aberdeen).

--------------------
(*1) Modelled on the Russian GT1 gas turbine locomotive.
(*2) Situated on Hiawatha Avenue, just north of OTL Lake Street Metro station where the Milwaukee Cut would cross.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 5: The 2010s

Intermodal freight was now the primary means of non-bulk freight transport.

Increasing globalization continued in the 2010s, and correspondingly intermodal traffic in particular increased on the Milwaukee Road, leading to high levels of traffic across the Lines West (former Pacific Extension) and Lines East (former Erie-Lackawanna main line), as well as Chicago as the central hub to the Milwaukee Road. Harvest time could be an incredibly busy time of year for the railroad, as this intermodal traffic was then further compounded by high levels of agricultural produce making their way across the network to either domestic factories, or to ports on the Gulf for export in particular. Although an awkward route via Kansas City was possible, some kind of better Chicago-bypass line was needed, and in the end the Milwaukee resolved to gain trackage rights or build a new line between Davenport and Peoria no matter what. This would link the former Milwaukee Road routes from the Twin Cities and the trunk route to Omaha through Iowa, to the former Illinois Central sections of the network allowing direct access to the Gulf without the need to operate via Chicago which would be a boon for the Milwaukee in offering better transit times. As an additional benefit, it also provided a route for trains operating between west and east to bypass Chicago.

The 2010s were also the era for attempted mega rail mergers, with a number of attempts. The Canadian National had made an attempt with rivals before, but now made inquiries in to merging with the Milwaukee Road in some manner, be it a takeover or merger. From the Canadian National point of view, this would give them significant extra east-east capacity to operate around the south of the Great Lakes, whilst also providing north-south connectivity to access the ports at the Gulf. From a Milwaukee Road point of view, the combined entity would bring them newer markets across Canada and in Michigan. It was not to be, with both Canadian and US regulators now firmly against further mergers in the rail industry, lest consolidation end up with two de facto monopolies - and previous mega-mergers had rarely gone without major disruption to customers. Instead, the Milwaukee Road and Canadian National worked out a partnership, with enhanced traffic exchange points and processes to allow freight to more easily flow between them - in particular assisting the Canadian National with freight flows around the south of the Great Lakes and out of Vancouver, which could often be extremely busy, allowing them to shift some traffic to the Milwaukee Road and relieve their own transcontinental routes. The partnership between the CN and the Milwaukee Road would also see a short stretch of track transferred to the Milwaukee from CN, allowing direct access to South Bend, Indiana, where electrification would be extended to and where trains would then be transferred to CN haulage; this allowed CN freight to be hauled from the Pacific all the way to South Bend by cheaper electric traction, without needing to stop in the yards in Chicago - reducing transit time as well as reducing congestion in the Chicago area.

This also fed in to the Milwaukee Road's latest modernization steps - principally to install it between Aberdeen via Minneapolis & St Paul to Chicago, whilst a new signalling system - compliant with federal requirements for positive train control - also began deployment across the Milwaukee Road's network. Work also progressed on expanding sidings on non-mountainous areas of Washington and Montana to form longer sections of double track and improving existing power substations - all substantially increasing capacity on the one of the Milwaukee Road's major trunk routes, and allowing longer and heavier trains to be hauled by electric traction without any requirement for diesel assistance due to power restrictions. By 2018, the Milwaukee Road had decided on finally electrifying the Chicago to New York section of their network, and just keeping the engineering staff who were now completing Aberdeen to Milwaukee & Chicago continuing directly with their work heading east. The railroad had settled in to two key flows of traffic - intermodal between Seattle, Minneapolis, Chicago and New York, and agricultural & bulk from the Midwest to the Gulf ports (although several other flows of traffic, especially coal from the Powder River Basin were also important sources of revenue). Allowing electric traction between Chicago and New York (or Hoboken to be precise) would make transit over the Pocono mountains far more easier to manage - but also be cheaper to operate, offering full end-to-end electric traction. New York state also offered to part fund an extension of the wires to cover the branch to Buffalo, which would allow Amtrak to introduce a new "Southern Tier" service from New York to Buffalo. This was an enormous investment - in effect electrifying from Aberdeen, SD, to Hoboken, NJ within 12 years, but the high price of oil in the 2000s and to an extent in the 2010s allowed the investment due to the significant fuel cost savings, increased power & speeds and lower operational costs. The 1970s "Modernisation and Gap Infill" scheme had comfortably paid off it's investment within approximately 20 years given the changes in oil price and increasing traffic; other sections of electrification between Minneapolis and Harlowton took longer at around 30 years. The tracks between Minneapolis and Chicago were on track for the quickest return due the high levels of usage, with only 15 years (depending on oil prices) estimated to pay back the cost of electrification.

The Lackawanna Cut Off would now see electric traction for the first time.

A major problem to overcome however, was a source of electrical power. Energy on Lines West (to Seattle) were covered by very long term contracts with hydroelectric companies in the Rockies and Cascades mountain range, also assisted by plenty of wind and geothermal power around Lines Central. Although power was also sourced from the grid, a large proportion of electricity was not sourced from the public grid, and this avoided issues with competing public power requirements. On Lines East (to New York) however, the denser population meant that most potential hydroelectric production had already been tapped in to, and was needed for the public grid rather than dedicated to the the railroad, meaning the railroad would have to expand their horizons. New wind farms where possible were situated in Ohio where the prevailing wind speeds were good, but otherwise the Chicago & Milwaukee Power Generation Corporation - the Milwaukee Road's sibling corporation in the same group- would rely on new gas power plants to generate electricity for the railroad, with excess going to the public grid, in Ohio and Pennsylvania near to shale gas deposits. Although gas was more expensive than renewable energy which had been opted for previously, this would assure the continuity of power for the railroad, whilst selling surplus to the local public grid for consumption. Batteries installed in several substations serving the steeper gradients of railroads in the Poconos would absorb regenerated braking electricity, in order to feed it back at later times instead of solely relying on the grid, further lowering the cost of operation for the busy route between the population centers.

The finale, in early 2020, finishing several years of wirework across the region saw much fanfare as the Milwaukee Road pronounced "the United States becoming smaller" and widely advertising their environmental credentials in a new era of climate change awareness. With a speciality in intermodal across the northern tier of the United States, the Milwaukee Road could now directly haul freight from coast to coast via Chicago and Minneapolis-St Paul, frequently at higher speeds than the competition, and at least operationally cheaper than the competition. Precision railroading at several competitors had seen blended trains become the norm, reducing operating costs, but also at the cost of lower train speeds. The Milwaukee Road charged higher prices - but would get freight to where it needed to be usually days quicker than the competition, which in many customers eyes meant lower operating costs as less wagons were needed to operate the supply chain, and also enhancing just-in-time production and shipping timetables. The United States postal service began a new era of mail-on-rail as postal trucks now used Milwaukee Road trailer-on-flat-car services to convey mail across the northern tier of the United States. The classic Little Joe preserved locomotive at Milwaukee headquarters was again in use, hauling a corporate promotional train in record time from New York to Seattle in under 2.5 days, an average speed of roughly 54mph - quite a feat, although assisted by a light promotional train being hauled, no long stops, expedited timetabling through the Midwest, and special crew timetabling / rotation. Even so, it attracted a blitz of positive publicity and coverage, whilst also assisting Seattle and Tacoma ports in their efforts to remain competitive with the power of Los Angeles and Long Beach for intermodal shipping where new investment had allowed separation of the busy freight rail routes from grade crossings with major road arteries.

The Canadian GF6C locomotives

With the General Electric E65 locomotives now ageing - the first batches of E65 units were now roughly 40 years old, it was time to begin investigations in to a replacement. General Electric offered a new locomotive based on their Genesis platform, Bombardier offered a locomotive based on their TRAXX design whilst Siemens also expressed interest in participating with their Vectron platform as a basis. The lack of widespread electrification in the United States meant that the latter two - TRAXX and Vectron - platforms were largely based on European designs, where economies of scale allowed a more productive design and manufacture industry. Problems with the General Electric bid led to the elimination of the Genesis platform - a largely uncompetitive price, attributed to an overreliance on the GE-Milwaukee partnership over many years - led to a Vectron-TRAXX competition. After GE then partnered with Siemens to provide further expertise on freight locomotive requirements in the United States, with Siemens not having sold locomotives in North America (*1), the Vectron platform won out. A major advantage it had was the 6,000kW of power available (utilising the upgraded power available from the wires, and 6 x 1,000kW motors; one for each axle) as well as the diesel-power module for low speed operation directly in to yards, eliminating the requirements for a switcher locomotive to do this. This offered the capability to better serve local freight operations along the electrified routes - which had largely unwired sidings, making local freight operations more challenging under electric power. Externally, by co-incidence, the locomotive looked rather similar to the former GF6C electric locomotives used in British Columbia, Canada for use on the BCRail electric route. The locomotives had a C-C bogie design with 6 motorised axles each, but were wide carbody locomotives, and resembling US locomotive design more than the Vectron platform would suggest. The larger locomotive allowed for a larger diesel auxiliary engine, producing up to 2,000kW of power as well as larger fuel tanks for the engines. Lastly, concrete weights were also added in order to increase axle weight and therefore improve adhesive traction, given the 6 axle design unlike the European B-B bogie design with only 4 axles. In operation, they would usually be seen operating in pairs, back-to-back (to avoid the need to turn the locomotives), offering speed and power for heavy freight trains as well as enough diesel power to operate in to unwired yards without resorting to a snail pace.

Interest also began in to more efficient yard switching locomotives. A trial with Railpower's "Green Goat" diesel hybrid locomotive commenced, with the locomotives featuring a small backup diesel engine of only 200kW, but a large array of batteries internally allowing it to mostly operate on battery electric power. The batteries, able to power a set of motors for 1,500kW of power, would also be able to be recharged in overhead electrified sidings, removing the need for any other type of charging system; the 3kV DC overhead system would allow rapid recharging.

-------------------------
(*1) Siemens never sold the ACS-64 to Amtrak here; in previous chapters I mentioned that Amtrak had used a version of the Bombardier ALP-46 for operation on Milwaukee electrified tracks (such as Hiawatha service), and it would stand to reason that Amtrak would just use the standard ALP-46 for 25kv AC operation in Amtrak too.

In the 2020s, I'd imagine that the Milwaukee Road would seek to take stock of where they are and what needs doing - no more electrification, just pay down existing debts, stabilise finances in wake of post-pandemic works, and take the opportunity to analyse what needs doing. In the 2030s, I'd imagine a push to electrify Chicago-St Louis-Memphis-New Orleans & Mobile, as well as maybe some of the Chicago-bypass routes.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 6: A look at Amtrak on the Milwaukee Road railroad & Postface

An Amtrak train (not on Milwaukee Road tracks)

Following the events of 9/11 in the United States, Amtrak has seen a quasi-renaissance in train travel across the country with passengers numbers gently rising - no doubt also helped by chronic traffic congestion in many of the larger cities, and a rigorous security process for flights. Following the Amtrak strategy laid out in 2004, named "Amtrak 2010", Amtrak laid out an expansion of rail services, and for the Milwaukee Road in particular, an expansion of rail services on "America's Express Route". Amtrak strategy continues to grow,


Hiawatha Service
The core of Amtrak's service on the Milwaukee Road is the regular Hiawatha service between Chicago and Milwaukee, calling at Glenview, Truesdell, Sturtevant & Milwaukee-Mutchell Airport. Following work in the late 2000s / early 2010s, a trip from Milwaukee to Chicago (or vice versa) now takes approx 1:25, with the services to run every 90 minutes, from 06:30 onwards with 10 services in each direction per weekday (reduced service on weekends). Following electrification, these trains were then hauled by newer Amtrak ALP-47 electric locomotives (based on the Bombardier ALP-47) which, although having a similar top speed, were much quicker to accelerate on the short service route and thus made improvements in journey time despite the added stations. A rake of single-level Horizon coaches are normally used, with a non-powered control unit (former F40PH locomotive) at the opposite end for reverse operations, which avoids the need to turn the train around. Future trainsets for post-2025 are currently being evaluated, with one idea being refurbished Acela Express trainsets; converted to standard class throughout, re-engineered for the different electrical systems and re-geared for a lower top speed but faster acceleration. The drawback for this would be the requirement to install high-level platforms at each station, which would present issues with other Amtrak services.

The Chicago Union "Masterplan" for 2020, should see the former mail platforms re-engineered, lowered, and modernised in order to bring 2 new Amtrak platforms in to existence. This would allow Amtrak to move the Hiawatha services out from the terminus platforms as a starting move, freeing up to 10 platforms slots per day from the northern platforms, whilst then allowing those Hiawatha services to run through Chicago and access southern Chicago. This would tied in with the Milwaukee Road works elsewhere to the south, where Amtrak has confirmed it will seek electrification as far as St Louis. Although there would be less demand to the south of Chicago, the Hiawatha service would then potentially operate either to St Louis (integrating with the Lincoln Service), or potentially to South Bend via the Milwaukee Road's branch to South Bend, augmenting South Shore Line services - or potentially both.


Lincoln Service
The Lincoln Service operates from Chicago to St Louis via Bloomington and Springfield, several times per day. It has seen major speed improvements recently, and Amtrak have confirmed they will try to work with the Milwaukee Road to justify electrification over the next 10 years. In such a case, as the trainset uses predominately single-level Horizon coaches, the train would likely run through Chicago Union station, on to Milwaukee and potentially other destinations such as either Green Bay or Madison, infilling Hiawatha services to potentially allow an hourly Chicago-Milwaukee timetable. The Lincoln Service currently uses Amtrak's favoured General Electric Genesis locomotives on the predominately unelectrified route.


The Olympian
The Olympian continues to operate, but was tweaked following Amtrak's deployment of dual-mode General Electric Genesis locomotives in the 2000s - able to operate under diesel power and the overhead power available on the Milwaukee Road network. Following the successful deployment of dual-mode locomotives on Metro-North and Long Island railroads, where third rail DC power was available, the same design was procured with 3kV capability for operating the long distance routes in northern United States. This allowed the Little Joe electric locomotives to be retired after 60 years of service, and eliminated the need for a time-consuming locomotive swap at Aberdeen. Whilst the service is not as popular as the Empire Builder service (which uses the Milwaukee Road tracks between Chicago and Milwaukee), it is a faster than the Empire Builder which takes a more scenic and gently journey for passengers and lasts just shy of 45 hours.

Following the further electrification and modernisation between Chicago and the Twin Cities, Amtrak purchased a fleet of the Bombardier ALP-47 locomotives, which would be able to operate the Olympian service the entire way from Chicago to Seattle under electric power, further reducing operating expenses, with the dual mode locomotives now operating the Empire Builder service to take advantage of the electric traction between Chicago and the Twin Cities. The Olympian is able to operate quicker due to electric power across the whole route, and usually completes the journey from Chicago to Seattle in just under 39 hours. The two services are spaced apart, in order to offer daily morning and late afternoon/evening services between Chicago and the Twin Cities.

The trainsets used are hauled by Amtrak ALP-47 locomotives, and usually consist of an array of Superliner coaches, including Sightseer Lounge coaches in order to appreciate the views as the train crosses the Rockies and Cascades. Due to the smaller cities called an en route, and the shorter end-to-end trip time, the Olympian is usually the preferred choice for long distance passengers from end-to-end, and thus a higher proportion of the train is set up for cabin passengers. Lounge cars, a small library, as well as wireless internet access make the trainsets a more comfortable longer distance service then other routes.


The Phoebe Snow
The Phoebe Snow is a later addition to the network, and is a newer service operating from New York City to Buffalo via Scranton and New York state's Southern Tier. This more direct route between New York City and Buffalo is approximately 400 miles (as opposed to the Empire Corridor's 437), and takes around 6 hours (an hour less than the Empire Corridor) due to the more direct route. It continues to be a lower demand service however, due to it's more rural route, and is heavily state-supported primarily by New York state during it's early years whilst it tries to find some traction, although many New York - Buffalo travellers have switched from the Maple Leaf service to the Phoebe Snow due to the shorter travel time. Efforts by Amtrak and New York state are focussed on some alignment and speed improvements to the Milwaukee Road tracks, which would aim to bring the travel time down to around 5 hours from end-to-end, and would potentially support the extension of the Phoebe Snow to Niagara Falls and potentially Toronto in Ontario, Canada.

The Phoebe Snow service is hauled by newer Amtrak locomotives based on Siemens locomotives which are compatible with all 4 major Amtrak electrification standards, a legacy of Amtrak's usage of many different private railroad tracks. This allows the Phoebe Snow to switch tracks in the Newark area, and serve New York's Penn Station instead of Hoboken, allowing better transport in to the heart of the city.


Other Routes
Several other routes operate across the Milwaukee Road, particularly around the Chicago area from the western half of the United States. The Panama Limited, a long distance service from Chicago to New Orleans, largely on Milwaukee tracks, is next on Amtrak's list for an overhaul, having been somewhat neglected for many years. The Californian Zephyr now uses Milwaukee tracks from Omaha to Chicago, whilst the Texas Eagle also uses Milwaukee tracks from Chicago to St Louis and Southwest Chief operates from Chicago to Kansas City on Milwaukee tracks.


-------

Postface

And thus ends this mini-timeline. To me, from abroad, the Milwaukee Road has been a fascinating look at how a business can fail; it seems to be a mix of overcrowded marketplace (too many railroads attempting to serve the same market), bad business practises (the Pacific Extension to Seattle is quoted in various places as being double expensed, making what was in reality a profitable route look loss-making), poor foresight (removing electrification barely months before the oil crisis elevated the price of oil substantially), and attempted mergers (trying to eliminate "non-standard" expenditure like electrification to make it a more attractive merger partner, or deferring maintenance to seem more profitable).

General Electric did, in OTL, offer a competitive business project to modernise the electrification out west, and infill the OTL gap; why it wasn't done I think relates somewhat to the Milwaukee's OTL merger attempts, and electrification was non-standard (and remains non-standard) across the United States. Whilst Burlington Northern would have probably been able to pull longer and heavier loads on their routes, the Milwaukee (as per this TL), would have been able to specialise in profitable fast freight, as it often did in OTL with the likes of the XL Special and Thunderhawk services. With problems in freight congestion around Los Angeles, I can see Seattle becoming an important secondary dock for intermodal transport which would work well for the Milwaukee Road; shipping to Seattle from the Far East will likely knock a day off shipping times, along with fast transport to the Midwest and Northeast - customers will pay for speed if it's reliable, improving supply chains.

Having an existing system of electrification also ties the railroad in to that standard realistically. 3kV DC, whilst maybe not the ideal choice of system if building from scratch, is a perfectly decent system, allowing for good distances between substations, and powerful locomotives (as can be seen from other countries where 3kV DC is used). It stands to reason that as the price of oil at least stays high, if not continues to rise as it often did/does in OTL, that extensions to a pre-existing electric network would be granted.

The merger with the Erie Lackawanna by the Milwaukee Road, I think, is a shot in the arm for the latter as it gives a real coast-to-coast route, which is compatible - the Erie Lackawanna route to New York/Hoboken is - like the Pacific Extension - avoiding of major cities en route and essentially an expressway to the coast. It's therefore pretty compatible with Milwaukee Road business of fast freight, and intermodal. The New Jersey ends of the Erie Lackawanna route were also, by chance, also electrified at 3kV DC. After that, I think the Illinois Central is a somewhat obvious merger partner by the 1990s; even so the Milwaukee Road of the 21 Century is still one of the smaller Class 1 railroads, flanked by the absolute giants elsewhere in the railroad market. It would be profitable in it's niche though, offering fast and profitable freight services, using cheaper to operate infrastructure.

 

[e of pi]

Thanks, Devvy, I really enjoyed this TL!

 

[Swede]

Another very nice rail timeline by Devvy.

A few bad decisions not made, a few good ones made, and we're off on a very different, but still recognisable, route from OTL.

Electrifying brings such clear benefits when enough of the line is done. And then bringing a line across to NYC (almost) into it, a road across the continent for express freight? Who wouldn't want to use that?
Taking over the line down to the Southern Coast makes it the only railroad reaching all three coasts, right? Via a hub in Chicago, at that!
By the modern day the Milwaukee Road fanboys would differ from those of other US railroads in that they'd be pushing hard for full electrification, is my guess. And maybe trying to conduct up with (unrealistic) deals that'd give the Milwaukee its own tracks to the ports of LA & LBC, either from Louisiana or even straight from Chicago.

 

[Devvy]

Thanks, Devvy, I really enjoyed this TL!

Thanks for the comments, glad you enjoyed it!

Another very nice rail timeline by Devvy.

A few bad decisions not made, a few good ones made, and we're off on a very different, but still recognisable, route from OTL.

Electrifying brings such clear benefits when enough of the line is done. And then bringing a line across to NYC (almost) into it, a road across the continent for express freight? Who wouldn't want to use that?
Taking over the line down to the Southern Coast makes it the only railroad reaching all three coasts, right? Via a hub in Chicago, at that!
By the modern day the Milwaukee Road fanboys would differ from those of other US railroads in that they'd be pushing hard for full electrification, is my guess. And maybe trying to conduct up with (unrealistic) deals that'd give the Milwaukee its own tracks to the ports of LA & LBC, either from Louisiana or even straight from Chicago.

Completely agree on all those points. The more electrification the Milwaukee does, the more I see it being desired to roll out further, especially across the "intermodal route" from Seattle-Chicago-New York. I think in the 2020s, the company would probably take a pause and breath before doing further works, but I guess any geopolitical events causing oil to significantly rise in price might cause a rethink and further works. Electrification to the south (Chicago - St Louis - Memphis - Jackson - New Orleans & Mobile) would be the last major project, and obviously the further south you go, the more viable and profitable solar electricity would be to part-power it (you'd need some large solar panel farms though!), given that it would provide a degree of insulation against electric prices.

I think the railroad industry is similar; I did toy with other mergers (the SP-SF one is interesting), but chopped them out to avoid getting bogged down in other areas. The very presence of the other big 4 railroads effectively guarantees the Milwaukee's independence; none can afford it to fall in to the hands of a competitor, and even splitting it on an east/west basis you'd end up with competition concerns or an even bigger rival (ie. if the UP took the Pacific Extension, it would be even harder for BNSF to compete against a much bigger giant).

The biggest negative is for Amtrak in that it introduces a fourth (yes, 4!) incompatible electric system to it's network (and a DC system - all the other 3 systems are AC).

 

[e of pi]

I know this is old, but would anyone consider nominating this for the Spaceflight and Technology Turtledove? I think it'd fit there, but I've already used my nomination:

2023 Turtledoves - (Closes (26/02/23) - Best Spaceflight and Technology Timeline Nominations and Seconds

This thread is only for Nominations, Seconds, and Nomination Corrections for Spaceflight and Technology Timelines. Furthermore, this award is only applicable to Timelines that are primarily focused on the topics of Spaceflight and Technology and not regular timelines that touch upon spaceflight...

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[focus9912]

I made a seconded a thread there, can I nominate one ?

 

[e of pi]

I made a seconded a thread there, can I nominate one ?

Yep!

Each member can make only one nomination and only one second to another nomination per category.

 

[focus9912]

Yep!

Done.

 

[Devvy]

@e of pi and @focus9912

Thank you for the nomination, I am much obliged!